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Notes	  on	  transliteration	  and	  pronunciation	  	  For	   the	   transliteration	   of	   Bengali	   words	   into	   Roman	   script	   I	   use	   the	  conventional	   system	   derived	   from	   the	   transliteration	   of	   Sanskrit.	   In	   general,	  'v/b'	  is	  written	  'b'	  when	  thus	  pronounced	  in	  Bengali.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  text,	  I	  keep	  the	  Sanskrit	  version	  with	  'v'	  for	  terms	  of	  common	  use	  largely	  employed	  in	  indological	   literature.	  Mute	   inherent	   vowels	   (short	  a)	  will	   be	  marked	  with	   an	  apostrophe,	  but	  they	  will	  be	  graphically	  represented	  if	  pronounced.	  In	  the	   case	   of	   proper	   names,	   familiar	   titles,	   names	   of	   places	   and	   familiar	  nouns,	  conventional	  spellings	  without	  diacritical	  marks	  have	  been	  followed,	  for	  example	   'Bengal',	   'Adivasi',	   ‘imam’,	   ‘panchayat’,	   and	   ‘Maulana’	   (when	  referring	  to	  a	  title).	  Similarly,	  familiar	  nouns	  and	  proper	  names	  derived	  from	  Arabic	  and	  Urdu	   will	   appear	   in	   conventional	   spelling	   without	   diacritical	   marks,	   for	  example,	   ‘Quran’,	   and	   ‘Sunnah’.	  When	   ‘Sunnah’	   refers	   to	   a	  manner	   of	   practice	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  actual	  text,	  I	  use	  italics	  and	  diacritical	  remarks	  to	  indicate	  the	  incorporation	  of	   the	  word	   in	  Bengali.	  Where	   secondary	   sources	   are	   cited,	   the	  diacritical	   marks	   (or	   lack	   of	   them)	   are	   reproduced	   as	   they	   appear	   in	   these	  sources.	  	  	  A	  brief	  guide	  to	  the	  pronunciation	  of	  key	  words:	  	  
ā	  -­‐	  	  as	  ‘a’	  in	  ‘banana’	  (e.g.	  jāti	  is	  pronounced	  phonetically)	  
a	  –	  as	  ‘o’	  in	  ‘dorm’	  (e.g.	  dharma	  is	  pronounced	  dhormo)	  
oy	  –	  as	  ‘w’	  in	  ‘water’	  (e.g.	  dārioyālā	  is	  pronounces	  dariwalla)	  	  	  
	  jñ	  -­‐	  	  as	  in	  ‘gy’	  	  (e.g.	  jñān	  is	  pronounced	  gyan)	  
ś	  –	  as	  ‘sh’	  in	  ‘shiver’	  (e.g.	  khuśi	  is	  pronounced	  khushi)	  
ṁ	  -­‐	  as	  ‘ng’	  in	  ‘doing’	  (e.g.	  hiṁsā	  	  is	  pronounced	  hingsa)	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Introduction	  
‘They	  are	  all	  animals!’	  	   	  Pratima	   Bibi1,	   the	   wife	   of	   Rahaman	   Saheb	   enters	   the	   room	  where	   I	   have	  come	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  scorching	  sun,	  panting	  with	  the	  heat	  fully	  covered	  in	  a	  black	  burqa.	  She	  is	  with	  her	  23-­‐year	  old	  son	  Samsuddin,	  who	  had	  just	  taken	  her	  to	   the	  doctor	  on	  my	  motorbike.	  Pratima	  Bibi	  suffers	   from	  low	  blood	  pressure,	  and	   several	   other	   hard	   to	   define	   ailments.	   While	   she	   undoes	   herself	   from	   a	  burqa,	  uncovering	  one	  of	  her	  best	  saris,	  I	  ask	  her	  what	  the	  doctor	  had	  said.	  With	  an	  air	  of	  frustration	  and	  helplessness	  she	  replies	  with	  the	  typical	  ‘kī	  jāni’	  (what	  do	  I	  know?)	  while	  handing	  me	  over	  a	  bag	  with	  several	  kinds	  of	  medicine,	  clearly	  unsure	  as	  to	  what	  they	  are	  and	  how	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  make	  her	  feel	  better.	  The	  visit	  to	  the	  doctor	  and	  the	  medicines	  had	  cost	  her	  several	  hundred	  rupees	  and	  this	  is	  not	  the	  first,	  and	  will	  surely	  not	  be	  the	  last	  time	  she	  makes	  this	  futile	  expenditure.	  	  Pratima	  Bibi’s	  son	  Samsuddin	  is	  a	  talented	  young	  maulānā	  (Islamic	  scholar).	  After	  training	  at	  local	  independent	  madrasas,	  he	  finished	  his	  degree	  at	  the	  Darul	  Uloom	  Deoband	  madrasa	  itself	  (the	  origin	  and	  epicentre	  of	  the	  Islamic	  reformist	  Deoband	  movement)	  in	  his	  early	  twenties.	  He	  now	  works	  as	  a	  well-­‐paid	  imam	  of	  a	  mosque	  in	  a	  relatively	  affluent	  mining	  region	  of	  West	  Bengal.	  As	  always,	  he	  is	   dressed	   in	   a	   meticulously	   clean	   white	   pāñjābi2	  and	   his	   upper	   lip	   is	   neatly	  shaven	  above	  the	  wild	  beard.	  Samsuddin	  is	  visibly	  upset	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	   doctor	   had	   sent	   his	   mother	   away	   with	   only	   vague	   advice	   and	   useless	  medicines.	   He	   claims	   that	   the	   doctor	   doesn’t	   care	   at	   all	   about	   his	   mother’s	  health;	  he’s	   just	  out	  to	  fill	  his	  own	  pocket.	   ‘None	  of	  the	  doctors	  care	  about	  the	  poor	  people’.	  Carried	  away	  with	  his	  agitation,	  he	  bursts	  out	  into	  a	  tirade	  about	  the	   contemporary	   political	   situation,	   which	   he	   feels	   is	   deeply	   immoral,	   and	  repeatedly	  says	  that	  here,	  ‘they	  are	  all	  crooks!’	  (‘sabāi	  badmāś!’)	  The	  problem	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  All	  names,	   including	  place	  names,	   are	  pseudonyms,	   except	   for	   the	  names	  of	  well-­‐known	  public	  figures	  (e.g.	  Siddiqullah	  Chowdhury	  Saheb)	  and	  well	  known	  places	  (e.g.	  Shantiniketan).	  	  2	  The	  Islamic	  attire	   in	  West	  Bengal	  consists	  of	  a	  knee-­‐long	  tunic	  called	  a	  kurtā,	  pāñjābi,	  or	  
kamīz	  over	  wide	  white	  trousers,	  called	  salwār.	  In	  Joygram,	  the	  salwār	  kamīz	  of	  women	  is	  usually	  called	  a	  cuṛidār,	  while	  male	   tunics	  are	  usually	  called	  pāñjābis.	  Tunics	  appear	   in	  various	   forms	  and	   styles;	  when	   I	   refer	   to	   the	  white	   salwār	  kamīz	  of	  Muslim	  men,	   I	   specifically	   refer	   to	   the	  white	   tunic	   with	   wide	   trousers	   that	   distinguishes	   Bengali	   Muslim	   men	   from	   non-­‐Muslim	  Bengalis.	  Most	  Bengali	  Muslims	  do	  not	  wear	  the	  specific	  Islamic	  attire	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  and	  those	  who	  do	  are	  usually	  Islamic	  scholars,	  imams	  or	  active	  members	  of	  the	  Tablighi	  Jamaat.	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that	   those	   in	  power	  don’t	  do	  anything	  about	   it	  because	   they	   follow	   their	  own	  rules	  (‘nijer	  āin’).	  The	  solution	  would	  be,	  according	  to	  him,	  to	  implement	  a	  very	  strong	   law,	   and	   employ	   competent	   people	   who	   would	   point	   out	   the	   badmāś	  people	  (crooks)	  and	  make	  sure	  they	  are	  beaten	  up	  or	  killed.	  I	  ask	  him	  what	  kind	  of	  law	  he	  has	  in	  mind,	  an	  Islamic	  law?	  	  He	  nods,	  Islamic	  law	  would	  be	  the	  best,	  naturally,	   but	   then	   he	   says	   that	   the	   constitution	   of	   this	   country	   is	   fine,	   and	  emphasises	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   Hadith,	   you	   have	   to	   obey	   the	   law	   of	   the	  country	   you	   live	   in.	   The	   problem	   is	   not	  which	   law,	   but	   the	   fact	   that	   people,	  including	  Muslims,	  don’t	  obey	  any	   law.	   I	  ask	  him	  whether	  he	  would	  first	  want	  the	  Muslims	  to	  be	  punished	  but	  he	  angrily	  answers	  that	  jāti	  (community/caste)	  doesn’t	  matter	  here,	  any	  badmāś,	  whichever	  jāti	  needs	  to	  be	  punished.	  When	  his	  outburst	   continues,	   however,	   it	   does	   seem	   that	   Islam	   is	   instrumental,	   if	   not	  essential,	   to	  whether	  one	  can	  at	  all	   live	  according	  to	  the	  country’s	   law.	  After	  a	  brief	  moment	  of	  silence	  and	  self-­‐reflection,	  he	  says:	   ‘Allah’s	   law	  is	  good,	   it	  has	  no	  flaws,	  and	  as	  soon	  as	  people	  don’t	  follow	  his	  rules	  they	  make	  mistakes’.	  	  FP:	  ‘But	  what	  about	  the	  Hindus,	  they	  have	  their	  Ṭhākur	  (God)…’	  Samsuddin:	  ‘Fine,	  that	  has	  some	  good	  things	  too,	  so	  let	  them	  obey	  that!	  Let	  them	  obey	  their	  dharma	  (ethics),	  not	  everybody	  has	  to	  follow	  Islam.	  As	  long	  as	  there	  is	  fear;	  people	  need	  to	  fear	  and	  obey	  a	  dharma’.	  	  FP:	  ‘But	  couldn’t	  it	  be	  that	  you	  obey	  not	  a	  dharma	  but	  just	  a	  law?’	  Samsuddin:	  ‘That	  would	  be	  fine,	  but	  nobody	  is	  able	  to	  do	  so.’	  FP:	  ‘I	  think	  that’s	  what	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  in	  my	  country	  do’.	  	  Samsuddin:	   ‘But	   in	  your	   country	   they	  are	  also	  all	  badmāś,	  worse,	   they	  are	  animals’.	  He	  smiles	  apologetically.	   ‘They	  should	  be	  humanised/made	  a	  person’	  (Oder’ke	   mānuṣ	   kar’te	   habe).	   ‘Really	   they	   are	   not	   mānuṣ	   (human),	   they	   are	  animals’.	  	  FP:	  ‘But	  I	  also	  don’t	  obey	  a	  dharma!’	  Samsuddin:	  ‘What	  do	  you	  obey?’	  	  FP:	  ‘I	  obey	  the	  law’.	  Samsuddin:	  ‘Fine.	  But	  you	  are	  the	  only	  one	  who	  can	  do	  so	  [obeying	  the	  law	  without	   obeying	   a	  dharma],	   you	  won’t	   find	   a	   second	   one	   in	   the	   entire	  world,	  take	  some	  binoculars	  and	   look	   for	   them	  very	  well,	  but	  you	  won’t	   find	  a	  single	  person.	   Take	   those	   doctors;	   of	   a	   100	   doctors,	   99	   are	   animals,	   only	   one	   is	  
14	  	  
actually	  a	  doctor.	  They	  don’t	  care,	  they	  don’t	  cure	  any	  patient,	  and	  they	  just	  give	  medicines	  to	  make	  money	  of	  it.	  Really	  99	  of	  them	  are	  animals	  and	  only	  one	  is	  a	  human	  being	  (mānuṣ)’.	  	   *	  The	  vignette	  presented	  above	  recounts	  one	  of	  the	  many	  conversations	  I	  had	  over	  the	  nineteen	  months	  I	  spent	  with	  a	  community	  of	  Muslims	   in	  a	  village	   in	  West	  Bengal	  that	  I	  have	  renamed	  as	  Joygram	  for	  the	  privacy	  of	  my	  interlocutors.	  I	  choose	  to	  open	  with	  this	  conversation	  because	  Samsuddin’s	  outburst	  reflects	  the	  anger	  and	  frustration	  I	  could	  feel	  lingering	  among	  the	  villagers	  and	  creeping	  under	   my	   skin.	   However,	   it	   also	   reflects	   an	   immense	   desire	   and	   hope	   for	  change.	  It	  summarises	  what	  slowly	  became	  clear	  to	  me	  over	  the	  many	  months	  I	  spent	   within	   this	   village:	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   everyday	   life	   of	   my	  interlocutors	   is	   deeply	   affected	   by	   the	   feeling	   that	   there	   is	   something	   wrong	  with	   this	  world	   in	  which	  we	   live	   in.	  They	   feel	   that	  many	  people	  around	  them,	  not	  least	  of	  all	  the	  powerful,	  have	  degenerated	  to	  animals,	  and	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	   ‘humanise’	   this	  world	   is	   through	   a	   revival	   of	  dharma	  (ethics	   of	   justice	   and	  order).	  	  	  This	   thesis	   is	  a	   study	  of	   the	  ethical	  dilemmas	  and	   the	  variety	  of	   responses	  that	  arise	  in	  a	  minority	  community	  confronted	  with	  structural	  marginalisation	  in	   an	   ambiguously	   secular	   democracy.	   The	   research	   revolves	   around	   the	  observation	  that	  among	  Muslim	  Joygramis	  the	  revival	  of	  dharma	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	   rhetoric	   and	   aesthetics	   of	   Islamic	   reformism:	   a	   large	   number	   of	   my	  interlocutors,	  including	  Samsuddin,	  are	  preoccupied	  with	  living	  a	  more	  puritan	  Islamic	   lifestyle	  and	  explicitly	  aspire	   for	   the	  cultivation	  of	   themselves	  as	  good	  Muslims.	  This	  observation	  raises	  a	  set	  of	  questions:	  Why	  are	  Muslims	  in	  West-­‐Bengal	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   Islamic	   reformation	   of	   the	   self?	   In	   light	   of	  increasing	   suspicion	   of	   the	   Islamic	   community,	   why	   do	   they	   choose	   to	  emphasise	   just	   that	   aspect	   of	   their	   public	   identity?	  Why	   does	   it	   look	   like	   the	  secular	  policy	  of	   the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state	  and	  thirty	  years	  of	  communist	  rule	   in	  the	  state	  of	  West	  Bengal	  have	  made	  Muslims	  ‘more	  religious’	  rather	  than	  ‘more	  secular’?	  The	  thesis	  then	  goes	  beyond	  the	  fieldsite,	  as	   it	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	   understanding	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   ethical	   life	   in	   the	   modern	   world	   more	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broadly.	   The	   answers	   to	   the	   questions	   of	   this	   particular	   study	   allow	   me	   to	  explore	   a	   broader	   set	   of	   questions:	   what	   are	   the	   sources	   of	   ethics?	   How	   do	  people	   navigate	   ethical	   dilemmas	   and	   ambiguities?	   How	   do	   processes	   of	  modernity	  impinge	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  ethical	  life?	  	  
	  This	  introduction	  is	  not	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  chapters	  that	  comprise	  the	  thesis;	  rather	   it	   discusses	   the	   themes	   and	   arguments	   that	   run	   across	   the	   chapters.	  Directly	   following,	   I	  clarify	   the	  central	  concepts	  and	  terminology	  of	   this	   thesis	  and	  briefly	  introduce	  the	  analytical	  approach	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Subsequently	   is	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	  historical	  background	  and	  how	  this	  impinges	  on	   contemporary	  debates	   about	   Indian	   secularism.	  Next,	   I	   gradually	  unfold	  how	  my	  ethnographic	  approach	  follows	  from,	  engages	  with	  and	  critiques	  the	  relevant	  literature.	  Then	  I	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  overarching	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  is	  employed	  to	  construct	  an	  innovative	  model	  of	  ethical	  reality,	  and	   the	   theoretical	   arguments	   that	   follow	   from	   this	  model.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	  introduction	  is	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  thesis	  chapters.	  
Dharma	  Since	  dharma	  is	  a	  crucial	  category	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  explore	  in	  detail	  what	  dharma	  is	  before	  I	  proceed.	  In	  West	  Bengal,	  Islam	  is	  considered	  a	  dharma,	   like	  the	  other	  ‘religions’	  in	  South	  Asia	  are	  dharma,	  yet	  
dharma	  is	  a	  category	  very	  different	  from	  the	  category	  religion	  for	  the	  reasons	  I	  will	   explore	   later	   in	   this	   introduction.	   I	   have	   synthesized	   the	   vernacular	  understanding	  and	  use	  of	  dharma	  as	  follows:	  dharma	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  order	  and	   justice	   in	  society;	  an	  ethical	  potential	  both	   in	  the	  person	  and	   in	  the	  social	  environment.	   As	   such,	   dharma	   connotes	   an	   aspiration,	   because	   harmonious	  order	  is	  an	  ethical	  ideal	  rather	  than	  an	  observable	  reality.	  Dharma	  is	  not	  a	  fixed	  set	   of	   rules,	   but	   a	   dynamic	  disposition	   that	   is	   activated	   contextually	   to	   create	  and	  reproduce	  order.	   It	  encapsulates	  both	  theory	  (ideology	  and	  theology)	  and	  practice	  by	  breaking	  down	  the	  oppositional	  boundary	  between	  these	  categories.	  This	  observation	  does	  not	  forestall	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  particular	  rule	  may	  be	  called	  
dharma;	  but	  the	  rule	  is	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  rather	  than	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  Similarly,	  if	   a	   person	   ‘has’	   dharma	   (and	   every	   person	   has	   dharma	   by	   definition	   of	   the	  category	  person)	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   this	  person	   is	   the	  personification	  of	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harmony	   and	   order,	   but	   that	   this	   person,	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   society,	  embodies	  the	  potential	  to	  act	  virtuously	  and	  as	  such	  contribute	  to	  social	  order.	  In	   short,	   I	   translate	   dharma	   as	   ‘ethics	   of	   justice	   and	   order’,	   denoting	   both	  macro-­‐cosmic	  ideals	  as	  well	  as	  actual	  practice.	  Upon	  returning	   from	   the	   field,	   I	   found	   the	  vernacular	  understanding	   to	  be	  strikingly	   consistent	   with	   more	   subtle	   interpretations	   of	   dharma	   in	  contemporary	   Indian	   philosophy	   (e.g.	   Chatterjee	   1968;	   Hamilton	   2001;	  Hiriyanna	   1995;	   Radhakrishnan	   and	  Moore	   2014;	   Grimes	   1996).3	  In	   its	   most	  literal	   translation	   from	  Sanskrit,	  dharma	  means	   ‘what	  holds	   together’	   (Grimes	  1996:	  113).	  As	  such	  it	  points	  to	  the	  inherent	  nature	  of	  a	  thing,	  both	  descriptive	  and	  prescriptive	  (Sharma	  2000:	  90).	  From	  this	  original	  meaning,	  wide	  ranges	  of	  derivative	   translations	   emerge:	  moral	   law;	   cosmic	   order;	   duty;	   righteousness;	  merit;	   religion	   (Hiriyanna	   1995:	   37-­‐38;	   Radhakrishnan	   and	   Moore	   2014;	  Grimes	  1996:	  113)	  and	  justice	  (Doniger	  2010:	  278).	  	  For	  a	  coherent	  conceptualisation,	  I	  will	  consider	  dharma	  to	  be	  operating	  on	  two	   levels	   (Hamilton	   2001).	   On	   the	  macro	   scale,	   dharma	   refers	   to	   the	   entire	  cosmic	  order	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  moral	  law	  that	  sustains	  the	  cosmic	  order.	  In	  the	  cosmic	   order	   the	   natural	   and	   the	   normative	   are	   intermeshed;	   so	   dharma	  includes	  natural	  as	  well	  as	  moral-­‐social	   law	  (Chatterjee	  1968:	  177).	  So	  on	   the	  macro	   level	  dharma	   is	  both	  an	  ontological	   as	  well	   as	   a	   regulative	  principle;	   it	  amounts	  to	  justice	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense.	   ‘Whatever	  there	  is,	  is	  part	  of	  dharma	  in	   this	   sense.	   If	   things	   are	   not	   as	   they	   should	   be…	   a	   state	   of	   disorder,	   or	   a-­‐
dharma,	  exists’	  (Hamilton	  2001:	  27-­‐28).	  On	   a	   micro-­‐scale,	   dharma	   is	   often	   translated	   as	   ‘duty’;	   the	   duty	   to	   live	  according	   to	   one’s	   ritual	   social	   role	   so	   as	   to	   reproduce	   dharma	   on	   the	  macrocosmic	   level	   and	   prevent	   a-­‐dharma.	   However,	   dharma	   is	   also	  righteousness,	   virtue	   or	  merit.	   Righteousness	   here	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	   correct	  performance	  of	  duty,	  i.e.	  the	  act	  is	  virtuous	  in	  that	  it	  reproduces	  dharma	  in	  the	  macrocosmic	   sense	   (Hiriyanna	   1995:	   37-­‐38).	   What	   kind	   of	   act	   is	   deemed	  virtuous	   depends	   on	   the	   context	   and	   the	   person	   (Laidlaw	   1995:	   14;	   Madan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  What	   follows	   is	   necessarily	   a	   concise	   summary,	   because	   the	   question	   of	   what	   dharma	  means	   pervades	   millennia	   of	   Indian	   philosophy	   (Sharma	   2000:	   91)	   and	   various	   strands	   of	  Hindu,	  Jain	  and	  Buddhist	  thoughts	  have	  developed	  divergent	  conceptualisations.	  
17	  	  
1992:	  108).	  The	  macro-­‐	  and	  the	  micro-­‐level	  are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin;	  the	  universal	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  particular.	  	  The	   vernacular	   understanding	   and	   practical	   use	   of	   dharma	   is	   fairly	  consistent	  with	  this	  rough	  outline	  of	  the	  basic	  philosophical	  conceptualisations	  and	  my	   suggestion	   that	  dharma	   is	   an	   ethical	   potential	   (both	   in	   the	   person	   as	  well	   as	   in	   the	   social	   world)	   reflects	   Hamilton’s	   (2001)	   conceptualisation	   of	  
dharma	  on	  a	  macro-­‐scale	  and	  a	  micro-­‐scale.	  This	  is	  notwithstanding	  the	  internal	  dynamics	   of	   this	   historically	   emergent	   category:	   like	   religion	   and	   secularism,	  
dharma	   is	  not	   a	  natural,	   static	   category	  and	   I	   explore	   the	  particular	  historical	  sense	  of	  dharma	  with	  which	  my	  interlocutors	  operate.	  	  There	  is	  a	  remarkable	  consistency	  between	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  dharma	  among	   my	   Muslim	   interlocutors,	   and	   anthropological	   interpretations	   of	   the	  vernacular	  use	  of	  dharma	  among	  Hindus	   (e.g.	  Parry	  1994)	  and	   Jains	   (Laidlaw	  1995).	  This	  may	  be	  surprising	  to	  the	  reader,	  however,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  there	  is	   more	   of	   a	   convergence	   between	   Muslims’	   and	   Hindus’	   understanding	   of	  
dharma	  as	  ethics	   than	   a	   theological	   or	   social	   scientific	   approach	   to	   Islam	   and	  Hinduism	   as	   religions	   would	   allow.	   Theological	   aspects	   of	   dharma	  will	   differ,	  but	   ideologies	   of	   kinship,	   for	   example,	   are	   shared.	   On	   a	   daily	   basis	   my	  interlocutors	   practice	   and	   express	   elements	   of	   Islamic	   theology	   as	   well	   as	   of	  local	   ideologies	   shared	   across	   the	   subcontinent,	   and	   live	   with	   the	  contradictions.	  They	  do	  so	   through	   the	   idiom	  of	  dharma.	   I	  will	   argue	   in	  detail	  against	   the	   analytical	   purification	   of	  Hinduism	   and	   Islam	   as	   entirely	   different	  religious	  systems	  later	  in	  this	  introduction.	  	  *	  Before	   continuing,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   make	   some	   further	   notes	   on	  terminology.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  category	  of	  Islamic	  ‘morality’	  or	  ‘theology’	  refers	  to	  ‘the	  sets	  of	  ethical	  norms,	   theological	  commitments	  and	  patterns	  of	  embodied	  practices	   that	   are	   demanded	   from	   a	   particular	   community	   by	   a	   group	   of	  religious	  experts’	   (Tareen	  2009:	  526).	  The	   ‘religious	  experts’	  are	   foremost	   the	  ‘vernacular	   theologians’	   (Fountain	   &	   Lau	   2013)	   among	   my	   interlocutors	  themselves,	  thus	  ‘theology’	  refers	  foremost	  to	  the	  local	  ‘ethno-­‐theology’,	  that	  is	  ‘the	   indigenous	   theological	   speculations	   and	   constructions	   of	   both	   laypersons	  and	  clergy’	  (Scott	  2005).	  Importantly,	  where	  I	  use	  the	  term	  morality,	  or	  moral	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person,	  it	  is	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  potential	  to	  live	  according	  to	  abstract	  rules,	  without	  invoking	   the	   assumption	   that	   people	  will	   act	   according	   to	   those	   rules.	   People	  will	   appeal	   to	  abstract	   rules	   from	  within	  an	  authoritative	   tradition,	  but	   in	   the	  midst	  of	  action	  they	  can	  never	  take	  an	  Archimedean	  vantage	  point	  from	  which	  to	  make	  a	  judgement.	  Morality,	  in	  my	  view,	  is	  part	  of	  the	  encompassing	  category	  of	  ethics;	  I	  have	  therefore	  translated	  dharma	  as	  ethics	  and	  this	  includes	  abstract	  moral	   imperatives	  and	  theological	  commitments	  (Das	  2010:	  377;	  Keane	  2015:	  20;	  Laidlaw	  2014).	  By	  being	  embedded	  in	  ethics,	  morality	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  macro-­‐cosmic	  ideals,	  and	  to	  a	  person’s	  social	  positionality.	  The	   terms	   ideology,	   cosmology	   and	   ontology	   are	   often	  used	   in	   ambiguous	  ways.	   I	   want	   to	   avoid	   a	   purely	   Marxist,	   Foucauldian	   or	   Dumontian	  interpretation	  of	  ideology.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘cosmopolitics’	  throughout	  to	  refer	  to	  the	   cosmology	   (including	   theology)	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   while	   implying	   the	  power	   relationships	   that	   are	   incorporated	  within	   the	  macrocosmic	   vision.4	  In	  other	   words,	   ‘cosmopolitics’	   does	   not	   refer	   to	   a	   immutable	   ‘culture’,	   an	  untranslatable	   symbolic	   system,	   but	   warrants	   attention	   to	   larger	   political-­‐economic	   forces	   (Gupta	   &	   Ferguson	   1992)	  Moreover,	   rather	   than	   a	   coherent	  cosmology,	   a	   cosmopolitics	   contains	   various,	   possibly	   contrasting	   ideologies	  within;	   I	   use	   the	   term	   ideology	   to	   refer	   to	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   abstract	   ideas	  within	  the	  cosmopolitics.	  By	  using	  the	  term	  cosmopolitics	  rather	  than	  the	  term	  ontology,	   I	   do	   not	   intend	   to	   dismiss	   ontological	   status	   a	   priori,	   but	   I	  want	   to	  suspend	  having	   to	  make	   such	   claims.	   Ideologies,	   cosmopolitics	   and	   theologies	  all	  make	  truth	  claims	  and	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  myself	  to	  be	  in	  the	  position	  to	  argue	  which	   claims	   indeed	   reflect	   an	   objective	   reality	   and	   which	   do	   not	   (see	   Scott	  2005).	  	  
Analytical	  approach	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  	  
Dharma	   is	   central	   to	   social	   justice;	   the	   degeneration	   of	   justice	   calls	   for	   a	  revival	  of	  dharma.	  From	  a	  purely	  secular	  point	  of	  view,	  justice	  in	  society	  follows	  from	   law	   and	   order.	   Samsuddin	  would	   agree	   that	   compliance	  with	   the	   law	   is	  crucial,	   but	   he	   thinks	   that	   it	   is	   simply	   impossible	   to	  do	   so	  without	  dharma.	   If	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  I	   do	   not	   use	   the	   term	   cosmopolitics	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Stengers	   (2005;	   see	   Latour	   2004).	  ‘Cosmo-­‐‘	   in	   the	   cosmopolitics	   in	   Stengers	   usage	   (an	   elaboration	   of	   Ulrich	   Beck’s	  ‘cosmopolitanism’)	  means	  ‘global’,	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  nation-­‐states.	  In	  my	  usage,	  ‘cosmo-­‐‘	  is	  derived	  from	  Sahlin’s	  use	  of	  ‘cosmology’	  (see	  e.g.	  Sahlins	  2000).	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operating	   with	   a	   religious/secular	   binary	   analysis,	   Samsuddin	   could	   be	  portrayed	   as	   a	   traditional	   subject	   rather	   than	   a	   modern	   citizen,	   who	   cannot	  possibly	   conceive	   of	   a	   separation	   of	   realms:	   a	   reactionary	   against	   secular	  democracy.	  Such	  a	  narrow	  understanding	  of	  religious	  reform	  misses	  the	  point.	  Samsuddin	  perfectly	  understands	  the	  ideology	  of	  secularism	  for	  what	  it	  means	  in	   the	   specific	   Indian	   context:	   it	   does	   not	  mean	   absence	   of	   religion;	   rather,	   it	  means	   equal	   treatment	   and	   opportunity	   of	   all	   religious	   groups.	   Nehruvian	  secularism	   –	  dharmaniropekṣatā	   (neutrality	   of	  dharma)	   in	   the	   vernacular	   -­‐	   is	  premised	   on	   pluralism.	   Samsuddin	   has	   no	   problem	   with	   Hindus	   living	  according	  to	  the	  law	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  dharma,	  as	  he	  does	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  Islamic	  dharma	  –	  but	  as	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  conversation,	  he	  does	  have	  a	  problem	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  dharma.	  This	  observation	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  its	  historical	  and	  political	  context.	  Across	   India,	   the	   ‘rural	   masses’,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   minorities	   suffer	   from	  various	  forms	  of	  structural	  violence.	  West	  Bengal	  in	  particular	  has	  a	  history	  of	  oppressive	  communist	  rule	  and	  is	  currently	  tainted	  by	  corrupt	  Realpolitik,	  vast	  economic	   inequality	   and	   widespread	   political	   violence.	   Joygrami	   men	   and	  women	  would	  not	  cease	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  moral	  bankruptcy	  they	  experience	  in	   their	   environment,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   constantly	   lingering	   sense	   of	   impending	  chaos.	   I	  have	  explained	   that	  dharma	   is	   an	  ethics	  of	   justice	  and	  order	  and	   that	  disorder	  means	  a-­‐dharma;	   so	   for	  my	   interlocutors	   a	   lack	   of	   justice	   and	   order	  implies	  a	  lack	  of	  dharma.	  	  The	   experience	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   dharma	   in	   the	   political	   and	   economic	  environment	   evokes	   an	   emphasis	   on	   dharma	   in	   every	   aspect	   of	   life.	   In	   my	  fieldsite	   and	   beyond,	   there	   is	   a	   growing	   popularity	   of	   Deobandi	   Islamic	  reformism5	  most	   clearly	   expressed	   in	   rhetoric,	   shifting	   aesthetics,	   and	   active	  participation	   in	   the	  Tablighi	   Jamaat.6	  Significantly,	   a	   revival	   of	  dharma	   can	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  I	   use	   the	   term	   reformism	   for	   ‘projects	   whose	   specific	   focus	   is	   the	   bringing	   into	   line	   of	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  with	  the	  core	  foundations	  of	  Islam,	  by	  avoiding	  and	  purging	  out	  innovation,	  accretion	  and	  the	  intrusion	  of	  ‘local	  custom’’	  (F.Osella	  &	  C.Osella,	  2008a:	  247-­‐8).	  6	  Deobandi	  reformism	  originated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  Century	  in	  the	  Darul	  Uloom	  Deoband	  Islamic	   seminary	   in	   Northern	   India	   (founded	   in	   1867	   in	   Uttar	   Pradesh	   in	   North	   India).	   The	  imams	  I	  knew	  in	  Joygram	  are	  nearly	  all	  educated	  at	  the	  Deoband	  madrasa.	  It	  follows	  the	  Hanafi	  school	   of	   thought	   in	   Sunni	   Islam	   (Metcalf	   2003).	   The	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   is	   a	   transnational	  voluntary	   mass	   movement	   of	   lay	   preachers	   who	   engage	   in	   Da’wa	   (‘to	   call	   towards	   god’),	  founded	  by	  Maulana	  Muhammad	  Ilyad	  (an	  alumni	  of	   the	  Darul	  Uloom	  Deoband,	  Sikand	  2002)	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Islamic,	  yet	  it	  can	  also	  be	  Hindu.	  The	  key	  is	  that	  it	  is	  only	  with	  dharma	  that	  one	  can	   avoid	   living	   like	   an	   animal	   in	   a	   politically	   corrupt	  world.	   So	   Samsuddin’s	  emphasis	  on	  living	  by	  dharma,	  and	  Islamic	  reformism	  in	  Joygram	  more	  broadly,	  are	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   process	   of	   social	   renewal	   and	  moral	   regeneration	   deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  contemporary	  politico-­‐economic	  context.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  asks	  why,	  if	  the	  goal	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  is	  a	  larger	  form	  of	  social	  renewal,	   this	   goal	   is	   expressed	   in	   the	   aesthetic	   and	   rhetoric	   of	   Islamic	  reformism,	   and	   how	   this	   phenomenon	   relates	   to	   the	   secularism	  of	   the	   Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  I	  shall	  answer	  these	  questions	  with	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of,	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   the	   roots	   of	   ethical	   action	   (local	   cosmopolitics)	   and	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   processes	   of	   vernacularisation	   (of	   historical,	   political	   and	   economic	  conditions).	   Neither	   local	   ‘culture’	   or	   beliefs,	   nor	   material	   and	   ideological	  circumstances	   are	   sufficient	   in	   themselves	   to	   explain	   the	   modes	   of	   ethical	  renewal	  taking	  place	  in	  Joygram;	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  all	  relevant	  forces	  and	  of	  how	  they	  interact	  is	  required	  to	  comprehend	  these	  phenomena.	  To	  avoid	  any	   kind	   of	   determinism,	  while	   paying	  due	   attention	   to	   coercive	   conditions,	   I	  will	   call	   these	   forces	   ‘ethical	  affordances’,	   a	   term	  proposed	  by	  Webb	  Keane	   to	  denote	   ‘any	   aspects	   of	   people’s	   experiences	   and	   perceptions	   that	   they	   might	  draw	   on	   in	   the	   process	   of	  making	   ethical	   evaluations	   and	   decisions,	  whether	  consciously	  or	  not’	  (2015:	  27).	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  thesis,	  I	  centrally	  draw	  upon	  anthropological	  approaches	  to	  ethics,	  which	   I	  discuss	   in	  more	  detail	   towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	   introduction.	  An	  analysis	  of	   ethics	   is	   inevitably	  based	  upon	   the	  observation	   that	  people	  do	  not	  live	   their	   everyday	   life	   largely	   unconsciously	   conforming	   to	   cultural	   norms,	  whether	  we	  call	   it	  a	  doctrine,	  a	  religion	  or	  a	  system	  of	   ideas	  (Carrithers	  1992;	  Das	   2007,	   2013,	   2014;	   Laidlaw	   1995,	   2002,	   2014a;	   Lambek	   2010;	  Mahmood	  2005;	   Mattingly	   2012;	   Pandian	   &	   Ali	   2010;	   cf.	   Fassin	   &	   Lézé	   2014;	   Robbins	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  near	   Delhi	   in	   1927.	   It	   shares	   the	   Hanafi	   Sunni	   normativity	   (Ali	   2003;	  Metcalf	   1989),	   and	   its	  activities	  are	  characterised	  as	  ‘Deobandi	  Da’wa’	  (Masud	  2000b:	  xlvii),	  but	  it	  contains	  strong	  Sufi	  elements	  and	   remains	  open	   to	  all	   Sunni	   law	  schools	  and	  sects	   (Reetz	  2006:	  33).	  The	  Tablighi	  Jamaat	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  reformism	  of	  the	  Deobandi	  school	  of	  thought	  (Ali	  2003;	  Masud	   2000a;	   Metcalf	   1993;	   F.Osella	   &	   C.Osella	   2013;	   Robinson	   2004,	   2008;	   Sikand	   2002).	  Most	   of	   the	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   members	   in	   Joygram	   that	   I	   spoke	   to	   did	   not	   have	   an	   Islamic	  education	   at	   a	   madrasa;	   they	   had	   learned	   the	   Deobandi	   normativity	   from	   the	   (frequent)	  gatherings	  organised	  by	  the	  Tablighi	  Jamaat.	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2004;	  Zigon	  2008).	   I	   am	  not	   supposing	   that	   there	  are	  no	  doctrinal	  discourses	  and	   shared	   value	   systems,	   however,	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   practical	   and	   discursive	  aspects	   of	   the	   process	   of	   social	   renewal,	   which	   is	   essentially	   a	   process	   of	  explicitly	   reflecting	   on	   and	   reconfiguring	   dharma.	   Dharma	   is	   not	   internally	  static	  but	  changes	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  modern	  life,	  and	  the	  vernacularisation	  of	  modern	  categories	  impinges	  on	  new	  understandings	  of	  dharma.	  Hence,	  social	  renewal	   is	   not	  without	   significant	   hurdles:	   the	   contradictions	   between	   actual	  practices	  of	  dharma,	  new	  understandings	  of	  dharma,	  and	  contradictory	  ideals	  of	  order	   and	  virtue	   create	   constant	   tensions	   and	  ambiguities	   in	   everyday	   life.	   In	  fact,	  my	   interlocutors	  repeatedly	  say	   that	   they	   ‘just	  want	   to	   live	   in	  peace’,	  but	  meanwhile	   they	   struggle	   with	   incommensurable	   and	   unattainable	   ideologies.	  Moreover,	  they	  are	  aware	  that	  they	  are	  themselves	  implicated	  in	  the	  everyday	  ‘banality	  of	  evil’	  and	  the	  reproduction	  of	  structural	  violence.	  	  The	  confrontation	  with	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  different	   ideologies,	  and	  with	  the	  banality	  of	  evil,	  is	  what	  I	  call	  the	  ‘ethical	  tragedy’.	  With	  this	  idiom	  I	  do	  not	   only	  want	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   Greek	   ‘moral	   tragedy’	   of	   good	   people	  unintentionally	   doing	   bad	   things	   because	   of	   circumstances	   beyond	   one’s	  control.	   I	  will	  also	  explore	   those	  situations	  where	   ‘good	  people	   [are]	  acting	   in	  ways	   that	   they	   consciously	   know	  are	   bad	   because	   they	   are	   caught	   in	   a	   tragic	  conflict	   because	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   incommensurable	   ethical	   claims’	  (Mattingly	  2012:	  168).	  	  	  Insofar	   as	   I	   seek	   to	   convey	   the	   ethical	   complexity	   of	   the	   everyday	   life	   of	  Muslim	   Joygramis,	   this	  dissertation	   is	   largely	   interpretive	   in	  nature.	  However,	  as	   it	   is	   my	   ambition	   to	   utilise	   the	   ethnography	   for	   broader,	   theoretical	  contributions,	   the	   interpretive	   analysis	   develops	   within	   an	   overarching	  theoretical	   framework	  and	   feeds	   into	  a	  number	  of	   theoretical	   arguments.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  arises	  from	  my	  reluctance	  to	  analyse	  and	  explain	  social	  life	   outside	   the	   West	   through	   historical-­‐cultural	   categories	   with	   a	   particular	  meaning	   originating	   in	   the	   West,	   in	   particular	   the	   binary	   opposition	  religion/secularism.	  My	  analytical	  approach	  puts	  at	  centre	  stage	  the	  vernacular	  categories	  through	  which	  my	  interlocutors	  conceive	  of	  ethics.	  Those	  categories	  are	   foremost	   dharma	   and	   jāti	   (community),	   which	   significantly	   differ	   from	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categories	   in	   the	   English	   academic	   vocabulary.	   Through	   an	   analysis	   of	  vernacular	   categories,	   I	   do	   address	   core	   problems	   of	   Islam	   and	   secularism	   in	  India,	  in	  part	  by	  showing	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  these	  categories	  themselves.	  Contrary	  to	  approaches	  that	  suggest	  an	  incompatibility	  between	  secularism	  and	  Islam,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   Islamic	   dharma,	   as	   understood	   in	   the	   local	  cosmopolitics	   (that	   is,	   not	   as	   a	   static	   compartmentalised	   religion	   but	   as	   a	  dynamic	  ethical	  disposition)	  offers	  the	  discursive	  and	  practical	  grounds	  for	  the	  development	  of	  sensibilities	  usually	  encapsulated	  by	  the	  category	  secularism.	  	  In	   order	   to	  make	   the	   analysis	   of	   vernacular	   ethical	   categories	   relevant	   for	  the	  study	  of	  ethics	  elsewhere,	  I	  need	  a	  broader	  framework	  that	  accommodates	  vernacular	   categories	   yet	   allows	   for	   cross-­‐cultural	   comparison.	   Therefore,	   I	  turn	   for	   inspiration	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Maurice	   Bloch	   (2008),	   who	   developed	   a	  theoretical	  model	  of	  the	   ‘transcendental	  social’	   that	  conceptually	  encompasses	  historically	   emergent	   cultural	   categories	   including	   religion,	   secularism	   and	  
dharma.	  In	  turn,	  this	  model,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  my	  ethnography	  allows	  me	  to	  make	   a	   theoretical	   intervention	   in	   the	   anthropology	   of	   ethics:	   I	   suggest	   that	  (social)	  imagination	  is	  the	  source	  of	  ethics.	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  introduction	  the	   model	   is	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail;	   before	   I	   develop	   my	   theoretical	  arguments	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  outline	  the	  historical	  background	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  particular	  configurations	  of	  religion,	  secularism	  and	  dharma	  in	  India.	  	  
Religion	  and	  secularism	  in	  India	  	  This	   section	   discusses	   the	   historical	   and	   political	   context	   of	   the	  contemporary	   situation	   for	   Muslims	   in	   West	   Bengal,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  literature	  on	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  Indian	  secularism.	  The	  emergence	  of	  Indian	  secularism	  in	  colonial	  and	  postcolonial	  governance	  involved	  the	  transformation	  of	   modes	   of	   social	   identification	   and	   navigation	   through	   the	   construction	   of	  distinctly	   South	   Asian	   modes	   of	   modern	   categorisation.	   Therefore,	   in	   this	  history	   lie	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   particular	   kinds	   of	   ethical	  affordances	  salient	  to	  the	  lived	  reality	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  today.	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  historical	  context	   is	   framed	  within	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	  academic	  debate	  on	   the	  crisis	  of	   secularism	   in	   India,	   as	   this	  debate	  exposes	  how	  (post)colonial	  logics	  of	  categorisation	  have	  fed	  into	  the	  scholarship	  on	  secularism	  in	  India.	  	  	  
A	  crisis	  of	  secularism?	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In	   the	   late	   twentieth	   century,	   a	   series	   of	   events	   across	   India	   sparked	   a	  debate	   on	   the	   meaning	   and	   proper	   implementation	   of	   secularism.	   The	   most	  significant	  events	  were:	  the	  Shah	  Bano	  case	  in	  1985;	  the	  increase	  in	  communal	  reservations	  recommended	  by	  the	  Mandal	  Commission	  in	  1989;	  the	  demolition	  of	  the	  Babri	  Masjid	  in	  Ayodhya	  in	  1992	  and	  the	  subsequent	  communal	  riots	  in	  Bombay;	   and	   the	   pogrom	   in	   Gujarat	   in	   2002.	   In	   parallel	   with	   these	   specific	  events,	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  Hindu	  right	  wing	  Bharatiya	   Janata	  Party	  (BJP)	  since	  the	  1980s	  (see	  Hansen	  1999),	  recurrent	  communal	  riots	  across	  India	  (see	  e.g.	  Basu	  &	  Kholi	  1997;	  Brass	  2003;	  Engineer	  1989;	  Hansen	  2001;	  Kaur	  2005a;	  Tambiah	  1996;	   Varshney	   2002;	   Wilkinson	   2006),	   and	   the	   poor	   socio-­‐economic	  conditions	   of	   Muslims	   and	   their	   lack	   of	   political	   representation	   (see	   Sachar	  Commission	  Report	  [SCR]	  2006)	  has	  led	  several	  Indian	  intellectuals	  to	  proclaim	  a	  ‘crisis	  of	  secularism’	  in	  India	  (Sunder	  Rajan	  &	  Needham	  2007).	  Many	  of	  them	  felt	  that	  the	  political	  success	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  democracy	  was	  threatened,	  and	   that	   religion	   and	   secularism	   (as	   categories	   or	   phenomena)	   were	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  the	  problem.	  It	  was	  not	  at	  all	  clear,	  however,	  where	  to	  place	  the	  blame.	  	  I	  will	  not	   summarise	   the	  debate	  here	   in	  detail,	   as	   that	   is	  done	  elsewhere.7	  Here	  it	  will	  suffice	  to	  mention	  that	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum	  we	  find	  the	  left-­‐liberal	   ‘modernists’	   or	   ‘secularists’	   according	   to	  whom	   the	   separation	  of	   state	  and	   religion	   should	   ideally	   foster	  progress	   and	   liberty,	   and	  a	  uniform	  code	  of	  law	  should	  harness	  an	  egalitarian,	  modern	  society.	  The	  blame	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  secularism	  is	  therefore	  with	  the	  Indians	  who	  fail	  to	  privatise	  their	  religious	  life	  and	   fail	   to	  prioritise	   their	  national	   identity	  over	   their	   communal	   identity	   (e.g.	  Engineer	  2003;	  Sen	  1996).	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum	  we	  can	  locate	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘communitarians’	   (e.g.	  Madan	  1987,	   1993;	  Nandy	  1999,	   2007).	  They	  assert	  that	  the	  imposed	  Western	  ideal	  of	  secularism	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  deeply	  religious	  and	  holistic	   Indian	  society	  and	   is	   therefore	  bound	  to	   fail.	  The	  imposition	   of	   an	   ‘alien	   cultural	   ideology’	   (Madan	   1987:	   754)	   reproduces	   an	  ‘imperialism	   of	   categories’	   (Nandy	   1999:	   321).	   Thirdly,	   advocates	   of	   Hindu	  nationalism	  blame	  the	  state	   for	  a	  weak	   ‘pseudo-­‐secularism’,	  which	   implies	  the	  appeasement	  of	  minorities	  and	  excessive	   intervention	   in	   the	  majority	   religion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	   for	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   overview	   the	   introductions	   of	   and	   contributions	   to	   the	  edited	  volumes	  by	  Bhargava	  (1999)	  and	  Sunder	  Rajan	  &	  Needham	  (2007).	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(see	   Bhargava	   2010:	   2;	   Tejani	   2008:	   9).	   Fourthly,	   Rajeev	   Bhargava	   (2010)	  argues	  that	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  Indian	  secularism	  is	  its	  strength,	  which	  should	  be	  recognised	  and	  fostered.	  His	  conception	  of	  secularism	  is	  alike	  to	  a	  spiritual,	  humanist	   ideal,	   a	   framework	   that	   can	   draw	  upon	   values	   found	   in	   any	   and	   all	  religions.	  The	   four	   aforementioned	   positions	   are	   all	   problematic,	   albeit	   in	   different	  degrees	   and	   for	   various	   reasons	   (see	   Chatterjee	   1994;	   Nigam	   2006;	   Tejani	  2008:	  11).	  Firstly,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  ‘[t]he	  entire	  debate	  has	  rarely	  touched	  on	   the	   actual	   secular	   practices	   of	   the	   Indian	   state,	  what	   secularism	  means	   to	  ordinary	  people	  in	  India,	  how	  it	  is	  practised	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  so	  on’	  (Hansen	  2000:	  256).	  Recently,	  anthropologists	  have	  called	  for	  more	  subtle	  studies	  of	  the	  way	  ordinary	  people	  define,	  experience	  and	  contest	  secularism	  (Bangstad	  2009:	  189;	   Cannell	   2010:	   97;	   Zuckerman	   2010:	   viii).	   Particular	   interest	   has	   been	  vested	  in	  the	  way	  Muslims	  engage	  with	  secular	  governance,	  often	  in	  response	  to	  the	  alleged	  incommensurability	  of	  Islam	  and	  secularism	  (Mahmood	  2009:	  836).	  These	   works	   are	   nearly	   without	   exception	   situated	   in	   Muslim-­‐majority	  countries	   (Bayat	   2007;	   Bowen	   2003;	   Hirschkind	   2006;	   Mahmood	   2006;	  Navaro-­‐Yashin	  2002;	  Tambar	  2009)	  or	  in	  a	  Western	  context	  (e.g.	  Bowen	  2007;	  2009).	   Little	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	  Muslims’	   experience	   of	   secularism	   in	  India	  (but	  see	  Ahmad	  2009;	  Hasan	  2007;	  Hansen	  2000;	  Williams	  2012).	  In	  this	  thesis,	   I	   seek	   to	   address	   the	   meaning	   and	   lived	   experience	   of	   secularism	   for	  ordinary	   Muslims	   in	   India.	   This	   allows	   me	   to	   provide	   a	   radically	   new	   and	  ethnographically	  informed	  perspective	  on	  why	  there	  is	  a	  crisis	  of	  secularism	  in	  India,	   as	   well	   as	   contribute	   to	   the	   anthropological	   scholarship	   on	   secularism	  more	  broadly.	  	  Secondly,	   it	   would	   be	   erroneous	   to	   assume	   (as	   both	   ‘modernists’	   and	  ‘communitarians’	   seem	   to	   do)	   that	   colonial	   rule	   introduced	   a	   full-­‐fledged	  European	   style	   of	   secularism,	   capitalism,	   liberalism,	   etc.,	   ideologically	   or	  institutionally	  (cf.	  Mamdani	  1996:	  9).	  What	   it	  did,	  rather,	   is	   introduce	  colonial	  versions	   of	   the	   Western	   ideological	   constructions	   that	   retained	   and	   changed	  elements	   of	   pre-­‐colonial	   ideologies	   and	   institutions.	   I	   now	   turn	   to	   trace	   the	  emergence	   of	   Indian	   secularism	   to	   reveal	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   debate	   on	  secularism	  in	  India	  and	  subsequently	  suggest	  another	  perspective.	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The	  colonial	  encounter	  The	  crisis	  of	  Indian	  secularism	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  historically	  very	  troubled	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  religion	  in	  the	  British	  Empire.	  My	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  how	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  produced	  the	  problem	  of	  religious	  communities:	  through	  colonial	  categorisation	  distinct	  religious	  communities	  emerged,	  whose	  problematic	  nature	  was	  essential	  to	  the	  legitimatisation	  of	  the	  colonial	  state	  as	  a	   neutral,	   secular	   arbiter.	   The	   paradox	   is	   that	   religious	   communalism,	   the	  problem	  to	  be	  solved	  by	  secularism,	  is	  itself	  a	  historical	  construction	  particular	  to	  the	  South	  Asian	  genealogy	  of	  secularism.	  	  	  The	  British	  colonial	  project	   in	  South	  Asia	  was	   famously	  built	  on	  an	  official	  policy	   of	   religious	   neutrality	   and	   non-­‐interference.	   In	   reality,	   ‘the	   British	  interfered	  with	   every	   aspect	   of	   Indian	   religion	   and	   society’	   in	   the	   shadows	  of	  the	   tropes	   of	   secularity	   and	   neutrality	   (Van	   der	   Veer	   1999:	   29,	   see	   also	  Appadurai	   1981;	  Bayly	  1999).	  The	   interference,	   however	  obscured,	   had	   great	  political	   consequences.	   Two	   crucial	   developments	   in	   this	   regard	   should	   be	  pointed	  out.	  	  First,	   both	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   and	   a	   result	   of	   the	   ambiguous	   colonial	  approach	   to	   non-­‐intervention	   is	   the	   reification	   of	   religion	   and	   religious	  communities	   in	   public	   discourse	   and	   policy,	   through	  modern	   technologies	   of	  governance	   like	  censuses	  and	  surveys:	   ‘a	   range	  of	   colonial	  practices	   in	  British	  India…systematically	   institutionalized	  a	  nation	  of	  communities’	  (Metcalf	  1995:	  954).	  The	  definition	  and	  taxonomy	  of	  caste	  was	  central	  to	  this	  process.	  As	  Dirks	  emphasises,	  the	  British	  did	  not	  invent	  caste,	  rather	  ‘the	  point	  is	  that	  caste	  was	  refigured	  as	  a	  “religious”	  system,	  organizing	  society	  in	  a	  context	  where	  politics	  and	   religion	   had	   never	   before	   been	   distinct	   domains	   of	   social	   action’	   (Dirks	  1992:	  8;	  see	  also	  Cohn	  1987;	  Dirks	  2001;	  Kothari	  1998).	  	  The	   modern	   epistemological	   grammar	   merged	   with	   traditional	  categorisation	  as	  the	  ‘systemizing	  idiom’	  of	  the	  British	  rulers	  created	  or	  at	  least	  constrained	  the	  social	  identification	  and	  legal	  categories	  conceivable	  for	  Indians	  (Dirks	  2001:	  5).	  The	  experience	  of	  colonial	  encounters	  in	  which	  Indians	  had	  to	  explain	   themselves,	   their	   action,	   their	   rituals,	   their	   social	   relations,	   in	   short,	  their	   ‘culture’,	   resulted	   in	   an	   objectification	   of	   their	   own	   culture	   (Cohn	  1987:	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230).	   The	   Bengali	   intellectuals	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   aimed	   for	   a	   purification	   of	  religious	   thought	   and	   practice	   to	   make	   it	   consonant	   with	   European	   ideas	   of	  rationality,	   empiricism,	   monotheism	   and	   individuality	   (Cohn	   1987:	   226;	   Van	  der	   Veer	   1999:	   31).	  Moreover,	   because	   the	   legal	   categories	   based	   upon	   one’s	  religious	  community	   and	   caste	   provided	   the	   grounds	   for	   claims	   to	   education,	  inheritance	  and	  governmental	  and	  electoral	  reservations,	   it	  was	  conducive	   for	  Indian	  citizens	   to	  actively	  engage	  with	   these	  categories	  (Cohn	  1987:	  231-­‐250;	  L.I.	   Rudolph	   &	   S.H.	   Rudolph	   1967:	   29	   –	   132;	   Van	   der	   Veer	   1994:	   19).	   The	  secularity	   of	   colonial	   intervention	   and	   modern	   techniques	   of	   categorisation	  effectively	   produced	   a	   particular	   form	   of	   religious	   communities	   (and	   a	   set	   of	  politico-­‐religious	  institutions)	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  colonial	  state	  (Van	  der	  Veer	  2002:	  178).	  	  Second,	   the	   colonial	   state	   was	   ultimately	   a	   Christian	   secular	   state	   with	   a	  civilising	   mission	   that	   allowed	   for	   religious	   communities	   to	   negotiate	   their	  entry	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  only	  to	  incorporate	  them	  within	  a	  hierarchical	  social	  order	  (Van	  der	  Veer	  1994:	  21;	  Van	  der	  Veer	  and	  Lehmann	  1999:	  28).	  The	  only	  ‘right	  kind’	  of	  religious	  community	  was	  the	  Christian	  secular	  community.	  In	  the	  liberal	   tradition	   as	   executed	   in	   the	   colonial	   state,	   freedom,	   autonomy	   and	  equality	   is	   granted	   ‘only	   to	   human	   beings	   presumed	   to	   possess	   the	   power	   to	  reason…and	  in	  this	  way	  systematizes	  domination	  over	  all	  other	  beings	  (such	  as	  animals	  or	  the	  colonized)’	  (Skaria	  2014:	  31,	  see	  also	  Dirks	  1992).	  	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   colonial	   state	   effectively	   created	   two	   realms	   of	   society:	   a	  rationalised	   middle	   class	   and	   the	   potentially	   dangerous	   masses,	   and	   a	  concomitant	   separation	   of	   politics	   and	   religion/culture.	   Hansen	   calls	   this	   the	  ‘colonial	   double	   discourse’,	   which	   ‘depicted	   the	   political	   realm	   as	   that	   of	  representation	  of	   rational	   interests	  of	   elites	   that	  were	   supposed	   to	   represent,	  transform	  and	  control	  ‘their’	  communities,	  that	  is	  the	  cultural	  realm	  of	  untamed	  passion	  and	  irrationality	  of	  the	  oriental	  masses’	  (2000:	  257;	  see	  also	  Bear	  2007;	  Dirks	  2001;	  Van	  der	  Veer	  1994,	  2001;	  Van	  der	  Veer	  and	  Lehmann	  1999).	  This	  double	  discourse	  is	  central	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  secularism.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  crisis	  of	  secularism	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  modernisation	  of	  traditional	  categories	  –	  such	  as	  caste	  and	  community	  -­‐	  in	  particular,	  disjunctive	  ways.	  ‘The	  categories	   of	   modernity	   for	   coloniser	   and	   colonised	   alike	   are	   formed	   in	   the	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imperial	   encounter	   itself	   and	   thus	   cannot	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  imposition	   of	   modern	   concepts	   on	   a	   traditional	   society	   that	   resists	   this	  imposition	   in	   its	   own	   moral	   languages’	   (Van	   der	   Veer	   2002:	   176).	   The	   new	  conceptual	  grammar	  and	  supralocal	  social	  horizon	  allowed	  for	  a	  transformation	  of	   existing	   idioms:	   ‘The	   transformation	   of	   these	   moral	   languages	   is	   at	   issue’	  (ibid.).	   The	   nature	   of	   this	   transformation	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   Muslims’	  everyday	  life	  is	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  analysis	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
Postcolonial	  ‘anti-­‐politics’	  Various	  elements	  of	   the	  ambiguous	  secularity	   that	  emerged	   in	   the	  colonial	  encounter	   were	   reproduced	   by	   the	   postcolonial	   Indian	   state.	   Firstly,	   in	   the	  struggle	   for	   independence,	   the	  nationalist	  elite	  reproduced	  a	  reversed	  version	  of	  the	  colonial	  double	  discourse	  that	  emphasised	  a	  united	  culture	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  sovereign	  Indian	  nation.	  Hansen	  calls	  the	  production	  of	  culture	  as	  the	  pre-­‐political	  heart	  of	  purity	  and	  morality	  ‘anti-­‐politics’	  (1999:	  50).	  The	  discourse	  of	  secularity	   and	   neutrality	   and	   the	   necessary	   reproduction	   of	   ‘culture’	   as	   the	  backbone	  of	  nationalism,	  required	  the	  assertion	  of	  the	  political	  realm	  itself	  as	  a	  morally	  empty	  space,	   ‘a	   set	  of	   lifeless	  procedures	  and	  alien	   institutions	  which	  only	   could	   be	   given	   life	   and	   indigenous	   meaning	   by	   a	   vibrant	   national	  community	   beyond	   the	   political’	   (Hansen	   2000:	   257;	   cf.	   J.L.	   Comaroff	   &	   J.	  Comaroff	  2008:	  30).	  Secondly,	   the	   bifurcation	   between	   a	   rational	   middle	   class	   society	   and	   the	  traditional,	   ignorant	   communities	   was	   extended.	   The	   potentially	   dangerous	  masses	   needed	   to	   be	   civilised	   and	   controlled	   in	   order	   to	   guarantee	   tolerance	  and	  peace,	  yet	  peace	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  for	  power	  were	  preconditioned	  by	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  communities.	  This	  contradiction	  inherent	  in	  secularism	  is	  not	  limited	   to	   the	   Indian	   state,	   as	   Asad	   observed:	   ‘The	   secular	   theory	   of	   state	  toleration	   is	   based	   on	   these	   contradictory	   foundations:	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   elite	  liberal	  clarity	  seeks	  to	  contain	  religious	  passion,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  democratic	  numbers	   allow	  majorities	   to	   dominate	  minorities	   even	   if	   both	   are	   religiously	  formed’	  (2003:	  61).	  In	  the	  Indian	  case,	  this	  means	  that	  ‘[f]or	  decades	  democracy	  and	   secularism	   meant	   protection	   and	   extension	   of	   social	   privileges	   to	   the	  educated	  Hindu	  middle	  classes,	  and	  condescending	  paternalism	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  lower-­‐caste	  groups	  and	  minorities’	  (Hansen	  1999:	  8).	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Secularism	   in	   India	   is	   ultimately	   the	   attempt	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   problem	   of	  difference	   within	   one	   liberal	   nation,	   in	   particular	   the	   problem	   of	   difference	  between	  the	  majority	  community	  and	  the	  minority	  communities	  (Tejani	  2008:	  11;	  see	  also	  Chandhoke	  1999;	  Chatterjee	  1994;	  Kothari	  1989;	  Viswanath	  2014;	  Williams	   2013).	   ‘Unity-­‐in-­‐diversity’	   is	   celebrated	   as	   if	   all	   communities	   are	  equally	   valid	   and	   legitimate,	   and	   equally	   vital	   to	   the	  moral	   foundation	   of	   the	  nation	  (Hansen	  2000:	  258;	  Viswanath	  2014:	  141),	  but	  in	  reality	  the	  principle	  of	  secularism	   is	   integrated	  with	   the	   nationalist	   discourse	   that	   seeks	   to	   subsume	  diversities	   and	   differences	   within	   the	   dominant	   majoritarian	   culture	   (Brass	  1997:	   279-­‐280;	   Pandey	   2006a;	   Viswanath	   2014:	   144-­‐145).	   In	   post-­‐Partition	  India,	  Muslims	  were	  structurally	  excluded	  since	  those	  living	  in	  India	  are	  Hindu	  by	   default,	   unless	   specifically	   claiming	   adherence	   to	   a	   minority	   (Viswanath	  2014:	  144-­‐145).	  	  Religious	  minorities	  are	  ‘recognized’	  but	  fundamentally	  denied	  political	  autonomy	  as	  the	  ‘political	  rights	  of	  religious	  minorities	  are	  replaced	  by	  
cultural	  protections’	   (Viswanath	  2014:	  142,	   emphasis	   in	  original).	  As	   a	   result,	  ‘the	  kind	  of	  subjectivity	  that	  a	  secular	  culture	  authorizes’	  (Mahmood	  2006:	  328)	  continues	   to	  be	  a	  subjectivity	  embedded	   in	  a	  religious/cultural	  community.	   In	  postcolonial	   India,	   the	   Hindu	   community	   is	   increasingly	   being	   valued	   as	   the	  only	   ‘right	   kind’	   of	   community	   whereas	   the	   Muslim	   community	   becomes	  increasingly	   marginalised	   as	   an	   illegitimate	   community	   (Van	   der	   Veer	   1994;	  Hansen	  2001).	  	  
Bhadralok	  communism	  in	  West	  Bengal	  	  The	  division	  between	  an	  educated	  elite	  consisting	  of	  upper-­‐caste	  Hindus,	  the	  civilised	   class,	   and	   the	   uneducated	   masses	   that	   need	   to	   be	   civilised	   is	  particularly	   strong	   in	   Bengal,	   where	   the	   British	   Raj	   first	   established	   their	  capital.	   The	   bhadralok, 8 	  a	   specifically	   Hindu	   Bengali	   ‘class’	   of	   self-­‐defined	  enlightened,	  cultured	  and	  educated	  avant-­‐garde	  formed	  the	  ruling	  elite,	  despite	  their	   being	   a	   minority	   (Chatterji	   1994).	   Arguably,	   the	   most	   determining	  identification	   in	   Bengal	   is	   the	   overarching	   divide	   ‘of	   being	   Bengali,	   yet	   not	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Bhadralok	   literally	   translates	   as	   ‘gentle-­‐folk’.	   The	   term	   denotes	   a	   broad	   category	   of	  relatively	   wealthy,	   educated	   Bengali	   Hindus,	   originally	   zamindār	   (landholders)	   and	   public	  servants	   of	   the	   colonial	   government,	  who	   defined	   themselves	   as	   the	   intellectual	   and	   cultural	  avant-­‐garde	  of	  Bengal.	  Later	  diversified	  and	  expanded	  to	  what	  could	  now	  roughly	  be	  called	  the	  ‘middle-­‐class’.	  	  
29	  	  
bhadralok’	   (Jalais	   2010:	   173).	   Although	   the	   non-­‐bhadralok	   includes	   non-­‐Muslims	   (most	   significantly	   Adivasis	   and	  Ḍalits),	   all	  Muslims	   are	   excluded	   by	  default	   from	   the	   bhadralok.	   These	   two	   oppositions,	   bhadralok/‘masses’	   and	  Hindus/Muslims	   have	   undergone	   various	   forms	   of	   configurations	   and	  manipulations	  but	  have	  been	  significant	  throughout	  the	  last	  century.	  The	  Partition	  of	  Bengal	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Independence	  left	  60	  million	  Muslims	  behind	  in	  West	  Bengal	  as	  ‘second-­‐class	  citizens’	  (Jalais	  2010:	  164).	  The	  Muslims	  consented	   that	   to	   live	   safely	   meant	   proclaiming	   ‘allegiance	   to	   India,	   to	  communal	   harmony	   and	   to	   secularism’	   (Chatterji	   2007:	   172).	   In	   interaction	  with	   the	   ambiguous	   modernisation	   of	   traditional	   categories,	   the	   religious	  identity	   was	   racialised	   and	   territorialised	   in	   an	   ethnic	   identity,	   with	  connotations	   of	   blood	   and	   soil.	   This	   implies	   by	   extension	   that	   a	   Bengali	   is	   a	  Hindu	  and	  the	  ‘Bengali	  Muslim…a	  living	  oxymoron’	  (Chatterji	  1996:	  16)	  so	  that	  a	  Muslim	   has	   trouble	  making	   claims	   to	   the	   soil	   and	   to	   the	   Bengali	   ‘ethnicity’	  attached	  to	  the	  deś	  ([home]land)	  (Aleaz	  2005:	  559).	  Yet,	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  Muslims	   was	   depoliticised	   and	   cast	   in	   terms	   of	   educated	   superiority	   and	  uneducated	   inferiority,	   so	   that	   ‘Muslim’	  was	  politically	  employed	  as	  a	   cultural	  category	   denominating	   the	   backward,	   uncultivated	   peasant	   rather	   than	   a	  religious	  category.	  In	  these	  terms,	  the	  bhadralok	  found	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  ‘noble’	  task	  of	  guiding	  the	  Bengali	  ‘masses’	  into	  modern	  civilisation.	  The	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  the	  Left	  Front	  (LF,	  a	  coalition	  of	  communist	  parties)	  in	  1977	  did	  not	  structurally	  change	  bhadralok	  superiority	  despite	  its	  discourse	  of	   radical	   leftism	   focused	   on	   the	   annihilation	   of	   class	   (Chatterjee	   2009).	   The	  homogeneous	   hegemony	   of	   the	   bhadralok	   in	   combination	   with	   communist	  politics	  in	  fact	  resulted	  in	  a	  particularly	  pervasive	  system	  of	  political	  patronage	  and	   developmentalism	   (Roy	   2004:	   150;	   Rogaly,	   Harris-­‐White	   &	   Bose	   1999;	  Ruud	  2003).	  The	  central	  paradox	  of	  the	  long	  decades	  in	  which	  the	  LF	  had	  ruled	  West	   Bengal	   is	   that	   despite	   the	   intense	   politicisation	   of	   society,	   communal	  marginalisation	   was	   further	   depoliticised	   and	   structural	   violence	   against	  minorities	   tacitly	   reproduced	   (Chatterjee	   1999;	   see	   SCR	   2006).	   The	   de	   jure	  availability	  of	  welfare	  schemes	  for	  all	  conveyed	  a	  sense	  of	  political	  participation	  and,	   importantly,	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  social	   justice	  ought	  to	   look	   like	   in	  a	  modern	  nation-­‐state.	   It	   ‘instilled	   a	   sense	   of	   a	  moral	   entitlement	   to	   respect…as	  well	   as	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expectations	  of	  becoming	  entitled	  to	  benefit	  from	  one	  or	  another	  development	  scheme’	   (Hansen	  1999:	  50).	  However,	   the	   incipient	   ‘quest	   for	   recognition	  and	  entitlements	   did	   not	   alter	   the	   brute	   fact	   of	   continued	   exploitation	   and	   often	  brutal	   domination’	   (ibid.)	   in	   villages	   and	   urban	   areas	   alike.	   The	   Trinamul	  Congress	   (TMC)	   finally	  defeated	   the	  LF	   in	  2011	  with	  populist	   identity	  politics	  that	  capitalised	  on	  the	  unabated	  deprivation	  of	  the	  Muslims.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  TMC	  and	   its	   identity	   politics	   stands	   in	   a	   complex	   mutual	   relation	   with	   Muslims’	  increasing	   awareness	   of	   political	   self-­‐determination,	   which	   I	   will	   discuss	   in	  Chapter	  1.	  	  
The	  contradictions	  of	  Indian	  secularism	  	  Concluding	   this	   section,	   I	   come	   back	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   crisis	   of	  secularism.	   Both	   the	   ‘modernists’	   and	   the	   ‘communitarians’	   reproduce	   the	  ideological	  rather	  than	  real	  bifurcation	  of	  politics	  versus	  religion/culture	  and	  of	  society	   versus	   community,	   although	   in	   reversed	   versions	   of	   each	   other.9	  The	  modernists	  believe	  that	  the	  enlightened	  and	  educated	  ‘society’,	  operating	  from	  a	   rational	   sphere	   of	   secular	   politics	   could	   civilise	   the	   ‘masses’.	   The	  communitarians	   reproduce	   the	   anti-­‐politics	   discourse	   in	   their	   adamant	   belief	  that	   the	   inherently	   tolerant	   and	   benevolent	   communities	   should	   be	   given	   a	  greater	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  to	  rule	  themselves	  in	  their	  traditional	  ways,	  rather	  than	   being	   ruled	   by	   a	   self-­‐aggrandising	   elite	   nestled	   in	   an	   alien	   institution.	  Several	  studies	  have	  shown	  how	  the	  Hindu	  nationalists	  manipulate	  the	  idiom	  of	  a	   pre-­‐political	   pristine	   culture	   to	   further	   their	   majoritarian	   agenda,	  conceptualised	  as	  against	  the	  evil	  ‘Other’	  (the	  Muslims)	  (see	  Hansen	  1999;	  Van	  der	  Veer	  1994).	  Rajeev	  Bhargava	  attempts	  to	  find	  the	  middle	  ground	  but	  in	  his	  normative	   liberal	   discourse	   he	   continues	   to	   propagate	   the	   need	   of	   ‘the	  respectful	   transformation	   of	   religions’	   (Bhargava	   2010:	   103),	  whereas,	   at	   the	  same	   time	   and	   paradoxically,	   the	   Indian	   version	   of	   secularism	   should	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Some	   of	   the	   modernists	   seem	   to	   be	   concerned	   with	   secularism	   as	   a	   decline	   in	   social	  significance	   of	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   practices.	   This	   notion	   is	   usually	   expressed	   as	   part	   of	   the	  ‘secularisation	  thesis’,	  first	  formulated	  by	  the	  forerunners	  of	  modernization	  theory,	  Weber	  and	  Durkheim	   (see	   Casanova	   1994;	   Cannell	   2010).	   Empirically,	   the	   secularization	   thesis	   has	   little	  resonance;	   Casanova	   (1994)	   has	   argued	   instead	   that	   a	   ‘deprivatization’	   of	   religion	   is	   taking	  place.	   In	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   ‘modernists’,	   the	   ‘failure’	   of	   the	   secularisation	   thesis	   is	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  secularism.	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grounded	   in	   the	   traditional	   values	   shared	   across	   communities.	   As	   such,	   he	  perpetuates	  the	  paradoxical	  colonial	  bifurcation	  of	  society	  and	  communities.	  	  	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  actual	  genealogy	  of	  secularism	  in	  India	  because	   it	   informs	  my	  analysis	  of	  my	   interlocutors’	   ‘narratives	  of	   the	  decay	  of	  public	  life’	  (Hansen	  1999:	  57).	  Subsequently,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  ethnography	  in	  conjunction	  with	  this	  literature,	  I	  offer	  a	  reassessed	  perspective	  on	  the	  crisis	  of	  secularism.	  As	  Hansen	  (1999)	  observes,	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  inherent	  contradictions	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  democracy	  as	  the	  ‘myth’	  of	  the	  two-­‐headed	  anti-­‐politics	  is	  gradually	  collapsing	  due	  to	  the	  actual	  and	  much	  messier	  democratisation	  of	  Indian	  society.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  middle	  classes	  and	  elites,	  the	  crisis	  of	  secularism	  lies	  in	  their	  dwindling	  control:	  the	  elites	  have	  trouble	   keeping	   the	   ‘masses’	   under	   control	   as	   they	   increasingly	   demand	  recognition	   in	   the	   public	   and	  political	   sphere	   –	   and	   as	   a	   citizen	   as	  much	   as	   a	  Muslim	  or	  Hindu.	  For	  Muslim	  Bengalis,	  the	  crisis	  of	  Indian	  secularism	  is	  at	  once	  in	   the	   denial	   of	   substantive	   citizenship	   in	   secular,	   liberal	   India,	   and	   in	   the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  holistic	  revival	  of	  dharma.	  The	  thesis	  demonstrates	  that	  while	  these	   two	   desires	   are	   not	   inherently	   contradictory,	   but	   embedded	   in	   the	  
dharma	  of	   Bengali	  Muslims,	   they	   are	   circumstantially	   contradictory	   given	   the	  secular	  epistemology	  of	  the	  modern	  state.	  Therefore,	  Bengali	  Muslims	  continue	  to	   be	   denied	   not	   only	   substantive	   citizenship,	   but	   also	   human	   dignity.	   I	   will	  elaborate	   on	   these	   claims	   after	   I	   have	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   the	   relevant	  literature.	  	  
Problems	  of	  categorisation	  	  From	  the	  postcolonial	  critique	  of	  Indian	  secularism	  transpires	  the	  problem	  of	  categorisation	  pervasive	  in	  the	  project	  of	  modernity.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  address	  anthropological	   engagements	   with	   and	   critiques	   of	   problematic	   categories:	  political	   and	   academic	   discourse	   often	   reproduce	   and	  mutually	   reinforce	   one	  another	   in	  unfortunate	  ways,	   and	   subsequently	   influence	   social	   identification.	  The	   literature	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   informs	  my	   analytical	   and	   theoretical	  orientations:	   I	  aim	  to	  deconstruct	  modern	  modes	  of	  categorisation	   in	  order	  to	  construct	   a	   model	   of	   ethics	   that	   better	   reflects	   the	   lived	   reality	   of	   my	  interlocutors.	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The	  problem	  of	  ‘religion’	  and	  ‘Islam’	  I	   first	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  translation	  of	  dharma	   to	  religion	  already	  mentioned	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  introduction.	  What	  would	  conventionally	  be	  called	  ‘religion’	  or	  ‘religious’	  in	  English	  would	  be	  called	  dharma	  in	  Bengali,	  yet	  a	  direct	   translation	   of	   dharma	   as	   ‘religion’	   would	   be	   problematic	   since	   these	  terms	  have	  very	  different	  epistemological	  and	  normative	  connotations.	  Religion	  is	  a	  category	  that	  emerged	  out	  of	  a	  particular,	  Christian	  history	  and	  is	  decidedly	  secular	  as	  it	  connotes	  modernist	  assumptions	  of	  separate	  domains	  (Asad	  1993:	  27-­‐54).	  As	  an	  empirical	  phenomenon,	  religion	  does	  not	  have	  a	  transhistorical	  or	  transcultural	  essence,	  so	  an	  ‘anthropologist	  who	  ‘seeks’	  religion	  when	  trying	  to	  understand	  a	  place	  where	   the	  Abrahamic	  religions	  have	  not	  been	  present	  will	  only	   mislead’	   (Bloch	   2010:	   4),	   especially	   ‘in	   the	   common	   contemporary	  situations	  where	  contact	  between	  non-­‐Abrahamic	  traditions	  and	  the	  Abrahamic	  religions	  is	  present’	  (ibid.:	  5).	  By	  using	  ‘religion’	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐analytic	  term,	  ‘quite	  different	   systems	   [for	   instance,	   Hinduism]	   are	   being	   recreated	   according	   to	  Abrahamic	  lines’	  (ibid.).	  Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  Hindu-­‐ism	  as	  a	  coherent	  religious	  system	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter	  (Cohn	   1987;	   Dirks	   2001;	  Masuzawa	   2005;	   Thapar	   1989;	   Van	   der	   Veer	   2002)	  and	   so	   is	   the	   categorisation	   of	   various	   expressions	   of	   dharma	   as	   different	  religions	  (Gombrich	  and	  Obeyesekere	  1988;	  Oberoi	  1994;	  see	  also	  Feuchtwang	  2010;	   Feuchtwang,	   Shih	   and	   Tremlett	   2006;	   and	   Josephson	   2012	   for	   similar	  processes	  of	  the	  ‘invention	  of	  religion’	  in	  China	  and	  Japan).	  	  Whereas	  it	  has	  been	  widely	  noted	  that	  certain	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  outside	  of	   the	   Abrahamic	   religions	   have	   been	   reconceptualised	   according	   to	   the	  Abrahamic	  mould,	  it	  has	  largely	  been	  overlooked	  that	  the	  same	  may	  be	  true	  for	  beliefs	  and	   traditions	   that	  are	  already	  practiced	  under	   the	  name	  of	  one	  of	   the	  Abrahamic	   religions.	   Islam	   is	  not	  an	  Abrahamic	   religion	  more	  or	   less	   static	   in	  form	  and	  content:	  even	  if	  Hinduism	  became	  Abrahamized	  as	  an	  ‘alternative’	  to	  Islam	   (Bloch	   2010:	   5),	   (Indian)	   Islam	   and	   (British)	   Christianity	   were	  transformed	  in	  this	  encounter	  as	  well	  (Van	  der	  Veer	  1999).	  I	  embrace	  Schielke’s	  point	  that	  ‘[f]rom	  a	  social	  scientific	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  Islam	  “is”	  is	   a	   bad	   one,	   because	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   question	   already	   loads	   the	   category	   of	  Islam	  with	   expectations’	   (2010:	   4).	   It	   creates	   Islam	   as	   an	   entity,	   as	   a	   system,	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whereas	   it	  was	   not	   until	   the	   20th	   century	   that	  Muslims	   themselves	   started	   to	  refer	   to	   Islam	   as	   such	   (as	   opposed	   to	   it	   being	   an	   act	   and	   disposition)	   (ibid.;	  Hefner	  1998;	  Starrett	  1998).	  	  I	   want	   to	   be	   careful	   to	   avoid	   a	   conceptual	   colonialism	   by	   projecting	   the	  epistemic	   connotations	   of	   the	   term	   religion	   on	   the	   vernacular	   theories	   of	  my	  interlocutors	   and	   instead	   do	   honour	   to	   the	   empirical	   reality	   in	   my	   fieldsite.	  ‘Positing	   (which	   is	   also	   inventing)	   a	   generic,	   abstract	   theology	   cannot	   furnish	  genuine	   engagement	   because	   such	   a	   move	   perpetuates	   the	   liberal	   secular	  strategy	  of	  managing	  difference	  and	  conflict	  such	  that	  meaningful	  dissent	  is	  pre-­‐emptively	   curtailed’	   (Fountain	  &	   Lau	  2013:	   231).	   In	   particular,	   analytical	   and	  theoretical	  problems	  follow	  from	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  Salvationist	  theology	  upon	  the	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  of	  Bengali	  Muslims,	  on	  which	  I	  will	  comment	  below.	  I	  therefore	  use	  the	  term	  dharma	  rather	  than	  ‘religion’,	  and	  Islamic	  dharma	  rather	  than	  Islam.	  Some	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  explicitly	  express	  resistance	  against	  the	  definition	  of	   their	   Islamic	   dharma	   as	   a	   ‘religion’.	   However,	   they	   cannot	   always	   resist	  operating	  with	   the	   categories	   imposed	  on	   them	  by	   the	  postcolonial	   state,	   and	  this	   interaction	   has	   real	   effects.	   The	   crucial	   point	   here	   is	   the	   mutually	  reinforcing	   interaction	   between	   legal	   categorisation	   and	   socio-­‐political	  identification.	   The	   social	   scientist	   should	   observe	   this	   effect	   but	   should	   avoid	  reinforcing	   it	   (Lambek	   2012).	   So	   I	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   (understanding	   of)	  beliefs	   and	   practices	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   have	   changed	   significantly	   when	  brought	   into	   contact	   with	   another	   Abrahamic	   tradition,	   with	   other	   non-­‐Abrahamic	   traditions,	   and	   with	   the	   category	   ‘religion’	   in	   its	   English	  contemporary	   usage.	   Neither	   do	   I	   assume	   that	   dharma	   has	   been	   a	   static	  category	  before	  colonialism,	  or	  that	  local	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  exist	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  I	  take	  dharma,	   like	  religion,	  to	  be	  an	  empirical,	  not	  a	  natural	  category,	  and	  my	  definition	   is	   therefore	   necessarily	   arbitrary	   (Bloch	   2010:	   4)	   and	   like	   any	  definition	   of	   religion,	   my	   definition	   of	   dharma	   is	   the	   ‘historical	   product	   of	  discursive	  processes’	  (Asad	  1993:	  29)	  and	  synthesised	  from	  everyday	  practices.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  use	  of	  religion	  or	  Islam	  as	  an	  analytical	  category	  is	   particularly	   problematic	   when	   it	   reinforces	   power	   structures	   already	   in	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place;	   power	   structures	   that	   may	   have	   already	   significantly	   altered	   local	  understandings	  of	  belief	  and	  practice.	  	  
Islam	  as	  a	  discursive	  tradition	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  the	  reification	  of	  Islam-­‐as-­‐religion,	  Asad	  (1986)	  proposed	  to	  study	  Islam	  as	  a	   ‘discursive	  tradition’.	  He	  aimed	  for	  a	  move	  away	  from	  symbolic	  interpretations	  so	  pervasive	  in	  the	  study	  of	  religion,	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  experiential	  orientations.	  Some	  of	  Asad’s	  students	  (Mahmood	  2005;	  Hirschkind	  2006)	  and	  others	  (e.g.	  Brenner	  1996;	  Deeb	  2006;	  Henkel	  2007)	  have	  generated	  theoretically	  innovative	  work	  by	  following	  his	  line	  of	  intellectual	  thinking	  in	  the	  study	   of	   Islamic	   reformism,	   in	   particular	   of	   piety	  movements.	   These	   scholars	  consider	  Islam	  as	  an	  embodied	  ethics	  rather	  than	  an	  abstract	  system	  of	  symbols	  and	  rules.	  This	  interpretation	  comes	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  of	   Islam-­‐as-­‐dharma	   and	   I	  will	  explicitly	  engage	  with	  some	  of	   the	  theoretical	   arguments	   of	   Asad	   and	   Mahmood	   in	   this	   thesis.	   But	   while	   the	  theoretical	  merit	  of	   the	  works	  on	  contemporary	  piety	  movements	   is	  generally	  accepted,	  many	  anthropologists	  of	  Islam	  critically	  engage	  with	  Asad’s	  students.	  Critics,	   many	   of	   whom	   draw	   on	   South	   Asian	   ethnography	   (see	   the	   edited	  volume	   by	   F.Osella	   &	   C.Osella	   2013)	   note	   the	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	  totalising	  nature	  of	  the	  movements	  and	  claim	  that	  the	  outward	  performance	  of	  ideological	  coherence	  has	  too	  easily	  been	  taken	  to	  reflect	  actual	  consistency	  in	  ordinary	   life.	   Schielke	   (2010:	   4)	   in	   particular	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘Muslimness’	   of	  people’s	  identity	  is	  favoured	  over	  other	  ideological	  engagements.	  Instead,	  most	  Muslims,	   even	   the	  most	   pious,	   engage	  with	   Islamic	   discourse	   and	   practice	   in	  erratic,	  inconsistent	  and	  pragmatic	  ways	  (Bayat	  2007;	  Marsden	  2005;	  Soares	  &	  Osella	  2009;	  Schielke	  2009;	  Simpson	  2008).	  	  This	  thesis	  can	  be	  situated	  within	  the	  critiques	  of	  the	  alleged	  coherence	  and	  homogeneity	   of	   Islamic	   reformism.	   However,	   it	   aims	   to	   go	   beyond	   this	  scholarship.	   My	   research	   is	   built	   on	   the	   critics’	   advice	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	  contradictions	  and	  ambiguity	  (and	  this	  thesis	  is	  probably	  more	  ‘messy	  but	  rich’	  than	   ‘elegant	   but	   narrow’	   [Schielke	   2010:	   6]),	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  underlines	   that	   there	   is	  need	   for	  a	  deeper	  analysis	   in	  order	   to	  understand	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   ordinary	   people	   navigate	   contradictions	   and	   ambivalence,	   as	  well	  as	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  ambiguity,	  and	  achieve	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  theoretical	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synthesis.	   The	   colonial	   history	   and	   ideological	   context	   feed	   into	   everyday	  ethical	  inconsistency.	  So	  rather	  than	  claiming	  once	  more	  that	  everyday	  Islamic	  life	  is	  filled	  with	  ambiguities	  and	  ambivalences,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  Joygramis	  live	  with	  discordant	  ideologies	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  which	  requires	  constant	  discursive	  and	  performative	  labour,	  to	  which	  dharma	  is	  a	  central	  concept,	  as	  well	  as	  Islam.	  As	  such,	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  highly	  political	  labour.	  In	  addition,	  I	  want	  to	  account	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ordinary	  people	  and	  (or	  as)	  vernacular	  theologians	  do	  strive	  after	   ideological	  and	  theological	  coherence	   in	   the	   face	  of	  such	  contradictions,	  by	  letting	  the	  systematicity	  of	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  emerge	  out	   of	   the	   process	   of	   selection	   and	   interpretation	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   rather	  than	   to	   ‘force	   the	   data	   into	   predetermined	   hermeneutical	   dichotomies	   and	  frameworks’	  (Scott	  2005:	  118).	  
Islamic	  reformism	  in	  South	  Asia	  	  Scholars	  of	  South	  Asian	  Islam	  have	  long	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  problem	  related	  to	  the	  definitions	  of	  Islam,	  which	  are	  often	  Middle-­‐Eastern	  centric	  and	  seem	  to	  consider	  Muslims	   outside	   this	   centre	   of	   gravity	   as	   a	   shadow	  of	   the	   ‘universal	  Muslim’	  (Ahmad	  2009:	  10)	  or	  not	  the	  ‘real’	  Islam	  (Masquelier	  2009:	  26).	  Islam	  in	  South	  Asia	  would	  be	  a	   ‘Little	   tradition’	  on	   the	  periphery	  of	   the	   ‘real’,	   ‘Great	  tradition’	   (Redfield	   1956;	   Geertz	   1968;	   Gellner	   1981).	   However,	   in	   a	  problematic	   reversal	   of	   the	   authoritative	   definition	   of	   Islam,	   the	   literature	   on	  South	   Asian	   Islam	   has	   until	   recently	   tended	   to	   reproduce	   the	   dichotomy	  between	  a	  ‘real’	  and	  a	  ‘syncretic’	  Islam.	  A	  normative	  preference	  has	  been	  shown	  for	  Sufism,	  as	  the	  authentic,	  benign	  local	  practice,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  threatening,	  supposedly	   external	   reformist	   movements	   (Roy	   2005;	   see	   e.g.	   Ahmad	   1981;	  Ahmad	   and	   Reifeld	   2004;	   Bayly	   1992;	   Ewing	   1997;	   Jalal	   2008,	   Troll	   1989;	  Werbner	  and	  Basu	  1998;	  Waseem	  2003).	   It	   is	  now	  being	   recognised	   that	   this	  dichotomous	  paradigm	  is	   increasingly	  untenable	  as	   it	   suspiciously	  reproduces	  the	   Islamophobic	   discourse	   of	   the	   ‘good’	   and	   the	   ‘bad’	  Muslim	   (Lipton	   2011:	  427).	  The	  boundaries	  between	  pure	  and	  syncretic	  versions	  of	  Islam	  are	  crossed	  and	   often	   blurred	   in	   practice,	   resulting	   in	   ‘sufi’	   reformism	   and	   ‘reformist’	  traditionalism	  (F.	  Osella	  &	  C.	  Osella	  2008a:	  250).	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Attention	   to	   blurred	   boundaries	   and	   the	   ambiguity	   noted	   above	   is	  particularly	  salient	  in	  a	  study	  of	  Muslims,	  who	  have	  often	  been	  ‘freeze-­‐framed’	  (Latour	   2005)	   in	   an	   Islamic	   tradition;	   and	   even	   more	   so	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  Islamic	   reformism.	   Moreover,	   Muslims	   in	   India	   are	   hard	   pressed	   to	   avoid	  negative	  stereotypes.	  There	  is	  a	  pervasive	  idea	  of	  the	  Muslim	  as	  the	  Other,	  with	  a	   particular	   ‘Muslim	   mind’	   and	   a	   ‘Muslim	   outlook’,	   which	   is	   categorised	   as	  communal	  rather	  than	  secular	  (Hasan	  2002:	  7).	  The	  roots	  of	  Islamic	  reformism	  are	   perhaps	   not	   ‘lying	   deep	   in	   the	   Islamic	   past’	   (Robinson	   2008:	   260),	   but	  rather	  in	  the	  colonial	  past.	  Indeed,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  state	  categorisation	  had	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  modes	  of	  identification	  and	  social	  organisation.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	   the	   last	   century,	   Bengali	   Muslims	   had	   started	   to	   self-­‐consciously	   refer	   to	  themselves	   as	   ‘Muslims’	   –	   that	   is,	   as	   different	   from	   ‘Bengalis’	   and	   outwardly	  distinguished	   themselves	   from	   non-­‐Muslims	   (through	   Islamising	   dress,	  changing	  titles	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  Urdu	  newspapers,	  for	  instance)	  (Ahmed	  1988).	   These	   transformations	   are	   entwined	   with	   the	   expansion	   of	   religious	  reform	  movements	  during	  colonial	  rule	  (Masud	  2000a;	  Metcalf	  1989;	  Robinson	  2003,	  2008).	  The	   emphasis	   on	   ‘Muslimness’	   (Schielke	   2010:	   4)	   by	   Indian	  Muslims	   is	   as	  much	  a	  political	  act	  -­‐	  an	  act	  that	  emerges	  from	  a	  colonial	  history	  in	  interaction	  with	   a	   vernacularized	   reification	   of	   categories	   –	   as	   it	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	   their	  ethical	  commitments.	  Like	  the	  success	  of	   the	  Hindu	  nationalist	  movement,	   the	  success	   of	   Islamic	   reformism	   could	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   ‘“revenge”	   of	   colonial	  governmentality’	   (Hansen	   1999:	   9).	   In	   this	   light,	   Filippo	   and	   Caroline	   Osella	  (2008b,	   2009)	   and	   others	   (e.g.	   Green	   2013)	   refute	   ‘any	   sort	   of	   Muslim	   or	  Islamic	   exceptionalism’,	   arguing	   that	   ‘historically	   specific	   social	   and	   political	  contexts’	   (F.Osella	   &	   C.Osella	   2008b:	   320)	   inflect	   the	   orientations	   of	   Islamic	  reformism.	   Many	   of	   the	   practices	   of	   contemporary	   reformism	   in	   India	   are	  expressions	  of	   a	  nation-­‐wide	  development-­‐minded	  political	   and	   social	   agenda	  (F.Osella	  &	  C.Osella	  2008b,	  2009;	  see	  also	  Soares	  &	  Otayek	  2007).	   Indeed,	   the	  central	   tropes	   of	   reformist	   movements	   like	   the	   Deoband	   are	   rationality,	  education,	   and	   progress	   –	   the	   promise	   of	   becoming	   modern	   citizens	   in	   this	  world	   is	   as	   important	   as	   the	   promise	   of	   salvation	   (see	   e.g.	   Huq	   2008,	   2009;	  Jasani	  2013;	  Marsden	  2005:	  9,	  2008;	  Simpson	  2008).	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Against	   a	   purified	   view	   of	   Islam,	   I	   agree	   with	   the	   refutation	   of	  exceptionalism,	   and	   I	   take	   Islamic	   reformism	   in	   India	   to	   be	   a	   locally	   specific,	  post-­‐secular	  engagement	  with	  the	  ambiguous	  Indian	  modernity	  (see	  also	  Euben	  1999;	   Haniffa	   2013).	   However,	   I	   am	   not	   satisfied	  with	   exclusively	   contextual	  arguments	   as	   the	   full	   explanation	   for	   the	   appeal	   and	   form	   of	   contemporary	  Islamic	   practices	   and	   beliefs.	   In	   my	   analysis,	   I	   attempt	   to	   find	   ‘a	   cogent	   and	  viable	   middle	   way	   between	   ‘object-­‐dissolving’	   anti-­‐essentialism	   and	   over-­‐determined	   theories	   of…‘culture’’	   (Scott	   2005:	   118).	   Islamic	   reformism	   in	  Joygram	  has	  roots	   in	  the	  contemporary	  political	  context,	  but	  also	   in	  particular	  local	  ethical	  frames	  of	  personhood.	  ‘Muslimness’,	  I	  will	  argue,	  can	  be	  a	  category	  that	   encompasses	   these	   various	   dimensions	   of	   ethical	   life	   when	   it	   is	   not	  mistaken	  to	  be	  a	  ‘religious’	  identification	  in	  the	  modern	  conception.	  	  
Ethnographic	  explorations	  In	  this	  section	  I	  elaborate	  on	  my	  ethnographic	  approach.	  I	  take	  an	  analytical	  approach	   that	   puts	   ordinary	   ethics	   at	   the	   centre	   because	   it	   allows	   me	   to	  overcome	   the	  problems	  of	   categorisation	  discussed	  above.	  An	  analytical	   focus	  on	   ethics	   avoids	   the	   replication	   of	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   binary	   oppositions	  (religion/politics;	  religion/secularism)	  central	  to	  the	  ambiguous	  Indian	  project	  of	  modernity,	  while	  it	  allows	  me	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  practical	  invalidity.	  	  An	   inspirational	   predecessor	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	   work	   of	   Hansen	   (2000),	  who	  has	  given	  an	  account	  of	   the	  Muslim	  experience	  of	  secularism	  in	  an	  urban	  context	   (Mumbai)	   and	   shows	   how	   the	   social	   reality	   is	   not	   dividable	   into	   two	  separate	   spheres.	   Instead,	   on	   the	   ground	   practices	   are	   never	   only	  cultural/religious	  or	  political	  in	  nature	  but	  cross-­‐cut	  such	  divides.	  Although	  my	  data	   largely	   supports	   Hansen’s	   observations,	   I	   deviate	   from	   his	   analytical	  approach.	  Hansen	  starts	  his	  analysis	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  ‘political’;	  instead,	  I	  make	  ‘ordinary	   ethics’	   central	   (Lambek	   2010),	   because	   ‘while	   everything	   may	   be	  political,	  politics	  isn’t	  everything’	  (Lambek	  2000:	  132).	  The	  ‘political’,	  I	  suggest,	  is	   not	   an	   obvious	   category,	   but	   a	   category	   that	   emerged	   with	   a	   particular	  connotation	   out	   of	   a	   particular	   history.	   In	   the	   postcolonial	   narrative,	   the	  political	   is	   rendered	  morally	   neutral	   or	   invested	  with	   cultural	   symbolism;	   for	  the	   Muslims	   described	   in	   both	   Hansen’s	   and	   my	   work,	   these	   acts	   are	   highly	  significant,	  ethically	   loaded	  acts	   that	  are	  political,	  but	  cannot	  be	   limited	  to	  the	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political.	  For	  this	  reason,	  and	  to	  do	  more	  justice	  to	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  actors	  involved,	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  call	  this	  kind	  of	  action	  ‘ethical’.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   take	   my	   interlocutors’	   ethics	   seriously	   (Laidlaw	   2014a:	   52)	   I	  choose	   to	   approach	   it	   analytically	   in	   terms	   that	   resonate	   with	   their	   ethical	  reality.	   Lambek	  argues	   that	  of	   the	   three	  most	   influential	   approaches	   to	   ethics	  (deontological,	  consequentialist	  and	  virtue-­‐ethical),	  a	  virtue-­‐ethical	  approach	  is	  least	   prescriptive	   and	   most	   descriptive,	   in	   that	   it	   responds	   best	   to	   ‘what	   is	  empirically	  the	  case,	  not	  only	  in	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  extra-­‐modern	  societies,	  but	  among	  ourselves’	  (2008:	  151),	  and	  indeed	  including,	  as	  I	  shall	  demonstrate,	  West	  Bengali	  Muslim	  society.	  Prominent	   anthropologists	   studying	   ethics	   build	   their	   work	   on	   the	  universalistic	  premise	   that	  ethics	   is	  an	   integral	  aspect	  of	   the	  human	  condition	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  2;	  Lambek	  2010a:	  1	   -­‐2,	  2013:	  841);	  a	   claim	  substantiated	  by	  ethnography	   and	   theorised	  with	   reference	   to	   philosophy.	   Indeed,	   the	   current	  engagement	   of	   anthropology	  with	   ethics	   is	   inspired	   by	   a	   revived	   attention	   in	  philosophy	   to	   Aristotelian	   virtue	   ethics	   (e.g.	   Arendt	   1958;	   MacIntyre	   2007;	  Nussbaum	  1990;	  Taylor	  1989;	  Williams	  1981,	  2011)	  and,	  to	  different	  degrees,	  by	   Foucault’s	   work	   on	   ethical	   self-­‐cultivation	   (1988,	   2000).	   Drawing	   on	   this	  scholarship,	  anthropologists	  express	  a	  critique	  of	  a	  Kantian	  ethics	  of	  duty,	  and	  argue	  that	  ethics	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  separate	  domain	  of	  life	  (Laidlaw	  2014aa:	   2,	   Lambek	   2010a:	   2);	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   moral	   law	   (Das	   2010);	  should	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  the	  Durkheimian	  social	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  16	  –	  23);	  nor	  is	  the	  special	  concern	  of	  religion	  (Keane	  2010:	  79).	  These	  abstract	  accounts	  of	   ethics	   do	   not	   tally	   with	   the	   experiential	   reality	   (Das	   2007,	   2013,	   2014;	  Laidlaw	  2002,	  2014a;	  Lambek	  2010;	  Mahmood	  2005;	  Mattingly	  2012;	  cf.	  Fassin	  &	   Lézé	   2014;	   Robbins	   2004;	   Zigon	   2008).	   Instead,	   ethics	   are	   intrinsic	   to	  ordinary	  acts	  and	  speech	  (Das	  2012;	  Lambek	  2010).	  	  Regarding	   the	   anthropological	   approaches	   to	   ethics,	   I	   have	   found	   most	  useful	   the	  work	   of	   Michael	   Lambek	   (2000,	   2010a,	   2010b),	   Veena	   Das	   (2007,	  2010,	   2012,	   2014),	   James	   Laidlaw	   (2014a),	   Webb	   Keane	   (2000;	   2015)	   and	  other	  anthropological	   approaches	   that	   emphasise	   the	  dynamic	  and	   contextual	  nature	  of	  ethics	  and	  that	  allow	  for	  tensions	  to	  remain	  unresolved,	  because	  these	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approaches	   resonate	   best	   with	   my	   observations	   in	   Joygram.	   I	   take	   a	   neo-­‐Aristotelian	  approach	  to	  virtue	  ethics,	  which	  implies	  that	  I	  consider	  ethics	  to	  be	  the	   incessant	   human	   endeavour	   to	   live	   virtuously	   and	   produce	   a	   just	   society,	  through	   situated	   practice	   rather	   than	   routine	   obedience	   of	   fixed	   rules	   and	  norms	   (Lambek	   2000:	   313).	   To	   avoid	   an	   unrealistic	   romanticised	   view	   of	  ethical	  life	  I	  take	  ‘as	  central	  the	  human	  predicament	  of	  trying	  to	  live	  a	  life	  that	  one	   is	   somehow	   responsible	   for	   but	   is	   in	  many	   respects	   out	   of	   one’s	   control’	  (Mattingly	  2012:	  179).	   It	   is	  partly	  out	  of	  one’s	   control	  because	  of	   the	  political	  context	  –	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  depoliticise	  the	  ethics	  of	  virtue	  as	  Laidlaw	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  doing	  (see	  Fassin	  2014:	  433).	  Against	  Foucauldian	  poststructuralist	  accounts	   that	   tend	   to	   emphasise	   ethics	   as	   the	   cultivation	   of	   the	   self	   (e.g.	  Hirschkind	  2006;	  Faubion	  2011;	  Mahmood	  2005)	  I	  believe	  that	  ‘[t]he	  paths	  to	  a	  moral	  life	  do	  not	  lie…in	  either	  rule	  following	  or	  taking	  recourse	  to	  technologies	  of	   self	  making’	   (Das	  2014:	  492).	  The	  cultivation	  of	   the	   self	   is	  only	  one	  way	  of	  trying	   to	   ‘keep	   […]	   at	   bay	   the	   skepticism	   that	   shadows	   relations’	   (Das	   2014:	  493)	  because	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  everyday	  life.	  Indeed,	  I	  want	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  melancholy	  and	  scepticism	  created	  by	  the	   ‘difficulty	  of	  reality’	  (Das	  2014),	  the	  ethical	   tragedy	  where	   there	   is	  not	  one	  good	  choice	   in	  a	   ‘conflict	  of	  values’	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  169).	  Through	  the	  conceptual	  lens	  of	  the	  ‘difficulty	  of	  reality’	  I	  will	  look	  at	  the	  ways	  my	  interlocutors	  deal	  with	  their	  immoral	  environment	  and	  especially	   with	   their	   own	   (or	   their	   relatives’	   or	   neighbours’)	   implication	   and	  participation.	  	  As	  mentioned	  at	   the	  outset,	  my	   thesis	   can	  be	  analytically	  divided	   into	   two	  parts:	  the	  roots	  of	  ethical	  action	  and	  processes	  of	  vernacularisation.	  Below	  I	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  core	  ethnographic	  arguments	  of	  each	  part,	  after	  which	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  my	  findings	  feed	  into	  broader	  theoretical	  arguments.	  	  
Roots	  of	  ethical	  action	  	  The	  first	  analytical	  step	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  study	  of	  ordinary	  ethics	  is	  to	  go	  deeper	   inside	  the	  ethnographic	  field	  to	  reveal	  the	  roots	  of	  social	  action,	  which	  will	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   chapter	   2	   and	   3.	   I	   have	   implied	   that	   ‘Muslimness’	   is	   a	  complex	   ethical	   category.	   In	   order	   to	   deconstruct	   this	   category,	   I	   start	   my	  analysis	  not	  with	   the	  category	   ‘Muslim’	  but	  with	   the	  category	   ‘person’.	  To	   live	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like	  a	  human	  being	  and	  not	  like	  an	  animal	  is	  to	  live	  with	  dharma,	  which	  implies	  that	   dharma	   is	   an	   essential	   element	   to	   becoming	   a	   human	   and	   a	   person,	   a	  
mānuṣ.	  I	   have	   been	   pressed	   to	   de-­‐essentialise	   the	   Muslim	   identity	   because	   my	  interlocutors	   share	   the	   South	   Asian	   ideologies	   that	   defy	   the	   separation	   of	  material	  substances	  and	  moral	  code	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  easily	  accommodate	  the	   idea	   of	   an	   essentialised	   identity.	   I	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   macrocosmic	  ideologies	  of	   the	   Islamic	  dharma	   fundamentally	  address	   forms	  of	   ‘relatedness’	  (Carsten	  2000):	  relatedness	  through	  bio-­‐moral	  substances	  and	  from	  within	  the	  positionality	   within	   the	   jāti.	   A	   person,	   then,	   is	   perpetually	   in	   a	   process	   of	  becoming	  through	  bio-­‐moral	  exchanges	  within	  networks	  of	  relatedness	  among	  which	   Muslim	   jāti	   relatedness	   is	   pivotal.	   I	   show	   in	   detail	   that	   the	   Islamic	  
dharma	  and	  the	  community	  identity	  (jāti)	  are	  visceral	  elements	  of	  ‘becoming	  a	  person’.	   Indeed,	   I	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   no	   moral	   personhood	   outside	   of	  relatedness	   conceived	   of	   through	   dharma.	   To	   stabilise	   the	   fluidity	   of	   moral	  personhood	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  chaos	  outside	  of	  dharma,	  a	  particular	  jāti	  identity	  with	   a	   particular	   dharma	   becomes	   ideologically	   essentialised	   in	   the	   mutable	  moral	  person.	  	  This	   analysis	   of	   personhood	   has	   significant	   consequences	   for	   the	   kind	   of	  ethics	  Bengali	  Muslims	  engage	  in,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  scholarship	  on	  religion	  and	  ethics	   more	   broadly.	   It	   demonstrates	   the	   deficiency	   alluded	   to	   earlier	   of	   a	  purified	   Salvationist	   framework	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   Bengali	   Muslims.	   Although	  there	   are	  decidedly	   Salvationist	   elements	   in	   Joygrami	   cosmopolitics,	   I	   suggest	  that	  this	  does	  not	  have	  the	  implications	  that	  others	  have	  anticipated.	  	  In	   his	   classic	   discussion	   of	   Mauss’	   famous	   essay	   ‘The	   gift’	   (1966),	   Parry	  (1986)	  argues	  that	  the	  stark	  separation	  between	  this	  world	  and	  the	  afterlife	  in	  Salvationist	   world	   religions	   has	   allowed	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   distinction	  between	   disinterested	   and	   purely	   self-­‐interested	   gifts,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  Maussian	   gift	   in	  which	   interest	   and	   disinterest	   are	   deeply	   intertwined.	   Parry	  suggests	   that	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	   ‘free	   gift’	   is	  made	   possible	   by	   the	   idea	   that	  rewards	   are	   delayed	   until	   the	   afterlife,	   with,	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  corollary	  domain	  of	  purely	  self-­‐interested	  action	  (the	  roots	  to	  the	  development	  of	   the	   autonomous	   capitalist	   market).	   According	   to	   Parry,	   the	   separation	   of	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exchanges	   directed	   at	   this-­‐worldly	   and	   otherworldly	   goals	   implies	   a	   range	   of	  other	   oppositions	   in	   Salvationist	   religions:	   the	  material	   and	   spiritual,	   persons	  and	  things,	  etcetera.	  	  Parry’s	  conception	  of	  particular	  values	  and	  ideas	  of	  personhood	  attached	  to	  particular	   belief	   systems	   fits	   within	   a	   longer	   philosophical	   tradition	   that	  equates	  morality	  with	  asceticism	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  more	  reflective	  ethics.	  In	  his	  conceptualisation	   of	   ethics,	   Laidlaw	   (2002;	   2014)	   tacitly	   draws	   on	   the	  distinctions	   made	   by	   Parry	   regarding	   Salvationist	   religions,	   and	   combines	   it	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Nietzsche	  and	  Foucault.	  Morality,	   in	  Laidlaw’s	  view,	  becomes	  equated	   with	   a	   (Nietzschean)	   self-­‐denying	   asceticism:	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	  worldly	   self	   in	   the	  pursuit	   of	   otherworldly	   aspirations.	  Against	   this,	   he	   posits	  (Foucauldian)	  ethics,	  which	  is	  reflective	  and	  constructive	  of	  the	  self.	  Against	   Parry’s	   generalisation,	   Cannell	   (2005;	   2013)	   has	   convincingly	  argued	   that	  a	   separation	  of	  opposed	  domains	  and	  actions	  does	  not	   reflect	   the	  lived	  experience	  or	  the	  ideology	  of	  all	  people	  calling	  themselves	  Christians,	  nor,	  I	  suggest,	  of	  those	  calling	  themselves	  Muslim.	  A	  purified	  Salvationist	  framework	  would	  not	  explain	   the	  cosmology	  of	  my	   interlocutors	  because	   the	  roots	  of	   the	  ethical	  actions	  of	  my	  Muslim	  interlocutors	  lie	  in	  dharma,	  which	  is	  dynamic	  and	  encompasses	   South	   Asian	   ideologies	   and	   practices	   of	   kinship,	   personhood	   as	  well	   as	   Islamic	   theology.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   that	   my	   interlocutors	   attach	   a	  particular	   Islamic	  notion	   to	  dharma,	  which	   includes	   ideas	  of	  Salvationism	  and	  asceticism.	   But	   in	   the	   ordinary,	   everyday	   dilemmas	   that	   I	   address,	   the	  opposition	   between	   a	   Salvationist	   religion,	   a	   reflective	   ethics,	   and	   a	   holistic	  ideology	  is	  far	  from	  clear-­‐cut.	  	  Despite	   a	   law-­‐like	   Islamic	   normativity	   and	   certain	   self-­‐denying	   ascetic	  practices,	  my	  Muslim	   interlocutors	  engage	   in	   fluid	  and	  constructive	  processes	  of	  becoming	   through	  bio-­‐moral	   exchanges,	  which	  originate	   in	   the	   cosmogonic	  act	   of	   Allah’s	   gift	   of	   life.	   Indeed,	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   ‘contract	   behind	  contracts’	   (Lambek	   2010a)	   with	   the	   creator-­‐god	   allows	   for	   the	   potential	   for	  ethics	   to	   emerge:	   the	   cosmogonic	   act	   is	   primary;	   from	   this,	   relatedness	  emerges;	   and	   finally,	   only	   from	   this	   relatedness	   are	   personhood	   and	   ethics	  derived.	  Still,	  having	  established	  this	  causal	  chain,	   I	  go	  on	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	   relationship	  may	  better	   be	  understood	   as	   hermeneutic:	   the	  macro-­‐cosmic	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order	   stands	   in	  a	   symbiotic	   relationship	   to	   individual	  virtue,	   as	   these	  are	   two	  sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin.	   Furthermore,	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	  idea	   of	   virtuous	   judgement	   (phronesis,	   Lambek	   2000:	   309),	  which	   refutes	   the	  opposition	  of	  ethicised,	  otherworldly	  directed	  action	  (in	  the	  religious	  domain)	  and	  self-­‐interested	  action	  (in	  political	  or	  economic	  domains):	  actions	  are	  never	  merely	   instrumental	   but	   always	   the	   embodied	   product	   of	   historically	  contextualised	   practical	   judgements.	   Ethical	   considerations	   are	   integral	   to	  reasoned	   judgement,	   and	   reasoned	   judgement	   cannot	   be	   limited	   to	   nor	   be	  excluded	  from	  either	  the	  political	  or	  the	  religious	  (ibid.:	  310).	  	  The	   local,	   holistic	   ideology	   and	   the	   Salvationist	   normativity	   are	   as	   such	  encompassed	  in	  dharma,	  despite	  contradictions	  between	  the	  two.	  People	  hardly	  ever	   hold	   completely	   coherent	   belief	   systems	   or	   ideologies,	   and	   ethical	   life	   is	  rife	  with	  tension	  (Das	  2007,	  2013,	  2014;	  Lambek	  2010a;	  Robbins	  2004,	  2009;	  Zigon	   2007,	   2009).	   My	   interlocutors,	   as	   mentioned,	   live	   with	   such	  contradictions	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  The	  enhanced	  stress	  on	  Salvationist	  aspects	  by	  Islamic	   reformists	   and	   the	   ambiguity	   of	   modern	   modes	   of	   categorisation	  however,	   do	   create	   increasing	   tensions	   as	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	  below.	  	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  discussion	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  the	  Islam	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  is	  not	  moulded	  according	  to	  our	  Western,	  Christian	  understanding	  of	   a	   Salvationist	   religion,	   but	   to	   a	   regional	   understanding	   of	   dharma.	   On	   the	  other	   hand,	   perhaps	   adherence	   to	   a	   Salvationist	   religion	   does	   not	   imply	   a	  dualistic	   separation	   between	   the	   physical	   and	   the	   spiritual	   and	   between	   this	  world	  and	  the	  afterlife	  in	  the	  lived	  reality	  (see	  Cannell	  2005:	  351).	  That	  is,	  the	  difference	   between	   the	   lived	   experiences	   and	   actual	   ethics	   of	   adherents	   of	  various	   belief	   systems	  may	   not	   be	   as	   great	   as	   the	   oppositions	   postulated	   by	  Parry	   and	   Laidlaw	   seem	   to	   imply,	   and	   a	   law-­‐like	   morality	   might	   always	   be	  contextualised	  by	  sociality	  and	  embedded	  in	  a	  dynamic	  virtue	  ethics.	  I	  return	  to	  the	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  this	  idea	  further	  down.	  	  	  
Processes	  of	  vernacularisation	  	  I	   proceed	   in	   chapter	   4	   and	   5	   to	   contextualise	   the	   local	   cosmopolitics	   in,	  firstly,	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   environment,	   and	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multi-­‐jāti	   society.	   The	   political	   and	   economic	   environment	   is	   experienced	   as	  deeply	   immoral	   as	   the	   ‘rural	  masses’	   encounter	   structural	   violence	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  As	  my	  interlocutors	  are	  denied	  substantive	  citizenship,	  they	  recognise	  the	  exclusionary	  mechanisms	  of	   the	  state	  and	  consider	  this	  due	  to	  the	  destructive	  idea	  of	  a	  morally	  neutral	  political	  sphere.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  desire	  for	  a	  revival	  of	  dharma	  in	  all	  spheres	  of	  life	  is	  expressed.	  	  Taking	   into	   account	   the	   roots	   of	   ethical	   action,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   why	   I	  understand	  Islamic	  reformism	  to	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  broader	  drive	  for	  ethical	  renewal.	   If	   there	   is	   no	   moral	   personhood	   outside	   dharma,	   becoming	   a	   ‘good	  person’	   inevitably	   implies	   becoming	   a	   good	   person	  with	   a	   particular	   dharma	  and	   a	   particular	   jāti.	   So	   a	   project	   of	   social	   renewal	   will	   rhetorically	   and	  performatively	  be	   located	  within	   the	  Muslim	   jāti,	   even	   though	   its	   roots	  are	   in	  
dharma	  and	  its	  scope	  and	  aspiration	  all-­‐encompassing	  and	  holistic.	  	  This	   kind	   of	   ideological	   essentialisation	   is	   further	   enhanced	   by	   the	  taxonomy	   of	   the	   modern	   state,	   as	   my	   interlocutors	   are	   confronted	   with	   the	  reification	  of	  religious	  identity	  by	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state;	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  modern	  democracy;	  and	  the	  ambiguous	  secularism	  of	  (post)colonial	  India.	  The	  inherent	   ambiguity	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   the	   secular	   Indian	   democracy	   (Hansen	  1999:	   16-­‐60)	   produces	   a	   continuous	   sense	   of	   impending	   chaos	   in	   the	  fragmented	   life	  worlds	   of	  my	   interlocutors.	   The	   result	   is	  mutually	   reinforcing	  processes	   of	   increasing	   essentialisation	   and	   increasing	   ambiguity	   and	  contradiction.	  Ambiguity	  is	  not	  just	  an	  individual	  emotion;	  it	  is	  also	  the	  outcome	  of	   political	   strategies.	   In	   particular,	   political	   strategies	   that	   curtail	   the	   ethical	  life	  worlds	  of	  the	  minorities.	  	  The	   state	   cannot	   be	   trusted	   to	   create	   peace,	   so	   it	   becomes	   the	   ethical	  responsibility	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  community	  to	  maintain	  order.	  Inter-­‐jāti	  harmony	  is	  constantly	  negotiated	  through	  bio-­‐moral	  exchanges	  that	  sustain	  the	  tension	   of	   living	   with	   differences.	   Dharma	   offers	   the	   potential	   for	   mutual	  resonance	  and	  peace:	  currently,	  the	  potentially	  dangerous	  Other	  is	  the	  political	  party	   (thought	   to	   lack	   dharma)	   rather	   than	   the	   other	   jāti	   that	   does	   have	  
dharma.	  However,	   the	  burden	  of	   responsibility	   to	  bear	   tension	   is	   increasingly	  with	   Muslims,	   who	   are	   portrayed	   as	   the	   dangerous	   Other	   in	   the	   Hindu	  nationalist	  narrative.	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Moreover,	   my	   interlocutors	   are	   acutely	   aware	   of	   their	   own	   unavoidable	  implication	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   vicious	   economic	   and	   political	   practices.	  Especially	   for	   the	   poor,	   survival	   may	   depend	   on	   the	   willingness	   to	   make	  concessions.	   The	   ‘householder’s	   dilemma’	   (Das	   2014;	   cf.	   Lambek	   2013:	   845),	  that	  is,	  the	  impossibility	  to	  transcend	  one’s	  biological	  needs	  when	  living	  in	  this	  world,	  is	  particularly	  great	  in	  a	  thoroughly	  politicised	  and	  corrupt	  environment,	  and	   when	   resources	   are	   scarce.	   This	   ethical	   tragedy,	   however,	   becomes	  interpreted	   as	   a	  moral	   failure	   of	   both	   the	   individual	   as	  well	   as	   of	   the	  Muslim	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  a	  necessary	  revival	  of	  dharma	  that	  I	  observed	  is	  a	  way	  of	  taking	  responsibility,	  regaining	  ethical	  dignity	  and	  trying	  to	  restore	  the	  flaws	  of	  the	   state	   –	   as	   it	   is	   for	   the	   Hindu	   nationalists	   described	   by	   Hansen	   (1999).	  Islamic	  reformism	  takes	  a	  very	  different	  form,	  particularly	  in	  its	  representation	  in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   Again,	   the	   difference	   is	   in	   part	   a	   result	   of	   colonial	   and	  postcolonial	   forms	  of	  ordering	  society	  (with	  the	  Muslim	  community	   lacking	   in	  public	   legitimacy),	   and	   in	   part	   of	   the	   vernacular	   categories	   through	   which	  Indian	   Muslims	   order	   their	   social	   environment.	   My	   interlocutors	   respond	   in	  creative	   ways	   to	   the	   ‘decay	   of	   public	   life	   in	   India’	   (Hansen	   1999:	   57)	   in	   a	  language	   that	   is	   the	   vernacularised	   amalgam	   between	   the	   political	   discourse	  that	  they	  have	  appropriated,	  and	  their	  habitual	  sense	  of	  justice.	  The	  encounters	  with	  legal	  and	  bureaucratic	  practices	  of	  the	  state	  have	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  the	   configuration	   of	   dharma	   in	  modern	   society:	   ‘[o]bjectification	   puts	   actions	  and	  actors	  at	  risk	  by	  giving	  them	  semiotic	  (thus	  public)	  form	  and	  changing	  their	  epistemic	   and	   pragmatic	   status’	   (Keane	   2003:	   239).	   Islamic	   reformism	   is	   an	  inherently	   ambiguous	   response	   to	   the	   modern	   categorisation	   and	  objectification	   of	   dharma	   as	   ‘religion’:	   it	   is	   a	   non-­‐political,	   rationalised	   and	  individualised	   expression	   of	   dharma,	   but	   contains	   the	   potential	   for	   holistic	  ethical	   renewal	  by	  making	   Islam	  a	   ‘total	  way	  of	   life’.	  By	  analysing	   the	   shifting	  grammar	  of	   ethics	   I	   reveal	   the	   fluid	  processes	  of	   vernacularisation:	  processes	  where	  modern	  sensibilities	  become	  encapsulated,	  transformed,	  or	  excluded	  by	  already	  existing	  (and	  always	  dynamic)	  embodied	  ideologies	  and	  practises.	  I	   want	   to	   avoid	   the	   idea	   that	  my	   interlocutors	   are	   the	   ‘prisoners’	   of	   their	  own	  traditional	  categories,	  and	  that	  they	  lack	  the	  ‘secular’	  agency	  that	  rational,	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secular	   citizens	   are	   ascribed.	   In	   this	   position	   I	   follow	   anthropologists	   like	  Mahmood	  (2005)	  who	  convincingly	  argue	   that	   liberal	   freedom	   is	  not	   the	  only	  possible	   ground	   of	   agency	   or	   resistance.	   Mahmood’s	   work,	   however,	   lacks	   a	  subtle	  analysis	  of	  the	  roots	  of	  ethical	  action	  of	  her	  interlocutors.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  personhood	  and	  sociality	  in	  the	  initial	  chapters	  of	  the	  thesis,	  the	  succeeding	  chapters	   illustrate	   the	  more	  subtle	  ways	   in	  which	   Joygramis	  enact	  their	  political	  thought	  and	  agency,	  rather	  than	  merely	  reproducing	  the	  myth	  of	  anti-­‐politics,	  or	  reacting	  against	  it.	  	  This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   great	   irony	   of	   the	   Muslims’	  predicament	   is	   in	   the	   inherent	   contradictions	   of	   the	   secular	   ideology	   that	  ‘freezes’	   Muslims	   in	   a	   pre-­‐political	   ‘religious’	   community	   only	   to	   deny	  legitimacy	  to	  their	  ethical	  narrative	  -­‐	  and	  deny	  their	  human	  dignity.	  The	  ethical	  tragedy	  is	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  conversion	  to	  Islamic	  reformism	  is	  counterproductive	  to	  its	  telos	  (goal):	  although	  reformist	  aesthetics	  and	  moral	  practice	  are	  intended	  to	   drive	   holistic	   ethical	   renewal	   (including	   ethical	   political	   and	   economic	  practice,	  and	  including	  all	  jātis),	  a	  reintegration	  of	  the	  plural	  social	  world	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   dharma	   is	   bound	   to	   fail	   for	   the	   Muslim	  minority	   living	   in	   a	   country	  ruled	   by	   the	   majority.	   In	   contrast,	   due	   to	   the	   limited	   depoliticised	   space	   for	  navigation	  of	  Muslims	  reified	  in	  a	  bounded	  ‘pre-­‐modern’	  community,	  reformism	  reinforces	   their	   ‘religious’	   identity	   and	   as	   such	   feeds	   into	   the	   exclusionary	  mechanisms	  of	  Indian	  secularism.	  	  The	  ethical	  tragedy	  of	  this	  insolubility	  is	  the	  tension	  Joygramis	  live	  with	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  It	  is	  this	  tension	  that	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  made	  palpable	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  I	  do	  not	  pretend	  to	  offer	  solutions,	  but	  rather	  to	  give	  an	  honest	  account	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  social	  life	  for	  a	  religious	  minority	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  
Theoretical	  framework	  As	   stated	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   introduction,	  my	   ambition	   is	   to	   arrive	   at	   a	  better	   insight	   into	   the	   nature	   of	   ethical	   life	   through	   the	   study	   of	   the	   Islamic	  
dharma	   in	   Joygram.	  As	   already	   explained,	   the	   point	   of	   the	   preceding	   sections	  has	   been	   to	   explore	   the	   value	   yet	   also	   the	   difficulties	   of	   asking	   this	   broad	  question	  in	  this	  very	  particular	  context.	  Here,	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  I	  have	  employed	  to	  overcome	  these	  difficulties.	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Maurice	  Bloch	  (2008)	  developed	  a	  theoretical	   frame	  for	  the	  transcendental	  
social	   -­‐	   the	   time-­‐less	   and	   space-­‐less	   social	   organisation	   of	   essentialised	   social	  roles	   and	   groups	   –	   that	   coexists	   in	   a	   mutually	   dependent	   fashion	   with	   the	  
transactional	   social	   -­‐	   the	   time-­‐	   and	   space-­‐bounded	   domain	   of	   everyday	  exchanges,	  competitions	  and	  power	  struggles	  of	  mortal	  individuals.	  Humans	  are	  distinctively	  able	  to	  live	  in	  the	  fictional	  world	  of	  the	  transcendental	  social	  where	  people	  act	   towards	  each	  other	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  essentialised	  roles	  and	  statuses	  and	   imagined	   communities.	   Indeed,	   Bloch	   argues	   that	   imagination	   is	   the	  cognitive	   faculty	   that	   distinguishes	   homo	   sapiens	   from	   even	   our	   nearest	  primates.	  Imagination	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  power	  of	  rituals	  and	  essentialised	  roles	  and	   groups:	   they	   are	   imagined	   to	   transcend	   a	   specific	   time	   and	   place,	   and	   as	  such	   they	  sustain	   the	  social	   reproduction	  of	   the	  community	  or	  society.	  So	  any	  human	  being	  will	  live	  partly	  within	  the	  transcendental	  social	  –	  even	  if	  this	  only	  really	  exists	  in	  the	  imagination	  and	  is	  very	  often	  unconscious.	  If	  we	  would	  live	  exclusively	  in	  a	  transactional	  social,	  then	  exchanges	  would	  be	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  competition	  and	  accumulation;	  reproduction	  would	  be	  only	  physiological.	  We	  would,	  in	  fact,	  live	  like	  animals.	  	  The	   transcendental	   social	   emerges	   from	   the	   human	   capacity	   for	   social	  imagination	   and	   as	   such	   comes	   analytically	   before	   any	   particular	   social	  formation	  and	  thus	  conceptually	  encompasses	  religious,	  secular	  or	  other	  ethical	  frameworks.	  I	  am	  using	  this	  conceptual	  architecture	  to	  enable	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  entire	   ethical	   life	   world	   of	   my	   interlocutors,	   undistorted	   by	   the	   reified	   and	  culturally	   specific	   categories	   of	   the	   analyst,	  with	   the	   ambition	   to	   open	  up	   the	  possibility	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  comparisons.	  	  	  Moreover,	   this	   theoretical	   framework	  allows	  me	   to	  address	  one	  of	   the	  key	  analytical	   problems	   in	   the	   anthropology	   of	   virtue	   ethics,	   namely	   the	   role	   of	  freedom	  for	  ethics,	  following	  from	  the	  assertions	  that	  ethics	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  a	  moral	   compliance	   with	   obligation	   or	   convention,	   nor	   enacted	   in	   the	   total	  absence	   of	   constraints	   (see	   for	   an	   overview	   Heywood	   2015).	   Although	   the	  ‘ethical	   turn’	   is	  mostly	  about	  a	  change	   in	  perspective	  and	  analytical	  approach,	  the	  question	  regarding	  freedom	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  question	  whether	  ethics	  is	  a	   universal	   capacity	   of	   the	   mind	   or	   a	   result	   of	   cultural	   conditions.	   In	   other	  
47	  	  
words:	   is	   there	   a	   universal	   human	   aspect	   that	   allows	   for	   ethics	   to	   emerge	   in	  various	  ideological	  manifestations	  and	  locations?	  Lambek	  (2010a:	  1-­‐2)	  claims	  that	  ‘the	  bases	  for	  the	  ethical	  predisposition	  are	  no	  doubt	  both	  ontogenetic	  and	  phylogenetic’	  (see	  also	  Keane	  2010:	  73,	  2015).	  Laidlaw	   (2002,	   2014a)	   suggests	   that	   freedom	   is	   definitional	   of	   ethics	   –	   not	  absolute	  freedom	  but	  the	  freedom	  inherent	  in	  reflective	  consciousness	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  96,	  102,	  108-­‐9,	  149).	  Neither	  Laidlaw	  nor	  Lambek	  are	  suggesting	  innate	  access	  to	  universal	  moral	  laws,	  but	  both	  seem	  to	  assume	  the	  universality	  of	  an	  innate	   ability	   to	  make	   practical	   ethical	   judgment,	   whether	   upon	   reflection	   or	  not.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  cannot	  ‘reduce	  the	  ethical	  to	  human	  psychology’	  (Lambek	  2010b:	  42),	   since	  both	  Lambek	   (2010a:	  2,	  10,	  17;	  2013)	  and	  Laidlaw	  (2014a:	  e.g.	  149,	  162),	  and	  including	  others	  (e.g.	  Das	  2010,	  2014;	  Keane	  2010)	  attend	  to	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   ethical	   is	   social;	   ‘the	   ethical	   is	   a	   modality	   of	   social	   action’	  (Lambek	   2010a:	   10,	   emphasis	   added).	   So	   instead,	   we	   have	   to	   situate	   ethical	  affordances	   between	   sheer	   cultural	   determinism	   and	   pure	   self-­‐invention	  (Keane	  2015:	  31).	  With	  Keane,	  and	  contra	  Laidlaw,	  I	  contend	  that	  ‘reflexivity	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  precondition	  for	  ethics	  as	  such’	  (2015:	  24-­‐5).	  Instead,	  I	  want	  to	  take	   a	   clue	   from	   my	   ethnography	   to	   make	   the	   tentative	   suggestion	   that	   the	  capacity	  to	  imagine	  may	  be	  the	  universal	  human	  predisposition	  that	  generates	  behaviour	  that	  is	  called	  ‘ethics’.	  	  Bloch	  (2008)	  claims	  that	  imagination	  is	  an	  innate	  faculty	  exclusive	  to	  homo	  
sapiens.	  Even	  if	  I	  want	  to	  avoid	  making	  such	  a	  strong	  ontological	  claim	  (not	  the	  least	  because	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  expertise	  to	  evaluate	  such	  a	  claim)	  I	  feel	  that	  the	  imagination	   is	   ‘good	  to	   think	  with’.	  10	  Central	   to	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   transcendental	  social,	   is	   the	   observation	   that	   only	   by	   virtue	   of	   imagination	   can	  we	   relate	   in	  particular	  ways	  to	  particular	  people,	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  imagine	  others	  and	  ourselves	  to	  occupy	  a	  role,	  within	  a	  group,	  gives	  speech	  and	  action	   its	  ethical	  dimension.	   Indeed,	   in	  my	   fieldsite,	   relatedness	   is	  a	  priori	  the	  person	  and	  society	  in	  the	  ideological	  construction	  of	  the	  self.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  term	  imagination	  may	  suggest	  that	  what	  is	  conceived	  in	  imagination	  is	  not	  real.	  This	  is	  not	  my	  intention;	  rather	  ‘imagination’	  is	  to	  imply	  the	  propensity	  to	  transcend	  time	  and	  place.	  For	  example,	  I	  want	  to	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  god	  exists.	  But	  to	  conceive	  of	  god,	  one	  has	  to	  have	  the	  propensity	  to	  transcend	  time	  and	  place.	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If	   imagination	   is	   the	   premise,	   then	   the	   social	   is	   not	   an	   immutable,	  deterministic	   whole,	   nor	   is	   the	   ethical	   an	   innate	   disposition;	   ethics	   and	   the	  social	  are	  inherently	  symbiotic.	  So	  I	  venture	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  positionality	  of	   the	  person	  bound	  up	  with	   the	  construction	  of	   the	  social	   is	  axiomatic	  to	  the	  ethical	  elsewhere.	  As	  Keane	  (2010:	  82)	  argues,	  ‘the	  bare	  fact	  of	  life	  with	  others	  [is]	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  ethics’;	  but	  animals	  live	  with	  others	  yet	  are	  not	  necessarily	  deemed	  ethical.	   Indeed,	  Long	  and	  Moore	  (2013)	  observed,	   the	  only	   aspect	   that	   seems	   to	   have	   universal	   recurrence	   in	   distinctively	   human	  forms	  of	  sociality	  is	  the	  ethical	  imagination.	   ‘The	  ethical	  subject	  here	  is	  the	  set	  of	  relations	  rather	  than	  an	  individual’	  (Das	  2014:	  492)	  because	  ethics	  ‘require	  a	  self	  and	  an	  other	  to	  whom	  that	  self	  owes	  an	  accounting’	  (Keane	  2015:	  26);	  an	  other	   who	   exists	   in	   an	   imaged	   relationship	   to	   the	   self.	   Humans	   are	  distinguishable	   from	   animals	   because	   of	   their	   innate	   propensity	   for	  imagination,	   thanks	   to	   which	   sociality	   across	   time	   and	   space	   is	   possible	   and	  from	   which	   the	   capability	   to	   enact	   the	   ethical	   potential	   emerges.	   Religion,	  
dharma	  and	  secularism	  are	  particular	  configurations	  of	  ethical	  imaginations.	  As	  Lambek	   points	   out,	   drawing	   on	   Rappaport,	   ‘…religion	   works	   by	   realizing	   the	  imagined’	   (2000:	   311)	   –	   and	   we	   need	   to	   understand	   religions	   as	   particular	  cultural	   phenomena	   that	   render	   visible	   and	   practical	   particular	   ethical	  imaginations.	  The	  imagination,	  I	  argue,	  is	  the	  key	  ethical	  affordance,	  from	  which	  others	  follow.11	  	  	  In	   turn,	   the	   anthropology	   of	   ethics	   allows	   me	   to	   further	   develop	   Bloch’s	  model.	  One	  of	  the	  critiques	  of	  Bloch’s	  model	  is	  his	  inability	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  two	   ‘socials’	   relate;	   the	   theoretical	   aim	   of	   his	   later	   work	   is	   to	   find	   universal	  similarities	   across	   humanity	   rather	   than	   explanations	   for	   variation	   (see	   also	  Parry	   2007:	   337ff).12	  I	   suggest	   that	   this	   deficiency	   is	   due	   to	   Bloch’s	   lack	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  A	   caveat	  may	   be	   in	   order.	   In	   chapter	   2	   and	   3	   I	   argue	   that	   in	   the	   cosmopolitics	   of	   my	  interlocutors	   there	   is	   no	   conceivable	   self	   and	   no	   humanity	   before	   relatedness.	  My	   claim	   that	  imagination	  is	  axiomatic	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  self;	  a	  self	  that	  can	  imagine.	  Yet	  my	   point	   is	   this:	   before	   relatedness,	   there	   is	   no	   humanity,	   but	   animals.	   An	   animal,	   with	  imagination,	  will	  imagine	  itself	  to	  be	  related,	  thus	  will	  be	  human.	  12	  Although	  Bloch	  has	  published	  extensively	  on	  ideas	  informing	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  presented	  here	  (e.g.	  1977,	  1986,	  1992)	  the	  particular	  conceptualisation	  I	  use	  appears	  only,	  as	  far	   as	   I	   am	   aware,	   in	   one	   article	   (2008).	   I	   have	   been	   informed	   by	   a	   seminar	   series	   titled	  ‘“Religion”,	  Cognition	  and	  the	  State’,	  held	  at	  the	  Anthropology	  Department	  of	  the	  LSE	  in	  autumn	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attention	  to	  ethics,	  and	  his	  unwillingness	  to	  take	  ethics	  seriously	  as	  a	  dimension	  of	  life	  beyond	  the	  struggle	  for	  power.	  As	  Lambek	  observes,	  in	  Bloch’s	  view	  the	  ritual	   establishment	   of	   the	   transcendental	   world	   serves	   as	   a	   means	   for	  alienation	   and	   repression,	   and	   ‘[i]mplicitly	   the	   ethical	   subsists	   outside	   the	  transcendent	   or	   in	   the	   attempts	   to	   escape	   from	   its	   shadow’	   (Lambek	   2012:	  348).	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  go	  beyond	  Bloch	  and	  to	  show	  how	  in	  a	  particular	  historical	  moment	  and	  in	  a	  particular	  place	  the	  universal	  human	  predicament	  is	  acted	  upon.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  combine	  Bloch’s	  theory	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  ethics,	  to	  explore	   the	   idealised	   forms	   of	   contracts	   and	   exchange	   from	   which	   ethical	  potential	  is	  generated.	  This	  allows	  me	  to	  turn	  Bloch’s	  general	  and	  abstract	  point	  into	   a	   more	   fine-­‐grained	   analytical	   framework	   for	   exploring	   the	   content	   of	  ethical	  imaginations	  and	  their	  consequences	  for	  social	  relations.	  I	  want	  to	  argue,	  in	  the	  vein	  of	  Lambek,	  that	  ethics	  is	  derived	  from	  rituals	  and	  the	   transcendental	   social,	   even	   if	   this	   relationship	   is	   ‘primarily	   one	   of	   formal	  entailment	   rather	   than	   of	   substance	   (specific	   content)’	   (2012:	   347).	   Ethics	   is	  always	  aimed	  at	  transcending	  the	  human’s	  mortal	  nature	  and	  safe-­‐guarding	  the	  harmony	  and	  continuity	  of	  the	  social	  group.	  If	  ‘religion	  is	  nothing	  special’	  (Bloch	  2008)	  there	   is	  no	  stark	  differentiation	  between	  this-­‐worldly	  and	  otherworldly	  goals;	  both	  are	  in	  the	  transcendental	  social.	  By	  implication,	  value	  statements	  are	  never	   either	   grounded	   in	   (transcendental)	   conceptions	   of	   human	   nature,	   or	  purely	  contextual	  (this-­‐worldly);	  a	  distinction	  that	  some	  scholars	  of	  ethics	  make	  (Laidlaw	  1995:	  10-­‐11).	  I	  venture	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  ethics	  is	  the	  linking	   of	   particular	   acts	   to	   larger	   collective	   ideals	   (see	   also	  Keane	   2015:	   18-­‐19).	  	  A	   study	   of	  dharma	   is	   particularly	   apt	   for	   such	   an	   analysis:	   the	  multi-­‐level	  (macro-­‐	   and	   micro-­‐cosmic;	   the	   collective	   and	   the	   individual)	   and	   contextual	  nature	  of	  dharma	  allows	   it	   to	  bridge	   the	   transactional	   and	   the	   transcendental	  social.	  Actions	  in	  the	  transactional	  social	  are	  dharma	  when	  they	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  transcendental	  social.	  However,	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  bridging	  quality	  is	  not	  limited	   to	  dharma:	   I	   think	   that	   any	  kind	  of	   virtue	  ethics	  does	   just	   that.	  Virtue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2013	  where	   Bloch	   expanded	   on	   the	   theoretical	   ideas	   and	   empirical	   evidence.	   The	   critiques	   I	  refer	  to	  here	  are	  critiques	  expressed	  by	  colleagues	  during	  the	  seminar	  series.	  	  
50	  	  
ethics,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  argued,	  is	  highly	  contextual	  and	  indeterminate	  yet	  it	  does	  not	  operate	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  there	  is	  a	  telos	  (goal)	  (MacIntyre	  2007:	  175).	  I	  suggest	  that	   the	  goal	   is	  not	   (only)	  compliance	  with	  a	  Kantian	  moral	   imperative	  but	   to	  further,	   through	   one’s	   actions,	   the	   realisation	   of	   collectively	   imagined	   ideals;	  ideals	  that	  are	  rendered	  explicit	  and	  shared	  through	  ritual.	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   theoretical	   intervention,	   I	   argue	   against	   a	   secular	  conceptualisation	  of	  ethics	  that	  presupposes	  a	  sovereign	  conscience	  (see	  Asad	  2003:	   245).	   This	   kind	   of	   secular	   conception	   of	   ethics,	   and	   the	   analytical	  application	   of	   this	   particular	   understanding	   of	   ethics	   outside	   of	   the	   ‘secular	  West’	  (see	  Taylor	  2007),	  is	  prominent	  in	  Laidlaw’s	  postulation	  of	  reflexivity	  as	  essential	  to	  ethics.	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  postulation	  is	  problematic,	  as	  it	  does	  not	   allow	   for	   the	   potential	   ontological	   reality	   of	   divine	   sovereignty	   and	  therefore	  fails	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  ethical	  lifeworlds	  of	  some	  people,	  including	  my	  interlocutors.	  	  
Chapter	  outline	  
Chapter	   1	  offers	   the	  ethnographic	   introduction	  to	   the	  dissertation.	  Here,	   I	  discuss	  the	  various	  contexts	  and	  ethical	  affordances	  that	  impinge	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   my	   interlocutors	   reflect	   upon	   their	   predicament,	   and	   on	   the	   ways	   in	  which	  I	  conducted	  my	  fieldwork	  and	  interpreted	  my	  data.	  I	  reflect	  upon	  my	  own	  and	  my	  interlocutors	  position	  whilst	  discussing	  my	  methodology.	  	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  address	  the	  roots	  of	  ethical	  action	  for	  my	  interlocutors.	   I	  will	   introduce	   the	  most	   important	   ideological	   reference	   points	   largely	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  ritual	  practices	  and	  people’s	  stories	  of	  how	  life	  should	  be	  lived,	  because	  I	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  both	  the	  ideal	  coherence	  people	  strive	  after	  as	  well	  as	  the	  actual	  incoherence	  in	  practice	  and	  everyday	  speech.	  In	  Chapter	  2	  I	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  deep	   insight	   into	  the	  cosmopolitics	  of	  Muslim	  Joygramis.	   In	  contrast	  to	  an	  essentialist	  account	  of	  Muslim	  personhood,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  Bengali	   Muslim	   person	   is	   generated	   out	   of	   ritual	   and	   everyday	   exchanges.	  
Chapter	  3	  analyses	  how	  ethics	  is	  conceptualised	  and	  practiced	  among	  Joygrami	  Muslims.	   I	   propose	   that	   they	   practice	   a	   virtue	   ethics	   that	   is	   embedded	   in	   an	  Islamic	  framework.	  	  In	   Chapter	   4	   and	   5	   I	   contextualise	   the	   cosmopolitics	   of	   Joygrami	  Muslims	  and	  analyse	   the	  processes	  of	  vernacularisation.	  Chapter	   4	  describes	   the	   local	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perception	   of	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   context,	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   my	  interlocutors	   respond	   to	   their	   environment	   with	   a	   desire	   for	   holistic	   ethical	  renewal.	   The	   critique	   of	   economic	   and	   political	   life	   explored	   in	   this	   chapter	  reveals	   ambiguities	   regarding	   a	   separation	   of	   domains.	   Chapter	   5	  contextualises	  the	  Muslim	  jāti	  in	  the	  plural	  society.	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  shared	  dharma	  between	   jātis	   fosters	   the	   potential	   for	   harmonious	   yet	   tense	   coexistence.	  Finally,	  Chapter	   6	  discusses	  how	  the	  processes	  of	  vernacularisation	   feed	   into	  ethical	   transitions	   within	   Joygram.	   I	   argue	   that	   Muslim	   Joygramis	   foster	  aspirations	  for	  a	  modern	  personhood	  that	  has	  global	  resonances	  and	  challenges	  the	  hegemonic	   ideology	  of	   the	   secular	   Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  However,	   I	   suggest	  that	  the	  modern	  ethical	  aspirations	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  unproductive	  in	  their	  quest	  for	  recognition	  and	  dignity	  within	  the	  Indian	  nation.	  	  In	  the	  Conclusion	   I	  offer	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research,	  in	  particular	  the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  model	   of	   ethical	   reality	   I	   offer	   in	   this	   thesis	  might	   inform	  deeply	   engaged	   and	   profoundly	   critical	   research	   on	   ethics	   and	   secularism.	   In	  addition,	   it	   reflects	  on	   the	  debate	  on	   the	   crisis	  of	   secularism	  discussed	   in	   this	  introduction,	   and	   reconsiders	   the	   causes	   and	   experience	   of	   this	   crisis.	   I	  conclude	  the	  thesis	  with	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  potentiality	  for	  ethical	  life	  in	  secular	  modern	   society	   more	   broadly,	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   us	   as	   anthropologists	   to	  uncover	  shared	  ideas	  of	  the	  good	  and	  sources	  of	  solidarity.	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1.	  Ethical	  reflections	  ‘There	  are	  no	  neutral	   framings…If	  we	  constrain	  agency	   in	  an	  explanatory	  framing	   so	   fully	   that	   no	   individual	   persons	   are	   to	   blame,	   then	   ethical	  responsibility	  cannot	  be	  assigned.	  Make	  everything	  agency,	  and	  local	  moral	  worlds	   lose	   the	   sense	   of	   powerful	   social	   constraints	   that	   organize	  collective	  experience.	  …	  both	  moral	  processes	  and	  ethical	  judgments	  must	  be	   taken	   into	   account	   and	   understood	  within	   the	   context	   of	   politics	   and	  social	  history’	  (Das	  and	  Kleinman	  2000:	  16-­‐17).	  	  	  There	  are	  no	  neutral	  framings,	  and	  I	  was	  not	  a	  neutral	  presence	  in	  Joygram.	  I	   could	   not	   possibly	   be.	   I	   am	   a	   woman,	   unmarried,	   who	   arrived	   alone	   on	   a	  bicycle	   in	   this	   village	   with	   initially	   just	   a	   basic	   knowledge	   of	   Bengali	   and	  determined	   to	   stay.	   I	   brought	   my	   own	   puzzles	   to	   the	   field,	   like	   any	  anthropologist,	  and	  I	  puzzled	  my	  interlocutors	  with	  my	  questions	  if	  not	  with	  my	  presence.	   Both	   their	   and	   my	   reflections,	   on	   each	   other	   and	   our	   own	  predicament,	  were	  inflicted	  by	  various	  layers	  of	  context	  and	  experience.	  In	  the	  introduction	   I	   focused	   on	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   of	   the	   thesis;	   here	   I	  introduce	   the	   ethnographic	   context	   and	   I	   address	   the	   continuous	   ethical	  reflections	  that	  both	  my	  interlocutors	  and	  I	  have	  engaged	  in.	  	  	  *	  The	   main	   aim	   of	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   to	   sketch	   the	   forms	   and	  contents	  of	   information	  that	   induce	  the	  ethical	  reflections	  of	  my	   interlocutors.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   tracing	   the	   circulation	   of	   information	   is	   also	   implicitly	   a	  fieldwork	  narrative	  and	   it	   illustrates	   the	   context	  of	   the	   fieldsite.	  There	  are	  no	  neutral	   framings;	   nor	   is	   there	   a	   neutral	   context	   (Strathern	   1987,	   1995;	  Huen	  2009).	  One	  of	   the	   things	   that	   initially	  brought	  me	   to	  do	   this	   research	  was	  my	  antipathy	  to	  the	  wave	  of	  Islamophobia	  post	  9/11	  that	  I	  perceived	  in	  my	  home	  country	   (the	   Netherlands)	   and	   elsewhere	   through	   the	   media.	   However,	  although	   this	   context	  of	  a	   seemingly	  global	   suspicion	  of	   Islam	  and	  of	  Muslims	  will	   occasionally	   appear	   in	   the	   thesis,	   I	   limit	   myself	   here	   to	   more	   locally	  relevant	  contexts.	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   main	   targets	   of	   this	   growing	   global	   suspicion	   were	   Islamic	  seminaries	   (madrasas),	   including	   branches	   of	   the	   Darul	   Uloom	   Deoband	  madrasa	   in	   India.	   Initially,	   my	   idea	   had	   been	   to	   study	   various	   forms	   of	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education	  in	  West	  Bengal,	   to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  choices	  by	  Muslims	  for	  either	  religious	  or	  secular	  education.	  The	  fieldsite	  would	  have	  been	  several	  kinds	   of	   schools,	   both	   Deobandi	   and	   governmental	   madrasas	   and	   regular	  governmental	   schools.	   Soon,	   however,	   I	   was	   drawn	   to	   the	   larger	   issues	   of	  politics	   and	   religion.	   I	   felt	   I	   had	   to	  understand	  all	   of	   the	  elements	   involved	   in	  these	   issues	  before	   I	   could	   say	  anything	   substantial	   about	   education;	   I	   had	   to	  grasp	   the	   context	   in	   which	   education	   had	   become	   a	   contentious	   issue.	  Meanwhile,	   I	   had	   begun	   my	   research;	   I	   read	   the	   Sachar	   Commission	   Report	  (soon	   to	   be	   discussed);	   interviewed	   Muslim	   intelligentsia	   and	   government	  officials	  in	  Kolkata;	  and	  I	  attended	  political	  rallies	  and	  Islamic	  congregations.13	  All	   this	   provided	   another	   context	   for	   the	   study	   of	   a	   Muslim	   community,	   as	   I	  began	   to	   learn	   the	   various	   structures	   of	   exploitation	   at	   work.	   The	   Bengali	  Muslim	  community	  I	  studied	  stands	  in	  a	  ‘merographic’	  rather	  than	  mereological	  relationship	  to	  global	  humanity,	   the	   Indian	  nation-­‐state,	   the	  Bengali	  state,	  and	  local	   economic	   and	  political	   structures:	   they	   are	  part	   of	   all	   these	   ‘wholes’	   but	  they	   relate	   to	   the	   different	   contexts	   in	   various	   ways,	   depending	   on	   the	  perspective	   (Strathern	  1992,	   in	  Huen	  2009:	  152).	   I	   shifted	   the	  context	   from	  a	  global	   to	  a	  national/state	   level,	  while	  widening	   the	   focus	   from	  a	  school	   to	   the	  entire	   Muslim	   population	   in	   a	   village.	   Now,	   as	   Strathern	   (2002:	   308)	   has	  reminded	  us,	  ‘contextualization	  is	  inevitably	  an	  open-­‐ended	  process	  with	  loose	  ends,	  unpredictability	  and	  disconnections’	  (Huen	  2009:	  164),	  and	  my	  choice	  of	  where	  to	  begin	  and	  end	  the	  contextualisation,	  let	  alone	  how	  to	  contextualise,	  is	  necessarily	   somewhat	   arbitrary,	   and	   has	   epistemic	   and	   ethical	   implications.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  all-­‐encompassing	  perspective	  or	  all-­‐encapsulating	  context,	  all	  I	  aim	  to	  do	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  evoke	  the	  events	  that	  have	  critically	  impacted	  on	  the	   way	   that	   my	   interlocutors	   perceive	   themselves,	   as	   well	   as	   impacted	   my	  perceptions.	   These	   events	   have	   constrained	   and	   offered	   particular	   forms	   of	  ethical	   affordances.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   contextualisation	   of	   my	   fieldwork	   as	  described	  here	  emerged	  as	  most	  relevant	  for	  me	  as	  well	  as	  for	  my	  interlocutors:	  ‘rather	  than	  control	  the	  contexts	  according	  to	  our	  (theoretical)	  preoccupations,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	   the	   process	   of	   widening	   my	   perspective	   I	   had	   already	   started	   fieldwork,	   so	   the	  presence	  of	  various	  kinds	  of	  schools	  (at	  least	  one	  each	  under	  the	  Department	  of	  Education,	  the	  Department	   of	   Development	   and	   the	   Department	   of	   Minority	   Issues,	   and	   an	   independent	  madrasa)	  did	  determine	  my	  choice	  of	  fieldsite.	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we	  focus	  on	  how	  others	  control	  their	  prefigured	  contexts	  in	  proportion	  to	  their	  sense	  of	  significance.	  We	  learn	   from	  their	  contextualizing	  practices	   in	  order	  to	  learn	  about	  them’	  (Huen	  2009:	  158).	  Global	  events,	   then,	  appear	   in	   this	   thesis	  only	  when	  my	  interlocutors	  construct	  them	  as	  a	  significant	  context.	  	  What	   is	   important	   to	   note	   is	   that	   the	   context	   and	   the	   ‘contexted’	   are	   in	  dynamic	   interaction	  and	  mutually	   constitutive	   (Huen	  2009:	  150).	  The	   context	  informs	   the	   reflections	   of	  my	   interlocutors	   on	   their	   predicament,	   and	   in	   turn	  their	  actions	  inform	  the	  context.	  As	  the	  narrative	  will	  describe	  how	  I	  gradually	  came	  to	  contextualise	  my	  fieldwork,	  the	  material	  presented	  here	  functions	  as	  a	  foil	  for	  the	  narrative	  presented	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  describe	  how	  this	  research	  came	  into	  being,	  the	  setting	  of	  the	  research,	  the	  methodology	  and	  my	  position	  in	  the	   field.	   The	   latter	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   an	   anthropology	   of	   ethics:	   it	  requires	   a	   high	   level	   of	   critical	   reflexivity,	   not	   least	   because	   the	   puzzles	   one	  brings	   to	   the	   field	   may	   in	   fact	   arise	   from	   a	   discomfort	   with	   one’s	   own	  presuppositions.	   This	   discomfort	   and	   critical	   reflection	   may	   in	   itself	   be	  considered	  ethical	  practice	  (Caduff	  2011:	  474).	  Indeed,	  ‘[m]oral	  anthropology	  …	  should	   always	   remain	   problematic	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   should	   always	   pose	  problems	  to	  the	  researcher	  both	  epistemologically	  and	  ethically’	  (Fassin	  2008:	  341)’.	  	  
The	  predicament	  of	  Muslims	  unveiled:	  the	  Sachar	  Committee	  Report	  In	  West	  Bengal,	   the	  Left	  Front	  (LF,	  a	  coalition	  of	  parties,	  dominated	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party	  Marxist,	  CPM)	  has	  ruled	  for	  34	  years	  and	  was	  toppled	  by	  the	  populist	   Trinamul	   Congress	   (TMC)	   in	   2011,	   only	   a	   few	   months	   before	   I	  commenced	  my	  fieldwork.	  In	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  the	  regime,	  the	  LF	  successfully	  improved	  the	  conditions	  of	  poor	  and	  middle-­‐class	  peasants	  and	  daily	  labourers	  (see	  Chatterjee	  2009;	  Rogaly,	  Harriss-­‐White	  &	  Bose	  1999).	  In	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  its	   rule,	   the	   LF	   was	   increasingly	   discredited	   due	   to	   a	   stagnant	   economy,	  widespread	   political	   violence,	   and	   a	   corrupt	   political	   apparatus.	   To	   a	   certain	  extent,	   the	   LF	   had	   successfully	   emphasised	   class	   categories	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  communal	   categories.	   However,	   in	   2006	   a	   report	   was	   published	   that	  highlighted	   the	   alarming	   economic	   plight	   of	   Bengali	   Muslims	   (Sachar	  Committee	  Report	  [SCR]	  2006).	  The	  SCR	  drew	  my	  attention	  to	  West	  Bengal	  as	  
55	  	  
an	  interesting	  fieldsite	  because	  of	  the	  remarkable,	  counter-­‐intuitive	  disjunction	  between	   a	   relatively	   peaceful	   cohabitation	   of	   Hindus	   and	   Muslims	   and	   an	  absence	   of	   Hindu	   right	  wing	   politics	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   but	   a	   staggering	   socio-­‐economic	  deprivation	  of	  Muslims	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  Within	  South	  Asia,	  social	  scientists	  have	  observed	  institutionalised	  practices	  of	  discrimination	  of	  Muslims	  and	  implicit	  forms	  of	  victimisation	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  places	   and	   forms	   (see	   e.g.	   Jeffery	   and	   Jeffery	   2006;	   Jeffrey	   et	   al.	   2008;	   Khan	  2007;	   Kirmani	   2008;	   Venkatesan	   2012;	   Williams	   2011b).	   There	   is	   sufficient	  literature	   on	  Muslims’	  marginalisation	   in	   India,	  whether	   this	   is	   economic	   and	  social	   marginalization	   (Alam	   2010;	   Hasan	   1997,	   2007),	   lack	   of	   political	  representation	   (Ansari	   2006;	   Williams	   2012),	   low	   levels	   of	   education	   and	  literacy	   (Alam	   and	   Raju	   2007),	   or	   the	   particular	   double	   marginalisation	   of	  Muslim	   women	   (Hasan	   and	   Menon	   2005,	   2006).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   report	   is	  remarkable,	  since	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  a	  governmental	  body	  had	  been	  given	  the	  task	  to	  conduct	  a	  nation-­‐wide	  survey	  on	  the	  condition	  of	  Muslims	  in	  India,	  particularly	   regarding	   education,	   political	   representation,	   and	   access	   to	  government	   services.	   The	   SCR	   shook	   politicians,	   NGOs	   and	   citizens	   alike	   into	  awareness	   regarding	   the	   social,	   political	   and	   economic	   deprivation	   of	   the	  Muslim	  community	  in	  India.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  report	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  Muslims	  in	  all	  states,	   but	   in	   some	   more	   than	   others,	   is	   deplorable.	   They	   lack	   political	  representation;	  they	  have	  less	  access	  to	  education,	  governmental	   facilities	  and	  benefits;	  and	  score	  lower	  on	  development	  indices.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  survey,	  the	  committee	   extensively	   interviewed	   representatives	   of	   the	  Muslim	   community	  on	  their	  perceptions	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  community	  and	  their	  experiences	  of	   public	   life.	   By	   way	   of	   concluding	   the	   chapter	   summarising	   Muslim	   public	  perceptions,	  the	  report	  reads:	  	  ‘The	   feeling	  of	   being	   a	   victim	  of	  discriminatory	   attitudes	   is	   high	   amongst	  Muslims,	   particularly	   amongst	   the	   youth.	   From	   poor	   civic	   amenities	   in	  Muslim	   localities,	   non-­‐representation	   in	   positions	   of	   political	   power	   and	  the	   bureaucracy,	   to	   police	   atrocities	   committed	   against	   them	   –	   the	  perception	  of	  being	  discriminated	  against	  is	  overpowering	  amongst	  a	  wide	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cross	   section	   of	   Muslims.	   This	   sense	   of	   discrimination	   combined	   with	  issues	  of	   identity	  and	  insecurity	  has	   led	  to	  an	  acute	  sense	  of	   inferiority	   in	  the	   Community	   which	   comes	   in	   the	   way	   of	   its	   full	   participation	   in	   the	  public	  arena	  and	  results	  in	  collective	  alienation’	  (SCR	  2006:	  15).	  	  West	  Bengal	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  states	  with	  the	  worst	  levels	  of	  socio-­‐economic	   development	   and	   governmental	   representation	   among	   Muslims.	  Recent	  surveys	  indicate	  that,	  despite	  explicit	  and	  repeated	  recommendations	  of	  the	  SCR,	  there	  have	  not	  been	  substantial	  changes	  (Social	  Network	  for	  Assistance	  to	  People	  [SNAP]	  Public	  Report	  2014).	  	  ‘In	   a	  word,	  Muslims	   in	  West	   Bengal,	   as	   also	   other	   disadvantaged	   groups,	  have	   been	   facing	   the	   sort	   of	   discriminations	   that	   belie	   the	   promises	   of	  social	   justice.	   What	   this	   preliminary	   report	   suggests	   above	   all	   it	   is	  capability	   deprivation	   –	   the	   lack	   of	   opportunities	   for	   self-­‐emancipation	   –	  that	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  poor	  socio-­‐economic	  condition	  of	   the	  Muslims.	  There	   is	   a	   circular	   relationship	   here:	   their	   socio-­‐economic	   fragility	  impedes	   the	   participation	   of	   Muslims	   in	   the	   larger	   socio-­‐political	   and	  economic	   power	   structure,	   and	   in	   turn	   their	   under-­‐representation	   in	   the	  spheres	   of	   influence	   results	   in	   policy	   neglects	   in	   areas	   of	   core	   capability	  enhancements	   –	   education,	   health,	   employment	   and	   so	   on.	   No	   policy	  actions	   or	   social	  movements	   concerning	   the	  Muslims	   of	  West	  Bengal	   can	  afford	  to	  fail	   to	  take	  this	  circular	  relationship	  into	  account.	   It	   is	  central	  to	  the	  demand	  of	   justice.’	   	   (Association	  SNAP	  and	  Guidance	  Guild	  2014:	  13-­‐14).14	  This	  paragraph	  captures,	  according	  to	  my	  observations,	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  Muslims’	  predicament	  in	  West	  Bengal.	  Clearly,	  the	  radical	  left	  discourse	  on	  class	  has	  overshadowed	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  LF	  has	   reproduced	  or	   even	  acerbated	   the	  marginality	   of	   the	   rural	   ‘masses’,	   in	   particular	   of	   the	   minorities	   due	   to	   the	  circular	  relationship	  mentioned	  in	  the	  SNAP	  report.	  	  
The	  awakening	  of	  Muslim	  agency	  The	  SCR	  gained	  wide	  attention	   in	   the	  media	  and	  among	  ordinary	  people.	   I	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  Muslim	  officials,	  journalists,	  activists,	  and	  academics	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Association	  SNAP	  and	  Guidance	  Guild	  are	  independent,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  that	   bring	   together	   Muslims	   and	   non-­‐Muslims	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   social	   justice	   for	   minorities,	  particularly	  Muslims.	  The	  survey	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Sachar	  Committee	  Report,	  in	   order	   to	  provide	  more	   extensive	  data	   so	   as	   to	   further	   the	  understanding	  of	   the	   causalities	  involved	  in	  the	  deprivation	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  in	  West	  Bengal.	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in	  Kolkata,	  who	  all	  claimed	  that	  the	  SCR	  sparked	  a	  virtual	  awakening	  of	  Muslim	  agency,	   among	   urban	   as	   well	   as	   rural	   Muslims.	   In	   a	   very	   common	   narrative,	  Muslims	   themselves	   are	   blamed	   for	   their	   backwardness:	   the	   Islamic	   culture	  would	  prohibit	  progress.	  The	   report	   showed	   that	   the	   state	  had	  a	  much	   larger	  role	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  development	  than	  was	  previously	  acknowledged	  –	  it	  revealed	  some	  of	  the	  myths	  of	  ‘equality’	  and	  ‘diversity’	  central	  to	  the	  mode	  of	  governance	  of	   the	   developmental	   state.	   In	   this	   section	   I	  will	   trace	   some	   of	   the	   important	  channels	   through	  which	  a	   specific	  Muslim	  agency	  was	   stirred	   in	   rural	  areas.	   I	  discuss	  civil	  society	  and	  political	  parties	  and	  the	  Muslim	  middle	  class	  because,	  firstly,	  the	  data	  I	  collected	  amongst	  these	  groups	  informed	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  position	  of	   Joygrami	  Muslims	   in	   the	  wider	  Bengali	  political	   landscape	  and	  offers	   a	   sense	   of	   the	  potential	   generalisability	   of	  my	   findings	   in	   Joygram;	   and	  secondly,	  these	  groups	  have	  informed	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  reflect	  upon	  their	  own	  positionality	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  landscape.	  	  
Public	  speeches:	  The	  Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind,	   the	  PDCI/AIUDF,	  and	  election	  
campaigns	  The	  power	  of	  public	  speeches	  in	  rural	  areas	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  As	  a	  large	   proportion	   of	   the	   rural	   population	   is	   not	   sufficiently	   literate	   to	   read	  newspapers,	   and	   do	   not	   have	   access	   to	   a	   television,	   speeches	   are	   the	   most	  important	  medium	   of	   spreading	   and	   accessing	   information.	   Speeches	   are	   not	  limited	  to	   JUH	  assemblies	  of	  election	  campaigns:	  any	  public	  event,	  such	  as	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  school,	  will	  involve	  several	  hours	  of	  speeches	  of	  various	  speakers,	  often	  including	  local	  political	  and	  religious	  authorities.	  For	  days	  afterwards,	  the	  content	   of	   the	   speeches	   would	   circulate	   in	   the	   village,	   and	   even	   weeks	   or	  months	   afterwards	   I	   would	   hear	   reference	   to	   a	   particular	   statement	   of	   a	  particular	  speaker.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  information	  thus	  conveyed	  would	  be	   readily	   accepted;	   there	   would	   be	   much	   discussion	   and	   deliberation.	  However,	  a	  crucial	  observation	   that	  emerged	  out	  of	   fieldwork	   is	   that	  villagers	  are	   not	   at	   all	   isolated	   and	   that	   they	   become	   familiar	  with	   particular	   political	  categories	   and	   discourses	   through	   public	   speeches.	   As	   Keane	   points	   out,	  ‘“ordinary”	   discourses	   and	   “distancing”	   discourses	   ([Abu-­‐Lughod]	   1991:	   158)	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another…the	  languages	  of	  officials,	  “experts”,	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journalists,	   and	   so	   forth	   saturate	   so-­‐called	   everyday	   speech	   with	   varying	  degrees	  and	  kinds	  of	  authority’	  (2003:	  240).	  Various	  forms	  of	   ‘meta-­‐’discourse	  ‘neither	   can	   nor	   aim	   to	   specify	   everything	   socially	   or	   conceptually	   relevant	  about	  an	  action	  or	   its	  context,	  but	  only	   those	   that	  are	  selected	  by	   the	  publicly	  available	  terms	  for	  the	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  actors’	  (ibid.).	  Here	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  most	  important	  political	  and	  civil	  society	  bodies	  stirring	  public	  awareness	  and	  inflicting	  a	  particular	  sense	  of	  (in)justice,	  foremost	  through	  public	  speeches.	  	  The	  Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind	  (JUH),	  originally	  a	  congregation	  of	  Islamic	  scholars	  borne	   out	   of	   the	   Darul	   Uloom	   Deoband	   and	   in	   practice	   a	   civil	   society	  organisation	   by	   and	   for	   Muslims,	   has	   been	   crucial	   in	   awakening	   Muslims	   to	  their	   predicament.	   The	   JUH	   provides	   a	   united	   leadership	   to	   Muslims	  irrespective	  of	  sectarian	  affiliation	  through	  an	  emphasis	  on	  common	  elements	  and	   a	   close	   relationship	   with	   nationalist	   elements	   outside	   the	   community	  (Metcalf	  1989;	  Siddiqui	  1998).	  The	  board	  of	   the	  West	  Bengal	  wing	  of	   the	   JUH	  translated	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   SCR	   into	   Bengali	   and	   distributed	   it	   in	   the	   rural	  areas;	   the	   JUH	  has	  an	  extensive	  network	  of	  members,	  mostly	   imams,	  madrasa	  teachers	   but	   also	   ordinary	   Muslims,	   across	   the	   state. 15 	  In	   speeches	   at	  congregations	   the	   speakers	  would	   refer	   to	   the	   report	   as	   often	   as	   they	  would	  refer	  to	  the	  role	  of	  Muslims	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  Independence.	  The	  JUH	  speeches	  convey	   a	   sense	   of	   indignation	   and	   responsibility	   simultaneously:	  Muslims	   are	  marginalised	  beyond	  our	  fault,	  but	  we	  Muslims	  have	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  earn	  back	  the	  respectable	  place	  in	  society	  we	  deserve.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  JUH,	  almost	   all	   villagers	   I	   met	   in	   Joygram	   and	   elsewhere	   know	   the	   tenor	   of	   the	  report:	  Muslims	   are	  marginalised	   all	   over	   India	   and	   exceptionally	   so	   in	  West	  Bengal.	  	  The	   People’s	   Democratic	   Conference	   of	   India	   (PDCI;	   later	   AIUDF)	   is	   the	  political	   front	   of	   the	   JUH	   and	   was	   founded	   in	   2007	   by	   a	   coalition	   of	   Muslim	  intellectuals	   and	   (mostly	   Deobandi)	   spiritual	   leaders.	   Siddiqullah	   Chowdhury	  Saheb,	  who	  is	  also	  the	  General-­‐Secretary	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  wing	  of	  the	  JUH,	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  According	   to	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   JUH	   in	  West	   Bengal,	   Siddiqullah	   Chowdhury	  Saheb,	   the	   JUH	   counted	   140.000	  members	   in	  West	   Bengal,	   and	   700.000	  members	   in	   India	   in	  2012.	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the	   chairman	   of	   the	   PDCI/AIUDF.16	  The	   political	   party	   came	   into	   being	   soon	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  SCR,	  and	  has	  included	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  SCR	   in	   its	  manifesto.	   Indeed,	   there	  was	  mention	  of	   the	  SCR	  at	  every	  assembly	  and	   public	   speech	   I	   attended.17	  The	   release	   of	   the	   SCR	   coalesced	   with	   the	  Nandigram	   agitations,	   which	  were	   a	   result	   of	   forced	   land	   acquisitions	   by	   the	  West	  Bengal	  state.18	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  displaced	  farmers	  were	  Muslim,	  which	  was	   considered	   another	   proof	   of	   the	   disregard	   for	   the	  wellbeing	   of	  Muslims.	  With	   references	   to	   the	   SCR	   and	   the	   Nandigram	   agitations,	   the	   PDCI/AIUDF	  conveyed	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  to	  Muslims	  in	  particular.	  During	  public	  speeches,	  injustice	  would	   be	   couched	   in	   explicitly	   secular	   terms:	  whatever	   the	   issue	   at	  hand,	   it	   would	   be	   emphasised	   that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   ‘Hindu-­‐Muslim	   issue’	   (Hindu-­‐
Muslim	   praṣṇa	   nay)	   but	   an	   issue	   of	   (a	   lack	   of)	   equal	   citizenship.	  One	   of	   the	  spearheads	   of	   the	   agenda	   of	   the	  AIUDF	   is	   the	   demand	   for	   reserved	   quota	   for	  Muslims	   in	  governmental	   jobs,	   in	  order	   to	  rectify	  communal	  discrimination	  of	  the	  past	  and	  ensure	  equal	  representation	  in	  the	  future.	  	  The	  TMC	  equally	  capitalised	  on	  the	  bleak	  picture	  painted	  of	  CPM	  governance	  regarding	  minorities	  in	  the	  SCR,	  and	  on	  the	  Nandigram	  agitations.	  The	  Muslim	  population	  in	  West	  Bengal	  is	  over	  25%	  (Census	  2001),	  and	  as	  such	  they	  form	  an	  important	  ‘vote-­‐bank’	  that	  could	  potentially	  make	  a	  party	  win	  or	  lose.	  I	  closely	  followed	  the	  election	  campaigns	  of	   the	  TMC	  during	   the	  panchayat	  elections	   in	  June	  2013	  and	   the	  national	   elections	   in	  April	   2014.	  At	   all	   the	   speeches	   in	   the	  predominantly	   Muslim	   areas	   (including	   campaign	   events	   in	   Farukhbazar,	  Joygram	   and	   in	   neighbouring	   villages)	   the	   speakers	   would	   explicitly	   make	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  PDCI	  merged	  in	  May	  2012	  with	  the	  AIUDF	  (All	  India	  United	  Democratic	  Front),	  which	  is	   a	   political	   party	   present	   in	   several	   Indian	   states,	  whereas	   the	   PDCI	  was	   a	   party	   limited	   to	  West	  Bengal.	  Siddiqullah	  Chowdhury	  remained	  chairman	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  wing	  of	  the	  AIUDF;	  the	  all-­‐India	  party	  leadership	  is	  in	  hands	  of	  Badruddin	  Ajmal,	  an	  MP	  in	  Assam.	  	  17	  Over	   the	  entire	  course	  of	  my	   fieldwork,	   I	  have	  closely	   followed	  the	  PDCI/AIDUF.	   I	  have	  conducted	   several	   interviews	   with	   Siddiqullah	   Chowdhury	   Saheb	   and	   with	   other	   party	  members	  and	  supporters,	  and	  I	  have	  attended	  all	  significant	  assemblies	  and	  rallies.	  	  18	  The	   CPM	   attempted	   to	   forcefully	   acquire	   land	   for	   a	   Special	   Economic	   Zone	   (SEZ)	   in	  Nandigram,	   which	   resulted	   in	   violent	   clashes	   between	   the	   police	   and	   protesting	   farmers	   on	  March	  14,	  2007.	  The	   forced	   land	  acquisition	  and	   state	  violence	  became	   symbols	  of	   the	  moral	  bankruptcy	  of	   the	  Left	  Front	  government,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  protests	  are	  widely	  seen	  as	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  LF.	  Siddiqullah	  Chowdhury	  Saheb	  was	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	   the	  protests	  as	  many	  of	   the	  duped	  villagers	  were	  Muslims.	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  (current	  Chief	  Minister)	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  subsequent	  protests.	  See	  e.g.	  articles	  in	  The	  Hindu:	  ‘Nandigram	   victims	   narrate	   their	   tales	   of	   woe’	   (Das	   2007)	   and	   on	   the	   BBC	   News	   website:	  ‘Questions	  over	  Bengal	  shooting’	  (Bhattasali	  2007).	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mention	   of	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   SCR,	   and	   promise	   various	   measures	   of	  development	   specifically	   directed	   at	   the	   Muslim	   community.	   The	   most	  prominent	   are	   the	   promise	   to	   include	   ten	   thousand	   independent	   madrasas	  under	   the	   West	   Bengal	   Board	   of	   Madrasa	   education	   (which	   means,	   most	  importantly,	  that	  they	  will	  receive	  funding)	  and	  the	  promise	  to	  provide	  a	  basic	  salary	   to	  all	  employed	   imams	  and	  muezzins	   (the	  person	  who	  calls	  Muslims	   to	  prayer	   from	   the	  mosque);	   the	   latter	   promise	  was	   fulfilled	   to	   a	   limited	   extent	  during	   the	   time	   of	   fieldwork.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   (autumn	   2015),	  Mamata	  Banerjee,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   TMC,	   is	   being	   discredited	   from	   various	   fronts	   for	  ‘appeasing’	  the	  Muslim	  community	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  ‘genuinely	  secular’	  policy.	  	  
Middle-­‐class	  Muslim	  philanthropy	  Most	  members	   of	   the	  Muslim	  middle-­‐class,	   including	  members	   of	   SNAP,	   I	  spoke	   with	   emphasise	   that	   marginalisation	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   religion,	   or	   of	  community	   but	   a	   matter	   of	   class	   and	   that	   most	   of	   the	   deprived	   and	  underprivileged	   peasants	   just	   happened	   to	   be	   Muslim	   because	   of	   historical	  conditions.	  They	  would	  be	  keen	  to	  stress	   the	   lack	  of	  communal	  antagonism	  in	  West	  Bengal.	   It	  has	   to	  be	   taken	   into	  account	   that	   the	   interviews	   took	  place	   in	  2011,	  only	  a	  few	  months	  after	  the	  LF	  was	  toppled.	  Most	  of	  the	  intelligentsia	  had	  been	   supporters	   of	   the	   CPM,	   and	   have	   imbibed	   the	   communist	   ideology	   even	  though	  they	  may	  have	  shifted	  official	  allegiance	  to	  the	  TMC.	  That	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  did	  not	  agitate	  against	  the	  deprivation	  of	  Muslims,	  but	  that	  they	  would	  perceive	  ‘Muslims’	  as	  a	  class,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  embed	  Muslim	  deprivation	  in	  a	  larger	  narrative	  of	  moral	  decay.	  The	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  Muslims	  was	  lamented	  in	   one	   and	   the	   same	   breath	   with	   a	   lamentation	   about	   the	   selfish	   consumer	  society.	  	  Nevertheless,	  among	  my	  Muslim	  middle-­‐class	  interlocutors	  in	  Kolkata	  there	  was	  a	  pervasive	  idea	  that	  ‘Muslims	  are	  the	  victims	  of	  secularism’;	  the	  class	  issue	  has	   developed	   into	   a	   communal	   issue.	   The	   trope	   of	   secularism,	   I	   was	   told,	   is	  used	  and	  abused	  by	  the	  Hindu	  elite	  to	  disclose	  differences	  in	  opportunities	  and	  access	   and	   therewith	   -­‐	   indirectly	   -­‐	   discrimination.	   The	   discourse	   of	   similarity	  conceals	  the	  differences.	  ‘Secularism’	  is	  also	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  Hindu	  majority	  against	   Muslim	   reserved	   quotas,	   which	   many	   Muslim	   intellectuals	   (including	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the	   JUH)	   deem	  necessary	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   a	  more	   balanced	   representation	   in	  governmental	   jobs.	   Governmental	   representation	   would	   reinstall	   the	   Muslim	  leadership,	   which	   faced	   a	   vacuum	   after	   most	   of	   the	   Muslim	   elite	   and	  intelligentsia	  left	  for	  East	  Pakistan	  after	  Partition.	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   social	   and	   political	   decay,	   Islam	   did	   come	   to	   play	   an	  influential	  role	  for	  some	  middle-­‐class	  Muslims.	  Many	  complained	  that	  they	  had	  to	  betray	   their	   religious	   identity	   if	   they	  wanted	   to	  be	   included	   into	   the	  overly	  Hindu	  middle-­‐class	  society.	  To	  aspire	  to	  bhadralok	  status	  is	  to	  ‘culture’	  oneself	  –	  but	  this	  culture	  is	  predominantly	  Hindu	  and	  continues	  to	  exclude	  Muslims	  and	  now	   they	   regret	   their	   ‘hinduisation’	   (for	   example,	   having	   learned	   Sanskrit	  instead	   of	   Arabic	   at	   school,	   and	   foregoing	   prayer	  when	   at	  work	   in	   an	   office).	  There	   is	   a	   sense	   of	   moral	   failure	   here:	   they	   expressed	   regret	   that	   they	   had	  forsaken	  their	  duty	  to	  take	  care	  of	  their	  Muslim	  ‘brothers’.	  Although	  most	  of	  the	  people	   I	   talked	   to	   took	   personal	   responsibility	   for	   this	   failure,	   they	   also	  reflected	   on	   the	   external	   constraints.	   NGO	  workers,	   for	   example,	   experienced	  serious	   constraints	   since	   any	   form	   of	   activism	   deemed	   ‘Islamic’	   attracts	  suspicion	  and	  may	  face	  repercussions	  from	  the	  police.	  	  The	   awareness	   of	   a	   particular	   Muslim	   deprivation,	   a	   perception	   of	   social	  decadence	  personal	   experiences	  of	  discrimination	   (particularly	   ghettoisation),	  and	  a	  vague	  feeling	  of	  curtailed	  identity	  and	  responsibility	  inspired	  a	  particular	  Muslim	  philanthropy	  with	  a	  double	  aim:	  to	  uplift	  the	  Muslim	  community,	  and	  to	  revive	   morality	   in	   society	   (see	   F.Osella	   &	   C.Osella	   2008b,	   2009	   for	   similar	  developments	  in	  Kerala).	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  determine	  where	  the	  class	  issue	  ends	  and	  the	   communal	   issue	   begins.	   As	   such,	   they	   both	   reproduce	   the	   common	   ‘anti-­‐politics’	  narrative	  of	  ‘the	  decay	  of	  the	  moral	  fibre	  of	  public	  life’	  that	  ‘throws	  back	  the	   question	   of	   regeneration	   of	   public	   morality	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   cultural	  communities’	  (Hansen	  1999:	  57).	  However,	  they	  also	  spoke	  out	  against	  the	  idea	  that	   Islamic	  scholars	  are	  the	  only	  representatives	  of	   the	  Muslim	  minority.	  The	  Muslim	  middle	  class	  strives	  after	  a	  more	  diversified	  and	  modern	  representation	  and	  this	  aspiration	  is	  translated	  into	  the	  forms	  of	  philanthropy	  that	   it	  engages	  in.	  It	  is	  a	  form	  of	  what	  Williams	  calls	  ‘defensive	  agency’:	  like	  Muslims	  Ansaris	  in	  Varanasi,	   Kolkatan	   Muslims	   establish	   ‘autonomous	   community	   welfare	  institutions	   rather	   than	   publicly	   contest	   the	   state’s	   apparent	   discrimination’,	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and	  they	  are	  informed	  by	  ‘pragmatism,	  acceptance	  and	  resilience	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  secure,	   as	  well	   as	   improve,	   the	   future	   capacities	   and	   ambitions	   of	   [Muslims]’	  (2011b:	  277).	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   important	   products	   of	   this	   philanthropy	   is	   the	   Islamic	  Mission	   Schools:	   boarding	   schools	   that	   aim	   to	   produce	   Muslim	   engineers,	  doctors,	   lawyers	   and	   politicians	   while	   imbibing	   the	   potential	   representatives	  with	  an	  Islamic	  morality.	  In	  order	  to	  contextualise	  social	  and	  political	  influences	  upon	  and	  within	   the	  Muslim	  community	  by	  governmental	   authorities	   and	   the	  middle	   class	   it	   becomes	   important	   to	   recognize	   the	   impact	   of	   educational	  initiatives	  on	  the	  community.	  
Educational	  initiatives	  	  Various	  initiatives	  of	  the	  LF	  government	  and	  the	  TMC	  government	  to	  cater	  to	   what	   they	   perceived	   to	   be	   the	   Muslims’	   needs	   are	   only	   half-­‐heartedly	  accepted	  by	  the	  Muslim	  community	  for	  various	  reasons:	  because	  the	  needs	  are	  not	   actually	   such;	   because	   the	   initiative	   is	   considered	   to	   interfere	   with	   the	  community’s	   autonomy;	   and	   out	   of	   fear	   of	   getting	   the	   brunt	   of	   non-­‐Muslims’	  anger	  over	  Muslims’	  appeasement.	  The	  initiative	  that	  sparked	  most	  debate	  was	  that	  of	  government	  madrasas:	  schools	  for	  Muslim	  children,	  with	  various	  levels	  of	   Islamic	   subjects	   added	   to	   the	   general	   curriculum,	   funded	   under	   the	   West	  Bengal	   Board	   of	  Madrasa	   Education	   (WBBME)	   (Gupta	   2009;	   Nair	   2009).	   The	  initiative	  had	  a	  double	  motivation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  a	  recognition	  that	  Muslims	  have	  on	  average	  lower	  levels	  of	  education	  (and	  a	  misrecognition	  that	  this	   is	  due	  to	  Muslims’	  exclusive	  preference	  for	  madrasas).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   expansion	   of	   independent	   madrasas	   under	   the	   Rabiya	   Board,	   a	   madrasa	  board	  developed	  by	  the	  Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind,	   inspired	  fear	   in	  the	  government	  for	  a	  potential	  radicalisation	  of	  Muslim	  youth.	  These	  initiatives	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	   ambiguous	   secular	   practices	   of	   the	   Indian	   state,	   as	   Hansen	   observes	  regarding	   the	   payment	   of	   salaries	   of	  madrasa	   teachers	   elsewhere:	   ‘Instead	   of	  expanding	   and	   enhancing	   the	   quality	   of	   government	   schools	   in	  Muslim	   areas,	  the	   government	   chose	   to	   govern	   through	   religious	   institutions,	   ostensibly	   to	  give	  Muslims	  the	  same	  treatment	  and	  possibilities	  as	  other	  communities,	  while	  fixing	  and	  strengthening	   the	  authority	  of	   religious	   leadership	  among	  Muslims’	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(2000:	   260).	   Muslims,	   however,	   do	   not	   uniformly	   buy	   into	   this	   logic	   of	  governmentality.	  	  I	   have	   visited	   several	   WBBME	   schools	   across	   West	   Bengal	   and	   spoke	  extensively	  with	  parents,	  children	  and	  teachers.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  initiative	  was	  fruitful,	   as	   small	   crumbling	  village	  schools,	   started	  by	  one	  or	   the	  other	  village	  philanthropist,	  found	  another	  source	  of	  government	  funding	  to	  tap.	  Opinions	  of	  parents	   and	   guardians	   varied.	   Those	   who	   preferred	   to	   send	   one	   of	   their	  children	   (daughters	   in	   particular)	   to	   a	   government	  madrasa	   rather	   than	   to	   a	  standard	  government	  school	  did	  so	  because	  there	  would	  be	  a	  good	  ‘culture’	  (in	  English;	  see	  chapter	  6).	  But	  most	  of	  the	  people	  I	  spoke	  to	  were	  not	  particularly	  happy	  that	  the	  local	  school	  was	  officially	  a	  ‘madrasa’.	  What	  most	  parents	  want	  is	  good	   education,	   and	   these	   schools	   are	  not	   usually	   assigned	   the	  best	   teachers,	  and	  the	  curriculum	  is,	  according	  to	  some,	  below	  the	  standard	  of	  the	  curriculum	  at	  other	   schools.	  Moreover,	   the	   title	   ‘madrasas’	   at	   the	   child’s	   certificate	  might	  make	  the	  child	  liable	  to	  be	  excluded	  in	  future	  applications	  for	  further	  education.	  The	  children	  can	  learn	  to	  read	  the	  Quran	  in	  the	  local	  independent	  madrasa	  or	  at	  the	  mosque	   in	  addition	   to	  attending	  government	   school.	  What	  parents	  do	  not	  want	  is	  that	  their	  local	  independent	  madrasa	  is	  converted	  into	  a	  governmental	  madrasa	   (unless	   there	   is	   no	   other	   educational	   facility	   at	   all	   in	   the	  neighbourhood).	   Generally,	   Islamic	   education	   and	   general	   education	   are	  considered	   to	   be	   very	   different	   and	   complementary.	   A	   half-­‐baked	   version	   of	  both	   in	   one	   school	   is	   considered	   a	   form	   of	   appeasement,	   and	   ineffective.	  Moreover,	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  growing	  hostility	  of	  the	  Hindu	  community	  over	  such	  forms	  of	  ‘preferential	  treatment’.	  	  Interference	  of	  the	  government	   in	  religious	  and	  cultural	   issues	   is	   felt	  as	  an	  offence	   for	   their	   cultural	   integrity	   and	   autonomy.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   Deobandi	  madrasa	   in	   Joygram,	   the	  Darul	  Uloom	   Jakaria,	  had	  accepted	  state	   funding	  had	  been	  a	  great	  source	  of	  contention	  within	  the	  board	  of	  the	  madrasa.	  So	  was	  the	  ‘doling’	  out	  of	  salaries	  for	  imams	  and	  muezzins.	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  sons	  accepted	  the	   salaries	   grudgingly,	   and	  made	  me	   promise	   never	   to	   tell	   their	   father,	  who	  would	  make	  them	  pay	  back	  every	  rupee.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Mission	  Schools	  are	  hugely	  popular	  in	  rural	  as	  well	  as	  urban	  areas	  and	   they	  are	   successful	   in	   the	   creation	  of	   a	  Muslim	  middle-­‐class	   (Gupta	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2009:	   126	   –	   166).19	  The	   phenomenon	   started	   with	   one	   Al-­‐Ameen	   Mission	  School	  in	  Howrah	  in	  1986;	  it	  now	  has	  32	  branches	  across	  the	  state.	  The	  model	  has	  been	  copied	  by	  several	  others	  initiators,	  who	  have	  again	  branched	  out,	  such	  as	  the	  Al-­‐Hilal	  Mission	  Schools.	  The	  schools	   follow	  the	  curriculum	  of	   the	  West	  Bengal	   Board	   of	   Secondary	   Education	   complemented	   with	   a	   minimum	   of	  Islamic	  subjects.	  The	  most	   important	  and	  distinguishing	  aspect	  of	   the	  mission	  schools	   is	   not	   its	   curriculum	   but	   its	   strict	   regimen	   and	   discipline,	   and	   the	  seamless	   inculcation	  of	   an	   Islamic	  disposition	  within	   the	   larger	  project	   of	   the	  making	  of	  the	  modern	  Muslim	  citizen.	  	  In	  January	  2013,	  a	  girls-­‐only	  branch	  of	  the	  Al-­‐Hilal	  Mission	  School	  opened	  in	  Joygram.	  The	  very	  presence	  of	  this	  school,	  and	  most	  evidently	  the	  speeches	  at	  the	   opening	   day,	   sparked	   a	   particular	   discourse	   on	   the	   marginalisation	   of	  Muslims	   in	   the	   nearby	   villages.	   Central	   to	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	   school,	   as	  conveyed	  in	  all	  the	  speeches	  at	  the	  ceremonial	  opening,	  is	  the	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  Muslims	  and	  the	  need	  to	  ‘uplift’	  the	  Muslim	  community	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  respectable	   and	   participatory	   citizens	   for	   the	   betterment	   of	   the	   Indian	  democracy	   as	   a	   whole.	   All	   of	   the	   responsibility	   is	   relegated	   to	   the	   Muslims	  themselves.	  
Public	  figures	  in	  the	  village	  In	   the	   village,	   local	  members	   of	   the	   JUH,	   the	  Mission	   Schools	   and	  Tablighi	  Jamaat	  members	  (locally	  known	  as	   ‘Tablighis’	  or	   ‘Jamaatis’)	  are	  crucial	   for	  the	  spread	  of	   information	  regarding	  Muslim	  marginalisation.	   I	  have	  myself	  visited	  the	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   headquarter	   in	   Delhi	   to	   talk	  with	   religious	   experts	   there,	  and	   found	   that	   most	   of	   the	   Tablighis	   in	   Joygram	   largely	   follow	   the	   official	  discourse	   but	   deviate	   from	   it	   as	   well.	   Although	   I	   found	   that	   in	   the	   village	  marginalisation	   is	  not	  generally	   interpreted	  as	  being	   community	   specific	   (as	   I	  will	   discuss	   shortly),	   when	   specific	   Muslim	   discrimination	  would	   come	   up,	   it	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  global	  as	  much	  as	  a	  national	  issue.	  The	  perceived	  global	  hostility	   towards	   Islam	   that	   some	  are	  made	   aware	  of	   through	   specific	   events,	  like	   the	   ‘anti-­‐Islam	   video’	   (Innocence	   of	   Muslims)	   impinges	   on	   how	   ordinary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Through	  contacts	  in	  Kolkata	  I	  visited	  several	  Mission	  Schools	  across	  West	  Bengal.	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Muslims	   perceive	   their	   position	   in	   the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state.20 	  Not	   all	   rural	  Muslims	  will	   be	   directly	   aware	   of	   these	   events,	   but	   some	   keenly	   are	   and	   this	  affects	  the	  wider	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  Muslim.	  	  	  There	   was	   a	   real	   sense	   of	   incredulity	   about	   the	   bigotry	   and	   exclusion	  Muslims	   face.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   ‘anti-­‐Islam	   video’	   Innocence	   of	   Muslims,	  Samsuddin	  came	   to	  me	  with	  a	  deeply	   tormented	  expression	  on	  his	   face.	   ‘Why	  are	   you	   doing	   this	   to	   us?	  Why	   are	   you	   so	   angry	   with	   us?’	   he	   asked	   me,	   not	  rhetorically.	   Similarly,	   Masiruddin	   asked	   me	   why	   ‘my	   country’	   had	   banned	  headscarves.	   In	   both	   cases,	   I	   could	   feel	   their	   genuine	   attempt	   to	   grasp	   why	  Muslims	   in	   particular	   would	   be	   treated	   so	   differently.	   Both	   Samsuddin	   and	  Masiruddin	  spoke	  highly	  of	  the	  protests	  against	  the	  anti-­‐Islam	  video	  –	  although	  neither	  of	  them	  went,	  for	  very	  mundane	  reasons.	  However,	  their	  lack	  of	  actual	  public	  action	  does	  not	  undo	  how	  significantly	  their	  awareness	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  global	  and	  national	  anti-­‐Islamic	  discourses:	  public	  actions	  such	  as	  protestations	  are	  time	  and	  cost-­‐intensive,	  and	  precarious	  for	  a	  suspicious	  minority.	  	  	  Devout	   reformist	   Muslims	   themselves	   would	   be	   the	   first	   to	   acknowledge	  that	   there	  are	  many	   ‘bad	  Muslims’,	  and	  examples	  range	   from	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  Syria’s	  Bashar	  al-­‐Assad	  to	  local	  guṇḍās	  (hitmen	  or	  gangsters).	  Usually	  a	  lack	  or	   an	   excess	   of	  money	  would	   be	   considered	   the	   cause	   of	  moral	   degradation.	  However,	  Masiruddin	   also	   astutely	   recognised	   the	   role	   of	   the	   ‘war	   on	   terror’	  and	  global	  Islamophobia	  in	  the	  ‘making’	  of	  ‘bad	  Muslims’.	  ‘If	  someone	  calls	  you	  a	  thief’,	  he	  asks	  me,	  ‘and	  then	  another	  one	  does,	  and	  another	  and	  another,	  won’t	  you	  say	  in	  the	  end,	  fine,	  I’m	  a	  thief,	  and	  live	  up	  to	  the	  expectation?’	  According	  to	  Masiruddin	   terrorism	   is	   a	   self-­‐fulfilling	   prophecy	   in	   India	  where	  Muslims	   are	  always	  under	  the	  suspicion	  of	  being	  potential	  terrorists	  and	  where	  the	  history	  of	  Partition	  means	  that	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Indian	  state	  is	  always	  questioned.	  	  The	   default	   exclusion	   of	   the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state,	   and	   the	   circulation	   of	  information	  regarding	  Muslim	  exclusion	  elsewhere,	  fosters	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	   the	   global	   Muslim	   community.	   Like	   most	   other	   Tablighis	   I	   spoke	   to,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  video	  Innocence	  of	  Muslims,	  ‘which	  portrays	  Islam's	  Prophet	  Muhammad	  as	  a	  fraud,	  a	  womanizer	  and	  a	  child	  molester’	  stirred	  violent	  protests	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  See	  also	  The	  World	  Post:	  ‘Innocence	  of	  Muslims’	  protests:	  Violent	  clashes	  over	  anti-­‐Islam	  film	  break	  out	  in	   3	   nations’	   (Khan	   2012).	   In	   India,	   the	   protests	  were	   limited,	   see	   IB	   Times:	   ‘Indian	  Muslims	  stirred,	  but	  not	  shaken	  by	  ‘Innocence	  of	  Muslims’	  protests’	  (Shwayder	  2012).	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Masiruddin	   idealised	   the	   future	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   the	   caliphate;	   considered	  the	  Taliban	  ‘the	  most	  peaceful’	  people	  in	  the	  world;	  hoped	  that	  Iran	  would	  wipe	  Israel	   of	   the	   map;	   and	   was	   wildly	   enthusiastic	   when	   Al	   Qaida	   managed	   to	  destroy	  American	  property	  and	  soldiers	  in	  a	  violent	  attack	  in	  Afghanistan	  (and	  ostensibly	  regretted	  that	  they	  just	  missed	  out	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  kill	  Prince	  Harry).	  In	  congruence,	  he	  was	  passionately	  excited	  about	  the	  protests	  in	  Libya	  and	   elsewhere	   in	   reaction	   to	   the	   anti-­‐Islam	   video.	   These	   political	   events	   and	  ideals	  become	  global	  reference	  points	  for	  Bengali	  Muslims’	  positionality.	  I	   am	   telling	   this	   story	   not	   because	   everyone	   in	   the	   village	   is	   aware	   of	   the	  headscarf	   debate	   in	   France	   or	   the	   Rushdie	   affair	   (another	   issue	   Masiruddin	  discussed	  with	  me).	   But	   Samsuddin	   and	  Masiruddin	   are	   public	   figures	   in	   the	  village,	  who	  influence	  the	  villagers’	  perception	  of	  their	  own	  positionality.	  After	  asking	  me	   to	  explain	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	  anti-­‐Islam	  video,	  Samsuddin	  proudly	  told	  me	   he	   had	   given	   a	   speech	   regarding	   the	   video	   at	   the	  mosque	  where	   he	  works	  as	  an	  imam,	  condemning	  the	  bigotry	  against	  Muslims.	  Masiruddin	  has	  a	  different	  sphere	  of	   influence:	  he	  is	   involved	  in	  local	  politics;	  he	  is	  a	  prominent	  businessman	  and	  occasionally	  joins	  gatherings	  of	  the	  Tablighi	  Jamaat.	  Through	  figures	  like	  Samsuddin	  and	  Masiruddin	  global	  and	  national	  discourses	  circulate	  among	   ordinary	   Muslims,	   from	   villagers	   with	   barely	   any	   knowledge	   of	  international	   politics	   or	   Islamic	   theology	   to	   middle-­‐class	   businessmen	   and	  politicians	   and	   devout	   members	   of	   the	   Tablighi	   Jamaat.	   If	   I	   often	   quote	   my	  conversations	  with	  figures	  like	  Samsuddin	  and	  Masiruddin	  this	  is	  not	  because	  I	  think	   their	   viewpoint	   is	   entirely	   representative	   for	   the	   perceptions	   of	   all	  villagers.	  But	  they	  do	  inform	  a	  direction	  of	  action	  and	  speech	  for	  other	  villagers,	  who	   would	   often	   justify	   their	   words	   or	   actions	   with	   reference	   to	   imams	   or	  Tablighi	   Jamaat	   members.	   These	   public	   figures,	   therefore,	   do	   not	   only	   form	  important	  channels	  of	  information	  but	  also	  function	  as	  ‘exemplars’	  (Humphrey	  1997;	   Robbins	   2015).	   The	   imams	   and	   active	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   members	   are	  ‘native	  theologians’	  and	  for	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  kind	  of	  Islam	  that	  circulates	  in	  the	  village,	  the	  native	  theologians	  form	  an	  excellent	  starting	  point	  for	  an	  ‘ethno-­‐theology’	  (Scott	  2005;	  see	  also	  Fountain	  and	  Lau	  2013).	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Fieldwork:	  access,	  setting,	  and	  methodology	  
Access	  	  I	  was	  warned	  time	  and	  again	  by	  people	  in	  Europe	  and	  Kolkata	  that	  I	  would	  have	  a	  terribly	  difficult	  time	  with	  the	  supposedly	  orthodox	  and	  dogmatic	  rural	  Deobandi	   Muslims.	   I	   was	   told	   that	   I	   would	   never	   be	   allowed	   access	   to	   their	  households,	   let	   alone	   their	  madrasas,	   those	   ‘bastions	  of	   orthodoxy’.	   In	   reality,	  during	   the	   first	   five	  months	  of	   living	   in	  Kolkata	  and	   traveling	  across	   the	   state	  visiting	  madrasas	  and	  Mission	  schools,	  I	  had	  found	  the	  interaction	  with	  Muslims	  dressed	   in	  white	   Islamic	   attire	   and	  with	   long	   beards	   the	  most	   pleasurable	   as	  they	  would	  almost	  without	  exception	  be	  the	  most	  hospitable,	  humble,	  eager	  for	  conversation	  while	  maintaining	  a	  socially	  respectful	  distance.	  Moreover,	   I	  was	  struck	  by	  the	   level	  of	  sophistication	  of	   their	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  politics,	  and	  the	  many	  layers	  of	  their	  reasoning.	  My	  opinion	  was	  shared	  by	  Manisha	  Banerjee,	  who	  first	  introduced	  me	  to	  my	  gatekeeper	   Rahaman	   Saheb.	   Manisha	   was	   a	   secretary	   for	   the	   AIUDF,	   the	  political	   party	   chaired	  by	   Siddiqullah	  Chowdhury	   in	  West	  Bengal.	  Most	   of	   the	  active	  members	  and	  local	  leaders	  of	  the	  AIUDF	  are	  Islamic	  scholars,	  so	  thanks	  to	  her	   position	   in	   the	   party	   Manisha	   could	   access	   a	   large	   network	   of	   Muslim	  colleagues	   working	   in	   mosques	   or	   madrasas,	   amongst	   whom	   she	   was	   and	   is	  highly	   regarded.	   She	   set	   up	   a	   meeting	   for	   me	   with	   Rahaman	   Saheb	   in	  Farukhbazar,	  who	  was	  at	  that	  time	  the	  district	  leader	  of	  the	  PDCI	  (and	  later	  for	  the	   AIUDF).	   I	   met	   him	   and	   another	   PDCI	   member	   in	   a	   dusty	   room	   above	   a	  friend’s	  shop.	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  was	  a	  small	  man,	  enfeebled	  by	  diabetes,	  wearing	  a	  white	  salwār	  kamīz,	  a	  skullcap	  (ṭupi),21	  a	  long	  white	  beard	  and	  a	  shaven	  upper	  lip.22	  After	  chatting	  for	  a	  while	  about	  the	  JUH,	  the	  PDCI	  and	  the	  madrasas	  in	  the	  area,	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  proposed	  to	  have	  tea	  in	  his	  house	  in	  Joygram,	  just	  a	  short	  ride	   away.	  We	   passed	   by	   the	   Darul	   Uloom	   Jakaria,	   the	   Deobandi	   madrasa	   in	  Joygram	   and	   I	   asked	   whether	   I	   could	   go	   there	   to	   study	   the	   schooling.	   He	  answered	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  problem	  at	  all,	  that	  I	  was	  welcome	  to	  come	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  Islamic	  skullcap	  is	  called	  a	  taqiyah	  in	  Arabic,	  and	  ṭopi	  in	  Urdu	  and	  Hindi.	  My	  Bengali	  friends	  always	  referred	  to	  the	  skullcap	  as	  ṭupi.	  	  22 	  Hair-­‐	   and	   beardstyles	   among	   Muslims	   can	   demonstrate	   sectarian	   affiliation.	   The	  Deobandi	  school	  prescribes	  an	  untrimmed	  beard	  and	  shaven	  upper	  lip.	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time,	  but	  that	  I	  could	  not	  stay	  the	  night	  there.	  After	  arriving	  at	  his	  home,	  I	  was	  served	  tea	  by	  his	  warmly	  hospitable	  wife	  Pratima	  Bibi,	  and	  one	  by	  one	  I	  met	  his	  sympathetic	  seven	  sons	  as	  each	  popped	  out	  of	  the	  small	  mud	  house.	  All	  seven	  were	   dressed	   in	   white	   pañjābi	   and	   ṭupi,	   with	   proud	   black	   beards.	   It	   then	  dawned	  upon	  me	  that	  I	  had	  now	  found	  my	  fieldsite.	  	  I	  went	  to	  see	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  another	  time,	  with	  a	  translator,	  at	  his	  madrasa	  in	  Kanur	  in	  order	  to	  ask	  for	  his	  consent	  to	  do	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  village	  and	  at	  the	  madrasa.	   Again,	   he	   said	   it	   would	   be	   no	   problem	   at	   all,	   and	   simply	   repeated,	  ‘come,	  come’	  (eso,	  eso).	  The	  next	  morning	  I	  arrived	  at	  his	  home	  in	   Joygram	  on	  my	  rusty	  bicycle	  after	  an	  hour	  ride	  through	  winding	  village	  paths	  and	  across	  the	  cattle	  market.	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  and	  his	  son	  seemed	  surprised	  that	  I	  had	  actually	  come	   by	   bicycle	   and	   at	   such	   an	   early	   hour	   of	   the	   morning.	   Arifuddin,	   the	  youngest	  son,	  who	  was	  still	  shy	  with	  me	  at	   the	  time	  (but	  became	   increasingly	  chatty	  -­‐	  he	  said	  to	  me	  once	  that	  he	  had	  never	  liked	  to	  talk,	  until	  I	  arrived	  in	  the	  village	   and	   he	   started	   to	   find	   pleasure	   in	   conversation),	   came	   to	   sit	   with	  me	  while	   I	   drew	   up	   a	   kinship	   diagram	   to	   hide	  my	   uneasiness.	   Rahaman	   Saheb’s	  household	  has	  been	  since	  that	  very	  first	  day	  one	  of	  my	  ‘homes’	  in	  Joygram.	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  was	  again	  extremely	  hospitable	  and	  ready	  to	  help	  me,	  but	  rather	  unsure	  about	  what	  to	  do	  with	  this	  foreign	  girl	  who	  hardly	  spoke	  a	  word	  of	  Bengali.	  He	  took	  me	  to	  the	  madrasa	  in	  Joygram	  as	  I	  had	  expressed	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  school,	  but	  after	  the	  usual	  tea	  and	  sweets	  there	  I	  knew	  I	  had	  to	  venture	  into	  the	  village	  by	  myself.	  With	  a	  short	  household	  survey	  in	  hand	  I	  went	  to	  one	  of	  the	  houses	  neighbouring	  the	  madrasa.	  It	  cannot	  have	  been	  a	  coincidence	  that	  Basir	  Khadim	  passed	  by	  this	  house	  within	  half	  an	  hour	  of	  me	  sitting	  there,	  as	  he	  was	   aware	   of	   pretty	  much	   everything	   that	   happened	   in	   the	   village.	   Basir,	   the	  local	  political	  leader,	  familiar	  with	  surveys	  like	  the	  census	  and	  able	  to	  speak	  and	  understand	  a	  few	  words	  in	  English,	  soon	  understood	  what	  I	  was	  up	  to	  and	  told	  me	   to	   start	   at	   the	   hamlet	   by	   the	   edge	   of	   the	   village,	   and	   work	   my	   way	   in.	  Knowing	  the	  villagers	  very	  well,	  he	  helped	  me	  with	   the	   first	   ten	  or	  so	  houses,	  and	  made	  sure	  I	  always	  felt	  welcome	  to	  join	  his	  family	  for	  lunch.	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  our	   friendship,	  and	  of	  my	  understanding	  of	  politics	   in	  rural	  West	  Bengal.	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  Maulana	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  was	  the	  religious	  authority	  in	  Joygram,	  and	  his	  consent	  was	  very	  significant	  for	  the	  other	  villagers’	  acceptance	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of	  my	  presence.	  But	  the	  party	  worker	  is	  more	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  everyday	  life	  of	  the	  villagers,	  and	  has	  a	  more	  direct	  influence	  on	  the	  affairs	  in	  the	  village.	  At	  that	  time,	  I	  did	  not	  yet	  understand	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  party	  worker	  taking	  over	  the	  role	  of	  a	  gatekeeper	  from	  the	  maulānā:	   the	  one	  authority	  taking	  over	  from	  the	  other.	  	  
Setting	  	  Joygram	  counts,	  of	   the	  570	  households,	  247	  Muslim	  households,	  71	  Hindu	  and	   252	   Adivasi	   households.	   The	   different	   jātis	   (communities/castes)	   live	   in	  different	  hamlets,	  but	  not	  all	  of	  one	   jāti	  are	   located	   in	  one	  hamlet.	  Rather,	   the	  different	   jātis	   are	   scattered	   in	   small	   hamlets	   across	   the	   village,	   so	   that	   the	  households	  of	  different	  jātis	  are	  clustered	  together	   in	  close	  proximity,	  often	   in	  groupings	  of	  extended	  families.	  As	  one	  follows	  the	  path	  from	  the	  main	  road	  that	  leads	   into	   the	   village,	   one	   first	   finds	   a	   small	   Adivasi	   hamlet	   on	   the	   right,	   not	  more	   than	   a	   few	   shacks	   built	   in	   the	   shadow	  of	   the	   primary	   school	  walls,	   and	  tucked	   away	   behind	   a	   tailor’s	   shop	   and	   a	   tea	   stall	   of	   some	   local	   Muslims.	  Continuing,	   one	   finds	   the	   large	   Deobandi	   madrasa	   on	   the	   left,	   where	   a	   large	  compound	   wall	   is	   being	   built	   enclosing	   around	   it.	   Diagonally	   opposite	   the	  madrasa,	   five	  mud	   houses	   form	   together	  Hazra	   Para,	   a	   small	  Hindu	   hamlet.23	  One	  of	  the	  Hazra	  households	  runs	  a	  small	  shop	  that	  sells	  basic	  necessities	  to	  the	  surrounding	  Muslim	  households	  and	  sweets	  to	  the	  madrasa	  students.	  Crossing	  the	  small	  path	  demarcating	  the	  end	  of	  Hazra	  Para,	  Khadim	  Para	  starts.	  It	  is	  the	  largest	   and	   most	   wealthy	   Muslim	   hamlet	   in	   the	   village.	   One	   crosses	   several	  more	  Adivasi	  and	  Muslim	  hamlets	  when	   following	   the	  path,	   to	  eventually	  end	  up	  at	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  house	  in	  Mach	  Para,	  located	  just	  off	  the	  main	  road.	  	  	  Instead	   of	   drawing	   a	   map	   of	   the	   village	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   demarcations	  between	  jātis	  and	  different	  Muslim	  lineages,	  I	  could	  also	  have	  divided	  the	  village	  according	   to	  political	  affiliation.	  There	  are	  equally	  strong	  boundaries	  between	  
pāṛās	   that	   house	   different	   jātis	   as	   there	   are	   between	   those	   that	   support	  different	  parties.	  Khamaipur	  and	  Khadim	  Para	  are	  both	  hamlets	  with	  a	  majority	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Pārā	   refers	   to	   a	   hamlet	   or	   a	   section	   of	   a	   village	   or	   town.	   I	   use	   non-­‐italicised	   and	  capitalised	  Para	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  proper	  name	  of	  a	  particular	  hamlet,	  e.g.	  Khadim	  Para.	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of	  Khadims.	  They	  are	  of	  different	   lineages,	  but	  more	   importantly,	   they	   largely	  support	  different	  political	  parties.	  Khamaipur	  is	  ‘red’;	  they	  are	  supporters	  of	  the	  CPM.	  Here	  is	  the	  house	  of	  the	  infamous	  Farhid	  Khadim,	  who	  was	  a	  notoriously	  violent	  CPM	  comrade.	  Lovokondo,	   a	  mixed	  hamlet	  of	   landless	  Hindus,	  Adivasi	  and	  Muslims,	   is	  divided	   into	   those	  who	  support	   the	  CPM	  and	   those	  who	  have	  been	  swayed	  into	  joining	  the	  TMC.	  Unwittingly,	  the	  geography	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  had	   been	   influenced	   by	   demarcations	   of	   party	   politics.	   Crossing	   the	   road	   to	  enter	  the	   ‘red’	  hamlet	  Khamaipur	  felt	  somehow	  dangerous	  and	  uncanny,	  and	  I	  largely	   avoided	   doing	   so	   even	   before	   I	   was	   aware	   of	   the	   different	   political	  affiliations.	   About	   half	   of	   the	   inhabitants	   of	  Mach	   Para,	   the	   pāṛā	   of	   Rahaman	  Saheb’s	   family,	   are	   CPM	   supporters	   as	   well	   (but	   not	   as	   actively	   so	   as	   in	  Khamaipur	  because	  of	  the	  mixed	  presence	  of	  TMC	  and	  CPM),	  but	  Khadim	  Para	  was	  host	  to	  the	  most	  active	  TMC	  supporters	  and	  that	  may	  have	  inspired	  a	  dread	  for	   Khamaipur	   in	   me.	   But	   it	   was	   not	   until	   much	   later	   that	   I	   understood	   the	  political	  tensions	  that	  had	  withheld	  me.	  	  	  It	  has	  to	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  Joygram	  forms	  an	  interesting	  place	  because	  not	  all	  Muslims	  in	  this	  village	  are	  the	  prototypical	   ‘marginalised	  poor’.	  In	  Joygram,	  the	  Khadims,	  Maliks	  (both	  Muslim	  lineages)	  and	  Mondals	  are	  the	  politically	  and	  economically	  powerful	  class,	  who	  dominate	  both	  other	  Muslim	  lineages	  and	  all	  the	  Hindus	  and	  Adivasi	  in	  the	  village.	  A	  section	  of	  the	  Khadims	  of	  Khadim	  Para	  own	   the	   cattle	   market	   across	   the	   road,	   and	   are	   very	   wealthy	   indeed.24	  The	  Maliks	  are	  ‘self-­‐made	  men’	  who	  have	  in	  one	  generation	  developed	  from	  among	  the	  poorest	  to	  the	  richest	  in	  the	  village,	  predominantly	  through	  various	  forms	  of	  trade.	  The	  Mondals	  trace	  their	  lineage	  to	  a	  wealthy	  landlord,	  jamidār,	  who	  held	  enormous	  tracts	  of	   land.	  Most	  of	  the	   land	  surrounding	  the	  village	   is	  owned	  by	  Khadims,	  Maliks,	  and	  the	  Mondals	  of	  Mach	  Para,	  even	  though	  most	  of	  the	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  cattle	  market	  is	  approx.	  600	  bighā	  (approx.	  200	  acres).	  The	  land	  was	  donated	  to	  the	  Khadims	   by	   a	   Hindu	   jamidār	  whose	   child	   had	   allegedly	   been	   cured	   by	   Champa	   Bibi,	   who	   is	  buried	  in	  the	  shrine	  on	  this	  land.	  The	  property	  was	  listed	  under	  the	  State	  WAQF	  Board	  in	  1899.	  WAQF	   properties	   are	   inalienable	   endowments	   of	   the	   Muslim	   community,	   to	   be	   used	   for	  charitable	  or	   religious	  purposes.	  Technically,	   the	  Khadims	  are	  not	   the	  owners	  of	   the	   land	  but	  they	  are	  ‘caretakers’	  (musualis),	  who	  have	  to	  provide	  official	  accounts	  to	  the	  State	  WAQF	  Board.	  Currently,	  the	  WAQF	  property	  includes	  the	  shrine,	  the	  graveyard	  (mājār),	  the	  land	  used	  for	  the	  cattle	  market	  and	  for	  a	  banyan	  tree	  plantation	  and	  the	  Eid	  ghāt	  (enclosed	  space	  for	  prayer	  on	  auspicious	  Islamic	  days).	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Muslims	   own	   small	   patches	   of	   land	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   Muslims	   in	  Lovokondo).25	  Two	  of	  the	  Khadims	  and	  two	  of	  the	  Mondals	  have	  relatively	  well	  earning	  government	  jobs	  (cākri,	  which	  are	  highest	  in	  status	  and	  job	  security).	  	  The	   majority	   of	   male	   Joygramis,	   however,	   work	   as	   day	   labourers	   in	  agriculture	  and	  masonry,26	  in	  various	  kinds	  of	  petty	  businesses,	  or	  as	  hawkers	  and	   market	   vendors,	   and	   earn	   on	   average	   3000	   INR	   a	   month.27	  The	   cattle	  market	  is	  a	  great	  source	  of	  income	  not	  only	  for	  its	  owners	  but	  for	  many	  of	  the	  Joygramis.	   Several	   men	   are	   involved	   in	   the	   cattle	   trade	   itself	   (the	   majority	  Khadims);	  others	  sell	  various	  goods	  and	  services	  at	  the	  market.	  At	  least	  half	  of	  the	   Joygrami	   women	   (from	   adolescence	   upwards)	   earn	   some	   money	   by	  stitching	  embroidery	  on	  salwār	  kamīz.	  The	  Hindus	  and	  Adivasis	  in	  Joygram	  are	  generally	  at	  the	  same	  income	  level	  of	   the	   poorest	   sections	   of	   the	   Muslims,	   and	   the	   vast	   majority	   are	   either	  subsistence	  farmers	  or	  landless	  day	  labourers.	  	  In	  Joygram	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  Farukhbazar	  Block28	  as	  a	  whole,	  Muslims	  form	  a	  majority,	   have	   most	   local	   political	   leverage	   and	   most	   of	   the	   local	   political	  leadership	   is	   Muslim.	   However,	   Hindus	   occupy	   the	   largest	   number	   of	  governmental	   posts,	   and	   both	   the	   Block	   Development	   Officer	   and	   the	  Superintendent	  of	  Police	  are	  Hindu.	  This	  ‘glass	  ceiling’	  does	  signify	  the	  problem	  of	  central	  recruitment	  processes,	  which	  are	  hard	  to	  penetrate	  for	  Muslims	  due	  to	   historically	   powerful	   networks	   among	   Hindus	   through	   which	   government	  jobs	  circulate.	  	  Like	   many	   anthropologists,	   I	   tend	   to	   find	   that	   ‘the	   dominated	   are	   more	  interesting	  and	  valuable	  than	  the	  dominators’	  (Bloch	  1994:	  283),	  and	  I	  initially	  lamented	   choosing	   Joygram	   because	   it	   was	   too	   big	   and	   too	   rich.	   But	   the	  different	  levels	  of	  wealth,	  poverty	  and	  power	  within	  the	  village	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  very	  revealing	  because	  it	  allowed	  me	  access	  to	  different	  perspectives,	  and	  to	  put	  these	  into	  a	  relational	  comparison.	  Within	  the	  microcosm	  of	  Joygram,	  Muslims	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  land	  redistribution	  schemes	  of	  the	  CPM	  (see	  Rogaly,	  Harriss-­‐White	  and	  Bose	  1999).	  	  26	  Including	  labour	  under	  the	  National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Act	  of	  2005	  (NREGA),	  locally	  known	  as	   ‘hundred	  days	  work’	  (ekśo	  din	  kāj)	  because	  it	   is	  supposed	  to	  provide	  at	   least	  one	  hundred	  days	  of	  work	  to	  all	  Indian	  citizens.	  	  27	  At	  the	  time	  of	  fieldwork,	  2011-­‐2013,	  3000	  INR	  is	  ±	  £30.	  28 	  Farukhbazar	   Block	   is	   an	   administrative	   area	   encompassing	   17	   villages,	   including	  Joygram.	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are	   both	   dominators	   and	   dominated:	   power	   relations	   existed	   between	   the	  wealthy	   landowners	   and	   the	   landless	   labourers,	   and	   between	   different	   party	  affiliates.	  The	  extreme	  monetary	  inequalities	  and	  exploitation	  within	  the	  village,	  if	   not	   within	   families,	   forestalled	   any	   form	   of	   romanticism	   of	   the	   ‘poor	  oppressed	   Muslims’	   as	   a	   homogeneous	   group.	   In	   fact,	   I	   was	   forced	   to	  sympathize	   with	   the	   ‘oppressors’	   as	   well,	   and	   got	   an	   insight	   into	   their	  deliberations	   (sometimes	   not	   without	   me	   squirming	   in	   indignation).	   This	  helped	   me	   to	   see	   where	   issues	   were	   experienced	   differently	   depending	   on	  political	   economic	   position,	   and	   where	   experience	   and	   practice	   were	   similar	  among	  all	  Muslims	  in	  Joygram.	  	  Moreover,	   I	   had	   often	   felt	   wary	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   my	   focus	   on	   the	  ‘Muslim’	   aspect	   of	   the	   social	   situation	   would	   reproduce	   a	   problematic	  categorisation.	   The	   heterogeneity	   of	   the	   Muslims	   in	   Joygram	   did	   bring	  many	  other	  salient	   issues	  to	  my	  attention.	   I	  have	  described	  the	  setting	  of	   the	  village	  deliberately	   in	   two	   ways,	   on	   communal	   religious	   determination	   and	   political	  affiliation.	   Most	   of	   the	   time	   I	   felt	   that	   party	   politics	   were	   a	   much	   stronger	  determining	   factor	   in	   everyday	   life	   than	   communal	   identity.	   That	   is,	   until	   I	  understood	  the	  more	  subtle	  ways	  in	  which	  dharma	  encapsulates	  all	  aspects	  of	  social	  life.	  	  	  A	   caveat	   is	   in	   order,	   as	   it	  might	   be	   true	   that	   in	   other	   villages,	  where	   the	  dominant	  group	  is	  Hindu,	  certain	  perceptions	  and	  evaluations	  may	  differ	  from	  the	   perceptions	   in	   Joygram.	   Some	   of	   these	   differences	   are	   reflected	   upon	   by	  Joygramis	  and	   I	  have	   included	   these	   in	   the	   thesis	  where	  relevant.	   It	  would	  be	  remarked,	  for	  example,	  that	  there	  is	  less	  freedom	  for	  Muslims	  elsewhere	  (here,	  the	  Khadims	  can	  slaughter	  a	  cow	  every	  Saturday	   in	   the	  centre	  of	   the	  village	  –	  this	  would	  not	  be	  possible	   in	  a	  village	  dominated	  by	  Hindus),	   or	   that	   there	   is	  more	   communal	   trouble	   elsewhere	   (these	   remarks	   could	   be	   made	   in	  comparison	  with	  other	  villages,	  with	  other	  districts,	  or	  with	  other	  states	  such	  as	  Tamil	  Nadu,	  where	  several	  young	  men	  from	  Joygram	  had	  migrated	  to	  work).	  	  Another	   aspect	   of	  my	   fieldwork	   that	   I	   deeply	   lamented	   at	   first	   but	   turned	  out	  to	  be	  highly	  beneficial	  is	  my	  interlocutors’	  refusal	  to	  house	  me	  in	  the	  village.	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  house	  was	  too	  small	  even	  for	  his	  own	  family	  hence	  I	  could	  not	  stay	  there,	  so	  in	  the	  first	  few	  days	  I	  had	  started	  to	  tentatively	  ask	  around	  if	  there	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was	  a	   spare	   room	  anywhere.	  All	   hospitable	   invitations	   started	   to	   fade	  when	   I	  became	  serious	  and	  on	  one	  day	  arrived	  in	  the	  village	  with	  a	  backpack.	  Finally,	  Basir	   took	   me	   aside	   and	   explained	   to	   me	   that	   I	   could	   not	   stay	   in	   Joygram,	  because	   the	   villagers	   feared	   that	   my	   presence	   would	   attract	   trouble,	   in	  particular	   trouble	   from	   boys	  who’d	   come	   from	   far	   and	  wide.	  Moreover,	   with	  Shantiniketan	  (a	  small	  university	  town)	  just	  some	  20	  kilometres	  away,	  they	  saw	  no	  reason	  why	  I	  could	  not	  stay	  there.	  Deeply	  disappointed,	  but	  not	  in	  any	  way	  wanting	   to	   enforce	   my	   presence,	   I	   settled	   in	   at	   Shantiniketan	   and	   continued	  cycling	   to	   Joygram	   every	   day	   (and	   soon	   bought	   a	   motorbike).	   My	   nomadic	  presence	   in	   Joygram,	   however,	   came	   with	   the	   advantage	   that	   I	   had	   no	   ties	  attached	   to	  a	  particular	   family,	   or	   even	   to	   a	  particular	  pāṛā.	   I	  was	   completely	  free	  and	  used	  this	  to	  my	  advantage	  to	  eat,	  nap,	  bath,	  cook,	  and	  gossip	  in	  dozens	  of	  different	  households,	  from	  the	  destitute	  widow	  in	  her	  single	  room	  mud	  hut	  to	  the	   descendent	   of	   a	   jamidār	  with	   a	   grass	   garden	   around	   his	   mansion.	   Soon	  enough,	  people	  had	  gotten	  used	  to	  my	  wandering	  presence	  and	  I	  was	  invited	  to	  stay	  over	  for	  the	  night	  (again,	  in	  different	  households)	  when	  my	  motorbike	  had	  broken	  down	  again,	  or	  when	  it	  had	  inadvertently	  become	  too	  dark	  to	  still	  cross	  the	   dangerous	   forest	   between	   Joygram	   and	   Shantiniketan,	   or	   on	   special	  occasions	  (I	  spent	  almost	  all	  of	  Ramadan,	  during	  which	  I	  fasted	  too,	  in	  different	  households	  across	  Joygram).	  	  My	  choices	  of	  where	  to	  eat	  and	  where	  to	  sleep	  (I	  always	   had	   more	   invitations	   than	   I	   could	   accept)	   were	   the	   topic	   of	   much	  deliberation	   in	   the	   village,	   and	   although	   at	   times	   exasperating,	   the	   politics	  surrounding	  my	  presence	  provided	  illuminating	  insights.	  	  
Reflections	  on	  methodology	  I	   have	   mentioned	   that	   one	   of	   the	   motivations	   for	   choosing	   to	   study	   the	  problematics	   surrounding	   Islam	   and	   secularism	   was	   my	   antipathy	   to	  Islamophobia,	   including	   the	   idea	   that	   ‘those	   Muslims’	   are	   incapable	   of	   ‘our	  secularism’.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   I	   suppose	   I	   encountered	   a	   MacIntyrian	   moral	  vacuum	  in	  liberal	  modernity,	  and	  I	  was	  in	  ‘search	  of	  fullness’	  (Taylor	  2007:	  19).	  I	   was	   attracted	   to	   the	   conviction	   of	   Islamists	   and	   non-­‐political	   Islamic	  reformists	  alike	  as	  they	  seemed	  to	  share	  my	  desire	  to	  revive	  a	  public	  morality.	  But	   in	   all	   honesty,	   I	   fostered	   a	   mild	   antipathy	   to	   what	   I	   perceived	   as	   the	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totalitarian	   and	   constraining	   aspects	   of	   religion	   since	   my	   only	   personal	  experience	   with	   religion	   was	   that	   of	   an	   oppressive,	   guilt	   and	   fear-­‐inspiring	  Calvinism	  in	  the	  rural	  Netherlands	  where	  I	  grew	  up.	   I	  wanted	  to	  reconcile	  the	  disjunctive	   feelings	   of	   antipathy	   and	   attraction	   through	   an	   understanding	   of	  why	   people	   would	   choose	   this	   kind	   of	   response	   to	   the	   moral	   vacuum	   of	  modernity,	   if	   that	   is	   at	   all	   a	   valid	   interpretation.	   The	   kind	   of	   ‘methodological	  agnosticism’	  (which	  has	  long	  been,	  and	  arguably	  still	  is,	  the	  disciplinary	  ‘rule	  of	  thumb’	   [Bowie	   2006:	   4])	   I	   brought	   to	   the	   field	   has	   been	   criticised	   for	   being	  condescending	   and	   impeding	   meaningful	   interaction	   (Kahn	   2011:	   80-­‐82),	  ultimately	  failing	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  religious	  life	  of	  others	  (Cannell	  2006).	  In	  contrast,	  my	  explicit	  position	  in	  the	  field	  as	  an	  agnostic	  doubting	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  god	  or	  the	  afterlife,	  but	  in	  search	  for	  a	  meaningful	  narrative	  created	  a	  space	  for	   learning	   and	   genuine	   discussions;	   for	   a	   truly	   engaged	   anthropology.	   To	  make	  things	  easier,	   I	  could	  have	  said	   from	  the	  beginning	  that	  my	  dharma	  was	  Christian,	  but	  that	  would	  have	  forestalled	  the	  endless	  confusions	  on	  their	  part	  about	  my	   lack	  of	  dharma,	   the	   confusion	  on	  my	  part	  of	   their	   insistence	  on	   the	  impossibility	  of	   living	  without	  dharma,	   and	   the	  slow	  understanding	   that	  grew	  between	   us.	   Villagers’	   reflections	   on	   my	   curious	   position	   in	   the	   village,	   and	  finding	   the	   fine	   balance	   between	   honesty	   and	   immersive	   participation	   also	  taught	  me	   about	   the	   complex	   layering	   of	  dharma:	   its	   universality	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   grounded	   in	   notions	   of	   human	  nature,	   and	   its	   flexibility	   and	   contextual	  applicability	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  I	  cannot	  claim	  that	  my	  anthropology	  is	  entirely	  ‘symmetrical’	  (Latour	  2012),	  but	   I	   have	   aimed	   for	   a	   true	   engagement	  with	   ‘vernacular	   theologies’	   through	  interactions	   that	   involve	   ‘[c]ritique,	   transformation,	   affirmation	   and	   negation’	  (Fountain	   and	   Lau	   2013:	   231).29	  One	   of	   the	   most	   transformative	   moments	  during	  my	  fieldwork	  was	  a	  long	  conversation	  with	  Wahed	  (an	  inspired	  Tablighi	  Jamaat	  member).	  He	  tried	  to	  explain	  to	  me	  that	  if	  one	  truly	  experiences	  real	  and	  deep	   imān	  (faith),	  one	  can	  truly	  see	  that	  Allah	  is	  not	  an	  anthropomorphic	   ‘god	  above’	  but	  immanent	  in	  everything	  that	  surrounds	  us.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  wedding	  celebrations,	   surrounded	  by	  dozens	  of	   people,	   I	   could	   suddenly	   feel	   a	   rush	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  With	   ‘critique’	   I	   do	   not	  mean	   criticism,	   but	   critique	   ‘that	   grows	   out	   of	   juxtaposition	   of	  multiple,	   ethnographically	   grounded	   perspectives’	   (Fischer	   and	   Abedi	   1990:	   xxxi).	   As	   such,	   I	  position	  myself	  in	  a	  tradition	  of	  ‘critical	  anthropology’.	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effervescence	   through	   my	   body,	   and	   finally	   started	   to	   understand	   Allah	   in	   a	  manner	   very	   different	   to	   the	   anthropomorphic	   Christian	   god	   I	   had	   grown	   up	  with.30	  I	   started	   to	   have	   a	   visceral	   sense	   of	   a	   different	   conception	   of	   the	  empirical	   reality,	   one	   in	  which	   the	   sacred	   is	   not	   separable	   from	  ordinary	   life.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  impacted	  my	  shifting	  conception	  of	  ethics	  as	  integral	  to	  action	  and	  speech,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  modality	  of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  actions.	  	  Another	   crucial	  moment	  was	  when	  my	   interlocutors	   realised	   that	   despite	  such	   experiences,	   I	   refused	   to	   officially	   convert	   to	   Islam.	   For	   example,	   my	  partaking	  in	  Arabic	  classes	  in	  the	  village	  was	  cut	  short	  when	  they	  felt	  that	  I	  only	  took	  part	  for	  my	  research,	  not	  because	  I	  believed	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  recitation	  of	   the	   Quran.	   Some	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   felt,	   indeed,	   that	   I	   had	   been	  condescending	  and	  had	  an	  arrogant,	   even	  abusive	  attitude	   towards	  a	  practice	  considered	  sacred	  to	  them.	  Others	  felt	  that	  I	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  continue	  the	  classes	  because	  it	  could	  still	  have	  a	  transformative	  effect,	  as	  they	  believed	  I	  had	  a	   genuinely	   open	   position	   rather	   than	   an	   a	   priori	   dismissive	   attitude.	   These	  kinds	   of	   engagements	   and	   encounters,	   ‘arguments	   as	  well	   as	   rapprochement’	  (Fountain	  and	  Lau	  2013:	  231),	  were	  only	  possible	  because	  I	  took	  seriously	  the	  vernacular	   theology	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   while	   also	   occupying	   a	   (transient)	  ‘theological	   position’	   myself,	   which	   is	   ‘inevitably	   a	   messy	   and	   complicated	  business’	  (ibid.).	  	   *	  The	   reader	   will	   find	   that	   I	   draw	   a	   lot	   upon	   conversations	   with	   my	  interlocutors,	  in	  which	  my	  voice	  is	  present.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  is	  due	  to	  my	   interest	   in	   vernacular	   theology,	   and	   I	   want	   to	   convey	   the	   mutual	  understanding	   that	   grew	   out	   of	   conversations.	   The	   other	   reason	   is	   very	  practical:	  as	  I	  did	  not	  have	  my	  own	  house	  in	  the	  village,	  I	  remained	  a	  visitor,	  and	  it	  was	  really	  only	  in	  the	  households	  of	  Basir	  and	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  that	  I	  was	  even	  allowed	  to	  contribute	  to	  daily	  chores	  like	  cooking,	  nursing	  babies	  and	  sweeping	  floors.	   So	   I	   ended	   up	   spending	   a	   lot	   of	   time	  wandering	   from	   house	   to	   house	  chatting	   with	   people	   while	   they	   would	   go	   about	   their	   work	   or	   share	   tea.	  Another	   reason	   is	   that,	   as	   is	   well	   known,	   Bengalis	   love	   to	   chat,	   gossip	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Obviously,	  the	  Christian	  god	  could	  be	  explained	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Wahed	  explains	  Allah	  to	   me	   here.	   I	   merely	   mean	   that	   I	   had	   (unwittingly)	   projected	   my	   anthropomorphic	  understanding	  of	  the	  Christian	  god	  upon	  the	  way	  my	  interlocutors	  see	  Allah.	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discuss	  intellectual	  or	  political	  matters	  over	  tea	  –	  the	  latter	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  activity	   called	   āḍḍā	   (Chakrabarty	   1999;	   Sen	   2011;	   Sil	   2013).	   Āḍḍā	   has	   been	  recognised	   to	   contain	   a	   sense	   of	   nostalgia	   and	  melancholy	   among	   the	  middle	  classes,	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  economy	  or	  politics	  will	  most	  definitely	  be	  negative.	  In	   the	   villages,	   āḍḍā	   can	   be	   a	   moment	   of	   nostalgic	   grievance,	   but	   also	   of	  vigorous	   debate	   and	   a	   playful	   banter.	   I	   am	   aware	   that	  my	   presence	   added	   a	  more	  reflexive	  element	  to	  āḍḍā:	  I	  would	  not	  just	  observe	  but	  actively	  engage	  in	  the	   conversation,	   ask	   provocative	   questions	   and	   make	   ironic	   comments.	   The	  data	  that	  I	  present	  here,	  then,	  emerges	  from	  these	  conversations,	  equally	  from	  the	   reflections	  of	  my	   interlocutors	  on	   their	  position	  and	  worldview,	  and	   from	  my	  reflections	  on	  my	  own.	  	  	  One	  of	   the	  problems	  of	  using	  conversations	  as	  data	   is	   that	  people	  often	  do	  not	  say	  what	  they	  do,	  and	  much	  less	  do	  what	  they	  say.	  The	  analysis	  presented	  here	  often	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  conversations,	  but	   is	   implicitly	  drawing	  as	  much	  upon	   observations	   of	   and	   participation	   in	   practice	   and	   this	   thesis	   would	   not	  look	   the	   same	   if	   I	   did	   not	   also	   spend	   nineteen	   months	   observing	   the	  discrepancies	   between	   speech	   and	   action.	   But	   I	   also	   do	   not	  want	   to	  make	   an	  absolute	   distinction	   between	   what	   people	   say	   and	   what	   they	   do:	  ‘What…villagers	   say	   they	   ought	   to	   do	   and	   think,	   is	   part	   of	   what	   they	   do,	  observably,	  do	  and	  think.	  Their	  thinking	  and	  saying	  is	  plainly	  part	  of	  what	  they	  do’	  (Laidlaw	  1995:	  11).	  Language	  is	  part	  of	  behaviour.	  	  What	   is	  equally	   interesting	   is	  the	  various	  ways	   in	  which	  people	  say	  things.	  Villagers	  say	  what	  they	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  reflect	  on	  their	  actions	  in	  various	  modes	  of	   speech,	   or	   speech	   registers	   (see	   e.g.	   Gilsenan	  1988;	  Hirschkind	  2001).	  One	  speech	  register	   is	   the	  Da’wa	   (proselytization)	  of	   the	  Tablighi	   Jamaat	  members	  in	  Joygram:	  ‘Da’wa	  defines	  a	  kind	  a	  practice	  involving	  the	  public	  use	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  reasoning	  whereby	  the	  correctness	  of	  an	  action	  is	  argued	  and	  justified	  in	  the	  face	  of	  error,	  doubt,	  indifference	  or	  counter-­‐argument’	  (Hirschkind	  2006:	  116).	  It	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  performative	  ethical	  speech,	  ‘deployed	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  moral	  selves’	   (Hirschkind	  2006:	  113).	   I	  would	  engage	  with	  these	  men	   in	  this	  kind	  of	  ethical	  deliberation,	  and	  the	  content	  of	   the	  Da’wa	   taught	  me	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  Islam	   they	   aspire	   to	   live	   according	   to,	   and	   the	   kind	   of	  men	   they	   aspire	   to	   be.	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Other	  speech	  registers,	  beyond	  ordinary	  conversation,	  are	   for	   instance	  Dada’s	  storytelling	   about	  his	   encounters	  with	  djins	   (beings	  of	   smoke	   featuring	   in	   the	  Quran),	  the	  pervasive	  ironic	  banter	  or	  the	  blatantly	  inaccurate	  accounts	  I	  would	  at	   first	   consider	   lies,	   later	   performances	   of	   another	   kind	   of	   potential	   truth.	  These	  modes	  of	   speech,	  whether	  public	  ethical	   speech,	   storytelling,	  or	  banter,	  create	   opportunities	   to	   transcend	   the	   everyday	   plight	   and	   its	   endless	  concessions	  and	  ambivalences,	  even	  though	  ‘the	  wider	  balance	  of	  forces	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	   field	   are	   always	   in	   play’	   (Gilsenan	   1988:	   196).	   The	   Da’wa	   I	  encountered	   is	   beaming	   with	   optimism	   -­‐	   a	   better	   self	   is	   possible	   -­‐	   yet,	   the	  performance	  is	  always	  vulnerable	  to	  scepticism	  and	  pessimism.	  Even	  if	  I	  would	  listen	   attentively	   to	   performative	   speeches	   of	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   members,	  
maulānās,	   and	   other	   men	   engaging	   in	   storytelling,	   I	   would	   eventually	   try	   to	  challenge	  or	  provoke,	  and	   I	  would	  often	  act	  as	  a	   ‘joker’	   (Gilsenan	  1988)	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	   penetrate	   the	   layers	   of	   performance	   and	   come	   to	   personal	  revelations.	   However,	   I	   was	   keenly	   aware	   that	   a	   potential	   pessimistic	  interpretation	  was	  at	  risk	  and	  some	  friends	  would	  refuse	  to	  confront	  this	  risk.	  I	  also	  had	  to	  learn	  that	  sometimes	  there	  was	  no	  truth	  behind	  the	  performances.	  Often	   my	   friends	   and	   I	   would	   engage	   in	   reflective	   conversation	   and	   the	  discrepancy	   between	   our	   speech	   and	   actions	   would	   become	   explicit	   in	   our	  discussions.	  	  Das	   would	   argue	   that	   social	   suffering	   and	   the	   experience	   of	   structural	  violence	   is	   ‘on	   the	   edges	   of	   conversation’,	   not	   in	   the	   ‘mode	   of	   public	  performance’	   (Das	   2007:	   10).	   Perhaps	   one	   may	   come	   closest	   to	   a	  phenomenological	  understanding	  of	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  other	  at	  the	  edges	  of	  personal	   conversation,	   and	   ‘see	   the	  other	  person	  as	   she/he	   actually	  dwells	   in	  the	  world’	  (Hansen	  2012:	  19).	  Still,	  the	  ‘forms	  of	  life’	  (Wittgenstein	  1953	  in	  Das	  2007)	   that	   we	   anthropologists	   study	   emerge,	   I	   believe,	   through	   all	   modes	   of	  speech,	   including	   performative	   speech	   and	   banter.	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	  ‘difficulty	   of	   reality’	   of	   the	   ordinary,	  which	   I	   feel	   is	   pervasive	   as	  much	   in	   the	  optimistic	   yet	   vulnerable	   public	   moments	   as	   in	   the	   pessimistic	   yet	   hopeful	  private	   moments.	   Like	   Hansen	   (2012:	   19-­‐20),	   I	   take	   the	   ordinary	   to	   be	   in	  everyday	  speech	  and	  action,	  whether	  whispers	  or	  public	  outrage,	  not	  hidden	  in	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a	  reality	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  language,	  or	  in	  a	  ‘semivisible	  ontology	  waiting	  to	  be	  divined’	  (ibid.:	  20)	  by	  an	  anthropologist,	  as	  Das	  (2007)	  seems	  to	  suggest.31	  	  *	  Throughout	  the	  interactions	  with	  Joygramis,	  I	  was	  struck	  most	  of	  all	  by	  the	  humble	  attitude	  of	  ethical	  responsibility.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  introduction,	  I	  could	  sense	  genuine	  anger	  and	  frustration,	  and	  the	  longer	  I	  spent	   in	  West	  Bengal,	   and	   the	  more	   I	  was	   confronted	  with	   stories	  of	   violence	  and	   rape,	   and	   experienced	   various	   forms	  of	   harassment	  myself	   (from	   tedious	  bureaucratic	  processes,	  corrupt	  government	  officials	  to	  physical	  harassment	  by	  a	  police	  officer),	  the	  more	  I	  gained	  a	  deeper	  sympathy	  for	  the	  people	  whom	  had	  to	  undergo	  these	  kinds	  of	  violences	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  and	  shared	  their	  anger	  and	  frustration.	  	  I	   could	   not	   help	   but	   take	   my	   anger	   to	   the	   field,	   and	   express	   it	   in	  conversations	  with	  my	   friends,	  particularly	  concerning	  politics.	  When	   I	  would	  become	   too	   upset,	   I	   realised	  my	   friends	   would	   turn	   away,	   and	   initially	   I	   felt	  disappointed	   that	   they	   did	   not	   want	   to	   see	   the	   real	   nature	   of	   the	   tragedy	   of	  Indian	   politics.	   But	   then	   I	   learned	   that	   a	   comment	   like	   ‘India’s	   democracy	   is	  great’,	  would	  not	  only	   serve	  as	   a	  means	   to	  end	   further	   conversation,	  nor	  as	   a	  reflection	  of	  reality	  or	  opinion,	  but	  as	  an	  imaginative	  reference	  point,	  as	  an	  ideal	  to	  hold	  onto,	  an	   ideal	   that	  keeps	  one	   from	  falling	   into	  a	  paralysing	  scepticism.	  Looking	   over	   the	   edge	   of	   the	   abyss	  may	   incite	   one	   to	   jump.	   Initially,	   I	  would	  often	   ask	   girls	  what	   their	   desires	   or	   ambitions	  were,	   or	  what	   they	  would	   do	  when	  they	  had	  all	  options	  open.	  They	  would	  look	  away	  and	  say	  ‘my	  mind/heart	  (man)	  doesn’t	  even	  go	  there’,	  and	  would	  turn	   into	  silent	  annoyance	  or	  cynical	  remarks	  if	  I	  would	  push.	  Only	  once	  I	  received	  a	  direct	  answer,	  from	  a	  16-­‐year-­‐old	   girl.	   ‘I	   would	   just	   sit’	   (em’ni	   base	   thāk’tām),	   she	   said,	   gazing	   at	   me	  provocatively,	  as	  if	  to	  say,	  ‘what	  did	  you	  expect?’	  More	  than	  once,	  close	  friends	  in	  Joygram	  told	  me	  they	  wanted	  to	  die.	  But	  they	  would	  only	  allow	  as	  much	  as	  a	  flicker	  of	  seriousness	  in	  their	  eyes,	  before	  they	  would	  undo	  the	  statement	  with	  an	   ironic	   comment.	   Irony	   and	   cynicism	   are	  ways	   to	   accept	   the	   parameters	   of	  action,	   while	   demonstrating	   these	   parameters	   are	   not	   taken	   for	   granted	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31 	  Das	   seems	   to	   suggest	   so	   in	   her	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   discussions	   of	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Cavell.	  I	  think	  her	  ethnography	  shows	  otherwise,	  and	  it	  is	  through	  reading	  her	  ethnography	  that	  I	  was	  inspired	  to	  use	  the	  idiom	  ‘difficulty	  of	  reality’.	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considered	   just.	  Maybe	  Žižek	   is	   right	   that	   ‘[c]ynical	  distance	   is	   just	  one	  way	  –	  one	  of	  many	  ways	  –	   to	  blind	  ourselves	   to	   the	  structuring	  power	  of	   ideological	  fantasy:	   even	   if	   we	   do	   not	   take	   things	   seriously,	   even	   if	   we	   keep	   an	   ironical	  distance,	  we	  are	  still	  doing	  them’	  (Žižek	  1989:33,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  –	  but	  it	  is	  therefore	  not	  so	  much	  a	  sign	  of	  blindness	  as	  a	  mockery	  of	  oneself,	  a	  self-­‐irony.	  Moreover,	   in	  a	  position	  of	  being	  subjected	  to	  structural	  violence,	  one	  does	  not	  have	   much	   of	   a	   choice.	   Refusing	   to	   look	   over	   the	   edge	   of	   the	   abyss	   is	   not	   a	  turning	  away	  from	  ‘reality’,	  it	  is	  not	  cowardice:	  it	  is	  an	  everyday	  labour.	  Most	  of	  all,	   I	   was	   awe-­‐struck	   by	   this	   emotional,	   mental	   and	   physical	   labour	   that	   is	  performed	  every	  day	  to	  try	  to	  keep	  going	  and	  ‘be	  good’.	  	  *	  I	   choose	   to	   take	   the	   reflections	  of	  my	   interlocutors	   seriously,	   as	  an	  ethical	  practice	   in	   itself,	   and	  as	   such	  not	  only	   as	   an	  object	  but	  also	   as	   a	  direction	   for	  anthropological	  analysis.	  There	  is	  no	  Archimedean	  point	  from	  which	  to	  view	  the	  ethical,	   and	   presenting	   conversations	   is	   a	   way	   of	   conveying	   the	   first-­‐person	  perspective	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  (see	  Mattingly	  2012).	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  way	  to	  genuinely	  enrich	  our	  anthropological	  understanding	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  an	  ethical	   life.	   To	   quote	   Laidlaw	   at	   length	   here,	   a	   truly	   ‘ethnographic	   stance’	  requires	  	  ‘in	  a	  specific	  sense	  taking	  seriously	  the	  forms	  of	  life	  we	  describe:	  regarding	  them	   –	   and	   therefore	   describing	   them	   –	   as	   something	   we	   learn	   from	   as	  well	   as	   about;	   and	   it	   involves	   learning	   to	   think	  with	   as	  well	   as	   about	   its	  concepts,	   such	   that	   they	   become	   resources	   in	   our	   own	   critical	   reflection	  and	  self-­‐constitution.	  Not	  all	  conceptions	  currently	  being	  canvassed	  in	  the	  anthropology	  of	  ethics	  …	  allow	  equally	  for	  taking	  the	  forms	  of	  life	  we	  study	  seriously	   in	   this	  way,	  but	   it	   is	  a	  precondition,	   I	   think,	   for	  anthropology	  as	  ethical	  practice’	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  45-­‐46).	  	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   I	   aim	   to	   understand	   (Verstehen)	   the	   ethical	   categories,	  speech	   and	   actions	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   within	   their	   local	   cosmopolitics,	   this	  thesis	   is	   in	   part	   an	   ethnography	   of	   the	   particular	   that	   embraces	   an	  ‘epistemology	   of	   intimacy’	   (Keane	   2003).	   But,	   with	   Keane,	   I	   believe	   that	   an	  epistemology	  of	  intimacy	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  complemented	  by	  an	  ‘epistemology	   of	   estrangement’.	   Understanding	   of	   local	   discourse	   and	  categories	  of	  understanding	  ‘offer[s]	  poor	  purchase	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  critical	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insight,	  help	  in	  sorting	  through	  the	  unequal	  relations	  among	  counter-­‐claims,	  or	  understanding	   which	   of	   them	   wins	   out’	   (2003:	   232).	   When	   interpretation	  moves	   too	   directly	   ‘to	   “meaning”	   without,	   for	   example,	   analysing	   how	   those	  meanings	  are	  objectified	  and	  circulate	  in	  public’	  (ibid.)	  crucial	  contextualisation	  and	  theoretical	  potential	  is	  forestalled.	  I	  turn,	  the	  epistemology	  of	  intimacy	  is	  a	  crucial	   component	   to	   the	   epistemology	   of	   estrangement	   as	   the	   potential	  determinism	   of	   political	   economic,	   evolutionary	   or	   psychological	   models	  ‘cannot	   tell	  us	  why	  these	  are	   their	  objects,	  why	  their	  explanations	  matter,	  and	  
for	  whom’	   (ibid:	  242).	   In	  my	  quest	   for	  a	   truly	  engaged	  ethnography	  that	   takes	  seriously	  the	  ethics	  of	  my	  interlocutors,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  profoundly	  critical	  analysis,	  I	   therefore	   seek	   to	   find	   a	   synthesis;	   a	   ‘dialectic	   between	   estrangement	   and	  intimacy	  [that]	  continually	  passes	  through’	  the	  ethnographic	  encounter.	  	  	  
Reflections	  in	  the	  village	  In	   the	  remaining	  part	  of	   the	  chapter	   I	   trace	  how	  the	  SCR	  and	  middle	  class	  perspectives	   in	   conjunction	   with	   ideas	   of	   moral	   failure	   and	   ethical	  responsibility	   inform	   the	   multi-­‐layered	   perceptions	   in	   Joygram;	   and	   I	   briefly	  discuss	  how	  the	  positionality	  of	  the	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  informs	  a	  desire	  to	  craft	  the	  image	  of	  the	  ‘good	  Muslim	  citizen’;	  an	  observation	  that	  will	  return	  time	  and	  again	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  In	   Joygram,	   like	   in	   Kolkata,	   the	   awareness	   of	  Muslim	  marginalisation	  was	  embedded	  in	  the	  narrative	  of	  moral	  decay,	  sometimes	  with	  explicit	  reference	  to	  Western	   influences	   and	   consumerism,	   sometimes	   with	   reference	   to	   local	  practices	  of	  corruption	  or	  greed.	  Yet	  more	   than	  amongst	   the	  middle	  class,	   the	  narrative	  of	  moral	  decay	  was	  expressed	  in	  conjunction	  with	  direct	  experiences	  of	   injustice	   cast	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   exploitation	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   poverty	  alleviation	  and	  opportunities.	  The	  SCR	   found	   that	   the	   ‘sense	  of	   insecurity	  and	  the	   crisis	   of	   identity	  makes	  Muslims	   perceive	   these	   problems	   [e.g.	   poor	   civic	  amenities;	   lack	   of	   political	   representation;	   discrimination;	   higher	   poverty	  levels]	  as	  community-­‐specific	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  attended	  to’	  (SCR	  2006:	  25).	  In	   contrast,	   most	   Joygrami	   Muslims	   seem	   well	   aware	   that	   the	   problems	  mentioned	  are	  not	   community-­‐specific,	   and	   this	  may	  have	   to	  do	  with	   the	   fact	  that	   the	   greatest	   burden	  of	   poverty	   in	   Joygram	   is	   shared	  by	  Muslims,	  Adivasi	  and	  lower	  caste	  Hindus	  alike.	  Muslim	  deprivation	  is	  more	  often	  explained	  as	  a	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negative	  side	  effect	  or	  symptom	  of	   the	  actual	  problem	  of	  structural	   inequality	  and	   a	   violent	   political	   culture,	   and	   only	   in	   some	   cases	   as	   community	   specific.	  There	  is	  ‘insecurity’	  as	  a	  result	  of	  communal	  antagonism	  but	  communalism	  does	  not	  determine	  everyday	  life	  quite	  as	  much	  as	  vicious	  party	  politics	  do	  –	  it	  would	  only	   be	   vote-­‐hungry	   politicians	  who	  would	   politicise	   an	   otherwise	   negotiable	  problem	   of	   cultural	   difference.	   At	   other	   times,	   the	   insecurity	   inspired	   by	   an	  increasing	   suspicion	   of	   the	  Muslim	   community	   in	   India,	   due	   to,	   among	   other	  factors,	  Hindu	  right	  wing	  politics,	  the	  Mumbai	  attacks	  in	  2008	  and	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’,	   is	   experienced	   or	   at	   least	   expressed	   as	   an	   abstract	   sense	   of	   unjust	  prejudice.	  	  My	  interlocutors	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  particular	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  Muslims	  but	  this	   awareness	   sparked	   a	   different	   emotion	   and	   served	   a	   different	   purpose:	  lamenting	  and	  shame	  for	  Muslims’	  inability	  to	  ‘do	  well’,	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure	  and	  responsibility,	  and	   the	  desire	   to	  uplift	   the	  community.	   It	   is	   impossible	   for	  me	   to	   say	   whether	   the	   double	   emotion	   of	   indignation	   and	   responsibility	   has	  ‘trickled	   down’	   or	   grown	   ‘bottom-­‐up’,	   but	   in	   any	   case	   there	   is	   a	   remarkable	  synchronisation	  of	  responses.	  The	  difference	  with	  the	  urban	  Muslims	  I	  spoke	  to	  is	  that	  the	  epistemological	  frame	  of	  reference	  is	  different.	  Class	  is	  not	  the	  most	  important	  point	  of	  reference;	  dharma	  is.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Chapter	  2	  and	  3	  will	  extensively	  elaborate	  on	  the	  vernacular	  meaning	  and	  practice	  of	  dharma.	  I	   will	   have	   to,	   as	   it	   were,	   zoom	   in	   on	   the	   vernacular	   cosmopolitics	   (with	   an	  epistemology	   of	   intimacy)	   before	   I	   can	   again	   zoom	   out	   and	   interpret	   the	  position	  of	  the	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  within	  the	  larger	  political	  landscape	  (with	  an	  epistemology	  of	  estrangement).	  	  
Multi-­‐layered	  positionality	  By	   way	   of	   ethnographic	   introduction,	   I	   will	   illustrate	   the	   multi-­‐layered	  reflections	  on	  the	  Muslims’	  predicament	  through	  a	  conversation	  with	  one	  of	  my	  interlocutors.	  Fuaduddin	  is	  Samsuddin’s	  elder	  brother	  and	  like	  him,	  Fuaduddin	  is	   trained	   at	   the	   Deoband	   madrasa	   and	   teaches	   at	   his	   father’s	   madrasa	   in	   a	  neighbouring	  village.	  He	  also	  works	  as	   the	   imam	  in	  the	  mosque	  of	  his	   father’s	  ancestral	  village.	  Fuaduddin	  had	  a	  much	  quieter	  piety	  than	  Samsuddin,	  but	  over	  time,	  he	  seemed	  to	  have	  grown	  increasingly	  politically	  aware,	  and	  increasingly	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bitter.	  Partly,	  this	  observation	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  had	  also	  become	  a	  closer	  friend	  and	  opened	  up	  more	  to	  me.	  	  In	  this	  conversation,	  he	  laments	  the	  difficult	  situation	  of	  the	  Muslims	  in	  the	  state.	  He	  easily	  slips	  between	  ascribing	  responsibility	  to	  the	  CPM;	  the	  Muslims	  themselves;	  and	  politics	  in	  general.	  I	  will	  transcribe	  the	  conversation	  here	  in	  its	  original	  chronological	  order,	  to	  convey	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Fuaduddin	  constantly	  switches	  the	  direction	  of	  accusation	  and	  responsibility.	  	  	  ‘We	   don’t	   have	   any	   freedom’,	   he	   starts.	   He	   feels	   that	   he,	  with	   his	   obvious	  Islamic	  attire	  and	  reformist	  style	  beard,	  is	  given	  a	  harder	  time	  than	  others.	  ‘It’s	  tough	   for	   the	   ‘bearded	   ones’	   (dāṛioyālā).	   At	   the	   train,	   for	   example,	   they	   only	  search	  us,	  they	  think	  that	  we	  have	  a	  bomb,	  that	  we	  are	  terrorists’.	  He	  claims	  that	  48000	  Muslims	  died	  during	  CPM	   rule	   because	   they	  were	  used	  by	   the	  CPM	   to	  work	  as	  guṇḍās	   [mobsters/hitmen].’32	  The	  next	   thing	  he	  says	   is	  however	  very	  significant:	  the	  Muslims	  are	  stupid	  to	  work	  as	  guṇḍās.	  I	  ask	  him	  why	  he	  thinks	  the	  Muslims	  are	  stupid.	  He	  repeats,	   ‘the	  Muslims	  are	  dumb!’	  (Muslim’rā	  bokā).	  ‘They	   claim	   they	   are	   knowledgeable,	   that	   they	   are	  paṇḍits	   [learned	   person]33	  but	   they	   are	   less	   educated;	   the	   Hindus	   are	   much	   better	   educated.’	   Here	   he	  assigns	   responsibility	   to	   the	  Muslims	   themselves.	  But	   then	  again,	   it’s	  not	  only	  the	  Muslims’	  own	  fault:	  ‘Yet,	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  Muslims	  with	  a	  BA,	  or	  an	  MA,	  and	  they	   are	   sitting	   at	   home.	   They	   are	   unemployed;	   they	   aren’t	   able	   to	   get	   a	  government	  job	  [cākri].	  They	  [non-­‐Muslims]	  say,	  ‘they	  aren’t	  educated,	  they	  are	  crooks	   [bad’māś]’.	   But	   even	   without	   education,	   we	   could	   sweep	   the	   floors!’	  [implying	  the	  fact	  that	  also	  in	  the	  lowest	  tier	  governmental	  jobs	  the	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  is	  disproportionally	  low,	  as	  the	  SCR	  shows].	  	  Fuaduddin	   says	   that	   in	   Gujarat,	   the	   Muslim	   population	   is	   much	   smaller	  relative	   to	   the	   Hindu	   population,	   yet	   they	   can	   pressure	   them	   more	   here	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  He	   also	   mentioned	   that	   6000	   members	   of	   the	   lower	   castes	   died	   because	   of	   the	   same	  reason.	   I	   cannot	   verify	   the	   exact	   numbers	   Samsuddin	   is	   giving	   here,	   but	   other	   sources	  confirmed	   the	   information.	   It	   is	   also	   alleged	   that	   a	   disproportionally	   large	   number	   of	   those	  detained	   in	   jail	  without	   trial	   are	  Muslim.	  Fuaduddin	   says	  he	  had	  heard	   this	   information	   from	  Siddiqullah	   Chowdhury	   Saheb,	   the	   General	   Secretary	   of	   the	   JUH;	   this	  means	   that	   Siddiqullah	  must	   have	   mentioned	   it	   in	   a	   public	   speech,	   and	   that	   more	   Muslims	   are	   aware	   of	   this	  information.	  	  33	  Significantly,	   he	   uses	   the	   Hindu	   term,	   implicitly	   associating	   civilization,	   culture	   and	  education	  with	  the	  bhadralok.	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[because	   here	   they	   are	   kept	   in	   a	   marginalised	   position	   and	   are	   not	   united].	  ‘They	  call	  me	  ‘uncle’	  (cācā),	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  make	  me	  feel	  small.	  While	  I	  offer	  them	  so	  much	  respect!	  I	  know	  how	  to	  love	  others!’	  I	  provokingly	  ask	  him	  what	  he	   wants;	   to	   unite	   the	   Muslims	   and	   cause	   a	   riot?	   Fuaduddin	   bursts	   out:	  ‘communal	  riots	  don’t	  have	  any	  benefit!	  That	  is	  just	  a	  political	  issue,	  and	  politics	  is	   just	   the	  whims	  of	   political	   leaders;	   they	   stage	   riots	   so	   that	   afterwards	   they	  can	  say	  ‘look	  how	  good	  I	  am,	  I	  solved	  the	  riot!’	  Just	  like	  Didi	  [Mamata	  Banerjee,	  current	  Chief	  Minister	  of	  West	  Bengal],	  she	  came	  in	  power	  because	  of	  her	  action	  in	  Nandigram,	  but	  now	  that	  she’s	  in	  power,	  she	  doesn’t	  do	  anything,	  instead,	  she	  tries	  to	  take	  the	  land	  herself!’	  	  	  This	   conversation	   with	   Fuaduddin	   exemplifies	   the	   multi-­‐layered	  positionality	   of	   Muslims	   in	   their	   current	   predicament:	   there	   is	   suspicion	   of	  terrorism	  and	  disrespect	  for	  Muslims;	  a	  lack	  of	  education	  but	  also	  a	  lack	  of	  jobs;	  a	  demoralised	  Muslim	  population	  willing	  to	  commit	  violent	  acts	  for	  money;	  and	  immoral	  politicians	  willing	  to	  stage	  riots	  for	  votes.	  In	  this	  scenario	  the	  desire	  to	  uplift	  the	  community	  is,	  importantly,	  both	  a	  moralising	  as	  well	  as	  a	  modernising	  mission.	  	  The	  various	  layers	  in	  Fuaduddin’s	  account	  show	  that	  the	  double	  discourse	  of	  the	  villagers	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  double	  discourse	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  state	  even	   though	   it	   may	   seem	   that	   the	   moralising	   mission	   is	   a	   duty	   of	   the	  community,	  and	   the	  modernising	  mission	  a	  duty	  of	   the	  state.	  Where	   it	  differs,	  however,	   is	   that	   the	   two	   missions	   are	   integral	   to	   each	   other	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   the	   villagers.	   Initially,	   the	   villagers’	   incessant	   emphasis	   on	  
dharma	  and	   references	   to	   Islam	   as	   a	   source	   of	   value	   and	  morality,	  made	   the	  account	   of	   Madan	   (1987)	   and	   Nandy	   (1998)	   seem	   plausible.	   But	   the	   ethical	  renewal	   Muslim	   Joygramis	   aim	   for	   is	   very	   different	   from	   the	   symbolic	  regeneration	  of	   public	  morality	   from	   ‘the	   realm	  of	   cultural	   communities,	   as	   if	  they	  remained	  reservoirs	  of	  values	  untouched	  by	  the	  larger	  transformations	  of	  Indian	   society’	   (Hansen	   1999:	   57).	   Both	   the	   self	   and	   society	   need	   to	   be	  moralised,	  and	  both	  the	  self	  and	  society	  need	  to	  be	  modernised.	  Politics	  would	  ideally	  be	  re-­‐embedded	  in	  dharma,	  but	  at	  the	  very	  same	  time,	  Muslims	  have	  to	  become	  both	  better	  Muslims	  and	  better	  citizens.	  The	  content	  of	  dharma,	   then,	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has	   to	  be	   reconfigured	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   it	   can	  accommodate	  modern	  politics	  and	  Islamic	  subjects	  within	  one	  moral	  framework.	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   transformation	   of	   Islamic	   practices	   is	   a	   result	   of	   everyday	  violence;	   a	   response	   to	   contemporary	   transformations	   in	   the	   global	   politico-­‐economy;	  and	  a	  corollary	  consequence	  of	  the	  reformation	  and	  cultivation	  of	  the	  ethical	  self.	  	  As	  Das	  and	  Kleinman	  describe	  it	  cogently:	  	  ‘Violence	   creates,	   sustains,	   and	   transforms	   [the]	   interactions	   [between	  moral	   processes	   and	   emotional	   conditions],	   and	   thereby	   it	   actualizes	   the	  inner	   worlds	   of	   lived	   values	   as	   well	   as	   the	   outer	   world	   of	   contested	  meanings.	   Neither	   are	   social	   violence	   and	   its	   consequences	   only	   of	   one	  kind.	  Multiple	  forms	  and	  dynamics	  of	  social	  violence	  animate	  local	  worlds	  and	  the	  individual	  lives	  in	  them.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  social	  violences	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  living	  are	  central	  to	  the	  moral	  order:	  they	  orient	  norms	  and	  normality’	  (2000:	  5).	  	  The	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure	  and	  consequent	  responsibility	  does	  not	  only	  come	  from	   an	   antipathy	   to	   the	   violence	   in	   one’s	   environment,	   but	   also	   because	   of	  one’s	   own	   involvement.	   Politics	   is	   trouble,	   the	   economy	   is	   vicious;	   but	   in	   a	  deeply	   corrupted	   society,	   engagements	   with	   the	   immoral	   environment	   are	  inevitable.	   One	   cannot	   locate	   oneself	   outside	   the	   narrative	   of	   moral	   decay.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  hard,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  change	  one’s	  environment,	  especially	  when	  it	  would	  involve	  fighting	  structural	  violence	  and	  corruption.	  	  Still,	  hope	  would	  remain.	   ‘We	  just	  want	  to	   live	   in	  peace’,	  (ām’rā	  em’ni	  śānti	  
thākte	  cāi)	  was	  uttered	  innumerable	  times.	  Starting	  with	  the	  small	  practices	  of	  everyday	  life,	  people	  try,	  in	  their	  own	  ways,	  to	  become	  a	  better	  person,	  a	  better	  Muslim,	  a	  better	  citizen,	  and	  try	  to	  live	  in	  peace.	  	  	  	  *	  My	   political	   position	   in	   the	   field	   was	   not	   neutral,	   and	   many	   of	   my	  interlocutors	   knew	   this.	   I	   have	   always	   been	   very	   frank	   towards	   my	  interlocutors;	  as	  I	  believe	  that	  we	  cannot	  expect	  our	  interlocutors	  to	  be	  frank	  if	  we	   are	   not	   frank	   ourselves.	   This	   is	   as	   much	   an	   ethical	   choice	   as	   it	   is	   a	  methodological	  strategy.	  Most	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  explained	  my	  presence	  in	  the	  field	   by	   assuming	   I	   wanted	   to	   learn	   the	   Bengali	   language	   and	   culture,	   even	  when	   I	   tried	   repeatedly	   to	   explain	   my	   research	   in	   more	   subtle	   terms.	   Some	  thought	   I	   was	   working	   for	   the	   Crime	   Investigations	   Department;	   some	   were	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hoping	   I	   collaborated	  with	   the	   government	   or	  NGOs	   and	   pleaded	  me	   for	   BPL	  cards	   or	   simply	   money.	   Some	   of	   the	   men	   and	   women	   I	   was	   closest	   to	   were	  aware	  of	  my	  motivations	  and	  my	  own	  political	  stance.	  They	  understood	  that	   I	  was	   not	   going	   to	   bring	   any	  measures	   of	   poverty	   alleviation	   to	   the	   village	   but	  they	  valued	  at	  least	  as	  high	  how	  they	  interpreted	  the	  goal	  of	  my	  research:	  to	  tell	  their	   story.	  Masiruddin’s	  plea	   summed	   it	  up:	   ‘Please	   tell	   them	  over	   there	   that	  we	  are	  not	  terrorists.	  Islam	  means	  peace,	  we	  are	  peaceful,	  and	  you	  know	  it,	  you	  have	  experienced	  it,	  you	  have	  seen	  it	  with	  your	  own	  eyes.	  So	  please	  go	  and	  tell	  the	  story’.	  	  So	  this	  is	  the	  story.	  It	  may	  not	  be	  the	  story	  that	  Masiruddin	  would	  have	  liked	  me	   to	   tell.	  But	   I	   think,	  and	  hope,	   that	  when	  he	  would	  get	   to	   read	   it,	  he	  would	  shake	  his	  head,	  and	  ultimately	  say	  with	  a	  sigh,	  ‘yes,	  it’s	  the	  tragic	  truth’.	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  Fig.	  1.	  Khadim	  Para	  seen	  from	  the	  paddy	  fields,	  soon	  after	  the	  harvest.	  	  	  	  
	  Fig.	  2.	  In	  the	  front,	  the	  concrete	  houses	  and	  tractor	  of	  Malik	  Para;	  in	  the	  back,	  the	  mudhouses	  of	  Mondal	  Para.
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2.	   ‘There	   are	   no	   people	   without	   dharma’:	  Becoming	   a	  
Muslim	  	  
Introduction	  In	   Joygram,	   not	   a	   day	   would	   go	   by	   without	   at	   least	   someone	   saying	  something	  about	  jāti	  (community/caste/‘genus’)34	  or	  dharma.	  The	  notion	  of	  jāti	  soon	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   extremely	   important	   since	   the	   indexation	   of	   the	   social	  context	   occurs	   through	   this	   idiom.	  My	   friends	  went	   to	   great	  pains	   to	   find	  out	  which	   jāti	   I	   belong	   to,	   and	   I	   often	   answered	   that	   I	   am	   simply	   mānuṣ	  (human/person),	  which	  would	  evoke	  laughter	  and	  disbelief.	  Usually	  there	  was	  astonishment:	   how	   can	   one	   be	   mānuṣ	   without	   a	   jāti?	   I	   had	   to	   concede	   to	  belonging	   to	   the	   jāti	   of	   Dutch	   people,	   despite	  my	   explaining	   that	   the	   concept	  ‘jāti’	  would	  not	  be	  that	  easily	  translatable	  to	  the	  environment	  I	  grew	  up	  in.	  I	  was	  also	  soon	  allocated	  the	  Christian	  dharma	  because	  a	  human	  without	  a	  dharma	  is	  like	   water	   without	   gravity;	   simply	   impossible	   in	   this	   world	   we	   live	   in.	   My	  insistence	   on	   a	   lack	   of	   Christian	   belief	   and	   worship	   posed	   an	   unresolved	  conundrum;	   my	   inclusion	   in	   the	   Dutch	   jāti	   included	   me	   by	   default	   in	   the	  Christian	  dharma,	  and	  I	  was	  considered	  a	  morally	  righteous	  person	  so	  surely	  I	  could	  not	  be	   called	   an	   immoral	   atheist	   (nastik).	   ‘There	   are	  no	  people	  without	  
dharma’	  (dharma	  chāṛā	  mānuṣ	  nei),	  Habiba	  Bibi	  said	  conclusively	  after	  another	  puzzling	   interrogation	   from	   her	   side,	   while	   vigorously	   shaking	   her	   head.	  Through	   these	   personal	   confrontations,	   it	   soon	   became	   clear	   to	   me	   that	   one	  cannot	  be	  a	  mānuṣ,	  a	  full	  human	  person,	  without	  both	  a	  jāti	  and	  a	  dharma.	  	  What	   struck	   me	   as	   a	   conundrum,	   however,	   is	   that	   in	   this	   sense	   jāti	   and	  
dharma	  are	  considered	  ‘essential’,	  natural	  categories,	  yet	  people	  from	  different	  
jātis	   are	   not	   physiologically	   different	   beings.	   Some	   friends,	   often	   the	   better	  educated,	  would	  recognise	  my	  claim	  to	  be	  mānuṣ	  without	  a	   jāti	  as	  reminiscent	  of	   the	   ideas	  of	   the	  anti-­‐caste	  social	   reformer	  Rabindranath	  Tagore,	  and	  would	  point	  out	  that	   indeed,	  we	  have	  the	  same	  blood,	  and	  we	  are	  all	  mānuṣ.	  But	  this	  often	   turned	   out	   to	  mean	   that	   they	   and	   I,	   despite	   our	   different	   jāti,	  have	   the	  same	  blood.	  While	  in	  some	  contexts	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  would	  be	  designated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Jātis	  are	   the	   units	   that	   constitute	   the	   social	   world	   in	   Bengal.	   The	   Bengali	   jāti	   is	   often	  translated	   into	   English	   as	   caste,	   but	   it	   goes	   far	   beyond	   this	   limited	   category.	   Therefore	   I	  translate	  it	  here	  as	  ‘genus’,	  and	  I	  will	  go	  deeper	  into	  it	  as	  I	  proceed.	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as	   belonging	   to	   different	   jātis,	   in	   other	   contexts	   they	  were	   described	   as	  bhāi-­‐
bhāi,	  brothers,	  sharing	  the	  same	  blood.35	  	  The	   concept	   of	   jāti	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   question	   of	   whether	  someone	   is	   born	   as	   a	  Muslim	  or	   how	  otherwise	   one	  becomes	   included	   in	   the	  Muslim	  jāti.	  When	  posed	  to	  my	  interlocutors,	  this	  question	  was	  met	  by	  a	  lot	  of	  bewildered	  looks.	  Most	  would	  initially	  answer	  that	  they	  are	  just	  Muslims;	  they	  are	  born	  like	  that	  and	  couldn’t	  have	  been	  anything	  else.	  Yet	  others	  would	  deny	  this,	  or	  would	  do	  so	  on	  second	  thought.	  Clearly,	  my	  question	  missed	  the	  point,	  as	  so	  many	  of	  my	  ignorant,	  Eurocentric	  questions	  did.	  I	  asked	  my	  friend	  Milon	  and	  Basir’s	  mother	  Parveen	  Bibi,	  who	  had	  at	  first	  claimed	  that	  babies	  are	  born	  Muslim,	   what	   would	   happen	   when	   a	   baby	   of	   a	   Muslim	   family	   would	   be	  interchanged	   with	   a	   baby	   in	   an	   Adivasi	   family.	   They	   reckoned	   after	   some	  bewildered	   deliberation	   that	   the	   former	   would	   become	   an	   Adivasi	   and	   the	  second	   would	   become	   a	   Muslim.	   Yet	   it	   turned	   out	   that	   it	   would	   be	   an	  ethnocentric	   error	   to	   conclude	   that	   jāti	   is	   consequently	   not	   ‘in	   the	   blood’	   or	  ‘genetic’.	  Rather,	  blood	  is	  mutable	  and	  inseparable	  from	  the	  category	  of	  jāti.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  engages	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human,	  to	  be	  a	   person,	   and	   to	   become	   a	   Muslim.	   As	   such,	   it	   lays	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	  exploration	  of	  the	  ethical	  life-­‐world	  of	  Muslim	  Joygramis	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  locally	  meaningful	   categories:	   jāti	   and	   dharma.	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   these	  indigenous	   categories	  do	  not	   fit	   a	   physiological/natural	   versus	   social/cultural	  divide,	   from	   which	   follows	   that	   they	   do	   not	   fit	   secular/religious	   or	  immanent/transcendent	   dichotomies.	   I	   will	   do	   so	   through	   an	   analysis	   of	  cosmogony,	  personhood	  and	  exchange.	  	  The	  outline	  of	   the	   chapter	   is	   as	   follows.	   In	   the	   section	  directly	   following,	   I	  discuss	   anthropological	   theories	   regarding	   personhood	   in	   South	   Asia,	   and	  develop	  my	  arguments	   in	  relation	  to	   this	   literature.	   I	   then	  move	  on	  to	  discuss	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Local	  ideas	  of	  shared	  blood	  have	  influenced,	  and	  are	  influenced	  by,	  philanthropists	  and	  reformers	  in	  Bengal,	  like	  Tagore,	  Ram	  Mohan	  Roy,	  and	  Kavi	  Nazrul	  Islam,	  who	  would	  all	  try	  to	  breach	   trough	   communalism.	   The	   legacy	   of	   elite	   intellectuals,	   foremost	   in	   the	   form	   of	   poetry	  and	   songs,	   is	   widely	   spread	   knowledge:	   a	   daily	   labourer	   once	   told	   me	   about	   Kavi	   Nazrul’s	  observation	  that	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  are	  just	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  same	  tree;	  this	  testifies	  that	  the	  philanthropist’	  preaching	  reaches	  far	  beyond	  the	  elite.	  Interestingly,	  while	  the	  poetry	  of	  Kavi	  Nazrul	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  rural	  ideology,	  rural	  ideology	  is	  now	  legitimized	  with	  reference	  to	  Kavi	  Nazrul’s	  poetry.	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Qurbani,	  the	  cosmogonic	  ritual	  sacrifice.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  sacrificial	  ritual	  (re-­‐)	  enacts	   the	   ‘contract	   behind	   contracts’,	   and	   (re-­‐)establishes	   the	   key	   ethical	  principles	   according	   to	   which	   exchanges	   within	   Muslim	   relatedness	   are	  constituted	  and	  evaluated:	  equality	  and	  solidarity.	  These,	  then,	  are	  the	  abstract	  values	   central	   to	   Joygrami	   cosmopolitics.	   The	   third	   section	   discusses	   the	   key	  rituals	   that	   generate	   the	  Muslim	   jāti	   identity:	   rituals	  pertaining	   to	  birth;	  male	  circumcision;	   food	   exchanges	   within	   the	   household;	   and	   marriage.	   Finally,	   I	  suggest	   that	   (physiological)	   kinship	   is	   played	   down	   in	   favour	   of	   jāti	  relationship.	   I	   will	   conclude	   with	   the	   suggestion	   that	   there	   is	   no	   moral	  personhood	   outside	   jāti/dharma;	   however,	   this	   argument	  will	   only	   come	   full	  circle	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   This	   chapter	   reveals	   the	   visceral	   inculcation	   of	   jāti	  according	   to	   the	   ethical	   principles	   central	   to	   the	   Islamic	   dharma;	   the	   next	  chapter	   considers	   the	   visceral	   inculcation	   of	   dharma	   and	   the	   concomitant	  faculties	   that	   allow	   for	   ethical	   action:	   the	   two	  chapters	   together	   comprise	   the	  roots	   of	   ethical	   action	   and	   allow	   for	   the	   suggestion	   that	   in	   the	   ethical	  imagination	  of	  Bengali	  Muslims	   there	   is	   no	   conceivable	   self	   that	   exists	   before	  relations	   organised	   by	   jāti	   and	   dharma:	   before	   jāti	   and	   dharma	   there	   is	   no	  sociality,	  thus	  no	  morality/ethics,	  thus	  no	  humanity.	  	  
Theoretical	  orientations:	  personhood	  in	  South	  Asia	  	  This	  chapter	  offers	  a	  novel	   intervention	   into	   the	   literature	  on	  personhood,	  kinship,	   and	   jāti	   in	   South	  Asia.	   Personhood	   and	   kinship	   studies	   in	   South	  Asia	  have	   long	   been	   influenced	   by	   the	   Chicago	   enthnosociologists	   (Inden	   and	  Nicholas	  1977;	  Marriot	  and	  Inden	  1977;	  Marriot	  1976).	  The	   latter	   followed	   in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  Schneider	  (1968,	  1984)	  who	  had	  been	  decisively	  influential	  in	  shifting	   from	   a	   formalist	   approach	   on	   kinship	   in	   terms	   of	   descent,	   lineage	  theory	   and	   alliance	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   biological	   and	   social	   elements	   of	  kinship.	  Schneider	  suggested	  that	  Americans	  perceive	  a	  fundamental	  distinction	  between	   ‘substance’	  (nature/blood)	  and	   ‘code	  of	  conduct’	  (law).	   In	  contrast,	   it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  in	  South	  Asia	  the	  opposite	  is	  true:	  society	  is	  conceived	  as	  a	  single	   order	   of	   being	   in	   which	   ‘no	   distinction	   is	   made…between	   an	   order	   of	  “nature”,	  defined	  by	  shared	  biogenetic	  substance,	  and	  an	  order	  of	  “law,”	  defined	  by	  code	  of	  conduct’	  (Inden	  and	  Nicholas	  1977:	  xiv;	  cf.	  Marriot	  1976).	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Consequently,	  the	  majority	  of	  South	  Asians	  supposedly	  consider	  the	  person	  to	   be	   constituted	   by	   a	   malleable	   amalgam	   of	   biological	   substance	   and	   moral	  code.	  Moreover,	  from	  this	  proposition	  it	  emerges	  that	  the	  South	  Asian	  person	  is	  ‘particularistic’	   and	   ‘divisible’	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   bounded	  Western	   individual:	  the	  protean	  South	  Asian	  person	  is	  made	  up	  of	  ‘circulations	  and	  combinations	  of	  particles	   of	   substance-­‐code	   [that]	   are	   continually	   occurring’	   (Marriot	   1976:	  112).	  	  	   More	   recent	   studies	   have	   gone	   beyond	   Schneider,	   and	   beyond	   the	  opposition	  of	  the	  Western	  and	  the	  non-­‐Western	  person	  and	  understandings	  of	  kinship.	   Several	   anthropologists	   argue	   that	   beliefs	   and	   ideologies	   of	   both	  Western	   and	  non-­‐Western	  people	   have	   been	   over-­‐systematized	   and	  mistaken	  for	   people’s	   a-­‐historical	   ontological	   reality	   (Bloch	   1993;	   Good	   1991,	   2000;	  Keesing	  1985;	  Lambek	  1998,	  2013;	  Parry	  1989a).	  In	  particular,	  kinship	  studies	  have	   been	   criticized	   for	   relying	   too	   much	   on	   a	   stark	   opposition	   between	  Western	   understandings	   of	   kinship	   (based	   on	   blood	   relationships),	   and	   non-­‐Western	  forms	  of	  relating	  to	  one	  another	  (Appadurai	  1986;	  Carsten	  2000,	  2004;	  McKinnon	   and	   Cannell	   2013).	   Even	   though	   I	   want	   to	   leave	   open	   whether	  particular	  ideologies	  are	  reflections	  of	  an	  objective	  ontological	  reality,	  I	  do	  take	  to	  heart	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  ideologies	  is	  often	  not	  as	  totalizing	  as	  it	   has	   previously	   been	   assumed.	   If	   in	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	   monistic,	   protean	  person	  kinship	  would	  be	  totalizing,	  kinship	  would	  not	  be	  recognized.	  But	  South	  Asians	  do	  distinguish	  between	  different	  forms	  of	  kin	  and	  non-­‐kin	  relationships	  though	   not	   in	   a	   strict	   sense:	   in	   both	   cases	   substance-­‐code	   is	   malleable	   and	  constituted	   and	   transformed	   through	   the	   exchange	   of	   bio-­‐moral	   qualities	  (Inden	  and	  Nicholas	  1977:	  20).	  	  Carsten	   suggests	   the	   term	   ‘relatedness’	   ‘in	   opposition	   to,	   or	   alongside,	  kinship,	   in	  order	   to	   signal	   an	  openness	   to	   indigenous	   idioms	  of	  being	   related’	  and	   ‘to	   suspend	  a	  particular	   set	  of	   assumptions	  about	  what	   is	   entailed	  by	   the	  terms	  social	  and	  biological’	  (2000:	  4).	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  ‘relatedness’	  here	  for	  that	  reason;	  again,	  not	  to	  reflect	  an	  ontological	  reality	  but	  because	  it	  offers	  the	  space	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   locally	   meaningful	   categories.	   The	   ‘essentially	  processual’	   nature	   of	   the	   category	   ‘relatedness’	   (Carsten	   2000:	   16)	   makes	   it	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appropriate	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   South	   Asian	   context,	   where	   relationships	  never	   ‘are’	   but	   always	   ‘become’.	   The	   circulation	   of	   substance-­‐code	   and	   the	  instability	   of	   the	   protean	   person	   require	   a	   constant	   and	   vigilant	   sharing	   and	  exchange	   of	   substances	   and	   gifts,	   as	   different	   forms	   of	   relatedness	   are	  continually	   fostered	   through	   physiological,	   social/cultural	   and	   affective	  transactions	  (Lambert	  2000;	  Carsten	  2000;	  Bear	  2007).	  Going	  beyond	  domains	  (Carsten	  2000:	  4),	  the	  idiom	  of	  relatedness	  allows	  us	  to	  open	  up	  the	  scope	  and	  consider	  jāti	  as	  standing	  in	  a	  continuum	  with	  kinship	  as	   different	   kinds	   and	   forms	   of	   relatedness.	   Jāti	   does	   not	   have	   to	   refer	  exclusively	   to	   the	   communal	   identity.	   In	   her	   study	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐Indian	  community	   in	  West	  Bengal,	  Bear	  draws	   attention	   to	   the	  manifold,	   historically	  produced	  meanings,	  associations	  and	  connotations	   that	   jāti	   can	  have:	   ‘[…]	   jāti	  can	   be	   broadly	   understood	   as	   referring	   to	   a	   type,	   sort,	   or	   class.	   The	   type	   it	  indicates	  can	  be	  anything	  from	  nation,	  race,	  religion,	  tribe,	  lineage	  and	  region	  to	  breed,	  pedigree,	  community,	  species	  and	  caste’	  (2007:	  287).	  Jāti,	  then,	  connotes	  a	  node	  of	  relatedness;	  relatedness	  in	  various	  segmentary	  groups,	  the	  members	  of	  which	  share	  particular	  substances	  and	  codes.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  essentialised	  Muslim	  jāti	  identity	  is	  more	  important	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  relatedness,	  for	  example	  the	  household.	  	  Although	   the	   anthropologist	   should	   be	   wary	   of	   over-­‐systemizing	   people’s	  (kinship)	  ideology	  and	  projecting	  stark	  oppositions	  between	  Western	  and	  non-­‐Western	  ideologies,	  it	  should	  equally	  be	  recognized	  that	  relatedness	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  locally	  specific	  cosmopolitics.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  most	  useful	  here	  to	  turn	  to	  Parry	  (1989a,	   1994),	  who	  makes	   a	   strong	   case	   against	   an	   easy	   dichotomy	   between	  the	   individual,	   bounded	   Western	   person	   and	   the	   divisible,	   constitutionally	  volatile	   Indian.	   He	   argues	   that	   these	   are	   ideological	   differences	   rather	   than	  ontological	   differences.	   If	   all	   Indians	   indeed	   believed	   that	   the	   person	   is	  constitutionally	   volatile,	   how	   could	   there	   be	   essentialised,	   bounded	   caste	  identities?	  His	  answer	   to	   this	   conundrum	   is	   that	   ‘the	  protean	  construct	  of	   the	  person…acts	   as	   an	   “ideology”	   in	   the	   classic	   Marxist	   sense’	   which,	   bearing	   a	  constant	   threat	  of	  chaos	  and	  disintegration,	   ‘creates	  and	  sustains	   the	  world	  of	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order	  and	  regulation’	  (Parry	  1989a:	  514).36	  That	   is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  salience	  of	  the	   ideology	   for	   the	   experiential	   reality:	   ‘castes	   are	   regarded	   as	   units	   of	  equivalence	  composed	  of	  people	  of	  the	  same	  general	  kind;	  and	  persons	  are	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  transformable	  bio-­‐moral	  substance	  which	  is	  continually	  modified	  by	  the	  transactions	  in	  which	  they	  engage’	  (Parry	  1989a:	  494,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Parry	  thus	  recognises	  in	  the	  Hindu	  cosmology	  two	  constructs	  of	  the	  person	  that	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  I	   suggest	   that	   a	   similar	  binary	   ideological	   construct	   is	   in	  operation	  among	  my	   Muslim	   interlocutors.	   In	   line	   with	   Parry,	   Lambek	   suggests	   that	   the	  continuous,	  ‘forensic’,	  monadic	  modern	  person	  and	  the	  ‘mimetic’,	  discontinuous	  
personage	   are	   best	   understood	   as	   ‘two	   alternative	   ways	   to	   conceptualize	  persons	   and…as	   two	   dimensions	   of	   active	   personhood	   that	   have	   universal	  relevance	   but	   carry	   relative	   weight	   or	   salience	   in	   different	   societies’	   (2013:	  837).	  Here	  we	  see	  the	  two	  constructs	  operating	  in	  one	  society,	  and	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  relative	  weight	  and	  salience	  is	  shifting	  from	  the	  personage	  to	  the	  modern	  continuous	  person.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  in	  particular,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that,	   just	  as	  among	  Hindus,	  among	  my	  Muslim	   interlocutors	   jāti	   is	   the	   category	   that	   creates	   order	   in	   the	  threatening	   chaos	   of	   bio-­‐moral	   exchanges.	   But	   the	   ideological	   content	   is	  different.	   Whereas	   Hindus	   are	   subdivided	   in	   hierarchically	   ordered	   jātis,	   the	  Muslim	   jāti	   in	   its	   entirety	   (like	   each	   one	   of	   the	   Hindu	   castes/jātis)	   is	   an	  essentialised	   unit	   composed	   of	   equal	   persons,	   created	   by	   Allah. 37 	  Jātis	   –	  whether	  referring	  to	  Hindu	  castes	  or	  to	  an	  entire	  community	  -­‐	  have	  to	  appear	  as	  essentialised	  groups	   in	  order	   to	  create	   the	   illusion	  of	  a	  well-­‐organised	  system	  whereas	  in	  mundane	  reality	  this	   is	  constantly	  negotiated	  through	  transactions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  For	   an	   unraveling	   of	   ideology/belief	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   practical	   knowledge	   on	   the	  other	  hand	  elsewhere	   (considering	  biological	   and	   social	   elements	  of	  kinship	  and	  gender),	   see	  Astuti	  (1995,	  2009).	  37	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  hierarchically	  ordered	  castes	  among	  Bengali	  Muslims	  exist	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  among	  Hindus,	  due	   to	   the	  many	  years	  of	  cohabitation	  (see	  e.g.	  Ahmed	  1988;	  Bhattacharya	   1973;	   Roy	   2014).	   Although	   the	   Muslims	   I	   spoke	   to	   recognize	   the	   fact	   that	  something	  alike	  castes	  have	  historically	  evolved	  among	  Muslims,	  they	  resolutely	  refuse	  to	  give	  it	   any	   ritual	   significance.	   Castes	   are	  manmade,	   Joygrami	  Muslims	  argue,	   that	   is,	   castes	  do	  not	  transcend	   the	   transactional	   social.	   So	  whereas	  Hindus	  have	  many	   jātis,	  Muslims	  are	  united	   in	  one	  jāti.	  Sectarian	  difference	  (e.g.	  Hanafi,	  Alh-­‐i	  Hadith),	  which	  is,	  importantly,	  not	  essentialised	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  caste	  difference,	  seemed	  more	  important	  than	  caste.	  Marriages,	  for	  example,	  tend	  to	  be	  endogamous	  with	  regard	  to	  sect	  (rather	  than	  caste),	  but	  even	  within	  Joygram	  there	  were	  plenty	  examples	  to	  the	  contrary	  (see	  chapter	  4).	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(Parry	   1989a:	   513-­‐514).	   The	   exchanges	   between	   protean	   persons	   create	  constant,	  contextual	  and	  temporary	  hierarchies;	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  countered	  by	  the	   idealisation	   of	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	   as	   internally	   equal,	   but	   in	   a	   hierarchical	  relation	  to	  other	  jātis.	  The	  two	  ideologies	  -­‐	  one	  of	  chaos	  and	  one	  of	  order	  –	  are	  intricately	  related:	   they	  sometimes	  act	  as	  balances	   to	  each	  other,	  and	  at	  other	  times	   perpetuate	   productive	   ambiguities.	   The	   interrelatedness	   of	   these	  ideologies	   implies	   that	   in	   the	   cosmopolitics	   of	  my	   interlocutors,	   the	  person	   is	  simultaneously	  created	  by	  Allah	  and	  generated	  out	  of	  relational	  exchanges.	  This	   interrelatedness	   is	   underscored	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   ideologies	   are	  encompassed	  by	  dharma.	  The	  two	  seemingly	  incompatible	  ideologies	  –	  that	  of	  a	  holistic	  macro-­‐cosmic	  order	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  substance	  and	  code,	  and	  the	  cosmogony	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  world	  by	  Allah	  –	  are	  united	  within	   dharma	   if	   we	   understand	   the	   creation	   of	   humanity	   by	   Allah	   as	   an	  exchange,	   that	   is,	   the	   first	   establishment	   of	   a	   form	   of	   relatedness	   and	   the	  potential	  for	  differentiation	  within	  the	  amalgam	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  substances.	  From	  this	  exchange,	  other	  forms	  of	  relatedness	  follow,	  and	  particular	  kinds	  of	  human	  persons	  can	  be	  generated.	  In	  the	  next	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  foundational	  exchange	  with	  Allah,	  re-­‐enacted	  in	  the	  sacrificial	  ritual	  on	  Qurbani,	  is	   the	   ‘contract	  behind	  contracts’	   from	  which	  subsequent	  ethical	  contracts	  are	  derived.	  	  As	   in	   the	   Christian	   cosmogony	   (Scott	   2005:	   119;	   cf.	   Cannell	   2006),	   a	  contradiction	  remains	  that	  the	  creator-­‐god	  created	  all	  beings	  equally,	  but	  only	  those	   people	   who	   recognize	   the	   creator-­‐god	   are	   worthy	   of	   salvation.	   This	  contradiction	   is	   enhanced	   by	   the	   idea	   that	   protean	   persons	   are	   constantly	  mutable	   by	   exchanges.38	  It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   people	   will	   desire	   logical	  coherence	   in	   the	   face	   of	   such	   contradictions	   (Scott	   2005:	   115),	   and	   the	  discussion	   about	   rituals	   that	   follows	   will	   show	   how	   the	   elements	   of	   both	  ideologies	  are	  incorporated.	  This	  chapter	  will	  reflect	  my	  interlocutors’	  coherent	  ethno-­‐theology,	   which	   provides	   the	   grounds	   for	   negotiating	   contradictions,	  although	   some	   contradictions	   cannot	   be	   overcome,	   and	   these	   will	   be	   further	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  e.g.	  Scott	  (2005)	  for	  an	  excellent	  discussion	  of	  a	  similar	  contradiction	  between	  two	  ideologies	   (or	   ontologies,	   in	   his	  words),	   in	   that	   case	   the	   poly-­‐ontology	   of	   the	  Arosi	   (Solomon	  Islands)	  and	  the	  Christian	  mono-­‐ontology.	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   This	  chapter	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  ritual	  generation	  of	  Muslimness	  and	  jāti	  relatedness.	  Drawing	  on	  Lambek,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  cosmogonic	  sacrificial	  ritual	  as	  well	  as	  life-­‐cycle	  rituals	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  ritual	  exchanges	  establish	  ethical	  principles.	   Whereas	   for	   Parry	   (1989a,	   1994),	   the	   protean	   construct	   of	   the	  person	   is	   an	   ideology	   in	   the	  Marxist	   sense;39	  and	   whereas	   for	   Bloch	   (1986;	  1992)	   the	   rituals	   that	   generate	   groups	   and	   roles	   are	   the	   instruments	   for	   the	  authorisation	   and	   legitimation	   of	   power,	   I	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sui	   generis	  ethical	   dimension	   to	   the	   ideological	   construction.	   Even	   if	   we	   adopt	   a	   secular	  approach,	   and	   consider	   (religious)	   narratives	   of	   being	   and	   becoming	   as	  ideologies	   or	   cosmological	   conceptualisations	   rather	   than	   as	   an	   ontological	  reality,	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  interpretation	  of	  religious	  rituals	  only	  as	  the	  legitimation	   of	   power.	   Lambek	   argues	   that	   ‘morality	   is	   a	   significant	   third	  domain	   alongside	   power	   and	   desire;	   if	   not	   to	   be	   invoked	   with	   “innocence,”	  neither	   is	   it	  reducible	  either	  to	  power	  or	  desire,	  or	   to	  refereeing	  the	  struggles	  between	  them’	  (Lambek	  2000:	  313).	  Rituals	  and	  narratives	  may	  be	  mystifying,	  repressive	  measures	  but	   they	   (also)	   serve	   to	  establish	   truth;	   to	   cope	  with	   the	  predicament	  of	  humanity	   (our	  mortality);	   and	   to	  establish	  ethical	   criteria	  and	  hence	  generate	  the	  possibility	  for	  evaluation	  –	  and	  value	  (Lambek	  2012:	  348).	  In	  this	  sense,	  narratives	  and	  rituals	  attempt	  to	  go	  beyond	  power,	  to	  transcend	  the	  Nietzschean	  self.	  	  People	  may	   not	   be	   consciously	   aware	   of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   sacrificial	  ritual	   instantiates	   ethical	   reference	   points,	   but	   that	   does	   not	   change	   its	  consequences.	   Bloch	   (1986,	   1992)	   has	   convincingly	   argued	   that	   ritual	   is	  effective	  in	  the	  production	  of	  ideology	  (and,	  I	  suggest,	  of	  ethics)	  through	  its	  very	  performance,	  notwithstanding	  individual	  enthusiasm,	  doubt	  or	  indifference.	  I	  do	  accept	  that	  the	  experiential	  aspect	  may	  be	  important	  (e.g.	  Cannell	  2007),	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  certain	  ethical	  criteria	  are	  being	  reproduced	  and	  embodied	   through	  ritual,	   whether	   enthusiastically	   endorsed	   or	   not.	   So	   far	   Lambek	   (2010b),	  following	  Rappaport,	  seems	  to	  agree	  with	  Bloch:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Admittedly,	  Parry’s	  use	  of	   the	   term	   ideology	   is	  ambiguous,	  as	   it	  contains	  elements	  of	  a	  Marxist	   as	  well	   as	  Dumontian	  meaning	  of	   the	   term.	  Here,	   however,	   he	   explicitly	   refers	   to	   the	  Marxist	  meaning	  of	  ideology.	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‘Rappaport	   argues	   that	   by	   submission	   to	   its	   bodily	   demands…the	  participants	  performing	  or	  undergoing	  a	  ritual	  demonstrate	  to	  others	  and	  to	  themselves	  their	  acceptance	  of	  both	  its	  message	  and	  its	  form.	  They	  do	  so	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  “believe”	  in	  any	  specific	  propositions	  associated	  with	  it;	  hence	  the	  outward,	  public	  consequences	  prevail	  irrespective	  of	  the	  inner	  state	  of	  the	  participants’	  (Lambek	  2010b:	  45).	  	  	  However,	   the	   sacrifice	   of	   freedom	   in	   exchange	   for	   order,	   in	  Bloch’s	  words	  (1986:	   171),	   does	   not	   only	   serve	   the	   production	   of	   power.	   Participation	   in	   a	  ritual	  is	  an	  act	  of	  public	  commitment	  (notwithstanding	  internal	  ambiguity)	  with	  public	  consequences,	  and	  thus	  fundamentally	  an	  ethical	  matter	  (Lambek	  2010b:	  47).	   In	   such	   public	   moments,	   courses	   of	   action	   and	   criteria	   are	   being	  established,	  and	  subsequent	  acts	  of	  exchange	  are	  evaluated	   in	   the	   light	  of	   this	  commitment.	   Submission	   to	   the	   creator-­‐god	   is	   therefore	   not	   about	   piety	  narrowly	  defined,	  but	  about	  the	  demand	  for	  an	  ethical	  relationality	  of	  exchange	  that	  is	  pervasive	  throughout	  everyday	  life.	  Thus,	   I	   consider	   the	   rituals	   described	   in	   this	   chapter	   not	   as	   symbolic	  representations	   separated	   from	   mundane	   action,	   but	   as	   constitutive	  performances	   that	   inculcate	   truth	   and	   virtuous	   disposition	   (Asad	   1993:	   55	   –	  170),	  ‘through	  which	  the	  subject’s	  very	  will,	  desire,	  intellect,	  and	  body	  [comes]	  to	  acquire	  a	  particular	   form’	  (Mahmood	  2001:	  834).	   In	  the	  next	  chapter,	   I	  will	  further	  elaborate	  on	  ethical	  practice	  and	  the	  ethical	  mind/body.	  
	   For	  heuristic	  purposes,	   I	  make	  the	  empirically	  rooted	  analytical	  distinction	  in	  the	  murky	  waters	  of	  identifications	  between	  two	  conceptions	  of	  Muslimness	  (as	   a	   form	  of	   relatedness)	   that	   operate	   in	  parallel,	   being	  dependent	   and	   even	  conditional	  upon	  each	  other.	  One	  is	  the	  generative	  Muslimness	  that	  is	  generated	  by	   being	   born	   into	   a	   Muslim	   family	   and	   carrying	   an	   Islamic	   name,	   or	   by	  conversion;	   it	   is	   the	   jāti	   as	   discussed	   above.	   Bear	   argues	   that	   ‘[jāti]	   is	   a	   term	  that	  suggests	  that	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  social	  life	  there	  exist	  hidden,	  shared,	  and	  often	  inherited	  essences	  that	  are	  revealed	  by	  personal	  demeanor’	  (Bear	  2007:	  287).	  However,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   ‘inherited	   essence’	   is	   better	   understood	   as	   a	  potential	   than	   a	   static	   essential	   substance	   already	   present.	   Generative	  Muslimness	   contains	   the	   essentialised	   potential;	   it	   connotes	   descent,	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consanguinity	   (even	   where	   actual	   consanguinity	   is	   absent)	   and	   race	   and	   is	  related	   to	  a	  notion	  of	   locality	   (deś).	   I	  will	   show	   in	   this	  chapter	  how	  particular	  rituals	   and	   exchanges	   invest	   people	   with	   this	   potential.	   This	   Muslimness	  becomes	  essentialised	  during	   the	  process	  of	   ‘making	  a	  human	  person’	   (mānuṣ	  
karā).	  	  The	   other	   sense	   in	   which	   I	   analyse	   Muslimness	   has	   to	   do	   with	   actual	  practice	  and	  belief,	  that	  is,	  with	  the	  Islamic	  dharma.	  It	  is	  explicitly	  conceived	  as	  dynamic,	   processual	   and	   claims	   to	   possession	   are	   subject	   to	   reflection	   and	  contestation.	  In	  fact	  it	  is	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  ‘good	  Muslim’,	  of	  the	  ‘Muslim	  as	  he/she	  ought	  to	  be’,	  that	  can	  hardly	  ever	  fully	  be	  acquired	  yet	  people	  constantly	  strive	  towards:	   it	   is	   the	   ethical	   dimension	   of	   life.	   I	  will	   refer	   to	   the	   second	   sense	   of	  Muslimness	  as	   ‘ethical	  Muslimness’.	   Importantly,	  the	  two	  categories	  stand	  in	  a	  symbiotic	   relation	   to	   each	   other:	   failing	   to	   acquire	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   ethical	  Muslimness	   may	   annul	   one’s	   claim	   to	   Muslimness	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   jāti.	  Generative	  Muslimness	  is	  therefore	  also	  a	  process	  of	  becoming;	  a	  potential.40	  	  	   Importantly,	   the	   potential	   of	   generative	   Muslimness	   is	   what	   makes	   one	  human	   and	   what	   as	   such	   collapses	   the	   ideological	   separation	   of	   the	   human	  being	  and	  the	  moral	  person	  prominent	  in	  the	  Cartesian	  philosophical	  tradition	  (see	   Taylor	   1989).	   Even	   recent	   work	   that	   dissolves	   biological	   and	   social	  elements	   in	   kinship,	   or,	   for	   that	  matter,	   relatedness,	   seems	   to	   imply	   a	   human	  being	  before	  the	  act	  of	  exchange.	  My	  ethnographic	  data,	  however,	  requires	  me	  to	   go	   a	   step	   further.	   If	   biological	   and	   social	   substances	   collapse,	   the	   human	  being	  and	  the	  moral	  person	  collapse;	  I	  therefore	  speak	  of	  the	  ‘human	  person’.	  I	  shall	  suggest	  that	  ideologically,	  no	  element	  of	  a	  priori	  ‘natural’	  human	  being	  can	  be	   distinguished;	   personhood	   is	   always	   embedded	   in	   an	   order	   of	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  I	   use	   the	   idiom	   ‘generative	   Muslimness’	   rather	   than	   ‘nominal	   Islam’	   or	   ‘Nominal	  Muslims’	  as	  the	  latter	  terms	  are	  products	  of	  British	  religion-­‐ethnic	  classification	  (Masud	  2000b:	  xxxvi;	   Roy	   2014:	   5).	   For	   their	   own	   reform	   agenda,	   reformist	  Muslims	   apply	   a	   similar	   logic.	   I	  attempt	  in	  this	  analytical	  distinction	  to	  reflect	  the	  vernacularisation	  of	  the	  colonial	  classification	  as	   it	   has	   become	   locally	  meaningful,	  while	   being	   careful	   to	   avoid	   a	   reproduction	   of	   the	   (neo-­‐)essentialisation	  of	  Muslim	  identity	  in	  my	  demonstration	  of	  the	  dynamic,	  social	  and	  generative	  character	  of	  non-­‐essential	  Muslim	  personhood	  and	  relatedness.	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relations	   and	   therefore	   always	   a	   moral	   position	   that	   is	   inseparable	   from	   a	  ‘human	  being’.41	  	  	  In	  the	   following	  sections	  I	  develop	  these	  arguments	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  sacrificial	  and	  lifecycle	  rituals,	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  social	  relations.	  	  
Exchanges	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Islam	  On	   an	   auspicious	   warm	   October	   afternoon	   I	   am	   wandering	   through	   the	  Muslim	  pāṛās	  of	  Joygram,	  with	  the	  smell	  of	  fresh	  meat	  penetrating	  my	  nostrils.	  Groups	  of	  men	  and	  women	  are	  gathered	  around	  carcasses	  of	  beef,	  removing	  the	  meat	  and	  cutting	   it	   into	  pieces,	  piling	   it	  up	   in	  small	  heaps:	  here	  the	   intestines,	  there	  the	  skin,	  here	  the	  stomach.	  The	  heaps	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  meat	  are	  then	  divided	  into	  several	  parts,	  ready	  for	  distribution.	  	  It	  is	  Qurbani,	  the	  day	  on	  which	  all	  Muslim	  households	  that	  can	  afford	  it	  will	  sacrifice	   a	   cow.42	  The	   previous	   evening,	   the	  women	   prepared	   the	   typical	   rice	  pancakes	  (piṭhe),	  and	  continued	   in	  the	  morning	  with	  the	  preparation	  of	  sweet	  dishes	   typical	   of	   Islamic	   festivals	   in	   West	   Bengal.	   From	   early	   morning,	   the	  imams	   of	   the	   mosques	   have	   been	   calling	   all	   men	   over	   the	   loudspeakers	   to	  prepare	  themselves	  for	  the	  prayers	  at	  the	  Eid	  ghāt.43	  At	  the	  Eid	  ghāt	  there	  is	  some	  pleasurable	  commotion	  since	  Qurbani	  is	  one	  of	  the	   few	  occasions	  where	  nearly	   all	   the	  men	  of	   Joygram	  and	   the	  neighbouring	  village	   meet;	   and	   especially	   since	   young	   men	   usually	   studying	   or	   working	  elsewhere	   will	   have	   come	   home	   for	   the	   occasion.	   Many	   of	   the	   children	   and	  teenagers	   have	   also	   come,	   as	   a	   miniature	   fair	   (melā)	   has	   established	   itself	  opposite	   the	   Eid	   ghāt.	   Here,	   children	   buy	   sweets	   and	   their	   most	   favoured	  uncommon	  snacks,	  and	  are	  given	  balloons	  or	  little	  toys	  by	  their	  fathers	  or	  elder	  siblings.	  Meanwhile	  the	  Eid	  ghāt	  is	  filling	  up,	  and	  still	  more	  men	  arrive	  while	  the	  imam	  has	  already	  started	  the	  prayers.	  Quite	  a	  large	  number	  of	  men	  arrive	  late	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  This	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  person	  or	  the	  body	  is	  a	  ‘microcosm	  of	  relations’,	  as	   Strathern	   argues	   for	   Melanesia.	   Persons	   are	   complete	   in	   themselves	   but	   always	   already	  connected	  though	  flows	  of	  substance	  (Busby	  1997:	  273-­‐276).	  	  42	  Qurbani	  means	  sacrifice	  in	  Arabic.	  The	  official	  name	  of	  this	  festival	  is	  Bakr’	  Id	  or	  Eid	  ul-­‐Adha.	  Although	  some	  Muslims	   in	   Joygram	  would	  refer	   to	   the	   festival	  with	   ‘Eid’,	   this	   is	  usually	  the	  short	  name	  for	  Eid-­‐ul-­‐Fitr,	  the	  festival	  that	  marks	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fasting	  month,	  and	  Qurbani	  is	  the	  most	  common	  local	  denomination	  for	  Bakr’	  Id,	  the	  day	  I	  am	  describing	  here.	  	  43	  The	   Eid	   ghāt	   is	   a	   walled	   space	   constructed	   specifically	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   collective	  prayer	  on	  Eid	  –ul-­‐Fitr	  and	  Qurbani	  (see	  fig.	  3).	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and	  while	  hurriedly	  putting	  the	  Islamic	  cap	  (ṭupi)	  on	  their	  head	  they	  take	  their	  position	  in	  the	  ghāt.	  Many	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  the	  habit	  of	  praying;	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  incongruity	  in	  their	  movements.	  	  After	  the	  prayer,	  some	  men	  linger	  around	  to	  chat	  with	  friends	  and	  wander	  around	  the	  melā,	  some	  others	  proceed	  to	  the	  burial	  ground	  at	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  road,	  to	  say	  prayers	  (du’a)	  at	  the	  graves	  of	  their	  ancestors.	  But	  most	  hurry	  back	  home	  in	  excitement,	  to	  where	  the	  cow	  is	  waiting	  to	  be	  sacrificed.	  Once	  at	  home,	   the	  men	   run	   back	   and	   forth	   to	   different	   neighbours’	   houses,	   excitedly	  screaming	  that	  here	  or	  there	  the	  throat	  has	  been	  cut	  already.	  When	  I	  arrive	  at	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	   house,	   the	   sons	   and	  brother	   of	  Rahaman	  Saheb	   are	   already	  bringing	  the	  cow	  into	  the	  courtyard.	  One	  is	  digging	  a	  large	  hole	  in	  the	  ground,	  for	  the	  blood	  to	  flow	  into.	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  is	  giving	  directions	  from	  his	  stool	  on	  the	   side.	   When	   the	   cow	   is	   put	   to	   the	   ground	   and	   kept	   still	   by	   considerable	  manpower,	   the	   eldest	   brother,	   Nasiruddin,	   finally	   cuts	   her	   throat,	   while	   he	  utters	  the	  appropriate	  invocation	  (du’a).	  	  
The	  ‘contract	  behind	  contracts’	  Qurbani	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   auspicious	   days	   of	   the	   year	   for	   the	   Muslim	  Joygramis,	   as	   the	   sacrifice	   of	   the	   animal	   is	   the	   ultimate	   testimony	   of	   man’s	  submission	  to	  Allah.	  The	  story	  behind	  the	  ritual	  is	  well-­‐known:	  God	  called	  upon	  Abraham	  to	  sacrifice	  his	  son	  Isaac,	  and	  he	  obediently	  went	  into	  the	  woods	  with	  his	   son.	   Isaac	   also	   showed	   willingness	   to	   be	   sacrificed	   in	   the	   face	   of	   God’s	  demand.	  At	  the	  last	  moment,	  God	  sent	  a	  deer	  and	  told	  Abraham	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  animal	   instead.	   This	   story	   is	   one	   of	   the	   foundational	  myths	   of	   the	  Abrahamic	  religions	  and	  the	  ritual	  of	  the	  sacrifice	  re-­‐enacts	  and	  commemorates	  Abraham’s	  willingness	  to	  sacrifice	  his	  son	  for	  God.	  But	  a	  ritual	  is	  always	  more	  than	  merely	  a	  ‘re-­‐enactment’;	  it	  does	  several	  things	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  has	  a	  creative	  force.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	   introduce	  Joygrami	  cosmogony	  through	  the	  ethnographic	  lens	  of	  Qurbani.	  The	  ritual	  firstly	  demonstrates	  the	  pivotal	  importance	  attached	  to	   submission	   to	  Allah	  and	  humanity’s	  perpetual	   indebtedness	   to	   the	   creator-­‐god;	   it	   is	   the	   foundational	   act	   of	   the	   “contract	   behind	   contracts”	   and	   as	   such	  creates	   society;	   and	   it	   establishes	   rules	   of	   exchange	   to	   enact	   equality	   and	  solidarity.	   The	   idea	   of	   the	   ‘contract	   behind	   contracts’	   becomes	   clearer	   in	   its	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details	   with	   reference	   to	   one	   of	   Dada’s	   ‘lessons’,	   but	   not	   before	   I	   have	  introduced	  Dada	  himself.	  	   *	  Dada	  (which	  means,	  elder	  brother)	  was	  one	  of	  my	  most	  emphatic	  teachers.	  Habiba	  Bibi,	  Dada’s	  wife,	   has	   consistently	   spoken	  about	  her	  husband	  as	   ‘your	  elder	   brother’	   (tomār	   dādā),	   after	   which	   Dada	   himself	   started	   to	   call	   me	   his	  sister.44	  For	   this	   reason,	   I	   call	   him	  Dada	   throughout	   this	   thesis.	   Dada	   and	   his	  wife	   and	   children	   live,	   and	   have	   lived	   since	   marriage,	   in	   a	   small	   mud	   hut	  consisting	  of	   two	  rooms	  downstairs,	  a	  space	  for	  sleeping	  upstairs,	  and	  a	  small	  porch	  on	  the	  front.	  The	  courtyard	  is	  divided	  into	  a	  cooking	  space,	  a	  shed	  for	  the	  cows,	   a	   small	   garden	  and	  a	   shed	   functioning	  as	   toilet.	  The	   two	  daughters	  had	  been	  married	   off	   at	   the	   age	   of	   14	   or	   15;	   the	   eldest	   of	   the	   sons	   was	  married	  during	   my	   fieldwork,	   while	   the	   youngest	   son	   (a	   twin	   with	   the	   youngest	  daughter)	  is	  still	  going	  to	  school.	  	  Not	   having	   enough	   land	   to	   live	   off,	   Dada	   has	  worked	   as	   a	   truck	   driver	   in	  various	   parts	   of	   the	   country,	   wherever	   the	   wage	  was	   highest.	   Ever	   since	  my	  arrival,	   he	   had	   been	   talking	   about	   his	   anticipated	  move	   to	   Kuwait,	   where	   he	  would	  earn	  much	  more	  as	  a	  truck	  driver.	  He	  had	  already	  paid	  80.000	  INR	  to	  a	  broker,	  who	  was	  to	  arrange	  a	  passport	  and	  visa.	  A	  year	  later,	  this	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  scam,	  and	  finally,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  his	  neighbour	  Masiruddin	  (who	  had	  put	  him	   in	   touch	   with	   the	   broker	   to	   begin	   with)	   he	   did	   get	   his	   money	   back.	  Meanwhile,	   he	   was	   doing	   odd	   jobs	   in	   the	   neighbourhood	   to	   get	   by,	  supplemented	  with	  some	  occasional	  money	  from	  his	  sons-­‐in-­‐law.	   Just	  before	  I	  left	   Joygram,	  when	   the	   dream	  of	   Kuwaiti	   fortune	   had	   already	   been	   scattered,	  Dada	  began	  a	  small	  restaurant	  at	  the	  cattle	  market.	  	  	  Despite	  his	  lack	  of	  formal	  Islamic	  education,	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  understand	  Arabic,	  he	  is	  a	  respected	  man	  in	  the	  village	  for	  his	  closeness	  to	  Allah.	  Every	  once	  in	  a	  while,	  he	  would	  be	  possessed	  by	  a	  djin,	  beings	  of	  smoke	  that	  are	  mentioned	  in	   the	  Quran	   and	   live	   in	   a	   parallel	  world	   to	   ours.	   From	   them	  he	   learns	   about	  Islam	  and	  the	  righteous	  way	  of	   living.	  Because	  of	  this	  gift,	  he	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Spouses	   do	   not	   usually	   mention	   each	   other’s	   name,	   and	   women	   are	   not	   supposed	   to	  pronounce	  their	  husband’s	  name	  at	  all.	  The	  habitual	  way	  of	  getting	  around	  this	  is	  to	  say,	  ‘father	  of	  [name	  of	  son]’,	  or	  simply	  ‘or	  ābbā’,	  meaning	  ‘his/her	  father’,	  implying	  the	  son/daughter	  even	  in	  absence.	  Habiba	  Bibi	  circumvented	  the	  name	  of	  her	  husband	  by	  calling	  him	  ‘your	  brother’.	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people	  in	  Joygram	  able	  to	  carry	  out	  particular	  sacred	  practices,	  like	  the	  healing	  of	   children	   by	   blowing	   over	   their	   face	   while	   pronouncing	   a	   du’a,	   and	  transforming	  water	  into	  a	  healing	  substance	  by	  doing	  the	  same.	  Usually	  this	  act	  would	   be	   preceded	   by	   Dada	   communicating	   with	   the	   djins	   while	   being	  possessed,	  to	  find	  out	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  affliction	  in	  order	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  right	  treatment.	  	  According	  to	  Dada,	  the	  source	  of	  his	  knowledge	  and	  the	  informal	  teachings	  he	  gave	  me	  are	  the	  djins	  themselves.	  He	  would	  often	  talk	  about	  the	  basic	  ideas	  of	   Islam	  and	   righteous	   living;	   for	   specific	   questions	   he	  would	   refer	  me	   to	   the	  
maulānās	  who	  could	  read	  Arabic	  and	  would	  know	  the	  precise	  answer,	  because	  he	  did	  not	  want	  me	  to	  learn	  and	  spread	  any	  incorrect	  knowledge.	  	  *	  One	   afternoon,	   after	   I	   had	   a	   nap	   on	   Dada’s	   porch,	   Dada	   walked	   into	   the	  courtyard	  wearing	  a	  blue	  checkered	  gām'chā45	  rolled	  up	  over	  the	  knees,	  his	  vest	  drenched	  with	  sweat	  from	  thatching	  the	  cow	  shed.	  Having	  just	  sat	  himself	  next	  to	  me	  in	  the	  shade,	  he	  started	  to	  profess.	  	  ‘Consider	  this.	  Allah	  has	  created	  us	  all,	  and	  everything	  around	  us,	  that’s	  a	   free	  service	   [in	  English].	  We	  can	  never	  pay	  back,	  and	  we	  can	  never	  give	  enough	  gratitude	  and	  praise	  (praśaṁsā)	   for	  this.	   Imagine	  you	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  water	  forever;	  you	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  pay	  that.	  And	  consider	  your	  hands,	  your	  eyes,	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  can	  see!	  Five	  times	  a	  day	  we	  pray	  
nāmāj,	  but	  still	   it	   is	  never	  enough.	  The	  only	  thing	  we	  can	  do,	  is	  thank	  him	  from	  our	  heart,	  and	  believe	  in	  him	  from	  our	  heart.	  …There	  is	  no	  image	  of	  Allah	  (nirākār),	  because	  you	  have	  to	  believe	  blindly.46	  …Allah	  has	  said	  that	  if,	  of	  all	  the	  millions	  of	  Muslims	  in	  this	  world,	  there	  is	  one	  that	  really,	  fully	  from	  the	  heart	  believes	  in	  him,	  and	  really	  believes	  that	  all	  that	  there	  is,	   is	  Allah’s	   creation,	   the	   ‘end	   of	   the	   world’	   does	   not	   have	   to	   take	   place	  (dhwaṁsa	  hobe	  nā).	  Then	  everyone	  would	  have	  a	  good	   life,	  because	  Allah	  would	   give	   us	   everything	  we	   need.	   So	   the	  most	   important	   thing	   is	   imān,	  blind	   faith	   (andhobiśwās).	   The	   most	   valuable	   thing	   in	   the	   world	   is	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  A	  gām’chā	  is	  a	  cotton	  towel,	  used	  for	  drying	  oneself	  after	  a	  bath	  but	  also	  regularly	  worn	  as	  a	  knee	  length	  loincloth,	  or	  tied	  as	  a	  headscarf.	  	  46	  Nirāk-­‐ar	   literally	   translates	   to	   ‘without	   a	   form’.	   In	   Dada’s	   explanation,	   in	   words	   and	  gestures	  (covering	  the	  eyes	  with	  his	  hand),	   the	   formlessness	  of	  Allah	   implies	   the	  requirement	  for	  blind	  faith	  (andhobiśwās).	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Muslim,	   ek'ṭā	   imānoyālā	   [someone	   with	   imān],	   because	   he	   is	   Allah’s	  creation	  and	  the	  imānoyālā	  is	  aware	  of	  that’.	  	  After	   a	   brief	   pause,	   I	   hesitantly	   ask,	   ‘and	  what	   about	   those	   people	  who	   don’t	  believe?’	  Dada	  answers	  resolutely,	  ‘They	  are	  worth	  nothing,	  less	  than	  a	  fly’.	  	  	   Dada	   points	   out	   very	   neatly	   what	   anthropologists	   have	   theorized	   in	   a	  variety	  of	  ways	   ever	   since	  Mauss	   suggested	   that	   there	   could	  be	  no	   ‘pure’	   gift.	  Humans	  are	  forever	  indebted	  to	  god	  for	  the	  gift	  of	  creation,	  which	  is	  impossible	  to	  return	  in	  full.	  He	  also	  points	  out	  that	  what	  humans	  can,	  and	  therefore	  should	  do,	   is	   to	   accept	   and	   acknowledge	   the	   gift	   –	   otherwise	   one	   negates	   the	   very	  creation	   that	   we	   are	   and	   live	   in.	   If	   Abraham	   had	   in	   fact	   sacrificed	   Isaac,	   he	  would	  have	  given	  back	  life	  to	  the	  creator	  –	  which	  would	  be	  the	  only	  gift	  equal	  in	  kind.	  But	  he	  could	  not	  have	  done	  so	  because	  he	  would	  have	  destroyed	  humanity	  –	  killing	  a	  son	  is	  killing	  the	  possibility	  of	  (biological	  and	  social)	  reproduction	  –	  and	   in	   so	  doing	  he	  would	  have	  destroyed	   the	   gift.	   Instead,	   an	   animal	   life	  was	  offered,	  which	   is	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   offering	   of	   one’s	   own	   offspring.	   So	   the	  ‘free	  service’	  Dada	  refers	   to	   is	   in	   fact	  an	   ‘impossible	  gift’,	   and	  Allah	  derives	  his	  authority	   from	   the	   ‘impossible’	   gift	   that	   he	   has	   given	   humanity	   because	   the	  indebtedness	  is	  perpetuated	  and	  always	  will	  be.	  	  	  Qurbani	   is	   the	  performance	  of	   this	  cosmogonic	  act.	  Yet	  as	  such,	   it	  must	  be	  stressed	   that	   Qurbani	   is	   not	   an	   isolated	   ritual	   but	   rather	   represents	   the	  ‘primordial	   act	   of	   sacrifice	   that	   founds	   the	   system	   of	   value	   and	   exchange’	  (Lambek	  2010a:	  18).	  That	  is,	  from	  the	  perpetual	  indebtedness	  to	  Allah	  all	  other	  promises,	   debts	   and	   exchanges	   follow;	   it	   is	   the	   ‘contract	   behind	   the	   contract’,	  the	  ‘debt	  behind	  the	  debt’	  (Lambek	  2010a:	  18),	  and	  as	  such	  the	  foundational	  act	  of	  dharma.	  Let	  me	  quote	  Michael	  Lambek	  at	  length	  here	  to	  clarify	  this	  point.	  	  ‘In	   all	   this	   there	   is	   apparent	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	   close,	   if	   not	   intrinsic,	  relation	   between	   ritual	   and	   ethics.	   Giving	   and	   receiving	   are	   not	   merely	  Durkheimian	  (or	  Kantian)	  moral	  obligations,	  but	  the	  active	  and	  formalized	  fulfilment	   of	   those	   obligations.	   Hence	   they	   are	   simultaneously	   acts,	  embedded	   in	   a	   cycle	   of	   the	   production	   and	   cancellation	   of	   particular	  personal,	   interpersonal,	   and	   collective	   states	   and	   re-­‐establish	   the	   criteria	  through	   which	   persons	   and	   relationships	   are	   constituted	   and	   evaluated	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and	   the	   world	   renewed.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   the	   ritual	   framework	   that	  establishes	  the	  authority	  and	  meaningfulness	  of	  any	  given	  act,	   that	   is,	   the	  “the	  contract	  behind	  the	  contract”.’	  (2010a:	  18)	  As	   Lambek	   points	   out	   elsewhere,	   ‘[a]mong	   the	   most	   significant	   and	  pervasive	   criteria	   are	   those	   that	   establish	   the	   basic	   humanity	   of	   persons	   –	   as	  being	   mutually	   subject	   to	   criteria	   and	   hence	   to	   be	   acknowledged	   as	   ethical	  subjects	  in	  their	  own	  right’	  (Lambek	  2010b:	  62).	  For	  my	  interlocutors,	  it	  is	  the	  acknowledgment	  that	  humanity	  is	  a	  gift	  that	  establishes	  ‘the	  basic	  humanity	  of	  persons’;	   they	  are	   ‘subject	   to	  criteria’	  and	  thus	   ‘ethical	  subjects’	   from	  the	  very	  moment	  of	   the	  creation	  of	  humanity	  until	  eternity.	  This	  acknowledgment	   is	   in	  the	  act	  of	  the	  sacrifice	  and	  in	  the	  speech	  act	  Bismillah	  Allahu	  Akbar	  (In	  the	  name	  of	  Allah,	  Allah	  is	  the	  greatest),	  which	  has	  the	  illocutionary	  function	  of	  the	  actual	  enactment	   of	   imān47	  (faith)	   (Lambek	   2013:	   844).	   Faith	   is	   the	   fundamental	  obligation	  of	  humanity	  (cf.	  Lambek	  2010b:	  18).	  Qurbani	  is	  the	  classic	  sacrificial	  ritual	   through	   which	   people	   ‘sacrifice	   freedom	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   order’	   (Bloch	  1986:	  171).	  	  Dada’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  for	  blind	  faith,	  also	  points	  to	  the	  pivotal	  role	  of	  the	   imagination.	  Bloch	   (2008)	   argues	   that	  we	   are	   predisposed	   to	   imagination	  and	   this	   distinguishes	   us	   from	   other	   animals.	   The	   creative	   potency	   of	   the	  imagination	  allows	  us	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  ‘system	  of	  value	  and	  exchange’,	  that	  is,	  of	  a	  society	  that	  is	  an	  ethical	  community	  rather	  than	  an	  unruly	  herd	  of	  animals,	  and	   faith	   (the	   acknowledgment	   of	   our	   indebtedness)	   is	   the	   crucial	   difference	  between	  the	  two.	  I	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  core	  values	  of	  Joygrami	  cosmopolitics,	   and	   which	   are	   publicly	   performed	   on	   the	   day	   of	   Qurbani:	  equality	   and	   solidarity.	   These	   are	   the	   pivotal	   criteria	   according	   to	   which	   the	  exchange	   relationships	   between	   essentialised	   persons	   and	   groups	   within	   the	  
jāti	  are	  evaluated.	  	  
Equality	  	  A	   significant	   element	   of	   the	   ritual	   of	   Qurbani	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   Muslims,	  provided	   they	  have	   the	  means,	   are	  obliged	   to	   sacrifice	   an	   animal.	   In	   Joygram,	  every	   household	   that	   can	   afford	   it	   will	   have	   bought	   a	   cow	   in	   the	   months	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  work	  out	  the	  content	  of	  the	  term	  imān,	  and	  explain	  that	  imān	  is	  the	  cultivated	  habitus	  of	  faith	  (Asad	  2003:	  90).	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weeks	  ahead.	  The	  cattle	  market	  across	  the	  road	  has	  been	  doing	  good	  business,	  and	  more	  often	  than	  usual	  I	  have	  been	  seeing	  men	  walking	  alone	  bringing	  home	  a	  single	  cow,	  however	  poor	  their	  appearance.	  Some	  villagers	  have	  been	  showing	  off	   their	   cow	   to	   me,	   asking	   whether	   it	   was	   looking	   good	   enough	   to	   be	  sacrificed.48	  The	  requirement	  for	  all	  to	  sacrifice	  makes	  all	  Muslims	  stand	  equally	  in	  relation	  to	  Allah;	  they	  are	  equally	  responsible	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  society.	  Each	  Muslim	   is	   in	   a	   direct,	   that	   is,	   unmediated,	   contractual	   relationship	  with	  Allah	  and	  thus	  each	  Muslim	  falls	  under	  the	  same	  ethical	  criteria.	  	  As	  my	   interlocutors	   render	   explicit,	   the	   principle	   of	   equality	   is	   one	   of	   the	  central	  distinguishing	  features	  of	  the	  Islamic	  dharma,	  and	  one	  which	  especially	  contrasts	  with	  the	  Hindu	  dharma.	  Ritual	  hierarchy,	  so	  fundamental	  in	  Hinduism,	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  absent	   in	   Islam.	  All	  male	  Muslims	  pray	  together	  and	  all	  male	  Muslims	  can	  carry	  out	  (most)	  rituals.	  This	  is	  most	  visibly	  mobilized	  on	  Eid	  and	  Qurbani,	  because	  all	  men	  pray	  together	  at	  the	  Eid	  ghāt,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  instantiated	  on	   a	   smaller	   scale	   in	   daily	   prayer.	   During	   Ramadan,	   the	  month	   of	   fasting,	   all	  Muslims	  have	  to	  fast,	  no	  matter	  how	  wealthy	  or	  poor	  they	  are.	  These	  ritual	  acts	  do	   not	   stand	   in	   isolation	   from	   everyday	   life,	   considering	   that	   rituals	   are	  instantiating	   ethical	   criteria	   that	   are	   subsequently	   pervasive	   in	   social	   life	  (Lambek	   2010b).	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   ongoing	   practice	   of	   exchange	  within	   the	  
jāti,	   which	   creates	   relatedness,	   should	   theoretically	   be	   an	   exchange	   between	  equals.	  	  It	  has	  to	  be	  stressed,	  however,	  that	  equality	  is	  an	  ideal	  pertaining	  to	  human	  dignity,	  rather	  than	  an	  edict	  concerning	  material	  wealth	  or	  worldly	  status.	  The	  people	   involved	  are	  aware	  of	   the	  actual	   inequality	  between	  themselves	  and	  of	  the	   Machiavellian	   power	   games	   so	   pervasive	   in	   everyday	   village	   life.	   But	  through	   these	   rituals,	   the	   constant	   negotiation	   of	   contextual	   hierarchies	  between	  ‘discontinuous’	  persons,	  as	  well	  as	  power	  struggles	  more	  broadly,	  are	  made	   ideologically	   subordinate	   to	   the	   ideal	   of	   equality	   between	   ‘continuous’	  persons	  within	  the	  jāti	  (see	  Lambek	  2013).	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  the	  ritual’s	  negation	  of	  the	   inequality	   in	   the	   everyday	   transactional	   social	   practices	   that	   makes	   the	  ritual	  so	  powerful	  (Bloch	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  There	  are	  very	  strict	  rules	  as	  to	  what	  animal	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  sacrifice:	  if	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  an	  ear	  or	  tail	  is	  missing	  then	  the	  animal	  is	  not	  suitable	  for	  sacrifice.	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Solidarity	  Equality	   is	   the	   most	   important	   value	   actualised	   during	   the	   festivals.	  Following	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  human	  dignity,	  solidarity	  is	  the	  key	  criteria	   pertaining	   to	   exchange.	   Similarly,	   solidary	   distribution	   is	   highly	  formalised	   and	   ritualised	   during	   the	   main	   festivals.	   Both	   Eid	   and	   Qurbani	  revolve	  around	  exchanges,	  not	  only	  with	  one’s	  kin	  and	  neighbours	  but	  also,	  and	  emphatically	  so,	  with	  other	  Muslims	  poorer	  than	  oneself.	  	  After	   the	   ritual	   sacrifice	   on	   Qurbani,	   the	   meat	   of	   the	   animal	   is	   to	   be	  distributed	  according	  to	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  rules.	  That	  the	  meat	  offered	  to	  Allah	  is	  given	   to	   society	   is	   not	   a	   paradoxical	   intention:	   if	   society	   is	   a	  manifestation	   of	  Allah,	   than	   it	   is	   inherently	   the	   same	   to	   offer	   it	   to	  Allah	   and	   to	   distribute	   it	   in	  one’s	  society.	  So	  the	  same	  act	  is	  carried	  out	  on	  two	  planes;	  once	  on	  an	  abstract	  level,	  and	  again	  on	  a	  concrete	  one.	  	  The	   distribution	   is	   carried	   out	   meticulously.	   Per	   each	   household	   of	  maximum	  seven	  members	  one	  animal	  has	   to	  be	  sacrificed.49	  The	  meat	  of	  each	  sacrificed	  animal	  has	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  equal	  portions,	  which	  means	  that	  each	  of	   the	   three	   should	   contain	   the	   same	  amount	  of	   the	  various	  parts	  of	   the	  animal,	  so	  that	  no	  portion	  will	  contain	  only,	  for	  example,	  liver	  and	  intestines.50	  One	  portion	  is	  for	  consummation	  by	  the	  household	  itself,	  one	  is	  for	  friends	  and	  relatives,	  and	  one	  is	  for	  the	  poor	  and	  needy.	  We	  can	  see	  again	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  at	  work	  here;	  no	  one	  can	  make	  a	  claim	  to	  a	  better	  piece	  of	  meat,	  and	  kin	  and	  unrelated	  poor	  are	  each	  receiving	  an	  equal	  portion	  of	  the	  same	  content.	  This	  is	  however	  not	  a	  strict	  obligation;	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  strong	  recommendation.	  So	  rather	  than	  a	  moral	  code	  one	  has	  to	  follow	  blindly,	  it	  poses	  an	  ethical	  ideal	  that	  one	  is	  encouraged	  to	  follow.	  In	  Joygram,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  could	  see,	  people	  did	  follow	  the	  instructions	  and	  they	  also	  felt	  a	  certain	  pride	  in	  it,	  because	  they	  knew	  they	  chose	  themselves	  to	  do	  the	  right	  thing.	  There	  is	  a	  significant	  element	  of	  ethical	  autonomy	  here,	  as	  shall	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  So	   a	   household	   with	   more	   members	   has	   to	   sacrifice	   two	   animals,	   and	   two	   or	   more	  smaller	  households	  of	  up	  to	  seven	  members	  in	  total	  can	  sacrifice	  one	  animal	  together	  (but	  they	  can	  also	  sacrifice	  an	  animal	  each).	  	  50	  If	   one	   is	   to	   distribute	   the	   meat	   among	   households	   or	   household	   members	   first,	   each	  1/7th	  has	  to	  be	  further	  divided	  into	  three.	  
105	  	  
Exchange	  and	  gift-­‐giving	  is	  perhaps	  even	  more	  central	  to	  Ramadan	  and	  Eid	  ul’Fitr	  than	  to	  Qurbani.	  Ramadan	  is	  the	  month	  of	  fasting,	  and	  Eid	  marks	  the	  end	  of	   the	  fast.	  Ramadan	  is	  an	   interesting	  month	  for	  my	  analysis,	   in	  respect	  to	  the	  contrast	   between	   fasting	   and	   feasting.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   is	   the	   time	   of	  complete	  abstinence.	  During	  the	  fasting	  times	  it	  is	  forbidden	  not	  only	  to	  eat	  and	  drink	  but	  also	  to	  have	  sexual	  intercourse	  and	  one	  is	  emphatically	  encouraged	  to	  stay	  clear	  of	  strong	  emotions.	   In	  fact,	   it	   is	  best	  to	  stay	  away	  from	  unnecessary	  social	   contact,	   and	   instead	   spend	   the	   day	   reading	   the	  Quran	   in	   as	   secluded	   a	  manner	  as	  possible.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Ramadan	  is	  a	  time	  of	  intense	  circulation	  of	  goods,	  money	  and	   food.	  During	   this	  month,	  zakat	   (almsgiving)	  has	   to	  be	  offered;	   fasting	  and	  almsgiving	   are	   two	   of	   the	   five	   pillars	   of	   Islam,	   and	   therefore	   are	   in	   principle	  obligations	  for	  every	  Muslim.	  Zakat	  technically	  means	  the	  gift	  of	  2.5%	  of	  one’s	  income	  to	  (in	  this	  order)	  relatives,	  friends	  and	  neighbours,	  and	  poor	  and	  needy	  Muslims.	   It	   can	   be	   given	   in	   money	   as	   well	   as	   in	   kind,	   and	   most	   Muslims	   in	  Joygram	  would	  do	  a	  combination	  of	  both.	  For	  example,	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  rice	  harvest	   would	   be	   saved	   in	   order	   to	   be	   donated,	   in	   smaller	   portions,	   to	   local	  madrasas	  in	  due	  time.	  Representatives	  of	  the	  madrasas	  come	  to	  the	  villages	  for	  collection	  during	  Ramadan.	  They	  write	  slips	  for	  all	  the	  alms	  received,	  so	  that	  the	  donors	  can	  maintain	  an	  account	  of	  their	  gifts.	  	  Besides	   the	   charity	   of	   zakat,	  Muslims	   engage	   in	   other	   forms	   of	   gift-­‐giving	  during	  Ramadan.	  Labourers	  and	  their	   families	  are	  bestowed	  with	  new	  clothes	  by	  their	  employers,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  norm	  to	  wear	  new	  clothes	  on	  the	  day	  of	  Eid	  (as	  on	  Qurbani).51	  They	   also	   often	   share	   in	   the	   feast	   that	   is	   consumed	   with	   the	  breaking	   of	   the	   daily	   fast.	   All	   the	   acts	   of	   sharing	   are	   the	   re-­‐enactment	   of	   the	  ethical	  principle	  of	  solidarity	  established	  in	  the	  ‘contract	  behind	  contracts’.	  	  	  Eid	  and	  Qurbani	  are	  naturally	  not	  the	  only	  days	  when	  exchanges	  of	  this	  sort	  take	   place	   but	   these	   rituals	   establish	   the	   principles	   and	   the	   potential	   for	  evaluation	  in	  subsequent	  exchanges.	  The	  ritual	  of	  Qurbani	  is	  the	  acceptance	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Gift-­‐giving	  of	  cloths	  between	  patron	  and	  worker	  on	  particular	  festivals	  is	  a	  South	  Asian	  custom	   in	   general,	   not	   limited	   to	  Muslims.	   Hindus	   are	   also	   supposed	   to	  wear	   new	   (and	   thus	  ‘pure’)	  clothes	  on	  auspicious	  days	  such	  as	  Durga	  Puja	  and	  paylā	  baiśākh	  (Bengali	  New	  Year).	  See	  e.g.	  Sen	  (1998).	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one’s	   nomination	   as	   a	   Muslim:	   in	   an	   emulation	   of	   Abraham,	   who,	   when	   he	  answered	  to	  the	  call	  of	  God,	  accepted	  his	  nomination	  and	  all	  that	  was	  entailed	  in	  that	   nomination	   (Lambek	   2010b:	   59).	   This	   acceptance	   of	   nomination	   is	   a	  processual	  act	  through	  which	  one	  becomes	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  person.	  It	  is	  an	  ethical	  act	  rather	  than	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  a	  primordial	  state	  of	  being;	  and	  this	  singular	  act	  is	  repeated	  by	  ordinary	  Muslims	  in	  ritual	  performance,	  and	   in	  subsequent	   ongoing	   actions.	   Indeed,	   I	   suggest	   that	   exchange	   is	   an	   ongoing	  practice	  from	  which	  personhood	  and	  relatedness	  are	  generated.	  I	  have	  stressed	  the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   solidarity	   at	   work	   during	   the	   rituals	   of	   these	  festivals	   because	   the	   rituals	   are	   the	   public	   performance	   of	   the	   ethical	  relationality	   of	   exchange	   and	   the	   commitment	   to	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	  personhood,	   according	   to	   which	   subsequent	   ordinary	   acts	   can	   be	   evaluated.	  Having	  addressed	  the	  cosmogonic	  creation	  of	  ethical	  relatedness	  and	  exchange,	  I	   now	   consider	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   Muslim	   human	   person	   is	   ritually	  generated	  out	  of	  this	  network	  of	  relatedness.	  	  	  
The	  ritual	  generation	  of	  Muslimness	  	  How	   does	   one	   become	   a	   human	   person,	   and	   how	   does	   one	   acquire	  Muslimness?	  This	  section	  attempts	  to	  answer	  these	  questions.	  To	  recapitulate,	  bio-­‐moral	   substances	   are	   inseparably	   merged	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   blood,	  since	  it	   is	  not	  a	  substance	  separate	  from	  moral	  substances,	   is	   itself	  considered	  mutable	  (Östör	  and	  Fruzetti	  1982).	  So	  in	  line	  with	  these	  conceptions,	  everyone	  is	   endowed	   with	   the	   potential	   to	   become	   a	   Muslim,	   and	   depending	   on	   the	  circumstances	   of	   one’s	   birth	   (and	   life-­‐course),	   he	   or	   she	   will	   become	   bio-­‐morally	  constituted	  as	  a	  Muslim.52	  However,	  everyone	  equally	  runs	  the	  risk	  to	  lose	   Muslimness	   because	   of	   the	   volatility	   of	   the	   discontinuous	   person.	   To	  acquire	   generative	   Muslimness	   is	   however	   very	   important	   as	   one’s	   very	  humanity	  can	  only	  be	  engendered	  from	  this	  web	  of	  relatedness;	  moreover,	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  This	  idea	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  theology	  of	  the	  Brahmans	  Parry	  (1989a)	  worked	  with:	  ‘All	  human	  beings	  […]	  are	  equally	  Shudras	  by	  birth.	  Brahmans	  are	  not	  born,	  but	  made	  by	  the	   life-­‐cycle	   rituals	   through	  which	   they	  pass’	   (ibid:	  498).	  The	   important	  distinction,	  however,	   is	   that	  anybody	   can	   acquire	   full	   Muslimness	   (through	   conversion	   and	   subsequent	   ethical	   action)	   -­‐	  those	   born	   within	   a	   Muslim	   household	   just	   have	   a	   higher	   potential	   –	   whereas	   becoming	   a	  Brahman	  is	  more	  exclusive	  and	  has	  deeper	  biological	  roots:	  ‘Only	  the	  product	  of	  Brahman	  seed	  has	  the	  capacity	  for	  such	  transformation,	  however.	  Only	  whose	  father	  and	  father’s	  father	  were	  Brahmans	  can	  learn	  to	  pronounce	  Sanskrit	  with	  the	  inflection	  necessary	  to	  please	  the	  gods	  and	  ancestors’	   (ibid.).	   The	   Islamic	   cosmogony	   seems	   in	   this	   sense	   more	   compatible	   with	   the	  ideology	  of	  the	  protean	  person	  than	  the	  caste	  ideology.	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Muslims	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  enter	  paradise	  after	  death.	  All	  the	  rituals	  considered	  in	  this	  section	  are	  attempts	  to	  essentialise	  and	  stabilise	   the	   jāti	  identity	   in	   the	  discontinuous,	  volatile	  person.	  Firstly,	  however,	  I	  will	  address	  the	  idiom	  central	  to	  becoming	  a	  human	  person:	  mānuṣ	  karā.	  
	  ‘Mānuṣ	  kora’/making	  a	  human	  person	  Because	   the	   ‘physiological	   human’	   and	   the	   ‘cultural	   person’	   are	   not	  oppositional	  categories,	  birth	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  action	  but	  only	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	   attainment	   of	   full	   personhood,	   the	   ‘minimum	   quantum	   of	   personhood’	  (Fortes	   1987:	   261).	  When	   talking	   about	   bringing	   up	   a	   child,	  my	   interlocutors	  use	  the	  Bengali	  ‘mānuṣ	  karā’.	  Mānuṣ	  karā	  in	  its	  most	  simple	  connotation	  means	  to	   take	   care	   of	   a	   child	   (bāccā)	   until	   he/she	   physiologically	   becomes	   a	  man/a	  woman	   able	   to	   sustain	   him/herself	   independently.	   I	   want	   to	   draw	   attention	  here	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   idiom	   infers	   simultaneously	   ‘to	  make	   [one]	   a	   human	  being’	  or	  ‘to	  make	  [one]	  a	  person’.	  	  Like	   ‘rearing’	   a	   child,	   ‘mānuṣ	   karā’	   can	   include	   every	   aspect	   of	   a	   child’s	  nurturing	  and	  education,	  yet	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  every	  aspect.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  does	  by	  no	  means	  have	  to	  be	  the	  biological	  parents	  who	  ‘make	  the	  child	  a	  person’;	  it	  is	  often	  a	  cooperative	  effort;	  and	  people	  are	  usually	  very	  conscious	  of	   whom	   it	   is	   that	   ‘made	   them	   a	   person’.	   By	   whom	   one	   is	   fed	   rice	   is	   often	  mentioned	   as	   an	   indicator	   for	   the	   ‘foster’-­‐parent,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   breast	  milk	   is	   an	   important	   substance	   through	   which	   kinship	   is	   constituted	   and	   by	  which	  the	  child	  is	  becoming	  ‘humanised’	  (cf.	  Fruzzetti,	  Östör,	  and	  Barnett	  1982:	  13;	  Lambert	  2000:	  80-­‐82).53	  It	  is,	  for	  example,	  not	  entirely	  unusual	  for	  a	  child	  of	  a	  young	  mother	  to	  be	  brought	  up	  by	  the	  mother’s	  mother,	  when	  the	  mother	  has	  other	  young	  children	  that	  demand	  her	  attention,	  does	  not	  have	  breast	  milk,	  or	  is	  for	  other	  reasons	  not	  financially	  or	  physically	  capable	  to	  raise	  the	  child.	  I	  have	  found	   these	   grandmothers	   to,	   when	   introducing	   the	   grandchild,	   proudly	  emphasise	  that	  they	  raised	  the	  child	  (‘āmi	  oke	  mānuṣ	  karechi’).	  Similarly,	  young	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  This	   is	   a	   common	   imaginary	   throughout	   the	   sub-­‐continent	   and	   not	   only	   limited	   to	  Muslims	  or	  Bengalis.	  Reddy	  (2006)	  describes	  the	  symbolic	  centrality	  of	  breast	  milk	  and	  feeding	  for	  hijra’s,	  and	  Bear	  (2007)	  does	  the	  same	  for	  Anglo-­‐Indians.	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boys	   may	   be	   brought	   up	   by	   their	   mother’s	   brother	   and	   his	   wife,54	  and	   these	  boys,	   when	   mature,	   would	   acknowledge	   their	   foster	   parents	   by	   saying,	   ‘orā	  
āmāke	  mānuṣ	   kareche’	   (they	   brought	   me	   up/	   ‘made	   me	   a	   person’).	   There	   is	  often	  a	  sense	  of	  significance	  and	  indebtedness	  attached	  to	  this	  utterance.	  I	  was	  at	  first	  surprised	  to	  find	  out	  that	  Arifuddin	  (Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  youngest	  son)	  did	  not	  think	  much	  of	  disobeying	  his	  venerated	  father,	  while	  he	  always	  obeyed	  the	  senior	  maulānā	  who	  had	  been	  his	   teacher	   for	  many	  years	  when	  he	  was	  still	  a	  young	   boy	   studying	   in	   the	   madrasa.	   Arifuddin	   explained	   his	   behaviour	   by	  saying	   that	   this	   senior	  maulānā	   ‘made	  me	   a	  man’	   (āmāke	  mānuṣ	  kareche).	   To	  emphasise	   the	   depth	   of	   their	   bond,	   Arifuddin	   recalls	   that	   he	   had	   been	   the	  preferred	  student	   to	  serve	   the	   teacher	  his	   food	  and	  massage	  his	   feet,	  while	   in	  turn	  he	  had	  been	  repeatedly	  hit	  on	  the	  hands	  with	  a	  bamboo-­‐stick.	  Through	  the	  substances	   of	   food,	   and	   affectionate	   and	   disciplining	   physical	   contact,	   their	  relatedness	  had	  come	  to	  be	  so	  significant	  as	  to	  trump	  the	  relationship	  with	  his	  father.	  	  	  	  Following	   from	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   monistic	   nature	   of	   bio-­‐moral	  substances,	   it	   makes	   sense	   that	   the	   two	   meanings	   of	   ‘mānuṣ	   karā’	   (‘to	  humanize’,	  and	  ‘to	  make	  a	  person’)	  are	  not	  used	  dichotomously;	  i.e.	  becoming	  a	  physiological	  human	  being	  and	  a	  moral	  person	  are	  inseparable	  processes.	  The	  one	   follows	   naturally	   after	   the	   other.	   The	   temporality	   involved	   is	   therefore	  important:	   ‘mānuṣ	  karā’	   is	   an	   idiom	  used	  only	   for	   children	   and	  young	  people,	  who	  first	  need	  to	  be	   ‘humanised’	   in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  childhood,	  made	   into	  a	  full	  human	  being,	  and	  they	  will,	  in	  an	  overlapping	  process,	  become	  a	  person.	  It	  is	  a	  process	  of	  cultivation	  that	   is	  directed,	   from	  the	  (‘foster-­‐’)parents	  upon	  the	  children,	   which	   involves	   the	   exchange	   of	   various	   substances	   and	   rituals	   and	  which	  is	  more	  or	  less	  completed	  once	  one	  is	  considered	  a	  full	  adult.	  To	  ‘make’	  the	   person	   is	   not	   metaphorical:	   it	   is	   the	   actual	   generation	   of	   life	   in	   both	   its	  physical	  and	  social	  form.	  While	  the	  child	  is	  growing	  physically,	  she	  is	  also	  made	  into	  a	  ‘moral	  person’	  within	  a	  social	  group	  and	  as	  such	  Muslimness	  is	  generated.	  There	  are	  various	  local	  rituals	  that	  mark	  the	  transition	  of	  a	  child	  into	  adulthood,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  This	  is	  often	  the	  case	  when	  land	  is	  involved;	  brothers	  usually	  live	  on	  their	  parents’	  land	  while	  sisters	  marry	  out.	  The	  land	  entitled	  to	  the	  mother	  will	  directly	  pass	  on	  to	  her	  son	  if	  he	  is	  raised	  on	  the	  land	  of	  his	  maternal	  grandparents.	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and	   thus	  mark	   the	  completion	  of	   ‘mānuṣ	  karā’,	  but	   these	  rituals	   can	  only	   take	  place	   after	   deliberation	   among	   the	   (‘foster-­‐’)parents	   on	   whether	   the	   child	   is	  indeed	  ‘made	  a	  person’	  to	  a	  sufficient	  extent.	  The	  actual	  age	  of	  ‘completion’	  will	  therefore	   vary	   per	   individual	   child	   and	   is	   not	   exclusively	   dependent	   on	  biological	   factors	   like	   age	   or	   a	   girl’s	   first	  menstruation.	   Some	   boys’	  marriage	  may	   be	   arranged	   at	   a	   young	   age,	   when	   they	   are	   already	   taking	   up	   the	  responsibility	   that	  comes	  with	  an	  adult	  mānuṣ:	   contributing	   to	   the	   finances	  of	  the	  household,55	  taking	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harvest	  of	  the	  paddy	  fields	  and	  all	   the	   labour	  and	   finances	   involved,	  and	  taking	  part	   in	  discussions	  within	   the	  household.	  However,	  others	  may	  at	  the	  same	  age	  not	  be	  considered	  ready	  yet,	  as	   they	  only	   ‘hang	  around’	  or	  have	  not	   finished	   their	   formal	   school	   education	  yet.	  	  	  There	  are	   two	  points	   that	   follow	  from	  this	  context.	  First,	  becoming	  human	  and	  becoming	  a	  person	  are	  deeply	  interrelated	  and	  inseparable	  processes.	  One	  is	   only	   fully	   human	   when	   one	   is	   not	   only	   physiologically	   mature	   but	   also	  morally	  mature	   and	   ready	   to	   take	   up	   his	   or	   her	   social	   and	  moral	   role	   in	   the	  group.	   As	   such,	   the	   generation	   of	   life	   and	   the	   regeneration	   of	   the	   group	   are	  closely	  interrelated.	  Second,	  the	  humanisation	  of	  the	  child	  and	  the	  cultivation	  of	  the	   person,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   ‘mānuṣ	   karā’,	   stretch	   over	   time	   yet	   are	   explicitly	  limited	   to	   a	   certain	   period	   of	   time.	   It	   is	   an	   activity	   that	   must	   be	   understood	  separately	   from	   the	   ‘cultivation	  of	   the	   self’,	   a	   concept	   I	  will	   address	   at	   a	   later	  stage	   (see	   Chapter	   3	   and	   6),	   which	   is	   an	   activity	   consciously	   exercised	   on	  oneself,	  and	  in	  a	  later	  stage	  of	  life.	  In	  short,	  the	  generative	  process	  of	  becoming	  
mānuṣ	  has	  to	  precede	  the	  conscious	  cultivation	  of	  the	  self.	  	  
Birth	  and	  becoming	  The	   first	   step	   in	   the	   process	   of	  mānuṣ	  karā	   is	   the	   ritual	   inclusion	   of	   new-­‐borns	   into	  Muslimness	   in	   Joygram.	   Firstly,	   the	   father,	   grandfather	   or	   another	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Although	   sons	   usually	   stay	   with	   their	   parents,	   also	   after	   marriage	   (Bengali	   Muslim	  society	  is	  virilocal),	  it	  is	  the	  norm	  that	  each	  son	  contributes	  a	  monthly	  amount	  to	  the	  household,	  often	  depending	  on	  their	  income.	  Once	  the	  sons	  are	  married	  and	  have	  children,	  it	  is	  not	  unusual	  that,	   although	   still	   sharing	   a	   house,	   they	  may	   prefer	   to	   run	   a	   separate	   (financial)	   household	  within	  the	  (physical)	  house.	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close	  male	  kin	  whispers	  the	  most	  fundamental	  kalimah56	  in	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  baby	  very	   soon	   after	   his/her	   birth.	   This	   is	   the	   initiation	   of	   a	   life-­‐long	   ritual	   of	  acquiring,	   belonging	   and	   recognition.	   It	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   traditional	  requisite	   in	   order	   to	   initiate	   the	   learning	   of	   Arabic	   and	   the	   memorisation	   of	  certain	  Arabic	  verses.	  Through	  the	  whispering,	  a	  male	  elder	   includes	  the	  baby	  instantly	   in	   the	   contractual	   bond	   with	   Allah;	   and	   in	   a	   male	   line	   of	   ancestry	  perpetually	  indebted	  to	  Allah.	  Throughout	  life	  the	  kalimah	  will	  be	  repeated,	  and	  one	   will	   be	   called	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   covenant	   with	   Allah	   again	   even	   after	  death.	  After	  death,	  an	  angel	  will	  come	  to	  the	  grave	  and	  ask	  the	  deceased	  three	  questions	   in	   Arabic	   (‘Who	   is	   your	   God	   [mālik]?	  Who	   is	   your	   Prophet	   [rasul]?	  What	   is	  your	  dharma?’)	  and	  one	  needs	   to	  answer	   these	  questions	  correctly	   in	  order	   to	  have	  a	   chance	   to	  enter	  paradise,	   as	   it	  will	  prove	   that	   the	  person	   is	   a	  Muslim.	  ‘So	  if	  you	  don’t	  know	  Arabic’,	  one	  man	  rhetorically	  asked	  me,	  ‘how	  will	  you	   answer?’	   The	   angel	   may	   not	   accept	   you	   as	   a	   Muslim.	   The	   answers	   are	  tantamount	  to	  the	  kalimah	  whispered	  in	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  new-­‐born.	  It	  is,	  again,	  an	  illocutionary	  act	  of	  imān	  (faith),	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  Allah	  as	  the	  creator-­‐god.	  	  Secondly,	  forty	  days	  after	  birth,	  the	  new-­‐born’s	  hair	  is	  shaven	  and	  weighed	  on	  a	   scale	  with	  gold,	  after	  which	   the	  hair	   is	   thrown	  away.	  According	   to	   some,	  the	  hair	   is	  shaven	  to	  rid	  the	  child	  of	  the	  polluting	  substances	  of	  the	  womb.	  On	  the	   same	   day,	   the	  mother	  washes	   herself	   entirely,	   including	   her	   hair	   and	   her	  clothes,	   to	  purify	  herself.	  After	   this	  day,	   she	  may	  again	  pray,	   touch	   the	  Quran,	  and	   visit	   other	   households:	   actions	   that	   until	   then	  had	   been	   forbidden	   to	   her	  because	  of	  her	  polluted	  status.57	  Most	  important	  for	  my	  analysis	  is	  that	  with	  the	  equivalent	  value	  of	  the	  gold,	  the	  father	  will	  buy	  and	  distribute	  meat	  in	  the	  pāṛā.	  Through	  the	  distribution	  of	  food,	  the	  child	  becomes	  included	  within	  a	  reciprocal	  social	  group.	  	  	  Related	   to	   the	   ritual	   of	   shaving	   the	   hair,	   and	   preferably	   performed	   on	   or	  around	  the	  same	  day,	  is	  the	  act	  of	  giving	  the	  name.	  The	  parents	  offer	  a	  goat	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  kalimahs	  (Ben.	  kal'mā)	  are	  verses	  from	  the	  Hadith	  that	  comprise	  the	  basic	  lessons	  of	  Islam,	  and	  are	  memorized	  and	  recited	  in	  Arabic.	  The	  kalimah	  tayyibah	  is	  the	  most	  fundamental	  verse,	   also	  proclaimed	  by	   a	   convert	   at	   the	  moment	  of	   conversion:	   ‘There	   is	  no	  god	  but	  Allah,	  [and]	  Muhammad	  is	  the	  messenger	  of	  Allah’.	  57	  See	  for	  comparison	  Blanchet	  (1984)	  on	  rituals	  of	  birth	  among	  Muslims	  in	  Bangladesh.	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cow	   (depending	   on	   one’s	   economic	   conditions)	   with	   the	   name	   of	   the	   child	  written	  on	   a	  piece	  of	   paper	   that	   is	   attached	   to	   the	   animal.	  This	   ritual	   assures	  that	  the	  child’s	  name	  is	  known	  by	  Allah	  and	  the	  angels,	  so	  that	  she	  is	  on	  the	  ‘list’	  of	  people	  whose	  account	  will	  be	  made	  up	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  death,	  and	  whose	  graves	  will	  be	  attended	  by	  the	  angels.	  Within	  the	  Islamic	  dharma,	  this	  ritual	  can	  be	   understood	   as	   a	   way	   to	   ‘reserve’	   a	   place	   in	   paradise.58 	  What	   is	   most	  important	  is	  that	  the	  meat	  is	  again	  distributed	  amongst	  the	  people	  of	  one’s	  pāṛā.	  	  The	   child	   is	   generated	   as	   an	   individual	   moral	   entity	   from	   relatedness	  through	   the	   rituals	   of	   purification,	   sacrifice	   and	   exchange.	   Firstly,	   the	   child	   is	  reborn:	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   polluted	   hair	   is	   the	   undoing	   of	   the	   birth	   from	   the	  womb,	  and	  the	  child	  becomes	  a	  direct	  creation	  of	  Allah	  through	  the	  giving	  of	  the	  name	  and	  the	  sacrifice:	  the	  sacrifice	  is	  a	  ‘birth	  done	  better’	  (Meyer	  2005:	  163).	  Secondly,	   the	  animal	   is	  sacrificed	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  child.	  Sacrifice	  here	   is	  the	  same	  act	  as	  the	  sacrifice	  on	  Qurbani:	  whereas	  the	  child	  should	  be	  given	  to	  Allah	  to	  reciprocate	  the	  gift	  of	  human	  existence	  Allah	  has	  given	  us,	  this	  cannot	  be	   done	   because	   it	   would	   undo	   the	   gift	   itself.	   The	   child,	   through	   the	   act	   of	  sacrifice,	   becomes	   included	   in	   the	   sacred	   covenant	  with	  Allah	   and,	   thereafter,	  she	  directly	  enters	  in	  bonds	  of	  exchange	  with	  her	  surroundings	  through	  the	  gift	  of	   the	   animal’s	   meat.	   The	   humanity	   of	   the	   child’s	   personhood	   is	   instantiated	  through	  these	  rituals	  of	  exchange;	  before	  this,	  the	  child	  did	  not	  have	  a	  name	  and	  was	   not	   formally	   an	   individual	   entity	   (cf.	   Lambek	   2010b:	   62).	   So,	   thirdly,	   the	  child	   is	   reborn	   again,	   this	   time	   as	   a	   moral	   person	   embedded	   in	   contracts	   of	  relatedness.	   Newborns	   are	   as	   such	   included	   in	   the	   jāti.	   ‘Persons	   are	   only	  persons	  in	  the	  context	  of	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  persons’	  (Lambek	  2013:	  838);	  
jāti	   denotes	   the	   kind	   of	   context	   and	   relationships,	   so	   once	   a	   human	   being	  becomes	  a	  person,	  she	  becomes	  inevitably	  a	  member	  of	  a	  particular	  jāti.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  In	  one	  instance,	  a	  woman	  had	  not	  been	  financially	  able	  to	  offer	  an	  animal	  at	  the	  time	  of	  her	  son’s	  birth.	  The	  son	  is	  nineteen	  now,	  and	  she	  hopes	  to	  soon	  offer	  a	  calf	  of	  the	  cow	  she	  owns,	  because	  otherwise,	  she	  says,	  he	  won’t	  know	  she	  is	  his	  mother	  when	  they	  meet	   in	  paradise.	  So	  she	  did	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  her	  son	  going	  to	  heaven	  (despite	  his	  name	  not	  being	  on	  the	  ‘list’)	  but	  rather	  acknowledged	  the	  fragility	  of	  kinship	  ties,	  something	  that	  apparently	  lasts	  into	  the	  afterlife.	   	  As	  I	  will	  soon	  discuss,	  the	  circumcision	  ritual	  detached	  the	  son	  from	  the	  mother,	  and	  attaches	  the	  son	  directly	  to	  Allah.	  The	  mother	  has	  to	  ritually	  communicate	  (and	  re-­‐establish	  
via	   Allah)	   her	   relationship	   to	   her	   son,	   if	   kinship	   ties	   are	   to	   be	   continued	   after	   death.	   This	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  a	  ritual	  demonstrates	  the	  fluidity	  of	  ideological	  content	  ascribed	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  ritual.	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Circumcision	  Despite	  the	  ritual	  essentialisation	  of	  the	  Muslim	  child	  from	  birth,	  the	  lack	  of	  inherited	   essences	   make	   identity	   inherently	   unstable	   and	   further	   ritual	  inclusion	   is	  required.	  Hence	  there	   is	   the	   initiation	  rite	  of	   the	  Muslim	  boys,	   the	  circumcision,	   to	  physically	  ensure	  their	  Muslimness.	  Significantly,	   the	  Muslims	  in	  Joygram	  (and	  elsewhere,	  see	  Mehta	  2000)	  call	  this	  ritual	  musal'māni	  karā	  (‘to	  make	  Muslim’).	  When,	  right	  after	  the	  circumcision	  of	  her	  grandson,	   I	  asked	  an	  elderly	   lady	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   ritual,	   she	   simply	   exclaimed,	   ‘he	   has	  become	  a	  Muslim	  now!’	  (ekhan	  Mus'lim	  haye	  giyeche!).	  Upon	  my	  asking	  what	  he	  would	   have	   become	   had	   he	   not	   been	   circumcised,	   (perhaps	   a	   Bengali,	   which	  would	   imply	   Hindu?),	   she	   looked	   baffled	   and	   replied	   in	   a	   confused	   and	  contradictory	  manner	   that	   ‘yes,	  he	  would	  be	  Bengali,	  but	  well,	  he	  was	  Muslim	  already	  anyway,	  but…we	  just	  do	  this!’	  The	  circumcision	  ritual	  combines	  the	  verbal	  and	  the	  corporeal:	  it	  would	  not	  be	   considered	  musal'māni	   if	   the	   proper	  kalimah	  was	   not	   uttered	   at	   the	   same	  time;	  the	  illocutionary	  force	  of	  the	  kalimah	  is	  absolutely	  vital	  for	  the	  subjection	  of	  the	  person	  to	  ethical	  criteria	  (Lambek	  2010b,	  2013).59	  As	  such,	  circumcision	  ‘establishes	  a	   relationship	  of	   identity	  between	   the	  spiritual	  and	   the	  corporeal’	  (Mehta	  2000:	  81);	   it	   fuses	  substance	  and	  code.	   It	  domesticates	  the	  male	  body,	  changing	   its	  metaphysic	   from	   an	   unrelated,	   bestial	   nature	   to	   an	   ethical	   body	  socialised	  within	  the	  male	  Muslim	  community.	  The	   collective	   element	   is	   very	   important,	   as	   ‘participation	   in	   the	   ummah	  (brotherhood)	  arises	  only	  after	  the	  ritual	  has	  been	  presented	  to	  the	  witnesses’	  (Mehta	   2000:	   94).	   Although	   there	   is	   not	   a	   feast,	   as	   I	   expected	   (since	   this	   is	  usually	   the	  case	  when	   I	  am	  notified	  days	  ahead	   that	  an	  auspicious	  moment	   is	  imminent),	   the	   circumcision	   is	   a	   public	   ritual.	   As	   soon	   as	   the	   doctor	   arrived,	  word	  would	  go	  around	  the	  village	  of	  the	  where	  and	  when	  of	  musal'māni.	  Most	  women	  of	  the	  para	  gather	  around	  the	  place	  of	  the	  act,	  pushing	  and	  shoving	  to	  not	  miss	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  very	  moment	  the	  doctor	  removes	  the	  foreskin	  of	  the	  child’s	  genitals.	  Whether	  I	  wanted	  to	  or	  not,	  I	  was	  urged	  to	  push	  myself	  forward	  with	  my	  face	  peering	  through	  the	  gate	  of	  the	  veranda	  where	  the	  loudly	  whining	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  On	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	   language	   in	  ritual,	   see	   further	  e.g.	  Bloch	  (1986,	  1992)	  and	  Keane	  (1997,	  2010).	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youngest	  son	  of	  Wahed	  was	  being	  held	  on	  the	  floor	  by	  Wahed’s	  sister’s	  son	  and	  Wahed’s	  brother.	  The	  women	  would	  repeatedly	  ask	  me	  whether	   I	  could	  see	   it	  properly,	   and	   whether	   I	   could	   hear	   what	   was	   being	   said.	   While	   the	   doctor	  carries	   out	   the	  physical	   circumcision,	   it	   is	   the	  public	   gaze	   that	   completes	   and	  legitimises	   the	  ritual	  act.	  Through	   the	  witnessing	  of	  both	  sight	  and	  sound,	   the	  physical	   pain	   as	   well	   as	   the	   spiritual	   elevation	   is	   shared	   by	   the	   entire	  community.	  This	  sharing	  has	  clear	  jāti	  boundaries	  as	  the	  circumcision	  marks	  a	  fundamental	   difference	   between	   Hindus	   and	   Muslims,	   and	   it	   is	   through	   the	  establishment	   of	   these	   boundaries	   that	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	   continues	   to	   be	  generated.	   The	   public	   witnessing	   continues	   after	   the	   ritual	   itself:	   for	   days	  ahead,	   the	   boy	  would	   walk	   around	  without	   pants.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	   the	  fabric	  may	   hurt	   the	   sensitive	   skin,	   but	   also	   to	   show	   his	   circumcised	   genitals:	  ‘look’,	  the	  mother	  or	  another	  female	  relative	  would	  say,	  pointing	  to	  the	  child,	  ‘he	  had	   musal'māni	   done’	   (or	   musal'māni	   hayeche).	   The	   ethical	   subject	   that	   is	  created	   becomes	   accountable	   to	   and	   subject	   of	   evaluation	   by	   the	   public	   that	  witness	  the	  act	  (Lambek	  2013:	  841-­‐2).	  Bourdieu’s	   influential	   interpretation	   of	   circumcision	   is	   that	   the	   central	  importance	  of	  the	  rite	  is	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  social	  difference	  between	  men	  and	  women	  (1992:	  81).	  This	  would	   imply	   that	   the	  Muslim	  person	   that	   is	  generated	  through	  circumcision	  is	  male,	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  circumcision	  begs	  the	   question	   whether	   Muslimness	   is	   foremost	   a	   masculine	   personhood.	  Although	  my	  focus	  here	  is	  not	  on	  gender,	  I	  have	  a	  few	  comments	  to	  offer.	  Firstly,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  paramount	  importance	  of	  the	  rite	  is	  to	  institute	  a	  separation	  of	  the	  boy	   from	  his	  mother,	   rather	   than	   from	  women	   in	  general	   (see	  also	  Mehta	  2000:	  83	  –	  85).	  The	  rite	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  ‘birth	  done	  better’	  as	   the	   boy	   is	   further	   incorporated	   in	   direct	   physical/spiritual	   relatedness	   to	  Allah.	  Secondly,	   the	  rite	  may	  socially	  differentiate	  women	  and	  men,	  but	   it	  also	  functions	  to	  unite	  all	  members	   in	  a	  singular	  collective	  body	  (Mehta	  2000:	  80).	  Witnesses,	  I	  have	  mentioned,	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  rite,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  witnesses	  are	   women,	   and	   as	   such	   they	   are	   included	   in	   the	   rite.	   Moreover,	   I	   have	   not	  heard	   reference	   to	   the	   ritual	   as	   having	   the	   purpose	   to	   make	   one	   a	   ‘man’	   or	  ‘masculine’;	   the	  purpose	   is	   to	  make	  one	   ‘Muslim’.	   I	  contend	  that	  the	  context	   is	  very	   important	   for	   the	   particular	   significance	   attached	   to	   the	   circumcision	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ritual.	   In	   Joygram,	   the	   threat	   of	   bio-­‐moral	   volatility	   and	   disintegration;	   the	  heightened	   sensitivity	   of	   the	   communal	   identity;	   and	   the	   anxiety	   concerning	  fluid	   jāti	   boundaries,	   together	   serve	   to	   make	   the	   institution	   of	   communal	  distinction	  more	   salient	   than	   gender	   distinction.	   Thirdly,	   notwithstanding	  my	  first	   and	   second	  point,	   the	   circumcision	   ritual	   allows	   for	  a	   stronger	  and	  more	  stable	   generative	   Muslimness	   among	   men	   than	   among	   women.	   Women’s	  personhood	   remains	   more	   volatile	   and	   precarious:	   she	   is	   not	   publicly	   and	  physically	  mutated	  in	  the	  way	  that	  men	  are.	  Women	  are	  most	  firmly	  included	  in	  the	  jāti	  through	  the	  ritual	  of	  marriage;	  until	  then	  she	  could	  more	  easily	  become	  a	  Hindu	  than	  a	  circumcised	  male	  can.	  A	  girl	  married	  off	  is	  a	  relief	  for	  her	  parents	  for	   several	   reasons,	   a	   pivotal	   one	   being	   that	   her	   Muslimness	   is	   further	  essentialised	  –	  although	   it	   is	  never	  entirely.	  One	  of	   the	  reasons	   for	  the	   limited	  mobility	  of	  women	  is	  to	  avoid	  exchanges	  with	  ‘dangerous	  others’	  for	  fear	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  mutation	  (more	  on	  this	  point	  in	  the	  next	  chapter).	  Because	  the	  generative	  Muslimness	   among	   women	   is	   more	   fragile,	   there	   is	   more	   pressure	   on	   the	  cultivation	  of	  ethical	  Muslimness.	  There	  are	  various	  means	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  ethical	  Muslimness	  among	  women:	  Islamic	  ritual	  practice	  (prayer	  and	  everyday	  piety);	   a	   particular	   bodily	   disposition;	   dress	   (the	   covering	   of	   the	   hair,	   and,	  increasingly,	   the	   salwār	   kamīz	   rather	   than	   the	   sari);	   and	   the	   engagement	   in	  particular	   forms	  and	  substances	  of	  exchange,	   like	   the	  preparation	  and	   feeding	  of	  meat.	  For	  example,	  the	  adoption	  of	  ‘Hindu’	  dress	  habits	  among	  girls	  is	  a	  great	  concern	  as	  the	  fear	  is	  that	  they	  are	  ‘becoming	  Hindu’.	  I	  will	  elaborate	  further	  on	  matters	   of	   distinction	   and	   inter-­‐jāti	   exchange	   in	   chapter	   5.	   So	   the	   aim	   of	  circumcision	   is	   to	   become	   a	   Muslim	   rather	   than	   a	   man,	   and	   although	  circumcision’s	  being	  exclusively	  male	  indicates	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  men	  and	  women,	  still	  the	  point	  is	  that	  both	  men	  and	  women	  are	  cultivated	  towards	  the	  same	  end,	  namely,	  Muslimness.	  	  Rituals	  are	  the	  key	  practices	  through	  which	  practical	  understandings	  of	  the	  world	   (‘everyday	   cognition’)	   are	   negated	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   the	   paramount	  significance	  of	  the	  idealized	  world,	  the	  ‘transcendental	  social’.	  ‘In	   rituals,	   …	   certain	   fundamentals	   of	   practical	   understanding	   concerned	  with	   time	   and	   the	   processes	   of	   life	   are	   apparently	   negated,	   but,	   as	   is	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inevitable	  in	  all	  negations,	  these	  understandings	  are	  predicated	  on	  what	  is	  negated.	  The	  negated	  practical	  understandings	  are	  universal	  because	  they	  come	   from	   the	   interaction	   between	   minds	   and	   the	   world	   in	   its	   most	  fundamental	  aspects’	  (Bloch	  2010:	  9).	  	  For	   instance,	   the	   initiation	   rituals	   described	   above	   negate	   the	  understanding	   that	   the	  child	  has	  come	   from	  the	  mother’s	  body,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  understanding	   of	   physiological	   kinship	   more	   broadly.	   Nevertheless,	   these	  understandings	   are	   unavoidable	   underlying	   premises	   for	   the	   ritual	   to	   be	  effective:	   the	   ritual	   can	   thus	   represent	   the	   child	   as	   a	   creation	   of	   Allah	   and	   a	  procreation	  of	   the	   jāti	   as	   a	  whole.	   Similarly,	   the	   ritual	   negates	   the	   ideological	  construction	   of	   the	   protean	   body.	   The	   awareness	   of	   the	   fragility	   of	   jāti	  boundaries	   (generated	   only	   out	   of	   constant	   exchanges,	   rather	   than	   being	  primordial)	   gives	   the	   ritual	   even	  more	   ideological	   force.	  The	   ritual	  derives	   its	  power	  from	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  contrast	  between	  the	  transcendental	  and	  the	  transactional	  social;	  the	  former	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  negation	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  In	   sum,	   rituals	   create	   a	   visceral	   belonging	   to	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	   while	  regenerating	   the	   latter.	   Personhood	   and	   jāti	   have	   come	   to	   be	   intrinsically	  linked:	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   ‘making	   a	   person’	   is	   through	   inclusion	   in	   a	   jāti,	  and	  therefore	  the	  jāti	  identity	  gains	  an	  air	  of	  essentialism.	  The	  Muslim	  jāti	  is	  the	  pivotal	   ‘essentialised	   group’,	   in	   which	   members	   are	   socialised	   through	   ritual	  and	   members	   come	   to	   occupy	   ‘essentialised	   roles’	   within	   the	   transcendental	  social	  primarily	  as	  Muslims.	  	  
The	  function	  of	  food	  exchange	  As	   the	   discussion	   of	   Qurbani	   indicated,	   in	   addition	   to	   life-­‐cycle	   rituals,	  feeding	   and	   sharing	   food	   is	   an	   important	   element	   in	   the	   process	   of	   the	  ideological	   construction	  of	  both	   the	  protean	  person	  and	   the	  essentialised	   jāti:	  ‘Foods	  are	  regarded	  as	  important	  media	  of	  contact	  between	  human	  beings;	  in	  a	  society	   that	   rests	   on	   the	   regulation	   of	   such	   contact,	   food	   is	   a	   focus	   of	   much	  taxonomic	  and	  moral	  thought’	  (Appadurai	  1981:	  495;	  cf.	  Janeja	  2010).60	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  There	   is	   an	   abundance	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   nowhere	   in	   the	   world	   the	   social	  consequences	  of	  food	  transactions	  are	  so	  political	  and	  the	  moral	  implications	  so	  powerful	  as	  in	  South	   Asia.	   See	   e.g.	   Cantlie	   1981;	   Eichinger	   Ferro-­‐Luzzi	   1977;	   Khare	   1992;	   Laidlaw	   1995;	  Marriott	  1968;	  Parry	  1985;	  Raheja	  1988.	  See	  futher	  chapter	  5.	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For	   example,	   food	   exchanges	   are	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   forging	   of	   marital	  relationships.	  For	  most	  South	  Asians,	  marriage	  is	  a	  highly	  structured	  long-­‐term	  relationship	  of	  exchange	  between	  two	  groups	  of	  affines,	   involving	  the	  transfer	  of	   goods,	   services	   and	   people,	   and	   some	   may	   be	   highly	   aware	   of	   this.	   The	  exchanges	  generate	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	   intra-­‐jāti	  relatedness	  to	  which	  pertain	  particular	   ethical	   criteria.	   The	   example	   directly	   below	   shows	   that	   exchanges	  between	  two	  families	  in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  kin	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  equal.	  	  	  One	   afternoon,	   Rehan	   (a	   bright	   young	   man	   of	   twenty	   aspiring	   to	   go	   to	  college)	   and	   I	   are	   sitting	   on	   his	   doorstep,	   overlooking	   the	   pond	   and	   the	   path	  leading	  around	   it	   to	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  house.	  Fuaduddin	   is	  approaching	  us	  on	  the	  path	  back	  home,	  having	  just	  dropped	  off	  his	  future	  wife’s	  sister’s	  husband.	  The	   latter	   had	   come	   for	   lunch,	   just	   Fuaduddin	   and	   some	   of	   his	   close	   kin	   had	  previously	  gone	  to	  them	  for	  a	  meal.	  This	  is	  after	  the	  marriage	  had	  been	  formally	  arranged	  and	  agreed	  to	  by	  all	  parties.	  Fuaduddin	  stops	  on	  his	  way	  and	  tells	  us	  grinning	   wide-­‐eyed	   that	   the	   guests	   (kutum,	   i.e.	   kin,	   in	   a	   broad	   sense)	   had	  brought	  enormous	  bags	  of	  uncooked	  vermicelli	   and	   rice	   to	  prepare	   the	   sweet	  dishes	   on	   Qurbani.	   When	   Fuad	   is	   gone,	   Rehan	   chuckles.	   ‘Isn’t	   it	   funny,	   the	  
system	   [using	  the	  English	  word].	  So	  now	  one	  of	  them	  has	  come	  here,	  and	  they	  have	  prepared	  a	  lavish	  meal	  for	  him.	  He	  has	  given	  them	  vermicelli,	  which	  they	  will	   prepare	   and	   eat	   on	   Qurbani,	   and	   will	   send	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   cooked	  vermicelli	  back	  to	  the	  kutum.	  And	  the	  other	  way	  around	  the	  same’.	  I	  sum	  up:	  ‘So	  basically,	  they	  both	  prepare	  the	  same	  food	  but	  prepare	  what	  the	  other	  gave	  and	  eat	  what	  the	  other	  prepared?’	  Rehan	  chortles	  and	  nods.	  ‘So	  why	  did	  he	  actually	  come,	  just	  to	  bring	  the	  vermicelli?’	  ‘Yes’,	  Rehan	  answers,	  ‘now	  relationships	  are	  being	  forged’.	  	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  work	  that	  focused	  on	  Tamil	  Brahmins,	  Appadurai	  argues	  that	  food	  in	  South	  Asia	  can	  serve	  ‘two	  diametrically	  opposed	  semiotic	  functions.	  It	  can	  serve	  to	  indicate	  and	  construct	  social	  relations	  characterized	  by	  equality,	  intimacy,	  or	  solidarity;	  or	  it	  can	  serve	  to	  sustain	  relations	  characterized	  by	  rank,	  distance,	   or	   segmentation’	   (1981:	   496).	   As	   for	   Bengali	   Muslims,	   the	   semiotic	  function	   of	   food	   exchange	   between	   jātis	   sustains	   hierarchical	   relationships;	  exchange	   within	   the	   jāti	   is	   to	   sustain	   equal	   and	   solidary	   relationships.	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Furthermore,	  intra-­‐jāti	  exchange	  is	  geared	  towards	  homogeneity	  and	  intimacy,	  whereas	   inter-­‐jāti	   exchange	   creates	   differentiation	   in	   the	   negotiation	   of	  proximity	  and	  distance.	  	  I	   will	   further	   elaborate	   on	   food	   exchanges	   and	   inter-­‐jāti	   relationships	   in	  chapter	  5.	  As	  for	  intra-­‐jāti	  exchange:	  the	  semiotic	  functions	  aforementioned	  are	  notwithstanding	  actual	  ranked	  and	  otherwise	  unequal	  relationships	  within	  the	  
jāti	  (in	  particular,	  gender	  inequality);	  food	  exchanges,	   if	  ethical,	  are	  to	  counter	  these	   kinds	   of	   hierarchies.	   Sharing	   food,	   then,	   is	   not	   only	   a	   way	   of	   creating	  relatedness,	  but	  also	  of	  instantiating	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  moral	  relatedness,	  and	  continually	   generates	   the	   people	   involved	   as	   particular	   kinds	   of	   persons.	  Restrictions	  on	  relatedness	  can	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  sharing	  of	  substances	  to	  challenge	   dominant	   scripts.	   One	   can	   ‘share	   up’	   in	   order	   to	   pull	   oneself	   up	   on	  what	   is	   felt	   to	   be	   a	   hierarchical	   relationship,	   or	   to	   reconstruct	   a	   sense	   of	  equality.	   Muslims	   are	   aware	   that	   sharing	   food	   across	   boundaries	   of	   rank	   or	  wealth	   goes	   against	   the	   grain	   of	   the	   hierarchical	   ordering	   of	   relations	  established	   in	   the	   dominant	  Hindu	   culture.	   As	   Bengali	  Muslims	   became	  more	  aware	   of	   typical	   Islamic	   values	   and	   where	   they	   differ	   from	   Hindu	   values,	  through	   the	   wave	   of	   reformism	   spread	   by	   Deobandi	   educated	   imams	   and	  Tablighi	  Jamaat	  proselytisers,	   following	  the	  distinctly	   ‘Islamic	  way’	  came	  to	  be	  more	  explicitly	  considered	  a	  virtue	  (see	  also	  chapter	  6).	  	  For	   example,	   there	   is	   a	   tendency	   among	   reformist	   Muslims	   to	   refuse	   a	  dowry	  and	  other	  material	  exchanges.	  This	  is	  considered	  not	  only	  too	  ‘Hindu’	  but	  also	   (or	   because	   of	   that)	   too	   instrumental	   and	   therefore	   devoid	   of	   ethical	  content,	  while	  the	  Quran	  celebrates	  the	  spiritual	  aspect	  of	  the	  union.	  Most	  are	  still	   afraid,	   however,	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   material	   exchange	   would	   result	   in	   too	  volatile	   a	   relationship	   with	   the	   affines,	   and	   fear	   for	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   their	  daughter	   if	   they	  do	  not	  send	  enough	  money	  and	  goods	  with	  her.	  Especially	   in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  marriage	  with	  a	   formerly	  unrelated	   family	   (rather	   than	  between	  kin,	   as	   is	   often	   the	   case),	   the	   need	   to	   ‘forge	   relationships’,	   as	   Rehan	   put	   it,	   is	  highly	  salient	  to	  counter	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  relatedness.	  One	  wants	  to	  ensure	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  lineage	  and	  of	  the	  jāti	  in	  general	  by	  way	  of	  offspring.	  So	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Fuaduddin,	  himself	  an	  imam	  and	  madrasa	  teacher,	  no	  dowry	  was	  exchanged,	  but	  a	  motorbike	  was,	  and	  all	   the	  more	  attention	  was	  given	   to	   rich	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and	  lavish	  meals.	  The	  father	  was	  not	  to	  know	  about	  the	  motorbike,	  as	  the	  pious	  and	  puritan	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  would	  have	  considered	  any	  material	  exchange	  un-­‐Islamic,	  but	   the	  parents	  of	   the	  bride	  had	   insisted	  on	   the	  gift.	  The	  exchange	  of	  food,	  however,	  is	  strictly	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  equality,	  which	  ensured	  a	  continuous	  back	  and	  forth	  of	  visits	  and	  food-­‐gifts	  to	  maintain	  the	  balance.	  Here,	  several	   ethical	   criteria	   are	   in	   play,	   which	   requires	   active	   negotiation	   and	  monitoring	  on	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  involved	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  secure	  bonds	  and	  preserve	  one’s	  ethical	  self.	  One	  can	  increase	  one’s	  claim	  to	  ‘ethical	  Muslimness’	  through	  a	  more	  Islamic	  way	  of	  living,	  but	  one	  fears	  for	  the	  roots	  and	  boundaries	  of	  the	  generative	  Muslimness.	  	  	   The	  negotiation	  of	  various	  ethical	  criteria	  is	  already	  visible	  in	  the	  everyday	  practices	   within	   the	   household.	   Because	   of	   my	   nomadic	   status	   in	   Joygram,	   I	  have	  consumed	  food	  in	  at	  least	  three-­‐dozen	  households	  and	  tea	  in	  every	  other	  one.	   It	  was	   considered	   a	   great	   honour	   for	   them	   to	   have	  me	   eat	   of	   their	   rice:	  sharing	  their	  food	  with	  me	  made	  us	  closer,	  and	  we	  became	  more	  similar,	  since	  ‘[t]he	   household	   constitutes	   an	   intimate	   micro-­‐environment	   within	   which	  people	  are	  related	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  food’	  and	  other	  substances	  (Lambert	  2000:	  84).	  This	  is	  true	  for	  both	  the	  North-­‐Indian	  Hindus	  Lambert	  worked	  with	  as	  well	   as	   the	  Bengali	  Muslims	   I	   have	   shared	  with;	   in	  both	   cases,	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  sharing	  takes	  place	  is	  a	  significant	  object	  of	  study,	  and	  my	  nomadic	  status	  conveniently	  allowed	  me	  to	  observe	  a	  variety	  of	  practices.	  Although	  the	  women	  nearly	  always	  cook	  and	  serve,	   they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	   to	  wait	  with	   their	  own	  meal	  for	  the	  male	  members	  to	  have	  finished	  eating,	  as	  is	  customary	  in	  rural	  Hindu	   households	   (e.g.	   Östör	   and	   Fruzetti	   1977;	   Raheja	   1988).	   In	   most,	  especially	  the	  smaller	  households,	  husband,	  wife	  and	  children	  eat	  together,	  not	  sharing	   the	  plates	  of	   rice	  but	   eating	   from	   the	   same	  bowls	  of	   vegetable	  dishes	  (tar'kāri),	  meat	  and	  whatever	  other	  side	  dishes	  are	  present.	  They	  were	  a	   little	  hesitant	   at	   first,	   but	   increasingly	   proud	   to	   show	   me	   that	   they	   defy	   the	  hierarchical	  Hindu	  script	   for	  sharing	   food	  (see	  Bear	  2007	  for	  a	  similar	  defiant	  attitude	   among	   Anglo-­‐Indians).	   In	   larger	   households,	   it	   is	   often	   practically	  impossible	  to	  eat	  all	  together,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  women	  eat	  last.	  But	  this	  is	  more	  a	  practical	  than	  an	  ideological	  choice.	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In	   the	   household	   of	   Rahaman	   Saheb,	   the	   men	   are	   served	   food	   by	   their	  mother	  or	  one	  of	  the	  wives	  whenever	  they	  come	  in	  and	  call	  out,	  ‘give	  me	  rice!’	  (bhāt	  dāo!).	  They	  usually	  eat	   from	  individual	  plates	  with	  rice,	   lentils	   (ḍāl)	  and	  curries	  (tar'kāris)	  heaped	  on	  it.	  On	  special	  occasions	  and	  auspicious	  days	  -­‐	   for	  instance,	  when	   the	  brothers	  working	  at	   faraway	  mosques	  or	  madrasas	  are	  all	  home,	  or	  when	  an	  affine	   is	  visiting	   -­‐	   they	  may	  share	  a	   large	  plate	  of	  rice	  or	  at	  least	  share	  the	  smaller	  bowls	  of	  tar'kāri,	  meat	  and	  fish	  dishes.	  Bowls	  and	  plates	  are	  never	  shared	  across	  gender,	  unless	  husband	  and	  wife	  happen	  to	  eat	  at	  the	  same	   time.	   Whenever	   Arifuddin	   has	   lunch	   at	   home,	   we	   are	   served	   lunch	  together,	   though	   in	   separate	   bowls	   and	   plates,	   the	   other	   family	   members	  appreciating	   our	   close	   friendship.	   The	  more	   often	   we	   ate	   together,	   the	  more	  often	  our	  hands	  would	  reach	  across	  the	  bowls:	  he	  helping	  himself	  to	  my	  meat,	  and	  me	  taking	  his	  vegetables	  in	  exchange.	  He	  would	  often	  polish	  off	  the	  heap	  of	  rice	  I	  never	  managed	  to	  finish,	  either	  reaching	  over	  to	  my	  plate	  or	  me	  shoving	  the	   rice	  with	  my	  hands	  on	  his	  plate.	  This	  would	  usually	  happen	  when	  no	  one	  was	   around	   and	   felt	   intimate,	   almost	   clandestine.	   When,	   on	   Eid,	   he	   quietly	  slipped	  my	   leftovers	   of	   the	   sweet	   dishes	   from	  my	   to	   his	   plate,	   in	   front	   of	   his	  brothers	  and	  even	  his	  father,	  who	  gave	  it	  a	  glance	  but	  not	  a	  word,	  I	  appreciated	  this	  as	  an	  act	  of	  defiance,	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  subversive	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  his	  father,	  but	  rather	   to	   undermine	   the	   hierarchical	   ideology	   of	   the	   protean	   person.	   In	   the	  ‘stream	  of	  practice’	  Arifuddin	  enacts	  a	  new	  performance	  (Lambek	  2013:	  844).	  He	  demonstrated	  an	   ‘ideological	  kinship’	  between	  him	  and	  me	  that	  cut	  across	  gender,	  age,	   jāti	  and	  whatever	  else	  may	  have	  had	  to	  be	  hierarchically	  ordered,	  and	  that	  he	  would	  legitimise	  with	  reference	  to	  our	  equality	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Allah.	  Most	  of	  the	  ‘gastro-­‐politics’	  (Appadurai	  1981)	  in	  daily	  food	  exchanges	  may	  be	  a	  game	   so	   ingrained	   in	   the	   everyday	   dispositions	   that,	   even	   though	   reflected	  upon,	   they	   are	   ‘as	   a	   cultural	   trait…which	   one	   can	   be	   sadly	   aware	   of	   having,	  without	   this	   awareness	   reducing	   much	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   one	   exhibits	   it’	  (Laidlaw	   1995:	   293).	   Yet	   here,	   Arifuddin’s	   defiance	   is	   made	   possible	   by	   the	  implicit	  reference	  to	  a	  conflicting	  ideology.	  	  Most	   of	   the	  Muslim	   inhabitants	   of	   Joygram,	   however,	   are	   not	   as	   bold	   and	  hesitate	  to	  be	  subversive	  -­‐	  or	  perhaps	  only	  in	  my	  presence,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  sure	  of	  the	  code	  of	  my	  jāti
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the	   imam	  of	   the	  Mach	  Para	  mosque,	  he	  broke	  away	   from	   the	  extended	   family	  and	   settled	   down	   as	   an	   independent	   financial	   unit	   with	   his	   wife	   and	   three	  daughters.	   They	   instantly	   changed	   eating	   patterns:	   through	   the	   half-­‐open	  curtains	  of	   the	  6m2	  room	  that	  constitutes	   their	  house	   I	  caught	   them	  eating	  all	  five	  together	  from	  one	  large	  plate	  in	  their	  midst.	  With	  a	  faint	  self-­‐conscious	  grin	  he	  explained	  that	  they	  would	  have	  fewer	  dishes	  to	  wash	  this	  way.	  I	  believe	  he	  did	   not	   dare	   to	   defend	   his	   subversion	   of	   the	   dominant	   Indian	   script	   too	  explicitly.	  
Scaling	  up:	  beyond	  kinship	  As	   mentioned	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   chapter,	   although	   Bengali	   Muslims	   do	  recognize	   differences	   between	   kin	   and	   non-­‐kin	   relationships,	   jāti	   relatedness	  trumps	   this	   distinction.	   Indian	   Muslims	   do	   not	   have	   the	   same	   endogamous	  limitations	  considering	  caste,	  kin	  and	  title	  as	  Hindus	  do	  regarding	  the	  choice	  of	  marriage	   partner.61	  So	   there	   is	   more	   flexibility	   and	   scope	   to	   produce	   widely	  spread	  webs	  of	  relatedness.	  That	  is,	  within	  the	  jāti:	  the	  one	  rule	  of	  endogamy	  is	  that	   the	   partner	   has	   to	   be	   of	   the	  Muslim	   jāti.	   I	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   one	   of	   the	  indications	  that	  on	  an	  ideological	  level,	  kin	  boundaries	  blur	  and	  membership	  to	  a	  jāti	  is	  more	  salient	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  moral	  personhood.	  But	  I	  would	  also	  encounter	   deliberate	   attempts	   to	   undermine	   kin	   relatedness	   in	   favour	   of	   jāti	  relatedness.	  	  As	   an	   anthropologist	   ought	   to	   do,	   I	   would	   often	   sit	   down	  with	   a	   piece	   of	  paper	  and	  a	  pencil	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  draw	  kinship	  diagrams.	  This	  would	  easily	  invite	   curious	   glances	   from	  onlookers,	   so	   initially	   I	   thought	   it	  would	   be	   fairly	  easy	   to	  have	  people	   talk	  me	   through	   their	  kindred.	  Yet,	  although	  many	  would	  figure	   out	   in	   a	  mere	  minute	  how	   the	  diagram	  worked	   and	  what	  my	   aim	  was,	  none	   was	   eager	   to	   help	   me	   draw	   out	   all	   the	   kin	   connections.	   Instead,	   I	   was	  actively	  discouraged,	  sometimes	  with	  an	  exhausted	  sigh	  (only	  the	  thought	  of	  it!)	  sometimes	   with	   a	   mocking	   grin	   (this	   silly	   anthropologist…)	   because	   I	   would	  never	  be	  able	   to	  disentangle	   the	  highly	  complex	  web	  of	  kin.	   It	   is	  not	  only	   that	  any	  piece	  of	  paper	  would	  be	  too	  small,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  would	  be	  filled	  with	  criss-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  There	   are	   some	   rules,	   for	   example	   intergenerational	  marriage	   between	   kin,	   e.g.	   a	   daughter	  marrying	  her	  mother’s	  brother,	  is	  prohibited.	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cross	   lines	   since	  every	  person	   is	   connected	   to	   several	  others	   in	  various	  ways.	  ‘You	  are	  never	  going	  to	  understand’,	  I	  was	  told,	  ‘even	  we	  don’t	  know	  exactly’.	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  most	  people	  did	  more	  or	  less	  know	  how	  they	  are	  related	  to	  each	  other,	   but	   they	   seemed	   hardly	   bothered	   to	   be	   clear	   on	   whether	   a	   particular	  ‘bhāi’	   (meaning,	   very	   generically,	   brother)	   is	   in	   fact	   father’s	   brother’s	   son,	   or	  father’s	   father’s	   sister’s	   son’s	   son,	   or	   any	   of	   the	   other	   nearly	   endless	  possibilities.	  My	   friends	  were	  more	   than	  once	   indifferent	   and	   annoyed	  by	  my	  endless	  probing	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  get	  it	  right	  (I	  often	  got	  a	  affirmative	  answer	  to	  any	   option	   I	   proposed),	   and	   more	   than	   once	   I	   found	   out	   later	   that	   several	  people	  had	  waved	  me	  off	  with	  an	  answer	  that	  was	  either	  not	  exactly	  right	  (this	  
bhāi	   is	  not	  father’s	  father’s	  sister’s	  son’s	  son	  but	  father’s	  father’s	  father’s	  son’s	  daughter’s	   son)	   or	   at	   least	   not	   the	   only	   form	   of	   relatedness.	   I	   came	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  what	  mattered	  in	  everyday	  life	  is	  that	  this	  bhāi	   is	  a	  bhāi,	  one’s	  
nijer	  lok	  (own	  people)	  never	  mind	  the	  form	  of	  relatedness.	  	  The	   higher	   level	   of	   fluidity	   in	   the	   construction	   kin	   and	  non-­‐kin	   relation	   is	  partly	  due	  to	   the	  problematic	   instability	  of	  blood	  relations	  and	  partly	  because	  an	   extensive	   ‘fictive’	   kin	   network	   is	   ideologically	   useful.	   Amongst	   Bengali	  Muslims,	   kinship	   terms	   are	  widely	   applied	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   any	  Muslim	   is	   a	  
bhāi,	   brother.	   Extending	   kin	   terminology	   to	   any	   member	   of	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	  creates	  not	  only	  a	  moral	  but	  also	  a	  supposedly	  physiological	  connection	  within	  the	   jāti. 62 	  This	   gives	   a	   sense	   of	   security,	   which	   is	   highly	   valued	   in	   an	  environment	  where	   the	  Muslim	  minority	  does	  not	   always	   feel	   safe	  or	   at	   least	  not	  equally	  valued.	  ‘Kinship…provides	  the	  one	  discursive	  realm	  that	  stands	  for	  axiomatic	  certainty’	  (Baumann	  1995:	  736).	  To	  call	  this	  sense	  of	  kinship	  ‘fictive’	  would	   be	   misleading	   because	   the	   emotions	   evoked	   and	   the	   practical	  consequences	  are	  decidedly	   real	   (cf.	   Carsten	  2004:	  144).	   It	   is	   a	   ‘metaphor	  we	  live	  by’	  that	  structures	  feelings	  and	  actions	  (Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1980).	  A	  sense	  of	   solidarity	   and	   equality	   is	   effectively	   shared	   with	   all	   members	   of	   the	   jati,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Significantly,	  bhāi	   is	   a	   neutral	   term,	   not	   hierarchical	   like	   the	   term	  used	   by	   Bengali	   Hindus,	  
dada.	  The	  latter	  means	  ‘elder	  brother’,	  whereas	  bhāi	  more	  generically	  means	  ‘brother’.	  Muslims	  often	  use	  bhāi	  as	  a	  suffix	   to	  a	  name	  where	  Hindus	  add	  –da	   to	   the	  name:	  both	  suffixes	  express	  respect	  and	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  formality,	  yet	  significantly	  the	  Hindu	  –da	  is	  inherently	  hierarchical	  where	  the	  Muslim	  bhāi	  is	  not.	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which	   has	   highly	   relevant	   political	   connotations.	   As	   I	   mentioned	   previously,	  networks	  of	  relatedness	  scale	  up	  but	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  happen	  in	  one	   direction.	   On	   a	   global	   scale,	   the	   Joygramis	   identify	  with	   the	   ‘overlapping	  webs	   of	   relatedness’	   (Astuti	   2000:	   100)	   that	   are	   the	   Indian	   nation	   and	   the	  Islamic	  ummah.	  These	  circles	  of	  relatedness	  are	  different	  in	  content	  because	  of	  the	  different	  forms	  and	  levels	  of	  exchange	  that	  (can)	  take	  place.	  But	  I	  am	  getting	  ahead	   of	   myself.	   In	   the	   following	   chapters,	   I	   will	   further	   discuss	   the	  consequences	   of	   this	   overlap	   and	   its	   discontents;	   here	   I	   hope	  merely	   to	   have	  explained	  how	  these	  forms	  of	  relatedness	  come	  about	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  exposed	  how	  relational	  exchange	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  transcendental	  social	  as	  it	  emanates	  from	  the	  social	  contract	  founded	   on	   Allah’s	   creation	   of	   mankind/humanity.	   Ultimately,	   all	   of	   the	  exchanges	   derive	   their	   ethical	   dimension	   from	   this	   sacred	   covenant.	   I	   have	  shown	  how	  ‘[a]ctors	  are	  rendered	  persons	  through	  performative	  acts’	  (Lambek	  2013:	   841)	   and	   how	   ‘ritual	   performance	   produces	   states	   of	   affairs,	   the	  descriptions	  under	  which	  people	  act,	   and	   the	  criteria	   for	   judgement’	   (Lambek	  2010b:	  54).	  Subsequent	  practice	  is	  evaluated	  in	  the	  light	  of	  these	  performances,	  and	   from	   practice	   new	   performances	   arise	   (Lambek	   2013:	   844).	   The	   social	  contract	   is	   all-­‐pervasive	   throughout	   all	   the	   relations	   and	   represents	   the	  fundamental	  element	  of	  the	  ethical	  self.	  The	  fact	  of	  being	  considered	  a	  person,	  or	   even	   a	   human,	   is	   premised	  upon	  one’s	  dharma.	   Therefore	   there	   can	  be	   no	  secular	  self,	  or	  a	  self	  without	  identity	  sprung	  directly	  from	  nature,	  as	  I	  will	  make	  more	  evident	   in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  This	  conceptualisation	  -­‐	  that	  one	  is	  not	  only	  not	  a	  person,	  but	  also	  barely	  human	  when	  outside	  particular	  social	  and	  ethical	  forms	   of	   relatedness	   (outside	   dharma)	   -­‐	   falls	   very	   much	   in	   line	   with	   the	  Aristotelian	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘citizen’	  (a	  person)	  and	  the	  ‘barbarian’	  (the	  pre-­‐humanised	  animal)	  (see	  Lord	  2013).	  This	  parallel,	  in	  turn,	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  conceive	  of	  Joygrami	  ethics	  as	  a	  virtue	  ethics	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  sense,	  as	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  3.	  	  For	   the	   ones	   included	   in	   the	   Muslim	   jāti,	   those	   ascribed	   to	   the	   Muslim	  category,	  it	   is	  inevitably	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  that	  forms	  the	  ethical	  imagination	  and	   the	   transcendental	   social,	   within	   which	   they	   aspire	   for	   full,	   moral	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personhood.	   Since	   the	   relationship	   between	   jāti	  and	   dharma	   is	   symbiotic,	   an	  increasing	   emphasis	   on	   belonging	   to	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	   also	   results	   in	   an	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  Islamic	  dharma.	  Vice	  versa,	  an	  increasing	  aspiration	  to	  live	  ethically,	  cast	  in	  terms	  of	  dharma,	  stresses	  belonging	  to	  the	  Muslim	  jāti.	  In	  the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   build	   upon	   the	   claims	   made	   in	   this	   chapter,	   and	   further	  elaborate	  on	  how	  dharma	  is	  axiomatic	  for	  the	  ethical	  self.	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  Fig.	   3.	   Collective	   prayer	   at	   the	   Eid	   ghat	   on	   Qurbani.	   Children	   from	   poor	  families	  (mainly	  Adivasi)	  wait	  at	  the	  entrance	  in	  the	  hope	  for	  alms	  at	  the	  end	  of	  prayer.	  Because	  of	   the	  poor	  management	  of	  WAQF	  profits,	   the	  Eid	  ghat	  has	  been	  in	  the	  current	  (unfinished)	  state	  for	  several	  years.	  	  	  
	  Fig.	  4.	  	  Muharram	  procession	  and	  bamboo	  stick	  fight	  at	  the	  cattle	  market.	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3.	   ‘We	   don’t	   want	   your	   freedom’:	   The	   ethical	  
imagination	  	  	  	  ‘[Morality]	   is	  neither	  the	  hypocritical	  moral	  code	  to	  which	  Nietzsche	  took	  exception	  nor	  the	  naive	  freedom	  of	  liberal	  individualism	  but	  action	  that	  is	  informed	   by	   culturally	   dense	   understandings	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	  judgment,	   the	   social	   contexts	   of	   commitments,	   and	   the	   fine	   line	   between	  happy	  and	  unhappy	  actions’	  (Lambek	  2000:	  315).	  	  
Introduction	  	  Finally	  I	  had	  a	  moment	  to	  sit	  alone	  with	  Arifuddin	  in	  one	  of	  the	  small	  rooms	  surrounding	   the	   courtyard	   of	   Rahaman	   Saheb’s	   household.	   Alone,	   because	   he	  had	  some	  secrets	  to	  tell	  me,	  and	  because	  I	  had	  to	  clandestinely	  hand	  him	  a	  train	  ticket.	  	  Arifuddin	  is	  the	  youngest	  son	  of	  Rahaman	  Saheb,	  around	  20	  years	  old,	  and	  educated	  at	  Deobandi	  madrasas	  in	  West	  Bengal.	  At	  18,	  he	  was	  supposed	  to	  go	  to	  the	  Darul	  Uloom	  Deoband	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  itself,	  as	  most	  of	  his	  elder	  brothers	  had	   done.	   He	   had	   refused	   to	   go	   and	   instead	   he	   was	   now	   living	   at	   home	  occasionally	  leading	  prayers	  or	  teaching	  small	  children	  Arabic	  in	  the	  mosque.	  	  We	  became	  close	  friends	  and	  after	  months	  he	  confided	  in	  me	  that	  the	  reason	  he	  had	  postponed	  was	  that	  he	  had	  fallen	  in	  love	  with	  a	  girl	  who	  was	  a	  student	  at	  a	  madrasa	  in	  Bardhaman,	  a	  town	  an	  hour	  away	  by	  train.	  His	  plan	  was	  to	  go	  to	  Delhi	   to	  work	   in	   the	   jewellery	  shop	  of	  a	   friend	  of	   the	   family,	   so	  he	  could	  earn	  enough	  money	   to	  marry	   this	  girl	  and	  build	  a	  house	   for	   them	  here	   in	   Joygram.	  His	  father	  would	  never	  allow	  him	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  path	  to	  become	  an	  Islamic	  scholar,	  so	  Arifuddin	  had	  asked	  me	  to	  secretly	  buy	  him	  the	  train	  ticket	  to	  Delhi,	  which	  I	  had	  refused	  to	  do	  for	  weeks.	  I	  sometimes	  had	  the	  feeling	  that	  he	  did	  not	  take	   Islam,	   or	   at	   least	   his	   role	   as	   an	   Islamic	   exemplar,	   as	   seriously	   as	   he	  was	  expected	  to	  and	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  a	  factor	  that	  would	  lead	  him	  further	  astray.	  	  Once	  I	  confronted	  him	  with	  my	  worries,	  after	  he	  himself	  complained	  that	  his	  staying	  at	  home	  without	  work	  made	  him	  hang	  around	  idly	  with	  the	  other	  boys	  in	  the	  village	  too	  much.	  In	  a	  slightly	  mocking	  voice,	  I	  asked	  him	  whether	  he	  had	  ‘forgotten’	  his	  dharma	  (tomār	  dharma	  bhule	  giyecho?).	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  rare	  moments	  he	  got	  genuinely	  upset	  with	  me	  and	  while	   looking	  me	  angrily	   in	   the	  eyes	   he	   said,	   ‘never,	   ever	   say	   that	   to	  me	   again’.	   Based	   on	   these	   assurances,	   I	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conceded	   to	   buy	   him	   the	   train	   ticket.	   But	   before	   I	   handed	   it	   to	   him,	   I	  interrogated	  him	  once	  more	  on	  the	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  his	  plan	  in	  this	  stuffy,	  secluded	  room.	  	  	  As	   soon	  as	  we	  are	   alone	   in	   the	   room,	  he	  bursts	   out,	   telling	  me	  he	  met	  his	  girlfriend	  again	  last	  night.	  He	  wanted	  to	  be	  sure	  she	  loved	  him	  before	  he	  would	  go	  to	  Delhi.	  He	  had	  sneaked	  out	  of	  the	  house	  in	  the	  evening	  and	  had	  met	  the	  girl	  in	   the	   crowded	   bazaar	   of	   Bardhaman	   so	   as	   not	   to	   draw	   attention.	   They	   had	  sneaked	  in	  a	  side	  alley,	  where	  she	  had	  removed	  the	  eye	  cap	  of	  the	  fully	  covering	  burqa,	  after	  which	  he	  had	  pulled	  off	  the	  cloth	  covering	  the	  mouth	  and	  asked	  her	  whether	  she	  loved	  him.	  She	  said	  yes.	  I	  cheekily	  ask	  whether	  he	  kissed	  her,	  but	  he	   resolutely	   says	   ‘no,	   I	   didn’t	   touch	   her,	   that	  would	   be	   a	   sin’.	   I	   exclaim	   that	  surely	  he	  wasn’t	  supposed	  to	  see	  her	  face	  either,	  to	  which	  he	  sniggers	  and	  says	  that	  that’s	  fine,	  she	  will	  be	  his	  wife	  anyway.	  	  In	   fact,	   they	   decided	   on	   the	   spot	   to	   get	   married	   in	   two	   years,	   after	   she	  finishes	  her	  education	  at	  the	  madrasa.	  He	  is	  radiating	  joy	  when	  he	  tells	  me:	  ‘it’s	  so	  beautiful!	  That	  will	  be,	  what’s	  it	  called…love	  marriage	  [using	  English	  term]!’	  I	  ask	  him	  whether	   that	   is	  acceptable	  among	  Muslims.	   ‘Yes,	   it	  will	  be	  sunnā	   [the	  teachings	  and	  deeds	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Mohammad].	  Marriage	  is	  sunnā.	  And	  it	  says,	  don’t	  leave	  the	  one	  that	  you	  love.	  Go	  to	  pains	  to	  marry	  her.	  So	  it’s	  fine,	  it’s	  even	  very	  good’.	  ‘And	  what	  if	  your	  father	  doesn’t	  agree?’	  ‘Well…then	  I’d	  have	  to	  listen	  to	  my	   father…’	   he	   answers	  with	   a	   pusillanimous	   chuckle.	   His	   father,	  we	   both	  know,	   is	  very	  unlikely	  to	  agree,	  because	  the	  girl’s	   family	  belongs	  to	  a	  different	  Islamic	   legal	   school.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   custom	   for	   brothers	   to	   marry	   in	  chronological	   order,	   and	   at	   that	   point	   Arifuddin	   still	   had	   five	   unmarried	  brothers	   above	   him.	   These	   points	   of	   contention,	   however,	   are	   according	   to	  Arifuddin	  subordinate	  to	  the	  Sunnah	  that	  says	  that	  one	  shall	  marry	  the	  woman	  one	  loves.	  	  I	  am	  pondering	  out	  loud	  that	  surely,	  disobeying	  his	  father	  is	  a	  sin	  (he	  nods),	  while	  he	  doesn’t	  touch	  his	  girlfriend	  because	  it	  would	  be	  a	  sin,	  even	  though	  to	  me	   touching	   his	   girlfriend’s	   hand	   seems	   a	   smaller	   sin	   than	   moving	   to	   Delhi	  against	  his	   father’s	  will.	   ‘Why	  do	  you	  follow	  the	  Quran	  in	  some	  occasions,	  and	  not	   in	   others?’	   Arifuddin	   rolls	   on	   his	   back,	   chuckling.	   ‘You	   are	   right!	   But	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touching	   her	  would	   be	   a	  much	   greater	   sin,	   because	   one	   touch	  will	  make	   you	  want	   more,	   more	   and	   more,	   and	   that	   would	   be	   a	   much	   greater	   sin	   than	  disobeying	   father’.	   ‘But	   how	  do	   you	   know	  which	   sin	   is	   greater?	  How	   can	   one	  make	   such	   a	   decision,	   if,	   like,	   following	   one’s	   love	   implies	   disobeying	   your	  father?’	   I	   ask.	   Arifuddin	   sits	   up	   straight	   again,	   and	   beaming	   with	   joy	   and	  conviction	  he	  says:	  ‘you	  are	  right.	  That	  isn’t	  written	  anywhere.	  That	  is	  my	  own	  judgment/wisdom	   (āmār	   nijer	   jñān).	   I	   know	   that	   if	   I	   would	   touch	   the	   girl,	   it	  could	   escalate	   and	   become	   a	   great	   sin.	   I	   know	   that	   from	   my	   own	   judgment	  (āmār	  nijer	  jñān	  theke)’.	  	  Various	   issues	   transpired	   in	   this	   conversation.	   Discussion	   of	   a	   number	   of	  these	   issues	  will	   be	   left	   until	   later	   chapters:	   chapter	   4	   addresses	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  a	  lack	  of	  money	  leads	  to	  pragmatic	  choices,	  and	  chapter	  6	  addresses	  the	  changing	  normativity	  resulting	  from	  the	  conversion	  from	  a	  more	  customary	  to	  a	  more	   puritan	   and	   individualistic	   Islam.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   discuss	   the	   ethics	  involved	  in	  living	  according	  to	  the	  Islamic	  morality.	  	  Arifuddin,	   however	  much	   committed	   to	   living	   a	   life	   as	   closely	   as	   possible	  resembling	   that	   of	   the	   Prophet	   Mohammad,	   has	   to	   make	   choices	   between	  incompatible	   imperatives.	   Following	   exactly	   the	   moral	   law	   derived	   from	   the	  Quran	  and	  the	  Sunnah	  is	  impossible,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  most	  religions	  are	  impossible	  (see	  Laidlaw	  2014a:	  126).	  It	  is	  still,	  however,	  possible	  to	  live	  dhārmik,	  that	  is,	  ethically.	  Dharma	  includes	  Islamic	  morality	  (the	  Quran	   and	   the	   Sunnah	   would	   be	   called	   dharma),	   yet	   it	   also	   includes	   the	  situational	   interpretation	  of	   the	  rules	  and	  one’s	  contextual	   judgement.	  That	   is,	  
dharma-­‐as-­‐ethics	  is	  not	  mere	  compliance	  with	  moral	  law,	  but	  includes	  the	  effort	  to	  live	  virtuously.	  	  In	  this	  conversation,	  I	  have	  made	  Arifuddin	  consciously	  aware	  of	  the	  ethical	  considerations	  involved	  in	  his	  decisions.	  One	  may	  call	  Arifuddin	  pragmatic,	  but	  I	  know	   him	  well	   enough	   to	   know	   that	   for	   him	   the	   Sunnah	   is	   not	   merely	   an	   a	  
posteriori	  justification.	  Rather,	  in	  daily	  life	  the	  Sunnah	  acts	  as	  a	  shared	  backdrop	  from	  which	  he	  makes	  his	  independent	  ethical	  evaluations.	  Where	  do	  we	  locate	  the	  propensity	  for	  ethical	  evaluation	  in	  the	  vernacular	  cosmopolitics?	  Arifuddin	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locates	   it	   in	   jñān;	   jñān	   is	   the	   faculty	   that	   allows	   him	   to	   live	  with	   the	   abstract	  norms	  of	  the	  Sunnah	  he	  refers	  to.	  	  	  According	   to	   Joygrami	  vernacular	   theologians,	   jñān	   (wisdom)	   is	   the	  ability	  to	  choose	  between	  right	  and	  wrong,	  which	  distinguishes	  us,	  as	  human	  beings,	  from	  animals	  and	  angels.	  I	  often	  asked	  why	  Allah	  even	  gave	  us	  the	  faculty	  to	  do	  wrong;	  could	  we	  not	  have	  been	  just	  ‘perfect	  humans’?	  The	  answer	  was	  more	  or	  less	  tautological	  but	  revealing	  nevertheless.	  Angels	  can	  only	  do	  right,	  they	  can’t	  do	  wrong.	   But	   Allah	   put	   human	   beings	   to	   the	   test	   and	   gave	   us	   the	   ability	   to	  choose	  between	  the	  right	  and	  the	  wrong	  path:	  He	  gave	  us	  brains	  so	  that	  we	  are	  able	   to	   acquire	   and	   exercise	   jñān.	   Animals	   were	   not	   given	   this	   faculty.	   If	   we	  acquire	  and	  exercise	   the	  right	   jñān	  we	  will	  eventually	  be	  able	   to	  pass	   the	   test	  and	  join	  the	  angels	  in	  paradise.	  When	  I	  would	  ask	  further,	  why	  we	  are	  given	  the	  capacity	  for	  jñān	  rather	  than	  just	  making	  us	  good	  right	  from	  the	  start,	  the	  final	  answer	  would	   usually	   be	   an	   exclamation	   like,	   ‘otherwise	   we	  would	   not	   have	  been	  humans	  (mānuṣ)!’	  	  
Jñān	  is	  the	  element	  that	  distinguishes	  humans	  from	  angels,	  who	  are	  beyond	  good	   and	   evil;	   and	   from	  animals,	  which	   act	   only	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   instrumental	  calculation	  and	  instinct.	  As	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  every	  human	  being	  has	  a	  jāti	  and	  a	  dharma,	  that	  is,	  every	  mānuṣ	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  live	   ethically.	   In	   the	   cosmopolitics	   of	   Bengali	   Muslims,	   this	   potential	   is	  generated	   in	   the	   fundamental	   exchange	   that	   generates	   life:	   the	   gift	   of	   life	   by	  Allah.	   It	   follows	   that	   human	   ethics	   needs	   to	   be	   located	  within	   the	   choice	   that	  Allah	  has	  given	  us;	  it	  is	  an	  autonomy	  acquired	  only	  after	  the	  acknowledgment	  of	  Allah’s	   gift	   of	   life.63	  It	   also	   follows	   that	   since	   relatedness	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	  the	   generation	   of	   human	   persons,	   relatedness	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	   ethics,	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa.	  	  In	   the	   Cartesian	   liberal	   philosophy,	   the	   pre-­‐moral	   human	   being	   is	   sprung	  directly	  from	  nature	  and	  only	  after	  the	  self	  and	  the	  body	  are	  separated,	  moral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  This	   element	   of	   the	   vernacular	   theology	   I	   describe	   here	   (the	   idea	   of	   the	   free	   will	  embedded	  in	  the	  choice	  given	  by	  god)	  has	  obvious	  parallels	  with	  particular	  strands	  of	  Christian	  theology,	  see	  Robbins	  (2004a)	  and	  Cannell	  (2006).	  What	  is	  distinctive	  about	  this	  context	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  salvationist	  theology	  with	  the	  local	  holistic	  ideology	  of	  the	  protean	  person.	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universals	  can	  be	  constructed	  by	  reason,	  which	  are	  subsequently	  to	  be	  followed	  (see	  Taylor	  1989).64	  In	  contrast,	  according	  to	  the	  ideology	  of	  my	  interlocutors,	  human	   life	   is	   generated	  by	   an	   exchange,	  which	   is	   the	   fundamental	   ethical	   act	  (Lambek	   2010a),	   since	   it	   infuses	   human	   life	   with	   ethical	   potential.	   Thus	   the	  human	   self	   emerges	   from	   relatedness,	   and	   ethical	   potential	   is	   integral	   rather	  than	  posterior	  to	  the	  human	  self.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  this	  chapter,	  this	  observation	  has	   far-­‐reaching	   consequences	   for	   the	   kind	   of	   ethics	   that	   people	   engage	   in:	  people	   act	   according	   to	   an	   (Aristotelian)	   embodied	   virtue	   ethics	   rather	   than	  according	  to	  (Kantian)	  universal	  moral	  imperatives.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   firstly	   develop	   a	   critique	   of	   an	   exclusively	   secular	  conception	  of	  ethics.	  Secondly,	   I	  analyse	   the	  ethnography	   that	   forms	   the	  basis	  for	   this	   critique:	   drawing	   upon	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   argue	   that	   Muslim	  Joygramis	  derive	   ethical	   autonomy	   from	   submission	   to	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	  creator-­‐god,	   rather	   than	   from	   a	   sovereign	   consciousness.	   The	   local	  cosmopolitics	   creates	  ethical	  affordances	   (Keane	  2015)	   that	  do	  not	  determine	  but	  do	  constrain	  and	  allow	  for	  particular	  forms	  of	  ethical	  reflection	  and	  action.	  The	   key	   ethical	   affordances	   are	   imān	   (faith)	   and	   jñān	   (wisdom),	   which	   I	   will	  compare	   to,	   respectively,	   habitus	   and	   phronesis.	   Thirdly,	   the	   telos	   of	   ethical	  exchange	   is	   locally	   conceptualised	   as	   khuśi,	   which	   means	   happiness,	   or,	   as	   I	  suggest,	   virtue.	   However,	   khuśi	   is	   not	   only	   the	   desired	   result	   but	   also	   the	  motivation	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  exchange.	  Exchange,	  then,	  is	  a	  total	  social	  fact	  that	  is	  not	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end	  but	  an	  end	  in	  itself:	  a	  khuśi,	  harmonious	  society.	  Fourthly,	   I	   demonstrate	   that	   even	   though	   absolute	   freedom	   is	   a	   human	  impossibility,	  it	  features	  prominently	  in	  the	  imagination	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  as	  an	   actual	   threat	   to	   order	   and	   justice	   in	   human	   society.	   I	   conclude	   with	   the	  observation	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  entering	  into	  a	  secular	  contract	  with	  the	  state	  as	  an	  entirely	  free	  sovereign	  being	  is	  inconceivable,	  since	  unconstrained	  freedom	  has	  to	  be	  renounced	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  ethics	  –	  and	  thus	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  humanity	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  The	   opposition	   between	   the	   self	   and	   the	   body	   –	   and	   of	   ascetic	  morality	   and	   embodied	  virtue	   ethics	   -­‐	   has	   its	   origins	   in	   Platonian	   philosophy	   (see	   Lambek	   2000)	   and	   takes	   on	   a	  particular	  form	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Nietzsche	  (see	  Laidlaw	  2002,	  2014a).	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Theoretical	  orientations:	  critical	  reflections	  on	  The	  subject	  of	  virtue	  In	  the	  introduction	  I	  have	  postulated	  a	  model	  of	  ethical	  reality	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  my	   ethnography	   and	   the	   theoretical	   work	   of	   Bloch	   (2008)	   in	   combination	  with	  two	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  advocates	  of	  ‘the	  ethical	  turn’	  in	  anthropology,	  James	   Laidlaw	   (2002,	   2014a)	   and	   Michael	   Lambek	   (2000,	   2010a,	   2010b).	  Ethics,	   I	   suggested,	   is	   the	  connection	  between	   the	   transactional	  social	  and	   the	  transcendental	   social,	   as	   embodied,	   situational	   acts	   are	   embedded	   within	  collective	   ideals.	   The	  precondition	   for	   ethics	   is,	   then,	   that	   humans	   are	   able	   to	  conceive	  of	  themselves	  as	  related;	  as	   in	  a	  particular	  social	  positionality	  within	  the	  transcendental	  social.	  Therefore,	  drawing	  on	  Bloch	  (2008),	  I	  suggested	  that	  the	   predisposition	   that	   allows	   for	   ethics	   to	   emerge	   is	   (social)	   imagination.	  Imagination	  allows	  humans	  to	  live	  in	  the	  transcendental	  social	  within	  which	  we	  occupy	   particular	   essentialised	   roles	   and	   groups.	   Since	   the	   transcendental	  social	  encompasses	  both	  this-­‐worldly	  and	  otherworldly	  roles	  and	  groups,	  there	  is	   no	   stark	   differentiation	   between	   ethical	   acts	   directed	   at	   this-­‐worldly	   or	  otherworldly	   goals;	   these	   goals	   collapse	   into	   the	   collective	   ideals	   of	   the	  transcendental	  social.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  detail	  how	  the	  social	   imagination	  and	  embodied	  ethics	  are	  conceptualised	   in	   the	  cosmopolitics	  of	   Joygrami	  Muslims.	  The	  model	  of	  ethical	  reality	  that	  emerges	  from	  my	  ethnography	  requires	  me	  to	  refute	  Laidlaw’s	  (2014a)	  claim	  that	  reflective	  freedom	  is	  the	  essential	  feature	  of	  ethics.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  Laidlaw’s	  conception	  of	  ethics	  is	  not	  universally	   applicable	   because	   it	   is	   ultimately	   secular	   and	   does	   not	   allow	   for	  Salvationist	  truth	  claims.	  	  James	  Laidlaw	  asserts	  that	  one	  of	  the	  central	  aims	  of	  his	  work	  The	  Subject	  of	  
Virtue	   is	   ‘to	   conceptualize	   character,	   freedom	   and	   responsibility	   each	   as	  qualities	   that	   emerge	   in	   social	   interaction	   rather	   than	   being	   features	   in	   any	  sense	  internal	  to	  the	  individual’	  (2014b:	  501).	  However,	  in	  his	  poststructuralist	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotelian	  virtue	  ethics,	  Laidlaw	  equally	  attempts	  to	  recover	  an	  innate,	  individual	  kind	  of	  freedom	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  virtuous	  qualities	  to	  be	  enacted:	  an	   irreducible	  reflective	  consciousness	  that	  constitutes	  the	  subject	  as	  an	   ethical	   being.	   He	   acknowledges	   the	   limited	   freedom	   involved	   in	   these	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‘processes	   of	   subjectivation’	   (Foucault	   2000):	   ‘The	   power	   relations	   that	  constrain	  and	  enable,	  and	  weaken	  and	  empower,	  some	  in	  relation	  to	  others	  are	  emphatically	  not	  mere	  appearances	  in	  contrast	  with	  a	  reality	  of	  freedom.	  They	  give	   such	   freedoms	   as	   people	   are	   ever	   able	   to	   exercise	   both	   their	   shape	   and	  their	   scope’	   (Laidlaw	   2014b:	   500).	   Nevertheless,	   Laidlaw	   maintains,	   the	  constraining	   cultural	   and	   social	   models	   do	   not	   make	   ‘the	   active,	   reflective	  freedom	  involved	  in	  actualizing	  [the	  processes	  of	  subjectivation]	  any	   less	  real’	  (2014a:	  102).	  I	  wonder	  whether	  Laidlaw	  would	  consider	  the	  relation	  with	  a	  god	  a	  ‘power-­‐relation’;	   whether	   this	   power-­‐relation	  would	   form	   an	   external	   or	   an	   internal	  constraint	   to	   ethics;	   and	   whether	   ultimately	   Laidlaw’s	   subject	   is	   a	   secular	  subject	  that	  can	  only	  be	  constrained	  to	  a	   limited	  extent	  by	  this-­‐worldly	  power	  that	   originates	   external	   to	   the	   subject.	   In	   Laidlaw’s	   model,	   this-­‐worldly	   or	  otherworldly	  power	  cannot	  ultimately	  constrain	  the	   internal,	  rational	  capacity	  of	   reflection,	  which	   is	   equally	  available	   for	  all.	  As	   such,	  Laidlaw’s	  approach	   to	  ethics	   contains	   elements	   of	   the	   Kantian	   concept	   of	   morality	   as	   rational	  autonomy;	  which	   is	   a	   normative	   expression	   of	   a	   distinctly	  modern	   (Western)	  egalitarianism	   (Keane	   2014:	   449). 65 	  This	   kind	   of	   autonomy	   inherent	   to	  Laidlaw’s	   idea	   of	   ethics	   is	   modern	   and	   secular	   as	   it	   is	   premised	   on	   a	   ‘self-­‐sufficing’	  or	   ‘exclusive	  humanism’	  (Taylor	  2007),	  which	  ‘rejects	  a	  cosmological	  vision	   of	   reality’	   (Mattingly	   2012:	   168).	   Indeed,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   sovereign	   and	  private	   conscience	   is	   the	   precondition	   of	   modern	   secular	   ethics	   (Asad	   2003:	  247).	  Modern	  secular	  ethics,	  indeed,	  appears	  as	  ‘liberation’	  from	  the	  shackles	  of	  the	   ‘unnatural’	   ascetic	   morality	   that	   Nietzsche	   so	   deplored	   (Laidlaw	   2002:	  316ff).	  	  Character,	   in	   Bengali	   cosmopolitics,	   indeed	   emerges	   in	   social	   interaction,	  but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   becomes	   internal	   to	   the	   individual,	   since	   character	   and	  flesh	  cannot	  be	  separated	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  quality/body	  is	  blurred.	  Social	   and	   cultural	  models	   create	  physical	   limitations,	   since	   the	   body/mind	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  ‘One	  reason	  Williams	  favours	  ethics	  over	  morality	  is	  because	  he	  sees	  the	  latter	  to	  require	  some	   supreme	   figure	   like	  God	   to	   enforce	   the	   laws	   (Laidlaw	  2014a:	   112).	  Working	  within	   the	  dominant	   secular	   assumptions	   of	   the	   twentieth-­‐century	   academy,	   he	   has	   to	   reject	   that.	   But	  these	  are	  normative,	  not	  empirical	  objections:	  many	  of	   the	  people	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  are	  not	  egalitarians,	  and	  do	  not	  reject	  the	  guidance	  of	  a	  God’	  (Keane	  2014:	  449).	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not	  only	  conditioned	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  but	  also	  shaped	   in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  can	  only	  conceivably	  make	  certain	  choices	  and	  not	  others.	  In	  his	  model	  of	  ethics	  Laidlaw	  assumes	   a	   shared	   humanity	   before	   the	   generation	   of	   particular	   kinds	   of	  persons,	   and	   within	   this	   shared	   humanity,	   reflective	   freedom	   is	   equally	  available	   for	   all.	   Laidlaw	   takes	   for	   granted	   (as	   a	   feature	   of	   humanity)	   a	  mind	  separate	  from	  a	  body	  that	  can	  ‘step	  back’	  and	  reflect.	  Taking	  this	  as	  his	  starting	  point,	  Laidlaw	  does	  not	  have	  to	  ask	  how	  different	  configurations	  of	  the	  self	  may	  have	   implications	   on	   different	   conceptions	   of	   the	   ‘mind’,	   the	   ‘brain’,	   or	   the	  ‘body’;	  or	  indeed	  on	  conceptions	  of	  the	  human.	  	  I	  feel	  that	  if,	  as	  anthropologists,	  we	  really	  want	  to	  ‘take	  seriously’	  the	  ethical	  life	   of	   others	   (Laidlaw	   2014a:	   52)	   and	   ‘go	   deeper’	   into	   the	   understanding	   of	  ethical	   sensibilities	   (Lambek	  2010a:	   3),	  we	  have	   to	   leave	   open	   the	  possibility	  that	   the	   truth	   claims	   of	   the	   vernacular	   cosmological	   vision	   from	   which	   the	  ethical	  is	  generated	  have	  ontological	  validity,	  and	  not	  dismiss	  them	  a	  priori.	  As	  I	  have	  demonstrated,	  in	  the	  cosmopolitics	  of	  my	  interlocutors,	  there	  is	  no	  human	  being	   before	   the	   generation	   of	   personhood.	   Furthermore,	   this	   chapter	   will	  reveal	   that	  only	  a	  particular	   shape	  of	  mind	   can	   reflect.	  This	  observation	   is	   an	  important	  modification	  because	  it	  shows,	  not	  only	  that	  a	  particular	  generation	  of	  personhood	  takes	  place	  before	  we	  can	  discern	  an	  ethical	  consciousness,	  but	  also	   that	   the	   alternatives	   between	   which	   to	   choose	   (Lambek	   2010b)	   from	  within	   this	  ethical	   consciousness	  may	  be	   limited	  because	  of	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  person	  is	  constructed.	  I	  do	  maintain	  that	  a	  kind	  of	  reflective	  autonomy	  is	  indicative	  of	  ethics,	  but	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  Laidlaw’s	  reflective	  freedom.	  I	  have	  mentioned	  the	   vernacular	   concepts	   imān	   (faith)	   and	   jñān	   (wisdom)	   in	   passing;	   here	   I	  demonstrate	   in	   detail	   that	   in	   the	   ideology	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   these	   are	   the	  faculties	   essential	   to	   cultivate	   virtue.	   Imān	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   a	  habitus	   of	  faith,	   and	   jñān	   is	   an	   ethical	   concept	   comparable	   to	   phronesis	   (judgement)	  (Lambek	   2000,	   2010b).	   Phronesis	   is	   the	  most	   apt	   cultural	   translation	   of	   jñān	  because	   phronesis	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   judgment	   that	   ‘is	   resolutely	   nonindividualistic’	  and	   is	   therefore	   ‘more	   appropriate	   than	   either	   freedom	   or	   convention	   as	   the	  fulcrum	   of	   everyday	   ethics’	   (Lambek	   2010a:	   26).	   I	   suggest,	   then,	   that	   the	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reflective	   autonomy	   central	   to	   ethics	   is	   an	   autonomy	   that	   emerges	   from	  exchanges	  in	  relatedness	  rather	  than	  from	  a	  sovereign	  consciousness.	  	  By	   emphasising	   the	   role	   of	   judgement	   as	   central	   to	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  Joygrami	  Muslims,	  I	  contribute	  to	  the	  line	  of	  work	  of	  several	   anthropologists	   who	   have	   in	   recent	   years	   argued	   for	   attention	   to	  ideological	  manifestations	  of	   freedom	  and	  autonomy	   in	   Islam	   that	  differ	   from	  the	  liberal	  conception	  of	  freedom	  (Asad	  2003;	  Mahmood	  2005;	  Marsden	  2005;	  Hirschkind	   2006).	   In	   addition	   to	   reinforcing	   this	   argument,	   I	   aim	   to	   give	   a	  broader	  picture	  of	  the	  generation	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  non-­‐liberal	  autonomy	  within	  an	  example	   of	   Islamic	   cosmopolitics.	   Here,	   I	   give	   a	   critical	   reading	   of	   Laidlaw’s	  (2014a)	   critique	   of	   Mahmood	   (2005),	   in	   order	   to	   take	  my	   argument	   beyond	  both	  authors.	  	  In	   her	   ethnography	   on	   the	   Islamic	   piety	   movement	   in	   Egypt,	   Mahmood	  draws	  on	  the	  Aristotelian	  legacy	  regarding	  virtue	  ethics	  as	  it	  ‘allows	  us	  to	  think	  of	   ethics	   as	   always	   local	   and	   particular,	   pertaining	   to	   a	   specific	   set	   of	  procedures,	   techniques,	   and	   discourses	   through	  which	   highly	   specific	   ethical-­‐moral	  subjects	  come	  to	  be	  formed’	  (Mahmood	  2005:	  28).	  In	  addition,	  she	  draws	  on	   Foucault	   in	   order	   to	   locate	   agency	   and	   ethical	   subjectivation	   in	   embodied	  forms	  of	  Islamic	  obedience	  and	  piety	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  understood	  as	  the	   ‘docile’	   subordination	   to	  norms	   (Mahmood	  2005:	  29).	   She	  argues	   that	   the	  internalization	  of	  a	  habitus	  (in	  the	  Aristotelian	  sense)	  requires	  the	  active	  work	  of	  ethical	  self-­‐fashioning	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  implies	  a	  free	  agent.	  	  I	  do	  not	  contest	  Laidlaw’s	  critique	  of	  the	  apparent	  coherence	  of	  the	  Islamic	  piety	   movement	   (2014a:	   167-­‐173).	   But	   perhaps	   Mahmood’s	   work	   is	   best	  interpreted	  as	   an	  ethno-­‐theology:	   a	   coherent	  model	  of	   and	   for	   ethics,	  with	   its	  particular	  interpretation	  of	  ritual,	  the	  body,	  and	  various	  values	  such	  as	  freedom,	  which	   is	  contested	  and	  compromised	   in	  everyday	  reality.	  She	  uses	   this	  ethno-­‐theology	   to	   critique	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   Western	   ideology	   has	   become	  implicit	   in	   anthropological	   categories.	   I	   find	   value	   in	   her	   ethnography	   as	   an	  ethno-­‐theology	   and	   I	   similarly	   convey	   my	   interpretation	   of	   the	   vernacular	  model	   of	   ethics	   in	   this	   chapter.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   aim	   to	   go	   beyond	  Mahmood’s	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work,	   as	   I	   also	   strive	   to	   explicate	   the	   ethical	   affordances	   that	   allow	   for	   the	  negotiation	  of	  ambivalences	  and	  value	  conflicts.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   I	   suggest	   that	   Laidlaw’s	   critique	   of	   Mahmood	   brings	   to	   the	  forefront	  the	  former’s	  problematically	  secular	  conception	  of	  ethics.	  In	  Laidlaw’s	  view,	  the	  ethnography	  of	  Mahmood	  proves	  his	  point	  that	  reflective	  freedom	  is	  essential	  to	  ethics,	  yet	  also	  shows	  that	  Islamic	  reformism,	  like	  other	  Salvationist	  religions	   (2014a:	   154),	   ultimately	   relinquishes	   reflective	   freedom	   (and	   thus	  ethics):	  	  ‘Tied	   as	   it	   is	   to	   the	   reality	   of	   consciousness	   and	   the	   constitution	   of	   the	  subject	   through	   socially	   instituted	   practices	   and	   relations	   of	   power	   and	  mutual	   recognition,	   reflective	   freedom	   is	  a	  precondition	   for	  ethical	   life	   in	  general.	   But	   what	   the	   reformist	   projects	   described	   by	   Mahmood	   and	  Hirschkind	   do	   with	   that	   freedom	   is,	   quite	   directly,	   to	   subordinate	   and	  reduce	   it	   in	   favour	  of	   securing	   a	   degree	  of	   obedience	   to	  God	   that	  will	   no	  longer	  depend	  on	  consciousness	  but	  will	  become	  as	  if	  instinctive’	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  177).	  	  What	  Mahmood	  describes	  is	  the	  ideal	  mutation	  of	  the	  mind/body	  so	  that,	  in	  Laidlaw’s	  words,	  the	  distinction	  between	  moral	  and	  physical	  incapability	  (to	  do	  the	  wrong	  thing)	  collapses	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  152-­‐154).	  Laidlaw	  argues	  that	  this	  observation	   makes	   the	   study	   of	   ‘ordinary	   ethics’	   obsolete,	   as	   Mahmood’s	  interlocutors	   apparently	   strive	   after	   positive	   liberty:	   in	   the	   Islamic	   piety	  movement,	  ‘reflective	  freedom	  is	  exercised	  towards	  its	  own	  future	  curtailment,	  through	  developing	  dispositions	  that	  restrict	  what	  one	  might	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  to	  do,	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  quite	  different	  value	  of	  positive	   freedom’	  (2014a:	  154).	  He	  continues	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  	  ‘such	   apparently	   paradoxical	   dynamics	   of	   a	   self	   extinguishing	  moral	   will	  are	  not	  uniquely	  a	  feature	  of	  reformist	  Islam,	  but	  are	  common	  in	  ethicized	  ‘world	   religions’…[I]ndividuals	   are	   invited	   to	   exercise	   individual	   ethical	  choice	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  path	  of	  self-­‐formation,	  the	  end	  result	  of	  which	  is	  the	  extinction	  of	  exactly	   the	  capacity	   for	  wilful	  decision	   that	  enabled	   them	  to	  take	  the	  path	  in	  the	  first	  place’	  (ibid.).	  	  In	  my	  view,	  Laidlaw’s	  critique	  misses	  the	  point,	  partly	  because	  of	  his	  secular	  conception	  of	  the	  mind	  that	  I	  critiqued	  earlier,	  and	  partly	  because	  of	  a	  confusion	  of	  the	  telos	  of	  virtue	  ethics.	  Firstly,	  I	  suggest	  that	  one	  requires	  the	  cultivation	  of	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a	   particular	   kind	   of	   mind/body	   (habitus)	   to	   work	   towards	   the	   realisation	   of	  one’s	  goal.	  Laidlaw	  limits	   the	  mutualism	  between	  the	  shape	  of	   the	  mind/body	  and	  virtuous	  action	  because	   in	  his	   idealised	  conception,	   the	  mind	  is	  static	  and	  constant.	   Virtue	   ethics,	   however,	   is	   about	   the	   symbiosis	   between	   the	  mind/body	   and	   character	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   virtuous	   action	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	  and	  habitus	  captures	  this	  symbiosis	  if	  we	  allow	  it	  to	  be	  dynamic.	  	  Secondly,	   I	   have	   already	   argued	   that	   obedience	   to	   god	   may	   be	   the	  precondition	  for	  ethics,	  rather	  than	  only	  a	  result.	  I	  further	  suggest	  that	  probably	  the	  telos	  of	  virtue	  ethics	  is	  the	  foreclosure	  of	  itself.	  The	  point	  of	  phronesis	   is	  to	  make	   ethics	   and	   desires	   converge,	   to	   shape	   character	   so	   that	   one	   will	   act	  ethically	   in	   a	   non-­‐deliberative	   way.	   For	   Aristotle,	   ‘the	   good	   life	   moves	   to	   a	  climax’;	  ‘the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  divine’,	  which	  is	  achieved	  in	  a	  ‘certain	  kind	  of	  
life’	   (MacIntyre	   2007:	   175,	   emphasis	   in	   original)	   –	   a	   kind	   of	   life	   in	   which	  inclination	  and	  virtue	  collapse	  thanks	  to	  the	  cultivation	  of	  character	  (ibid:	  149).	  So	  perhaps	  the	  ‘paradoxical	  dynamics’	  of	  Salvationist	  world	  religions	  should	  be	  interpreted	   as	   the	   apex	   of	   virtue	   ethics,	   rather	   than	   as	   diverging	   from	   virtue	  ethics.	  The	  foreclosure	  of	  moral	  will	  implies	  that	  one	  has	  gone	  beyond	  good	  and	  evil,	   and	  virtue	  ethics	  becomes	   indeed	  obsolete.	   It	   is	   a	   telos	  that	   can	  never	  be	  achieved	   in	   this	   life,	  because	   the	  choice	  between	  good	  and	  evil	   is	  what	  makes	  one	   human.	   But	   that	   does	   not	   foreclose	   the	   fact	   that	   virtue	   ethics	   is	   the	   path	  towards	   that	   goal,	   perhaps	   more	   in	   Salvationist	   religions	   than	   in	   any	   other	  ethical	  tradition.	  
From	  generative	  to	  ethical	  Muslimness	  Joygrami	   Muslims	   are	   continuously	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   ethical	  degeneration	   they	   perceive	   in	   their	   environment.	   On	   an	   everyday	   level,	   this	  preoccupation	   is	   often	   expressed	   as	   a	   concern	   with	   being	   a	   ‘good	   person’	  oneself	  in	  contrast	  to	  particular	  others	  who	  are	  considered	  ‘bad	  people’.	  Indeed,	  I	   found	   it	   to	   be	   very	   common	   among	   people	   to	  make	   straightforward	   ethical	  judgements	  about	  others.	  There	  are	  various	  reasons	  why	  someone	  is	   ‘good’	  or	  ‘bad’,	   but	   usually	   the	   observation	   that	   there	   are	   good	   and	   bad	   people	   is	  considered	   a	   social	   fact:	   there	   are	   inevitably	   bad	   people,	   just	   like	   there	   are	  inevitably	  good	  people.	  A	  metaphor	  most	  commonly	  deployed	  is	  that	  of	  a	  hand:	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  son	  Wasim	  answered	  my	  query	  as	  to	  why	  people	  are	  badmāś	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(a	  generic	  term	  implying	  various	  kinds	  and	  levels	  of	  inappropriate	  behaviour	  or	  ‘bad’	   people)	  with	   holding	   up	   his	   hand:	   ‘Are	   my	   fingers	   all	   equal?	   No,	   and	  similarly	   people	   are	   not	   all	   the	   same.’	   However,	   badmāś	   people	   aren’t	   born	  
badmāś,	  he	  added,	   it’s	  because	  of	  envy	   (hiṁsā).	  Badmāś	  people	  will	   inevitably	  be	   there,	  yet,	  he	  claims,	   it	   is	  because	  of	  upbringing	  and	  education	   that	  people	  become	  good	  or	  bad.	  	  	  I	   have	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter	  made	   an	   analytical	   distinction	  between	   the	  generative	   Muslimness	   closely	   related	   to	   becoming	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Muslim	  
jāti,	   and	   ethical	   Muslimness,	   related	   to	   the	   actual	   enactment	   of	   dharma.	   I	  focused	   on	   how	   a	   Muslim	   person	   becomes	   generated	   out	   of	   the	   exchanges	  within	   the	  web	   of	   relatedness	   that	   is	   the	   jāti.	   Jāti	   is	   a	   sine	  qua	  non	   to	   ethical	  personhood	  but	   inclusion	   in	   the	   jāti	   is	  not	  sufficient	   to	  establish	  oneself	  as	  an	  ethical	   being,	   and	   one	   needs	   to	   cultivate	   ethical	   Muslimness	   to	   secure	   one’s	  claim	   to	   generative	   Muslimness.	   A	   claim	   to	   Muslimness	   is	   fragile	   due	   to	   the	  threat	  of	  disintegration	  inherent	  in	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  protean	  person.	  So	  being	  engendered	  in	  the	  Muslim	  jāti	  does	  not	  make	  one	  necessarily	  a	  good	  person	  –	  it	  generates	   the	  potential	   to	   live	  ethically	  but	   this	  potential	  has	   to	  be	  constantly	  cultivated.	  Which	  actions	  exactly	  generate	  ethical	  Muslimness	  is	  situational	  and	  contestable.	   For	   instance,	  whether	   I	   would	   need	   to	   actually	   practice	   Islam	   to	  become	  a	  Muslim	  was	  a	  subject	  of	  discussion;	  some	  women	  would	  say	  it	  would	  suffice	  to	  marry	  a	  Muslim	  man,	  others	  would	  say	  that	  at	   least	   I	  would	  have	  to	  pray	  and	  wear	  a	  veil	  (as	  that	  is	  what	  makes	  a	  Muslim	  woman,	  they	  would	  say),	  still	  others	  would	  dismiss	  any	  aspiration	  to	  become	  Muslim	  without	  believing	  in	  Allah	  and	  the	  afterlife.	  The	  different	  opinions,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  debate	  at	  all,	   suggest	   different	   levels	   of	   importance	   attached	   to	   nested	   forms	   of	  Muslimness	  associated	  with	  jāti	  and	  with	  dharma.	  	  However,	   the	   actually	   tenuous	   nature	   of	   ‘being	   good’	   is	   essentialised	   in	  particular	   persons.	   Similar	   to	   the	   tendency	   to	   essentialise	   jāti	   membership,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  essentialise	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  people.	  The	  essentialised	  jāti	  identity	  and	  the	  essentialised	  good	  character	  do	  not	  necessarily	  correspond:	  the	  relationship	  between	  being	  ‘good’	  and	  being	  of	  a	  particular	  jāti	  is	  not	  taken	  for	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granted	  but	   depends	   on	   individual	   behaviour	   and	   characteristics.66	  There	   are,	  however,	  essentialised	  faculties	  that	  allow	  for	  good	  character	  to	  develop.	  	  In	   this	   section,	   I	   gradually	   reveal	   that	   imān	   (faith)	   and	   jñān	  (wisdom/judgment)	  are	  the	  essential	  qualities	  to	  the	  disposition	  and	  cultivation	  of	  ethical	  Muslimness.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  ethnography	  leads	  me	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	   generation	   of	   a	   particular	   mind/body	   includes	   the	   generation	   of	   the	  potential	   for	   faith	  and	   judgment/jñān	   to	  develop.	  This	  analysis,	   in	   turn,	   forms	  the	  backdrop	  to	  my	  critique	  of	  Laidlaw’s	  conception	  of	  ethics.	  	  
Becoming	  a	  good	  Muslim	  	  I	   presented	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   essentialised	   jāti	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	  essentialised	   good	   character	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   to	   Ishaque	   and	   his	   mother	  Parveen	   Bibi.	   No	   one	   in	   this	   household	   is	   very	   explicitly	   pious,	   or	   outwardly	  Islamic	  in	  dress	  or	  disposition,	  but	  they	  are	  respected	  for	  their	  worldly	  pursuits.	  Ishaque’s	   father	   runs	   a	   homeopathic	  medical	   practice	   in	   Farukhbazar	   and	  his	  brother	  Basir	  is	  the	  local	  political	  leader	  of	  the	  TMC.	  The	  daughter	  is	  married	  to	  a	   well-­‐earning	   teacher	   and	   the	   other	   three	   sons	   are	   studying	   in	   school	   and	  college	   and	   doing	   odd	   jobs,	   often	   as	   brokers.	   Currently,	   Ishaque	   works	   in	   a	  factory	  in	  a	  town	  one	  hour	  away	  by	  bus.	  Parveen	  Bibi	  is	  pious	  in	  her	  very	  own	  way:	  she	  is	  well	  familiar	  with	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Deobandi	  imams	  and	  tries	  to	  incorporate	   them	   in	   everyday	   village	   life.	   She	   often	   encounters	   impossible	  hurdles:	   how	   to	   buy	   vegetables	   from	   the	   vendor	   passing	   through	   if	   he	   is	   not	  supposed	   to	   see	   her	   face?	   In	   these	   moments,	   she	   shakes	   her	   head	   and	   says	  Islam	  is	  very	  hard	  (khub	  kaṣṭa),	  the	  hardest	  of	  all,	  and	  continues	  with	  her	  daily	  chores.	  	  Ishaque,	  who	  spends	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  with	  his	  friends	  at	  the	  bazar,	  admits	  that	  some	  of	  his	   friends	  are	  rogues	   (badmāś)	  but	  claims	   that	  he	   is	  not,	  because	  he	  knows	  how	  to	  be	  good	  ‘from	  the	  inside’,	  ‘with	  my	  own	  wisdom’	  (nijer	  jñān).	  His	  mother,	   however,	   laughs	   and	   claims	   that	   he	   had	   learned	   from	   her	   how	   to	  distinguish	   between	   good	   and	   bad:	   ‘from	   mother’	   (māyer	   kāch	   theke).	   In	  another	   conversation,	   which	   I	   recounted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   Milon	   and	  Parveen	  Bibi	  reckoned	  that	  a	  Muslim	  baby	  would	  become	  Adivasi	  and	  vice	  versa	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  judgements	  considering	  various	  jātis	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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if	  they	  were	  to	  grow	  up	  in	  each	  other’s	  household.	  After	  saying	  this	  Parveen	  Bibi	  immediately	  added	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  drama	  that	   it	  would	  be	  a	  great	   loss	  for	  the	  Muslim	   baby	   to	   be	   socialized	   in	   the	   Adivasi	   jāti,	   because	   she	  would	   ‘become	  bad’	  (khārāp	  haye	  yeto)	  whereas	  the	  Adivasi	  baby	  is	  lucky	  as	  she	  would	  ‘become	  good’	   (khub	  bhālo	   dharma	  haye	   yeto)	   by	   the	   virtue	   of	   the	   dharma	   she	  would	  acquire.67	  But	  here,	   in	  conversation	  with	  her	  son,	   it	   turns	  out	   that	   the	  parents	  can	  only	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  good	  dharma	  to	  develop.	  Parveen	  and	  Ishaque	  eventually	  agree	  that	  children	  first	   learn	  from	  their	  parents,	  but	  once	  they	  are	  mature	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  person,	  because	  nobody	  can	  tell	  an	  adolescent	  what	  to	  do	   anymore:	   ‘How	   will	   she	   know	   whether	   I	   go	   out	   drinking	   or	   doing	   other	  mischief?’	   he	   asks.	   ‘She	   can’t	   stop	  me,	   so	   it	   just	   depends	   on	  me	   and	  my	   own	  rules	  (nijer	  niyam)’.68	  	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  jñān	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  ethical	  behaviour	  came	  up	  time	  and	  again,	   as	   in	   this	   conversation	   with	   Ahmed	   and	   his	   son	   Rehan.	   I	   had	   many	  conversations	  on	  dharma	  and	  politics	  with	  Ahmed	  –	  not	  in	  the	  least	  because	  he	  was	  free	  most	  afternoons	  to	  talk:	  he	  is	  a	  middle	  class	  landowner,	  whose	  land	  is	  cultivated	  by	  sharecroppers	  (bar’gādār),	  and	  his	  household	  is	  maintained	  by	  his	  brother,	   who	   works	   as	   an	   artist	   in	   Gujarat.	   So	   Ahmed	   spent	   most	   of	   his	  afternoons	  drinking	  tea	  and	  reading	  the	  newspaper	  on	  his	  veranda	  and	  seemed	  all	   too	   pleased	   to	   have	   āḍḍā	   with	  me.	   According	   to	   Ahmed,	   some	   20%	   of	   all	  people	  will	  simply	  be	  badmāś.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  people	  need	  dharma,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  control	   themselves.	   Just	   the	  control	  of	  other	  people	   is	  not	  enough,	  and	   less	  authoritative	  because	  one	  can	  evade	  punishment	  too	  easily:	  Rehan	  could	  go	  out	  drinking	  and	  simply	  not	  come	  home	  until	   the	  smell	  of	  alcohol	  has	  evaporated,	  and	  thus	  avoid	  (physical)	  punishment.	  Interestingly,	  Ahmed	  says	  that	  dharma	  is	  a	  stronger	  controlling	  measure,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  spur	  ethical	  action,	  especially	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Parveen	  Bibi	   distinguishes	  more	   radically	   between	   jātis	  as	   being	   by	   itself	   good	   or	   bad.	  This	  has	  to	  do	  with	  gender	  in	  relatedness:	  see	  page	  109.	  Moreover,	  we	  were	  talking	  here	  about	  Adivasis,	   and	   they	   are	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   lowest	   in	   any	   hierarchical	   ranking	   in	  society,	  including	  in	  a	  moral	  ranking.	  They	  are,	  in	  fact,	  hardly	  included	  in	  the	  plural	  composition	  of	  Indian	  or	  Bengali	  society.	  	  68	  ‘Niyam’	  is	  always	  a	  morally	  charged	  rule.	  It	  is	  however	  not	  agreed	  upon	  (also	  not	  between	  the	  Muslims	   in	   Joygram)	  what	   exactly	   are	   the	   ‘right’	   niyam:	   some	  would	   claim	   that	   only	   the	  rules	  coming	  directly	  from	  Hadith	  are	  right;	  some,	  like	  Ishaque,	  claim	  to	  be	  able	  to	  live	  ethically	  according	   to	   the	  niyam	   that	   are	   inspired	   by	   Islamic	   dharma	   though	   leave	   space	   for	   personal	  interpretation.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  niyam	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	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because	   Allah	   cannot	   smell	   Rehan’s	   breath,	   nor	   punish	   him	   immediately	   and	  physically,	  nor	  can	  Rehan	  see	  Allah.	  One	  has	  to	  have	  the	  jñān	  (wisdom)	  to	  know	  how	   to	   follow	   ‘Allah’s	   command’	   (Āllāh’r	   hukum).	   Both	   father	   and	   son	  emphasise,	  over	  and	  beyond	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  external	  god,	  that	  one	  makes	  ethical	  decisions	  from	  the	  inside,	  because	  Allah	  is	  inside	  (as	  they	  gesture	  with	  hands	  on	  their	   chests).	   From	   the	   inside,	   one	  will	   know	  how	   to	   act	   so	   that	  Allah	  will	   be	  ‘happy’	  (Āllāh	  khuśi	  thāk’be).	  	  What	  Ahmed	  implies	  is	  that	  external	  control	  may	  influence	  people’s	  actions	  but	  that	  control	  from	  within	  is	  ultimately	  more	  important	  for	  ethical	  action.	  In	  other	  words,	  blindly	  following	  external	  constraint	  is	  not	  ethical;	  it	  is	  only	  ethical	  when	  the	  choice	  to	  act	  emerges	  from	  individual	  judgement,	  jñān,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	   borne	   out	   of	   faith	   in	   the	   invisible	   god.	   So	  dharma	  here	   denotes	   both	   blind	  faith	  (imān)	  as	  well	  as	  comprehension	  (jñān)	  of	   the	  value	  of	  Allah’s	  command	  (Āllāh’r	   hukum),	   which	   inspires	   the	   desire	   to	   make	   Allah	   happy	   (Āllāh	   khuśi	  
thāk’be).	  	  	  When	  the	  previously	  quoted	  conversation	  with	  Ishaque	  continued,	  the	  latter	  implied	  the	  same	  as	  Ahmed.	  I	  suggest	  to	  Ishaque	  that	  in	  line	  with	  his	  reasoning,	  I	  should	  be	  able	  to	  use	  my	  own	  jñān	  to	  become	  good	  or	  bad,	  just	  like	  him	  (and	  here	   he	   nods	   affirmatively).	   Yet,	   I	   continue,	   so	   many	   others	   tell	   me	   it	   is	  impossible	   to	  do	  so	  without	  a	  dharma.	  Bemused,	   Ishaque	  mumbles,	   ‘Well,	  you	  obviously	   need	   to	   fear	   Allah…(Āllāh’ke	   to	   bhay	   kar’tei	   habe…).69	  Ishaque	   had	  assumed	   it	   to	   be	   obvious	   that	   one	   can	   only	   develop	   jñān	   by	   virtue	   of	   fearing	  Allah.	  	  One	  committed	  reformist	  Muslim,	  Masiruddin,	  had	  assumed	  this	  as	  well	   in	  yet	   another	   conversation.	   Masiruddin	   would	   always	   emphasise	   the	   ‘rational’	  aspects	  of	  Islam	  to	  me,	  and	  once	  concluded	  one	  of	  his	  lectures	  on	  the	  scientific	  value	  of	  Islam	  by	  triumphantly	  saying	  that	  the	  ‘brain’	  (in	  English,	  pointing	  to	  his	  head)	   is	   most	   important	   in	   life.	   I	   replied,	   ‘well,	   that’s	   why	   I	   don’t	   feel	   it	  necessary	   to	   believe	   in	   a	   god’.	   Masiruddin	   gazed	   at	   me	   bewildered,	   as	   if	   he	  wondered	  whether	  he	  had	  just	  conceded	  the	  ridiculous	  possibility	  of	  an	  atheist	  yet	  humane	  life.	  He	  shook	  his	  head	  and	  added	  that	  it	  is	  Allah	  who	  has	  given	  us	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘fear’	  rather	  than	  ‘belief’	  below.	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the	   brain,	   and	  without	   acknowledging	   that	   fact	   through	   imān	   from	   the	   heart	  (man,	   pointing	   to	  his	   chest),	   the	  brain	   is	  useless.70	  The	  brain	   can	  only	   give	  us	  
jñān	  by	  virtue	  of	  our	  imān.	  He	  smiled	  relieved;	  an	  atheist,	  humane	  life	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  after	  all.	  	  	  Wasim	  and	  Ishaque	  already	  stressed	  that	  one’s	  upbringing	  is	  a	  determining	  feature	   to	   one’s	   disposition	   to	   live	   according	   to	   dharma,	   and	   what	   Ishaque’s	  mother	  further	  exemplifies,	   is	  the	  idea	  that	  dharma	   is	  engendered	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  inevitably	  during	  the	  process	  of	   ‘making	  a	  person’	  (mānuṣ	  karā).	  The	  tendency	  to	  essentialise	  good	  and	  bad	  people	  stresses	  once	  again	  that	  dharma	  –	  as	   an	   ethical	   potential	   -­‐	   is	   an	   essential	   yet	   mutable	   bio-­‐moral	   substance	  involved	   in	  the	  process	  of	  mānuṣ	  karā.	  Just	   like	  any	  human	  being	   is	  born	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  Muslim,	  depending	  on	  the	  subsequent	  exchange	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  substances	  and	  the	  inclusion	  in	  the	  Muslim	  jāti,	  any	  human	  being	  is	  also	  bestowed	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  make	  reasoned	  judgements	  from	  within.	  When	  ‘humanised’,	  a	  child	  is	  socialised	  into	  a	  jāti,	  and	  gradually	  engendered	  with	  the	  qualities	  of	  jñān	  and	  imān,	  wisdom	  and	  faith.	  So	  when	  children	  do	  things	  that	  a	  Muslim	   is	   ought	  not	   to	  do,	   this	   is	   excused	  because	   they	  do	  not	  have	   jñān	   yet.	  When	  adults	  do	  things	  that	  a	  Muslim	  ought	  not	  to	  do,	  this	  is	  more	  often	  blamed	  to	   a	   lack	   of	   fear	   for	   Allah,	   because	   they	   are	   not	   using	   jñān	  when	   they	   should	  have.	  Jñān	  is	  conditional	  upon	  faith,	  so	  the	  potency	  of	  jñān	  depends	  on	  whether	  an	  element	  of	  faith	  and	  fear	  has	  been	  instilled	  in	  us;	  that	  is,	  on	  whether	  Allah	  is	  acknowledged.	   It	   is	   only	   because	   of	   Allah	   that	   true	   jñān	  can	   be	   acquired	   and	  that	   one	   will	   feel	   compelled	   to	   act	   according	   to	   one’s	   jñān.	   Jñān	   and	   imān	  together,	  then,	  form	  the	  two	  basic	  faculties	  that	  allow	  a	  Muslim	  to	  live	  according	  to	  dharma.	  	  
Jñān	  and	  imān:	  phronesis	  within	  a	  habitus	  of	  faith	  	  I	   have	  made	   the	   observation	   that	   jñān	   is	   conditional	   upon	   faith,	   and	   that	  faith	   is	   inculcated	   in	   the	   process	   of	   mānuṣ	   karā.	   The	   potential	   for	   imān	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  As	   happened	   more	   often	   in	   conversations	   with	   Masiruddin,	   his	   proud	   use	   of	   the	   few	  words	  in	  English	  he	  was	  familiar	  with	  highlighted	  the	  problem	  of	  translation.	  The	  Bengali	  word	  
man	  famously	  does	  not	  have	  an	  appropriate	  translation	  in	  English,	  as	  it	  refers	  to	  both	  the	  mind	  and	   the	   heart,	   and	   is	   both	   physical	   and	   spiritual.	   Here	   I	   translate	  man	   to	   ‘heart’	   because	   he	  points	  to	  his	  chest	  and	  because	  he	  emphatically	  separates	  man/heart	  here	  from	  man/mind	  by	  using	  the	  English	  word	  ‘brain’	  for	  the	  latter.	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engendered	   through	   one’s	   upbringing;	   it	   is	   instantiated,	   demonstrated	   and	  affirmed	   by	   the	   ritual	   performance	   of	   sacrifice	   and	   exchange	   that	   I	   have	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter;	  and	  continuously	  cultivated	  through	  ongoing	  practice.	   Yet,	   even	   though	   I	   have	   not	   been	   engendered	   in	   a	   jāti	   through	   the	  process	  of	  mānuṣ	  karā,	  I	  may	  cultivate	  imān.	  Many	  women	  would	  say	  to	  me	  that	  praying	   nāmāj	   or	   reading	   Arabic	   will	   shape	   my	   imān;	   it	   will	   come	   with	   the	  bodily	   practice.	   In	   this	   light,	   I	   need	   to	   slightly	   expand	   on	   my	   use	   of	   the	   key	  concepts	   imān	   and	   jñān.	   I	   will	   suggest	   that	   imān	   is	   better	   understood	   as	   a	  visceral	  habitus	  rather	  than	  a	  belief	  that	  resides	  in	  the	  mind.	  	  	  Asad’s	   description	   of	   the	   term	   imān	   is	   most	   accurate	   in	   this	   context.	   He	  states	  that	  imān	  	  ‘is	   not	   a	   singular	   epistemological	   means	   that	   guarantees	   God’s	   existence	  for	  the	  believer.	  It	  is	  better	  translated	  as	  the	  virtue	  of	  faithfulness	  towards	  God,	   an	   unquestionable	   habit	   of	   obedience	   that	   God	   requires	   of	   those	  faithful	   to	  him…a	  disposition	   that	  has	   to	  be	  cultivated	   like	  any	  other,	  and	  that	   links	   one	   to	   others	   who	   are	   faithful,	   through	   mutual	   trust	   and	  responsibility’	  (Asad	  2003:	  90).	  71	  	  	  I	   suggest	   that	   imān	   as	   a	   ‘virtuous	   habit	   of	   obedience’	   is	   a	   habitus	   in	   the	  Aristotelian	  sense	  very	  much	  like	  Mahmood’s	  use	  of	  habitus	  (2005).72	  A	  habitus	  of	   faith	   here	   denotes	   the	   embodied	   disposition	   that	   allows	   for	   and	   is	   the	  dynamic	  product	  of	  the	  customary	  inculcation	  and	  the	  conscious	  cultivation	  of	  virtue.	  	  I	  have	  at	  various	  times	  quoted	  my	  interlocutors	  saying	  that	  one	  should	  fear	  Allah,	   rather	   than	   saying	   one	   should	   believe	   in	   Allah.	   Fear	   (bhay)	   and	   belief	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Asad	   moreover	   points	   to	   the	   important	   element	   of	   mutuality,	   which	   marks	   again	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  Muslim	   jāti,	  and	  to	  responsibility	  not	  only	   for	  oneself	  but	  also	   for	  everyone	  within	  the	  same	  sphere	  of	  identification.	  Combine	  this	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  divisible	  person,	  and	   the	   idea	   of	   mutual	   trust	   becomes	   even	   more	   crucial:	   ‘Since,	   moreover,	   one’s	   bio-­‐moral	  substance	  extends	  into	  other	  persons	  –	  both	  through	  one’s	  transactions	  with	  them	  and	  through	  the	   body	   particles	   shared	   with	   kin	   –	   any	   irregular	   exchange	   in	   which	   one	   engages	   also	  represents	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  these	  other	  selves.	  In	  such	  a	  world	  nobody	  can	  be	  allowed	  to	  act	  as	  an	  autonomous	  individual,	  and	  all	  with	  whom	  one	  associates	  have	  a	  directly	  personal	  interest	  in	  monitoring	  one’s	  conduct’	  (Parry	  1989a:	  513-­‐514).	  	  72	  Mahmood	  points	  to	  the	  Aristotelian	  legacy	  in	  Islamic	  theology	  (2005:	  137,	  see	  also	  Asad	  2003:	  251).	  For	   instance,	   there	   is	   remarkable	  congruence	   in	   Ibn	  Khaldun’s	  explanation	  of	   the	  meaning	   of	  malaka	   (usually	   translated	   as	   habit)	   and	   Aristotle’s	   discussion	   of	   habitus.	   To	  my	  knowledge,	  Mahmood	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  similar	  discussion	  of	   intellectual	   congruence	  regarding	  
phronesis	  so	  it	  remains	  debatable	  whether	  Islamic	  theologians	  have	  indeed	  been	  influenced	  by	  this	  particular	  concept.	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(biśwās)	   are	   used	   indistinguishably	   in	   common	  parlance:	   ‘Āllāh’ke	  bhay	  kar’te	  
habe’	   (one	   has	   to	   fear	   Allah)	   implies	   belief	   (biśwās)	   and	   faith	   (imān)	   in	   the	  omnipresence	  of	  Allah,	  and	  whenever	   I	  asked	   for	   the	  meaning	  of	   imān	   (faith),	  most	  were	  quick	  to	  answer	  that	  it	  means	  that	  ‘I	  fear	  Allah’	  (Āllāh’ke	  bhay	  kari),	  and	  would	  further	  answer	  that	  it	  means	  to	  believe	  that	  Allah	  created	  the	  world	  and	   to	   believe	   in	   the	   afterlife.	   Fear	   is	   visceral,	   located	   in	   the	   mind/body,	  whereas	  belief	  may	  be	  interpreted	  to	  be	  located	  in	  the	  mind.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘fear’,	   then,	   points	   us	   to	   the	   visceral	   aspect	   of	   faith;	   ‘faith’	   is	   in	   this	   case	   an	  embodied	  habitus	  rather	  than	  something	  in	  the	  mind.	  Many	   of	   the	   participants	   in	   the	   piety	   movement	   in	   Cairo	   that	   Mahmood	  studied	   (2005)	  drew	   ‘the	   ineluctable	   relationship’	   ‘between	   the	   ability	   to	   fear	  God	   and	   capacities	   of	  moral	   discernment	   and	   action’	   (2001:	   840;	   2005:	   142-­‐145).	  Fear	  implies	  the	  imagination	  of	  god	  and	  therewith	  the	  actor’s	  positionality	  in	   relation	   to	   god.	   The	   actor	   as	   such	   is	   subject	   to	   criteria,	   and	   becomes	   an	  ethical	   subject	   (Lambek	   2010b).	   Fear	   does	   not	   exclude	   deliberation,	   but	   it	  makes	  deliberation	  ethical;	  and	  ‘it	  is	  a	  condition	  for…the	  felicitous	  performance	  of	  the	  act’	  (Mahmood	  2001:	  842).	  	  In	  my	  fieldsite,	  a	  lack	  of	  dharma	  is	  often	  attributed	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  fear:	  without	  fear,	   people	   tend	   to	   act	   according	   to	   instrumental	   motivations,	   but	   from	   the	  visceral	  disposition	  of	   fear	  people’s	   judgement	  gains	  an	  ethical	  dimension.	  My	  reading	   Arabic,	   and	   my	   prayers	   (as	   I	   joined	   the	   women	   in	   prayer	   during	  Ramadan)	  were	  considered	  an	  empty	  act	  until	   I	  would	  start	   to	   fear	  Allah,	  but	  they	   encouraged	   the	   practice	   because	   it	   is	   the	   practice	   that	   inculcates	   fear.	  Subsequent	  actions	  are	   then	  gaining	  an	  ethical	  dimension	   in	   light	  of	   this	   fear.	  Obedience	  to	  god	  becomes	  a	  precondition	  for	  ethical	  deliberation.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  that	  Laidlaw	  (2014a)	  cannot	  accept	  because	  in	  his	  conception	  the	  mind	  loses,	  rather	  than	  gains,	  the	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  when	  one	  submits	  oneself	  to	  a	  god.	  	  	  Ethical	  judgement	  is	  opposed	  to	  instrumental	  action:	  the	  practice	  is	  virtuous	  in	  itself	  rather	  than	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  For	  this	  reason,	  anthropologists	  drawing	  on	   virtue	   ethics	   distinguish	   the	   Aristotelian	   use	   of	   habitus	   from	   the	   way	   in	  which	   Bourdieu	   uses	   it	   (Laidlaw	   2014a:	   63;	   Lambek	   2010a:	   16,	   2000;	  Mahmood	   2001:	   838,	   2005:	   27).	   According	   to	   Bourdieu	   (1977),	   any	   practice	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from	  within	  a	  particular	  habitus	  is	  ultimately	  geared	  towards	  the	  accumulation	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  capital.	  Lambek	  therefore	  criticises	  Bourdieu	  for	  limiting	  the	  meaning	   of	   habitus	   to	   an	   instrumental	   disposition	   while	   paying	   scarcely	   any	  attention	  to	  the	  ethical	  aspect	  of	  practice	  (2000:	  316).	  Lambek	  uses	  the	  concept	  
phronesis	   (2000;	   2010a)	   to	   conceptually	   analyse	   the	   fundamental	   difference	  between	   the	   instrumental	   and	   the	   ethical,	   and	   to	   distinguish	   himself	   from	   a	  Bourdieusian	   perspective	   while	   maintaining	   a	   stress	   on	   practice.	   Whereas	  usually	  translated	  as	  ‘practical	  reason’	  Lambek	  prefers	  to	  translate	  phronesis	  as	  practical	  judgment,	  and	  one	  motivation	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  praxis	   of	   Bourdieu.	   ‘What	   Bourdieu	   emphasises	   about	   practice	   is	   habit	   and	  strategy,	  whereas	   for	   Aristotle	   phronesis	   is	   both	   intellectual,	   in	   that	   it	   entails	  reasoning,	  as	  well	  as	  virtuous,	  in	  that	  its	  end	  is	  human	  flourishing.	  Phronesis	  is	  not	   calculative,	   instrumental	   reason.	   The	   exercise	   of	   judgment	   implies	   the	  exercise	   of	   good	   judgment	   (and	   not	   merely	   cleverness)’	   (Lambek	   2000:	   316,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  This	  discussion	  brings	  me	   to	   the	  additional	   element	  necessary	   to	   cultivate	  the	  habitus	  of	   faith:	   jñān	   (wisdom).	   If	   imān	   is	   the	   cultivated,	   virtuous	  habit	  of	  faith,	   then	   jñān	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   phronesis,	   the	   Aristotelian	   ongoing	  practical	  judgement.73	  Judgement	  is	  conditional	  upon	  faith;	  jñān	  is	  embedded	  in	  
imān.	   Ultimately	   the	   relationship	   between	   jñān	   and	   imān	   is	   hermeneutical,	  because	  it	  is	  upon	  reflection	  that	  the	  disposition	  of	  faith	  is	  cultivated.	  Yet	  faith	  has	   to	   come	   first.74 	  I	   make	   the	   conceptual	   comparison	   between	   jñān	   and	  
phronesis	   in	   order	   to	   emphasise	   that	   jñān,	   although	   usually	   translated	   to	  wisdom,	   is	   not	   an	   objectively	   existing	   body	   of	   knowledge	   but	   a	   socially	  engendered	   judgment	   that	   can	   only	   be	   a	   good	   judgement	  when	  made	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  faith.	  It	  is	  in	  jñān	  that	  we	  have	  to	  locate	  ethical	  autonomy.	  	  
The	  generation	  of	  autonomy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73 	  Lambek	   does	   translate	   phronesis	   occasionally	   to	   ‘wisdom’,	   which	   is	   also	   the	   most	  common	  translation	  of	  jñān.	  He	  says	  that	  for	  Aristotle	  ‘[p]hronesis	  is	  central	  because	  it	  describes	  what	  practical	   judgment	   is,	   though	  here	  a	   closer	   translation	   is	   “wisdom”	   (Lambek	  2010a:	   20;	  21).	  	  74 	  This	   is	   a	   reiteration	   of	   my	   argument	   outlined	   in	   the	   introduction	   regarding	   the	  hermeneutical	   relationship	   between	   the	  macro-­‐cosmic	   order	   and	   individual	   virtue.	   First	   one	  needs	   to	  have	   faith	   in	   the	   truth	   claims	   that	   establish	   the	  macro-­‐cosmic	  order,	   before	  one	   can	  exercise	  judgment	  and	  cultivate	  virtue.	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In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  theoretical	   implications	  of	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  
jñān/phronesis	   is	  socially	   engendered,	   I	   describe	   the	   perplexity	   of	   a	   group	   of	  women	   over	   my	   question	   whether	   a	   baby	   would	   have	   the	   freedom	   to	   be	  something	  else	  than	  a	  Muslim	  in	  case	  he	  happens	  to	  grow	  up	  not	  believing,	  like	  me.	  The	  vignette	  will	   further	  demonstrate	   that	   in	   the	  dynamic	  virtue	  ethics	  of	  Joygrami	   Muslims,	   there	   is	   a	   symbiotic	   relationship	   between	   the	   mind/body	  and	  the	  habitus	  of	  faith	  and	  that	  ideally,	  the	  mind/body	  will	  be	  cultivated	  in	  the	  
habitus	  of	  faith	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  virtue	  becomes	  its	  own	  motivation;	  even	  though	  that	  is	  an	  unattainable	  ideal.	  	  I	   am	   sitting	   on	   the	   veranda	   with	   five	   related	   women	   of	   three	   different	  generations,	   the	   grandmother	   cradling	   a	   recently	   born	   boy.	   They	   are	   elated	  over	  the	  idea	  that	  I	  would	  become	  a	  Muslim	  (I	  have	  been	  taking	  Arabic	  classes	  now	   for	  some	   time	  with	   the	  youngest	  of	   the	  women	  present,	  which	  has	  made	  them	  think	  that	  I	  am	  in	  the	  process	  of	  conversion).	  I	  comment	  that	  even	  though	  I	  may	  be	  ‘doing’	  Islam,	  I	  do	  not	  believe,	  I	  don’t	  have	  the	  imān	  (faith).	  The	  women	  look	  a	  little	  puzzled,	  but	  soon	  they	  say	  with	  a	  self-­‐confident	  smile	  that	  imān	  will	  come	  through	  the	  reading	  of	  Arabic	  and	  the	  praying	  of	  nāmāj.	  I	  fend	  off	  further	  talk	   about	   me	   by	   pointing	   to	   the	   little	   boy.	   ‘How	   about	   him,	   is	   he	   already	   a	  Muslim?’	  Most	  of	   the	  women	  react	  befuddled,	  some	  nod	  yes,	  some	  no,	  but	   the	  grandmother	   laughs	   at	  my	   ignorance	   and	   says,	   ‘no,	   of	   course	   not,	   he	   doesn’t	  have	   any	   jñān	   yet!’	   ‘But	   will	   he	   necessarily	   be	   a	   Muslim?’	   I	   ask.	   ‘Of	   course,	  because	  he	  will	   learn	  Islam	  when	  he	  grows	  up’,	  another	  woman	  answers.	   ‘But	  does	  he	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  something	  else?’	  After	  an	  awkward	  silence	  of	  perplexity,	  one	  of	  the	  women	  answers:	  ‘He	  won’t	  want	  to	  because	  he	  will	  see	  that	  Islam	  is	  the	  best’.	   ‘But	  what	  if	  he	  grows	  up	  not	  believing,	  what	  if	  he	  won’t	  have	  imān,	   like	  me?’	  The	  puzzled	  faces	  of	  the	  women	  have	  by	  now	  turned	  into	  grimaces	  of	  incomprehension.	  They	  reassure	  me	  again	  that	  my	  imān	  will	  come	  with	  practice,	  and	  leave	  it	  at	  that.	  	  This	   conversation	   is	   illuminating	   in	   various	   ways.	   As	   I	   have	   described	   in	  chapter	  2,	  for	  my	  interlocutors	  the	  body	  and	  the	  mind	  is	  a	  holistic	  entity	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  whole,	  mutable.	  This	  entity	   is	   taking	  shape	  through	  the	  process	  of	  mānuṣ	  
karā,	  humanisation.	  As	  for	  the	  baby	  boy,	  his	  mind/body	  will	  be	  shaped	  in	  such	  a	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way,	  through	  the	  generative	  process	  of	  becoming	  human	  and	  the	  inculcation	  of	  
jñān,	  that	  he	  will	  not	  only	  automatically	  be	  a	  Muslim,	  he	  will	  also	  only	  want	  to	  be	  a	  Muslim.	   As	   the	   grandmother	   points	   out,	   the	   boy	   is	   not	   really	   a	  Muslim	   yet	  because	  he	  does	  not	  have	   jñān	   yet	  –	   that	  means	   there	  has	   to	  be	  a	  measure	  of	  reflection,	  and	  the	  women	  expect	  this	  reflection	  to	  be	  of	  a	  certain	  nature,	  viz.	  to	  want	  to	  be	  a	  Muslim.	  	  In	  the	  conception	  of	  my	  interlocutors,	   the	  mind	  is	  not	  an	   independent	  unit	  with	  which	  one	   can	   reflect	   on	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   god;	   instead,	   god	   shapes	   the	  mind/body,	   and	   the	   mind/body	   is	   shaped	   in	   subsequent	   interactions.	   The	  conception	   of	   the	   holistic	   humanisation	   of	   the	   child	   (during	   which	   the	  potentiality	  of	  imān	  and	  jñān	  are	  imbibed)	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  reflection	  on	  one’s	  ‘being	  a	  Muslim’.	  The	  ‘learning	  of	  Islam’	  that	  one	  of	  the	  women	  referred	  to,	  includes	  the	  physical	  mutation	  of	  the	  body	  during	  circumcision	  for	  men,	  the	  incorporation	  in	  the	  jāti	  through	  food	  transactions,	  as	  well	  as	  learning	  Arabic	  in	  the	  mosque	  and	  the	  everyday	  interactions	  in	  the	  village,	  some	  of	  which	  I	  have	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.	  This	  is	  how	  one	  becomes	  Muslim.	  Ideally,	  the	  desire	  to	  become	  a	  Muslim,	  the	  visceral	  disposition	  and	  ethical	  Muslimness	  collapse	  into	  one.	  	  Whereas	  in	  my	  questions	  to	  the	  women	  with	  the	  baby	  boy	  I	  located	  freedom	  
outside	  Muslimness	  (asking	  whether	  the	  boy	  would	  be	  free	  to	  choose	  to	  become	  a	   Muslim	   or	   not),	   ethical	   autonomy	   is	   located	   within	   Muslimness.	   Being	  engendered	  in	  a	  jāti,	  acquiring	  human	  personhood,	  and	  a	  particular	  shape	  of	  the	  mind/body	  becomes	  the	  condition	  for	  the	  ethical	  subjectivation	  and	  the	  habitus	  of	   faith.	   We	   have	   to	   take	   this	   a	   step	   further	   from	   the	   premise	   that	   only	   a	  particular	   shape	  of	  mind	   can	  be	   ethical,	   because	   the	   shape	  of	   the	  mind	   is	  not	  static,	  but	  mutable.	  Hence	  it	  can	  be	  consciously	  cultivated;	  this	  is	  where	  we	  can	  locate	  jñān.	  	  
Jñān	  is	  the	  faculty	  that	  allows	  for	  reflection,	  in	  order	  for	  humans	  to	  be	  free	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  right	  and	  the	  wrong	  paths.	  Even	  if,	  or	  perhaps	  because,	  the	  choices	   are	   limited,	   this	   is	   what	   makes	   us	   human.	   Muslimness	   is	   a	   non-­‐individualistic	   concept;	   it	   does	   not	   exist	   before	   sociality,	   since	   it	   is	   generated	  from	   relatedness.	   If	   autonomy	   is	   located	   within	   Muslimness	   it	   follows	   that	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relatedness	   is	   the	   condition	   for	   freedom.	   This	   is	   radically	   different	   from	   a	  conception	  of	  freedom	  as	  located	  within	  the	  individual	  before	  sociality.	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   argument	   that	   ethical	   autonomy	   is	   embedded	   in	  relatedness	   and	   is	   located	   within	   dharma,	   we	   can	   by	   implication	   draw	   a	  corollary	   conclusion.	   I	   have	   suggested	   that	   the	   jāti	  and	   the	  disposition	   to	   live	  according	   to	   dharma	   is	   the	   sine	   qua	   non	   for	   humanity/personhood.	   The	  reflective	   freedom	   that	  dharma	   offers,	   sets	   the	   limit	   of	   humanity,	   despite	   the	  fact	  that	  it	  comes	  after	  the	  construction	  of	  personhood	  within	  the	  jāti.	  So	  one’s	  claim	  to	  being	  a	  human	  person	  is	  also	  constantly	  contestable	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  one’s	   ethical	   action,	   because	   there	   is	   no	   humanity	   without	   ethics. 75	  Furthermore,	  ethics	  located	  in	  a	  sovereign,	  individual	  consciousness	  is	  a	  human	  impossibility	  because	  ethics	  and	  humanity	  are	  both	  socially	  generated.	  
The	  soft	  mind/heart	  of	  women	  I	  want	  to	  briefly	  elaborate	  on	  the	  implications	  for	  gendered	  action	  following	  from	   the	   idea	   of	   ethics-­‐in-­‐relatedness.	   It	   is	   no	   coincidence	   that	   the	   vignette	  above	   involves	  only	  women.	  Rural	  Muslim	  women	  usually	   live	  within	  a	  rather	  small	  and	  contained	  web	  of	  relatedness,	  and	  their	  exchanges	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  
pāṛā.	  Indeed,	  because	  of	  the	  danger	  contained	  in	  morally	  precarious	  exchanges,	  women	  are	  actively	  confined	  to	  certain	  spaces.	  Their	  minds/bodies	  are	  ideally	  maintained	  according	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  jāti/dharma.	  Moreover,	  or	  perhaps	  for	  this	  ideological	  reason,	  women’s	  minds/hearts	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  conducive	  to	  mutate.	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  women’s	  generative	  Muslimness	  is	  more	  fragile	  than	  men’s.	  When	  I	  asked	  Ishaque,	  himself	  spending	  most	  of	  his	  time	  at	  the	  nearby	  town,	  why	  women	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  go	  to	  the	  town	  freely,	  he	  answered	  that	  it	  would	  be	  dangerous	  because	  the	  town	  is	  full	  of	  bad	  things	  and	  the	  ‘girls’	  mind/heart	  is	  very	  soft’	  (meyeder	  man	  khub	  ‘soft’	  āche).	  He	  was,	   thus,	  not	   so	  much	  preoccupied	   that	   the	  women	  would	  be	  harmed	  by	   the	  ‘bad	  things’,	  as	  that	  they	  would	  be	  influenced	  and	  changed	  by	  what	  they	  would	  encounter	  at	  the	  town.	  There	  is	  freedom	  within	  the	  mutability	  of	  the	  mind,	  but	  men	   try	   to	   limit	   this	   freedom	   of	  women	   to	   a	   particular	   space	   by	   limiting	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  The	  obvious	  question	  that	  arises	  here	  is	  whether	  my	  interlocutors	  consider	  non-­‐Muslims	  capable	  of	  ethical	  action.	  I	  will	  address	  this	  question	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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exchanges	  they	  might	  be	  involved	  in.	  And	  because	  women’s	  space	  of	  exchange	  is	  more	  limited,	  it	  follows	  that	  women	  may	  therefore	  have	  a	  more	  static	  sense	  of	  the	   self	   and	  of	   the	  way	  dharma	   is	   embodied,	   as	   is	   exemplified	   in	   the	  vignette	  above.	   Men,	   in	   contrast,	   are	   continuously	   in	   interaction	   with	   other	   jātis	   and	  have	   to	   enter	   in	   all	   kinds	   of	   exchanges	   that	   may	   be	   precarious,	   and	   their	  conception	  of	  dharma	  may	  be	  more	  dynamic.	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   cultivation	  of	  the	  self	  among	  Muslim	  men	  is	  particularly	  informed	  by	  a	  modern	  reformist	  idea	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  (see	  chapter	  6)	  whereas	  the	  pressure	  for	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  Muslimness	   (in	   the	   face	   of	   a	   ‘soft	  mind/body’)	   is	   in	   fact	   higher,	  more	   holistic	  and	  more	   constant	  among	  women.	  This	  will	   still	   take	  place	   from	  within	  a	   jāti	  and	  the	  visceral	  dharma.	  
Khuśi	  and	  the	  ‘art	  of	  life’	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  elaborate	  on	  the	  role	  of	  exchanges	  in	  the	  Joygrami	  model	  of	  virtue	  ethics.	  I	  argue	  that	  ethical	  exchanges	  are	  the	  enactment	  of	  virtue	  and	  as	  such	  an	  end	  in	  themselves.	  Lambek	  argues	  that	  Aristotelian	  virtue	  ethics	  ‘is	  not	  a	  means	   to	  an	  end	  but	   constitutes	  a	  happy	   life’	   (2010a:	   20).	  This	  observation	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  value	  of	  freedom.	  Ethical	  autonomy	  is	  crucial	  for	   the	   exercise	   of	   jñān,	   and	   indeed,	   ‘any	   exercise	   of	   judgment	   presupposes	  some	  measure	  of	   freedom’	   (ibid.),	  but	  absolute	   freedom	  has	   to	  be	   forsaken	   in	  the	   act	   of	   submission	   of	   sovereignty	   to	   Allah	   for	   ethics	   to	   be	   generated.	   So	  freedom	  is	  not	  a	  valued	  goal	  in	  itself.	  As	  Lambek	  argued:	  ‘Whereas	  an	  ethics	  of	  the	  extraordinary	  might	  posit	  freedom	  as	  its	  end	  or	  even	  its	  condition,	  an	  ethics	  of	   ordinary	   practice	   does	   better	   to	   stick	  with	   happiness’	   (ibid).	   In	   this	   vein,	   I	  will	   suggest	   that	   in	  my	   interlocutors’	   ethno-­‐theology	   happiness	   (khuśi)	   is	   the	  
telos	  of	  jñān.	  	  The	   ‘art	   of	   life’	   is	   living	   ethically	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   it,	   which	   implies	   the	  transcendence	   of	   instrumentality	   (Lambek	   2010a:	   23).	   Phronesis/jñān	   is	  practical	   judgement	   that	   transcends	   instrumentality	   because	   it	   is	   located	   in	  faith,	  which	  implies	  that	  it	  needs	  to	  have	  a	  motivation	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  foundational	  ideas	  on	  which	  faith	  is	  based.	  Individual	  acts	  are	  virtuous	  insofar	  as	   they	   are	   in	   accordance	  with	   or	   contribute	   to	   the	   realisation	   of	   the	  macro-­‐cosmic	   ideal	   that	   amounts	   to	   harmony	   and	   justice.	   This	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	  stating	   that	   acts	   are	   virtuous	  when	   they	   are	   according	   to	   a	   law-­‐like	  morality.	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One	   has	   to	   make	   a	   deliberate	   judgement	   as	   to	   what	   action	   is	   most	   just	   and	  harmonious,	   because	   one	  will	   find	   that	   the	   rules	   are	   ‘impossible’	   to	   abide	   by	  rigidly,	  inevitably	  encountering	  a	  conflict	  of	  values.	  	  Indeed,	   the	   ‘art	  of	   life’	  entails	  balanced	   judgment,	  which	   includes	   finding	  a	  fine	   balance	   between	   incommensurable	   values,	   between	   ‘being	   pious,	  nurturing,	   industrious,	   etc.’	   (Lambek	   2010a:	  23).	   This	   is	   clear	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Arifuddin	  described	  in	  the	  opening	  vignette:	  he	  wants	  to	  live	  a	  pious	  life,	  but	  he	  also	  wants	  to	  be	  able	  to	  build	  a	  house	  for	  his	  future	  wife,	  so	  he	  chooses	  to	  work	  in	   Delhi	   rather	   than	   study	   at	   the	   Deoband	   madrasa.	   Specific	   virtues	   can	   be	  inculcated	   during	   one’s	   ‘becoming	   a	   Muslim’,	   but	   the	   ‘meta-­‐virtue’	   is	   ‘simply	  finding	   the	   right	  balance,	  both	   in	   the	   circumstances	  and	   in	   life	  overall’	   (ibid.).	  Judgement	  (phronesis/jñān)	  is	  about	  finding	  this	  balance.	  	  I	  have	  previously	  mentioned	  that	  norms	  (niyam)	  denote	  the	  moral	  rules	  that	  prescribe	  how	  one	  shall	  act,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  (like	  Ishaque)	  say	  that	  they	  can	   use	   their	   jñān	  and	   act	   according	   to	   their	   own	  niyam	   (norms)	  means	   that	  there	   is	   some	   freedom	   of	   interpretation;	   this	   is	   the	   situational	   judgment	   that	  
phronesis	  entails.	  Abstract	  rules	  in	  themselves	  are	  not	  necessarily	  virtuous	  –	  the	  
niyam	   (norms)	  have	  to	  be	  generated	  out	  of	   faith	  in	  a	  framework	  of	  dharma	  so	  that	  the	  end	  of	  living	  according	  to	  them	  will	  be	  the	  just	  and	  harmonious	  society;	  and	  it	  depends	  on	  phronesis/judgment	  that	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  these	  rules	  in	  a	  particular	  situation	  is	  well-­‐balanced	  and	  therefore	  virtuous.	  Dharma	  is	  enacted	  contextually,	   depending	   on	   the	   position	   of	   the	   person	   and	   the	   particular	  situation	   one	   finds	   oneself	   in.	   Ideally,	   good	   judgement	   in	   any	   particular	  situation	   will	   come	   instinctively:	   ‘For	   Aristotle,	   living	   ethically…entails	  organizing	  desires	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  character	  so	  that	  one	  is	  disposed	  to	  act	  virtuously’	  (Lambek	  2010a:	  20).	  In	   the	  previous	  chapter	   I	  have	  discussed	  the	  centrality	  of	  exchanges	  to	   the	  (re-­‐)production	   of	   ethical	   relatedness.	   I	   have	   addressed	   the	   abstract	   rules	   or	  obligations	   guiding	   the	   exchanges.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   expand	   on	   the	   ethical	  dimension	   of	   exchanges,	   and	   suggest	   that	   exchanges	   are	   virtuous	   insofar	   as	  they	  are	  balanced,	  and	  are	  displayed	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves.	  The	  description	  of	  such	   exchanges	   in	   the	   vernacular	   is	   khuśi,	   which	   is	   generally	   translated	   as	  ‘happy’	   but	  which	   I	  wish	   to	   translate	   as	   ‘virtuous’,	   since	   the	   virtuous	   and	   the	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happy	  ideally	  converge.	  I	  will	  further	  elaborate	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  dharma	  is	  not	  foremost	  a	  moral	  code,	  or	  about	  compliance	  with	  a	  moral	  code,	  but	  about	   the	  ethical	  transcendence	  of	  instrumentality.	  
The	  virtue	  of	  exchange	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  2,	  Islamic	  festivals	  are,	  in	  anticipation,	  invariably	  described	   as	   khuśi,	   which	   is	   usually	   translated	   as	   ‘happy’	   or	   ‘happiness’.	   A	  common	  way	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   festivals	  would	   even	   be	   to	   call	   it	   a	   ‘khuśi	   din’,	   a	  happy	   day.	   As	   Ring	   observes	   among	   Muslims	   of	   various	   denominations	   in	  Karachi,	   ‘doing	   khuśi	  was	   a	   familiar	   diagnostic	   of,	   and	   prescription	   for,	   social	  intimacy…a	   central	   pragmatic	   and	   symbolic	   mode	   of	   forging,	   marking,	   and	  performing	  social	  relationships’	  (2006:	  75).	  Similarly,	  often	  when	  I	  asked	  after	  the	  ‘why’	  of	  a	  certain	  practice	  of	  exchange,	  if	  the	  answer	  would	  not	  be	  a	  ‘this	  is	  just	  what	  we	  do’	  kind	  of	  response,	  it	  would	  be,	  in	  one	  word,	  ‘khuśi’.	  	  The	   full	  meaning	   of	   calling	   these	   acts	  khuśi	   becomes	   clearer	  when	   I	   recall	  that	   when	   I	   would	   question	   people	   on	   the	   ‘what’	   rather	   than	   ‘why’	   of	   the	  practice	   (as	   in,	  what	   are	   you	  doing?	  What	  will	   you	  do	  on	   that	   occasion?),	   the	  answer	  would	  similarly	  be	  ‘khuśi’.	  Khuśi,	  then,	  is	  an	  act,	  the	  practice	  itself;	  one	  is	  practicing	   virtue	   when	   practicing	   exchange.	   Happiness	   connotes	   activity,	   as	  Nussbaum	  observed	  (Lambek	  2000:	  314),	  so	  means	  (ethical	  practice)	  and	  ends	  (the	  good	  life)	  coincide.	  As	  I	  quoted	  Dada	  saying	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  if	  there	  was	  real	  imān	  (faith)	  and	  people	  would	  act	  accordingly,	  everyone	  would	  have	  ‘a	  good	  life’;	  acts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  imān	  and	  jñān	  create	  harmony	  for	  everyone.	  	  	   A	  wedding	  is	  another	  kind	  of	  event	  that	  is	  invariably	  referred	  to	  as	  khuśi.	   I	  never	   felt	   quite	   comfortable	   attending	   weddings	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   ‘happy	  commonality’	   as	   I	   would	   describe	   it.	   I	   could	   not	   attune	   to	   the	   atmosphere	  during	   the	   meal	   and	   I	   felt	   uncomfortable	   accepting	   lavish	   food	   from	   poor	  families,	  which	  I	  wasn’t	  quite	  sure	  how	  to	  reciprocate.	  Whether	  there	  would	  be	  chicken,	  mutton	  or	  beef	  would	  be	  commented	  on	  from	  at	  least	  a	  day	  before	  the	  meal,	   and	   people	   would	   discuss	   the	   richness	   of	   the	   several	   dishes	   for	   hours	  afterwards.	  However,	  during	   the	  meal	   itself,	   there	  was	  a	  detached,	   indifferent	  attitude	  to	  the	  food,	  as	  if	  it	  was	  any	  other	  regular	  meal.	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After	  the	  food	  is	  consumed,	  the	  attending	  neighbours	  make	  a	  payment:	  this	  is	  public	  and	  written	  down,	  usually	  by	  a	  young	  relative	  who	  lives	  in	  the	  hamlet	  and	  is	  well	  schooled.76	  At	  each	  wedding,	  I	  tried	  to	  make	  this	  payment,	  but	  I	  was	  never	   allowed	   to:	   noting	   down	   the	   payments	   is	   not	   just	   to	   know	   how	  much	  everyone	  gave,	  but	  mainly	  to	  know	  how	  much	  to	  pay	  at	  their	  wedding	  in	  turn,	  which	  would	  usually	   be	   the	   same	  amount,	   unless	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   hierarchical	  relation	   of	   patronage.	   I	   was	   not	   part	   of	   this	   ‘system’,	   they	   explained,	   so	   my	  payment	  would	  be	  useless.	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  persuade	  them,	  telling	  them	  I	  would	  be	  happy	  just	  to	  give	  them	  money,	  knowing	  that	  this	  wedding	  has	  been	  a	  heavy	  burden	   on	   them,	   and	   maybe	   they	   could	   just	   note	   it	   somewhere	   on	   the	   side.	  However,	  this	  seemed	  senseless	  to	  them	  –	  as	  if	  money	  does	  not	  have	  any	  value	  outside	   this	   closed	   system	  of	   reciprocity.	   And	   indeed,	   it	   does	   not.	   Although	   it	  seemed	  terribly	  instrumental	  to	  me	  at	  first,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  opposite.	  Accepting	  my	  money	  would	  have	  had	  an	  instrumentality	  to	  it,	  but	  them	  giving	  money	  is,	  as	  they	  say,	  only	  because	  it	  is	  ‘khuśi’.	  	  	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  Islamic	  notion	  of	  almsgiving,	  zakat,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	   five	   pillars	   of	   Islam.	   I	   have	   addressed	   the	   notion	   of	   zakat	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   solidarity.	  Here	   I	   reconsider	   the	   actual	  practice	  of	  zakat	  in	  light	  of	  the	  concept	  khuśi.	  	  The	   idea	   of	   zakat	   has	   been	   variably	   interpreted	   in	   the	   literature.	   Some	  consider	  it	  a	  voluntary	  act	  of	  piety,	  whereas	  others	  consider	  it	  an	  obligation	  that	  is	  ideally	  centrally	  organised	  (much	  like	  tax)	  (Eickelman	  and	  Piscatori	  1996:	  17;	  cf.	  Benthall	  and	  Bellion-­‐Jourdan	  2003).	  I	  suggest	  it	  is	  probably	  best	  understood	  as	  an	  ethical	  act	  that	  combines	  the	  elements	  of	  ‘voluntary	  piety’	  and	  ‘obligation’	  within	   itself:	   the	   criterion	   of	   equal	   relationships	   of	   solidarity	   within	   the	  boundaries	   of	   the	   jāti	   constituted	   and	   renewed.	   My	   interlocutors	   are	  unequivocally	  proud	  of	  this	  criterion	  and	  say	  that	  they	  feel	  happy,	  khuśi,	  to	  give	  
zakat.	  They	  are	  happy	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  maintenance	  and	  renewal	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  There	  are	  several	  elements	   to	  a	  Muslim	  Bengali	  wedding,	   including	  several	  meals.	   I	  am	  here	  referring	  to	  the	  meal	  that	  the	  family	  of	  groom	  or	  bride	  offers	  to	  the	  neighbours	  of	  the	  pāṛā,	  or,	   in	   case	   they	   are	   wealthy,	   to	   the	   entire	   village.	   Invitations	   will	   have	   been	   sent	   round	  beforehand;	   of	   the	   invited	   households	   usually	   only	   one	   or	   a	   few	  members	  will	   attend,	   to	   not	  burden	  the	  hosts	  too	  much	  financially.	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the	  criterion,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  also	  considered	  as	  an	  obligation	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  indebtedness	   to	   Allah.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   contradiction.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  virtuous	  practice	  is	  ‘happiness’.	  Not	  happiness	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  elated	   state	   of	   being,	   but	   of	   a	   state	   of	   harmony	   and	   order	   as	   it	   is	   ideally	  imagined.	  I	  observed	  very	  little	  obvious	  emotional	  expression	  of	  ‘happiness’	  (or	  something	  I,	  from	  my	  perspective,	  would	  interpret	  as	  happy),	  following	  from	  an	  exchange	  of	   gifts	  whether	  during	  weddings	  or	  on	   religious	   festivals.	   I	   suggest	  that	  khuśi	   is	   not	   an	   emotional	   state	   that	   results	   from	   the	   virtuous	   act;	   rather,	  happiness	  and	   the	  gift	  are	   integral	   to	  each	  other,	   just	   like	   the	  reproduction	  of	  harmony	  and	  order	  is	  in	  the	  exchange	  and	  not	  a	  separable	  result	  of	  it.	  	  	  In	   other	  words,	   the	   act	   of	   giving	   is	  what	   is	   called	  khuśi,	   rather	   than	  khuśi	  being	   the	   result	   of	   the	   gift.	   The	   gift	   here	   is	   clearly	   a	   ‘total	   social	   fact’,	   and	  Lambek	  has	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  inherent	  ethical	  aspect	  of	  this	  (2010a:	  18).	  The	   illocutionary	   force	   of	   calling	   the	   exchange	   khuśi,	   happiness,	   attributes	   it	  with	   an	   ethical	   dimension,	   and	   makes	   the	   exchange	   an	   end	   in	   itself.	   ‘For	  Mauss…the	   concept	  of	   the	  gift	  was	  also	  meant	   to	   reveal	   the	  underlying	  moral	  dimensions	   of	   social	   life’	   (Keane	   2010:	   79),	   and	   calling	   the	   gift	   khuśi	   draws	  attention	  to	  this	  moral	  dimension.	  	  It	  may	   seem	   that	   the	   end	   is,	   if	   not	   to	   redistribute	  wealth,	   then	   at	   least	   to	  forge	   relationships	   with	   solidarity.	   However,	   those	   are	   derivatives	   of	   the	  intrinsic	   ethical	   nature	   of	   the	   act.	   There	   will	   naturally	   be	   solidarity	   through	  which	  wealth	  is	  redistributed	  if	  acts	  are	  virtuous.	  ‘One	  should	  live	  in	  solidarity’	  is	   a	   value	   that	   is	   enacted	   in	   the	   gift	   (see	   Keane	   2015:	   21).	   Classical	  anthropological	  analyses	  of	   the	  gift	  demonstrate	   that	   ‘the	  source	  of	  well-­‐being	  and	   productiveness	   is	   reciprocal	   exchange’	   (Parry	   1986:	   465,	   emphasis	   in	  original).	  	  	  Even	  the	  rules	  explicitly	  phrased	  in	  the	  Quran	  or	  the	  Hadith,	  some	  of	  which	  I	  have	  addressed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  require	  balanced	  judgement.	  The	  rules	  of	   distribution	   of	   the	   meat	   of	   Qurbani	   are	   not	   strict	   obligations,	   but	  recommendations,	  so	  it	  requires	  jñān/phronesis	  to	  choose	  to	  do	  the	  right	  thing.	  There	  is	  a	  strict	  prohibition,	  however,	  on	  selling	  the	  animal’s	  skin	  and	  bringing	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the	  money	  into	  personal	  use.	  The	  leather	  may	  be	  brought	  into	  personal	  use,	  but	  it	  is	  better	  to	  give	  it	  to	  a	  madrasa,	  or	  to	  sell	  it	  and	  give	  the	  money	  to	  a	  madrasa.	  So	  a	  purely	   instrumental	   act	   is	  prohibited,	   yet	   a	   clear	  obligation	   is	   averted	  as	  well.	  I	  have	  therefore	  emphasised	  the	  aspect	  of	   ‘khuśi’:	  the	  exchange	  is	  neither	  an	  obligation	  devoid	  of	  agency,	  nor	  a	  purely	  instrumental	  act.	  This	  explains	  why	  my	   interlocutors	  often	  say	  that	  a	  certain	  practice	   is	   ‘Allah’s	  command’	  (Āllāh’r	  
hukum),	   and	   that	   they	   choose	   to	   follow	   this	   command	   so	   that	   ‘Allah	   will	   be	  happy’	   (Āllāh	   khuśi	   thāk’be).	   Essentially,	   they	   do	   not	   follow	   the	   command	  because	  it	  is	  an	  inevitable	  and	  strict	  obligation	  but	  because	  they	  have	  made	  the	  judgment	   that	   if	   they	   follow	   the	   command	   it	   would	  make	   Allah	   khuśi,	   and	   if	  Allah	   is	  khuśi	   the	   act	   is	   virtuous	   and	  by	   implication	  maintains	  harmony.	   If	   all	  rules	  would	   be	   followed	   in	   a	  well-­‐balanced	  manner	   there	  would	   be	   the	   ideal	  situation	  of	  harmony	  and	  order	  in	  a	  just	  society	  and	  that	  is	  the	  end	  in	  itself.77	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  I	  feel	  that	  jñān	  is	  analytically	  comparable	  to	  phronesis	  –	  the	  practical	   judgment	   that	   finds	   the	   right	  balance,	   and	   that	   allows	  one	   to	   realise	  the	   happiness	   that	   is	   found	   in	   living	   virtuously	   as	   an	   end	   in	   itself.	   It	   is	   no	  coincidence	  that	  when	  I	  would	  ask	  my	  interlocutors	  what	  Islam	  is,	  many	  would	  not	  at	  first	  give	  me	  a	  list	  of	  rules	  or	  obligations,	  but	  simply	  say	  Islam	  is	  ‘khuśi’,	  happiness.	  Islam	  is	  the	  virtue	  and	  the	  list	  of	  rules	  is	  secondary.	  	  
The	  impossibility	  of	  absolute	  freedom	  	  In	   this	   final	   section,	   I	   discuss	   the	   rejection	   of	   absolute	   freedom.	   Absolute	  freedom	   is	   what	   Laidlaw,	   following	   Flathman	   (2003)	   calls	   the	   ‘soaring’	  conceptions	  of	  freedom:	  freedom	  as	  absence	  of	  constraint	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  96,	  102,	  108-­‐9,	  149).	  It	  is	  the	  freedom	  as	  ‘liberation’:	  the	  absolute	  freedom	  of	  man	  in	   nature	   that	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   Christian	   theology	   and	   became	   prominent	   in	  liberal	   philosophies	   (Asad	   2003;	   Keane	   2007;	   Taylor	   2007).	   Anthropologists	  have	  therefore	  rejected	  this	  kind	  of	  freedom	  as	  an	  ideological	  illusion,	  but	  may	  have	  overlooked	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ideology	  of	  freedom	  may	  feature	  as	  a	  reality	  in	  our	  interlocutors’	  ethical	  imaginaries.	  I	  found	  ‘soaring’	  conceptions	  of	  freedom	  to	   feature	   prominently	   in	   my	   fieldsite,	   even	   if	   it	   features	   as	   an	   ideal	   to	   be	  rejected.	  I	  have	  found	  it	  as	  such	  an	  interesting	  indicator	  of	  macro-­‐cosmic	  ideals	  and	  of	  how	  the	  ‘good	  life’	  is	  imagined.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  See	  for	  a	  congruent	  argument	  regarding	  the	  fatwa:	  Agrama	  (2010).	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  My	  interlocutors	  reject	  unconstrained	  freedom,	  but	  they	  feel	  that	  this	  is	  the	  kind	  of	   freedom	   that	   people	   in	   the	   ‘West’	   ‘have’	   and	   they	   fear	   that	   this	   is	   the	  direction	   their	   society	   is	   going,	   unsettling	   the	   moral	   order.	   Many	   feel	  overwhelmed	  by	  contemporary	  transformations	  and	  ethical	  dilemmas,	  but	  one	  thing	  is	  sure:	  ‘we	  don’t	  want	  your	  freedom’,	  (tomār	  swādhīnatā,	  ām’rā	  cāi	  nā)	  as	  Basir	   told	   me	   with	   a	   disconcerted	   gaze.	   This	   was	   Basir’s	   final	   answer	   to	   a	  conversation	  I	  had	  with	  him	  and	  his	  friends	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  West	  on	  village	   life.78	  The	  young	  men	   feel	   that	   the	   social	  organisation	   in	   the	  villages	   is	  good	  now,	  but	  they	  can	  foresee	  how	  in	  a	  year	  it	  will	  already	  have	  changed	  more	  in	   the	   image	   of	   the	  West,	   because,	   they	   say,	   the	  West	   is	  more	   advanced	   and	  shows	  the	  direction	  their	  own	  society	  is	  going	  in.	  Now	  village	  people	  still	   take	  care	   of	   their	   elders,	   like	   they	   should,	   and	   do	   not	   leave	   them	   to	   their	   own	  devices,	   like	   in	   the	  West.	   Yet	   it	   is	   changing,	   and	   partly	   because	  women	   have	  become	   more	   liberated.	   According	   to	   the	   men,	   it	   is	   best	   when	   women	   stay	  home,	   cook	   and	   do	   the	   chores,	   but	   now	   they	  want	   to	   go	   outside	   as	  well,	   like	  Western	   women.	   In	   response	   to	   my	   increasingly	   aggressive	   pushing,	   Basir	  contends	  that	  women	  are	  more	  or	  less	  equal	  to	  men,	  both	  have	  equal	  value	  as	  a	  human,	  and	  in	  principle	  both	  can	  take	  up	  jobs,	  but,	  he	  mumbles	  flustered,	  	  ‘there	  has	   to	   remain	  a	  difference’	   (kichu	  ‘difference’	  thāk’te	  habe).	   I	   ask	  him	  whether	  women	  should	  not	  have	  the	  same	  freedom	  as	  men	  have.	  Now	  visibly	  agitated,	  Basir	  exclaims,	  ‘we	  don’t	  want	  your	  freedom!’	  (tomār	  swādhīnatā,	  ām’rā	  cāi	  nā).	  	  	  The	  most	  repulsive,	  potentially	  destructive,	  but	  equally	   fascinating,	  kind	  of	  freedom	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  free	  sex,	  as	  the	  following	  vignettes	  will	  demonstrate.	  ‘Free	  
sex’	  is	  metonymic	  for	  absolute	  freedom.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  most	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  the	   transcendental	   social,	   as	   it	  destabilises	   the	   (reproduction	  of)	  essentialised	  roles	  and	  groups.	  	  Samsuddin,	  the	  young	  Deobandi	  imam,	  at	  times	  says	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  go	  to	  my	  country,	  or	   to	  London;	  he	   figures	  he	  could	  be	  an	   imam	  there	  as	   I	   told	  him	  there	  is	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Bengali	  speaking	  Muslims	  in	  London.	  At	  one	  point,	  I	  tell	  him	  he	  may	  actually	  find	  it	  really	  hard,	  because	  he	  would	  not	  know	  anyone	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  conversation	  appears	  as	  the	  opening	  vignette	  of	  chapter	  4.	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and	  he	  would	  have	   to	   take	   care	  of	  himself.	  He	   immediately	  gets	  upset,	   saying	  ‘it’s	   such	   a	   bad	   system’	   (system-­‐ṭā	   khub	   khārāp).	   Everybody	   living	   separately	  and,	   particularly,	   not	   ‘feeding’	   each	   other	   (khāoyā-­‐dāoyā	   debe	   nā),	   is	   most	  objectionable	   in	   his	   eyes.	   Curling	   his	   lips,	   he	   says	   he	  would	   rather	   stay	   here;	  ‘here	   it’s	   comfortable,	   here	   I	   will	   be	   taken	   care	   of	   and	   I	   will	   be	   fed’	   (ekhāne	  
ārām,	  ekhāne	  khāoyā-­‐dāoyā	  debe).	   Especially	   the	   idea	  of	   free	  sex	  disgusts	  him,	  it’s	  a	  result	  of	  all	  living	  apart	  and	  now	  everyone	  is	  just	  having	  sex	  with	  anyone.	  
Free	  sex	  has	  a	  lot	  of	  bad	  consequences	  (‘free	  sex’	  theke	  anek	  kichu	  khārāp	  habe);	  he	  has	  read	  in	  an	  Urdu	  book	  that	  in	  the	  ‘West’	  (‘your	  place	  over	  there’,	  tomāder	  
okhāne)	   all	  married	  people	  have	   sexual	   relationships	  on	   the	   side.	  No,	   then	  he	  would	   rather	   stay	   here,	   maybe	   poor	   and	   in	   a	   small	   room	   shared	   with	   his	  brothers,	  but	  at	  least	  rice	  is	  shared	  and	  sex	  is	  not	  free.	  	  	  Whereas	   it	  may	  be	   considered	   ‘typical’	   of	  Deoband-­‐trained	   imams	   to	  have	  this	  opinion,	  it	  was	  expressed	  as	  well	  by	  other	  people	  in	  the	  village	  who	  are	  on	  the	   far	   other	   end	   of	   the	   ‘piety-­‐spectrum’.	   Take	   for	   example	   the	   following	  conversations	  with	  two	  relatively	  liberal,	  well-­‐educated	  students.	  	  Shamim	  and	  I	  are	  sitting	  on	  the	  cot	  in	  his	  bedroom.	  He	  has	  taken	  me	  to	  this	  more	  or	  less	  secluded	  space	  because	  he	  wants	  to	  interrogate	  me	  about	  the	  free	  
sex	   in	  my	  country.	  He	  himself	   is	  clearly	  curious	  to	  meet	  girls:	  he	  is	  a	  bright	  20	  year	  old	  boy	  studying	  physical	  education	  at	  a	  renowned	  university	  in	  Barampur,	  where	  he	   lives	   in	  a	  student	  hostel.	  He	  dresses	  fashionably,	  occasionally	  drinks	  beer	  and	  only	  wears	  a	  skullcap	  on	  Eid	  and	  Qurbani.	  Shamim	  frankly	  admits	  he	  has	   the	  desire	   to	   ‘do’	  what	  he	  calls	   free	  sex	   (khub	  icchā	  āche)	  and	  has	  secretly	  met	  up	  with	  a	   few	  girls,	  but	  never	   ‘used’	   them	  (kakhano	  ‘used’	  kari	  ni),	   that	   is,	  never	   kissed	   or	   had	   sexual	   interaction	   with	   them.	   Where	   I	   come	   from,	   he	  believes,	  there	  is	  the	  freedom	  to	  have	  sexual	  relations	  with	  girls,	  but	  here	  there	  would	   be	   punishment.	   ‘We	   have	   all	   these	   rules	   (rīti-­‐nīti),	   you	   know,	   every	  community	  has	  its	  own	  rules,	  and	  we	  Muslims	  have	  sunnā	  [words	  and	  deeds	  of	  Prophet	  Mohammad]’.	  I	  ask	  him	  whether	  he	  would	  like	  it	  better	  without	  all	  the	  rules.	   ‘Not	   really’,	   he	   answers:	   ‘unlimited	   freedom	   leads	   to	   problems	   (abādh	  
swādhīnatā	  muś’kil	  habe).	   Everyone	  would	   just	   do	  whatever	   he	   likes.	   But	   you	  need	   discipline	   (śṛṅkhal).	   For	   justice	   (nyāy)	   in	   society	   you	   need	   rules	   and	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regulations’.	  Moreover,	  he	  could	  run	  off	  with	  a	  girl	  but	  he	  really	  does	  not	  see	  the	  point	  of	  that.	  Firstly,	  if	  he	  would	  not	  marry,	  he	  would	  not	  truly	  belong	  to	  society	  (biye	   nā	   kar’le,	   ki	   kare	   ‘society	   belonging’	   habe?79),	   and	   secondly,	   he	   wants	   to	  take	  care	  of	  his	  parents	  when	  they	  grow	  older.	  Free	  sex	  may	  sound	  enticing,	  but	  he	  would	  not	  do	  it	  even	  if	  he	  had	  a	  chance	  to.	  	  	  Rehan,	  who	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  started	  studying	  at	   the	  same	  university	   as	   his	   friend	   Shamim,	   similarly	   expressed	   a	   desire	   for	   sexual	  relations.	  Rehan	  thinks	  that	  the	  restrictions	  on	  sexual	  relations	  may	  be	  a	  reason	  for	   the	   staggering	   numbers	   of	   rape	   and	   sexual	   harassment,	   because,	   he	   says,	  young	  men	  like	  him	  have	  an	  enormous	  desire	  yet	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  have	  sex.	  He	  says	  that	  in	  my	  country	  there	  are	  probably	  less	  rapes	  because	  we	  ‘have	  free	  
sex’.	   Here,	   however,	   that	   wouldn’t	   be	   possible,	   because	   there	   are	   millions	   of	  people	  and	  everyone	  would	  be	  fornicating	  everywhere	  (pointing	  to	  the	  corners	  around	   us,	   there,	   there,	   and	   there…).	   It	   would	   be	   complete	   chaos.	   So	   he	   is	  willing	  to	  control	  his	  desire	  and	  sacrifice	  ‘free	  sex’	  for	  a	  harmonious	  society.	  	  Neither	   Samsuddin,	   nor	   Shamim	   and	   Rehan	   represent	   the	  majority	   of	  my	  interlocutors;	   they	   do	   not	   because	   no	   segment	   of	   the	   Joygrami	   Muslims	  constitutes	   a	   ‘majority’.	   The	   Joygrami	  Muslims	   are	   a	   heterogeneous	   group	   of	  people.	  Shamim	  and	  Rehan	  are	  probably	  at	   the	   least	  pious	  and	  most	  educated	  end	  of	   the	   spectrum,	   and	   they	   tend	   to	  objectify	   their	  own	   society	   and	   culture	  more	   than	  most	   of	  my	  other	   Joygrami	   friends.	   Yet	   they	   stand	   in	   a	   continuum	  with	  people	  like	  Samsuddin	  because	  they	  equally	  feel	  the	  need	  for	  constraints	  in	  their	  society.	  Shamim	  explicitly	  mentions	  marriage	  as	  a	  means	  to	  belonging	  to	  the	  Muslim	  society,	  and	  therefore	  absolutely	  essential	  (he	  could	  simply	  not	  get	  his	   head	   around	   my	   uncertainty	   on	   whether	   I	   would	   ever	   marry	   at	   all).	  Moreover,	   he	   could	   not	   imagine	   eloping	   with	   a	   girl	   because	   he	   needs	   –	   and	  wants	  –	  to	  take	  care	  of	  his	  parents;	  it	  is	  a	  khuśi/virtuous	  obligation.	  On	  another	  occasion,	  Rehan	  jokes	  that	  he	  will	  marry	  a	  rich	  English	  woman,	  divorce	  her	  and	  take	  all	  her	  money,	  and	  then	  do	  the	  same	  with	  an	  American	  woman,	  and	  a	  Dutch	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  We	   had	   just	   before	   discussed	   issues	   of	   belonging,	   and	   he	   had	   stated	   that	   he	   belongs	  foremost	  to	  the	  ‘Muslim	  society’.	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woman,	  etc.	  I	  tell	  him	  that	  they	  are	  not	  that	  stupid	  and	  would	  marry	  him	  only	  with	  a	  prenuptial	  agreement.	  He	  is	  stupefied	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  possibility	  and	  comments:	  ‘nothing	  is	  sure	  in	  your	  place,	  your	  country	  is	  very	  rough’	  (tomāder	  
okhāne	  konokichu	   ‘sure’	  nei,	  khub	   ‘rough	  country’	   tomār).	  Despite	   his	   banter,	   a	  marriage	   without	   exchange	   literally	   scares	   him;	   that	   kind	   of	   freedom	   is	   not	  desirable	   but	   ‘rough’.	   He	   eventually	   rescinds	   his	   wild	   dreams	   and	   concludes	  that	  it	  is	  much	  nicer	  to	  stay	  here,	  in	  Joygram,	  because	  here	  it	  is	  ‘happy’,	  khuśi.	  	  	  My	  interlocutors	  would	  likely	  agree	  with	  Geertz	  when	  he	  said	  that	  without	  constraints	   ‘we	   would	   be	   unworkable	   monstrosities	   with	   very	   few	   useful	  instincts,	  fewer	  recognizable	  sentiments,	  and	  no	  intellect:	  mental	  basket	  cases’	  (1973:	   49).	   ‘Free	   sex’	   features	   here	   as	   an	   exemplary	   lack	   of	   constraints,	   the	  liberty	   of	   fornication	   anywhere,	   with	   anyone,	   at	   any	   time,	   and	   is	   considered	  deeply	   problematic.	   The	   problem	   here	   is	   the	   denial	   of	   the	   aspect	   of	   sex	   that	  implies	   the	   social	   reproduction	   of	   a	   community,	   as	   it	   is	   now	   a	   purely	  physiological	   act.	   ‘Free’	   could	   here	   be	   replaced	   by	   ‘unconstrained	   by	   rules	   of	  exchange’,	  that	  is,	  unconstrained	  by	  dharma	  –	  and	  ‘free	  sex’	  is	  consequently	  of	  a	  bestial	  rather	  than	  a	  human	  nature	  (cf.	  Keane	  2015:	  10-­‐12).	  Although	  Shamim	  in	  particular	  mentions	   ‘rules	   and	   regulations’	   as	  means	   for	   constraint,	  what	   is	  ultimately	  most	   important	   is	   that	   people	   feed	   each	   other	   and	   that	   there	   is	   a	  sense	  of	  belonging	   to	  a	  particular	   society;	   feeding	   is	   enacted	  and	  belonging	   is	  generated	  through	  virtuous	  exchanges.	  	  In	   the	  cosmopolitics	  of	   Joygrami	  Muslims	  the	  most	   fundamental	  constraint	  of	  humanity	  is	  the	  cosmogonic	  exchange	  with	  the	  creator-­‐god:	  the	  gift	  of	  life	  in	  exchange	   for	   a	  promise	   to	   acknowledge	  Allah	  and	   take	   the	   ‘right	  path’,	  which	  implies	   to	   live	  virtuously.	  The	  gift	  of	   life	   therefore	   infuses	  god’s	   creation	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  imān	  and	  jñān	  and	  as	  such	  human	  persons	  are	  generated.	  To	  be	  entirely	  free,	  and	  to	  be	  entirely	  unfree,	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  same:	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  choose	  between	  one	  path	  and	  the	  other,	  and	  ethics	  is	  absent	  at	  this	  point.	  Because	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  ethical	  constraints,	  absolute	  freedom	  is	  indeed	  a	  human	  impossibility,	  not	  only	  according	  to	  Laidlaw	  but	  also	  according	  to	  my	  interlocutors.	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Conclusion	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   considered	   the	   ethics	   of	   Joygrami	   Muslims.	   I	   have	  suggested	   that	   Joygrami	   ethics	   is	   best	   interpreted	   as	   an	   Aristotelian	   virtue	  ethics:	  ethical	  life	  consists	  in	  contextual	  and	  balanced	  practical	  judgement	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  virtuous,	  happy	  life.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  key	  ethical	  affordances	  are	   imān	   and	   jñān,	   which	   I	   have	   interpreted	   to	   denote	   a	  habitus	   of	   faith	   and	  practical	   judgement,	  respectively.	  Absolute	  freedom	  has	  to	  be	  forsaken	  for	  the	  generation	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   ethics;	   Joygrami	   Muslims	   forsake	   absolute	  freedom	  in	  their	  submission	  to	  Allah.	  	  To	   conclude	   this	   chapter,	   I	   anticipate	   one	   of	   the	   central	   arguments	   of	   the	  next	  chapter,	  regarding	  the	  fear	  for	  the	  ‘law	  of	  the	  fishes’	  (Parry	  1994),	  and	  in	  fact	   go	   beyond	   it.	   The	   ‘law	   of	   the	   fishes’	   denotes	   the	   experiential	   reality	   of	  exchanges	  bereft	  of	  their	  ethical	  dimension	  and	  rendered	  purely	  instrumental.	  It	  denotes	  therefore	  not	  only,	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  will	  point	  out,	  the	  fear	  for	  an	  unconstrained	   competitive	   market	   mentality,	   but	   also	   the	   fear	   for	   the	  unconstrained	   freedom	   that	   negates	   ethics	   more	   in	   general.	   For	   my	  interlocutors,	   unconstrained	   freedom	   (abādh	   swādhīnatā)	   features	   as	   a	  dangerous	   threat	  because	   it	   is	   a	  very	   real	   threat	   to	  humanity.	   In	   the	  previous	  section,	  I	  quoted	  Rehan	  pointing	  out	  how	  people	  would	  fornicate	  randomly,	  like	  animals	   if	   there	  were	   unconstrained	   freedom.	  As	  Rehan’s	   father	   had	  put	   it	   at	  another	   moment,	   ‘if	   everything	   was	   free,	   you	   couldn’t	   control	   anything’	   (sab	  
‘free’	   hale,	   sab	   jinis	   ‘control’	   kar’te	   pār’be	   nā).	   In	   fact,	   more	   than	   once	   have	   I	  heard	  people	  without	  dharma	  having	  been	   referred	   to	  as	   ‘animals’.	  Dharma	   is	  the	   element	   that	   allows	   human	   persons	   to	   transcend	   from	   the	   transactional	  social	  where	  the	  ‘law	  of	  the	  fishes’	  rules.	  To	  relate	  this	  back	  to	  my	  earlier	  argument	  about	  the	  transcendental	  social:	  if	  people	  were	  to	  live	  in	  absolute	  freedom,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	   switch	   off	   their	   imagination	   and	   live	   solely	   in	   a	   transactional	   social,	  which	  would	  imply	  the	  degeneration	  of	  humans	  to	  animals.	  However,	  real	  humans	  are	  inevitably	   predisposed	   to	   imagination;	   hence	   they	   will	   construct	   a	  transcendental	  social	  and	  they	  will	  engage	  with	  various	  essentialised	  groups.	  	  The	  inherent	  problem	  of	  the	  liberal	  ideology	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  is	  that	  the	  human	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  –in	  origin-­‐	  entirely	  free	  thus	  not	  in	  relatedness	  with	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other	  humans;	  and	  this	   idea	   is	   the	  basis	  of	   individual	  citizenship.	  The	  basis	  of	  the	  secular	  separation	  of	  state	  law	  from	  ethics	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  ethics	  resides	  in	  the	   sovereign,	   private	   conscience	   of	   the	   individual	   rather	   than	   in	   embodied	  relatedness,	   or	   in	   an	   ethical	   autonomy	   derived	   from	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	  creator-­‐god	  (Asad	  2003:	  235-­‐248).	  In	  the	  postcolonial	  state	  secularism	  takes	  a	  particularly	   violent	   form	   because	   it	   promises	   justice	   as	   liberation	   from	  pervasive	   communal	   relatedness.	   Religion	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	   is	   undesirable	  because	   it	   represents	   ‘unfreedom’	   (Skaria	   2014:	   30).	   What	   follows	   from	   the	  argument	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  this	  idea	  of	  ‘liberation’	  (from	  community,	  from	  religion)	   is	   a	   violent	   act	   against	   humanity.	   Unconstrained	   freedom	   has	   to	   be	  renounced	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   humanity;	   the	  potential	   for	   virtue	   can	  only	   emerge	  from	   the	   fundamental	   relatedness	   of	   people.	   That	   implies	   that	   the	   limit	   of	  freedom,	   including	  reflective	   freedom,	   is	   the	  foundational	   ‘contract	  behind	  the	  contract’;	   freedom	  is	  within	  relatedness,	  which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  means	  within	  Muslimness.	   Freedom	   comes	   a	  posteriori	   in	   that	   it	   comes	   after	  one	  is	  generated	  from	  the	  foundational	  contract	  with	  Allah.	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  Fig.	  5.	  The	  cattle	  market	  	  
	  Fig.	  6.	  The	  shrine	  of	  Champa	  Bibi	  at	  the	  cattle	  market	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4.	   ‘Politics	   is	   dharma,	   isn’t	   it?’	   Ambiguous	  
vernacularisations	  
Introduction	  	  On	  a	  rainy	  Sunday	  afternoon	  Basir	  Khadim	  invites	  me	  to	   join	  him	  to	  hang	  out	   at	   the	   small	   brick	   building	   just	   outside	   Joygram	   that	   serves	   as	   the	   health	  centre.	  It	  is	  located	  at	  the	  wasteland	  owned	  by	  his	  ‘uncle’	  (cācā)	  and	  friend	  Irfan	  Khadim.	  Several	  friends	  of	  Basir	  have	  gathered	  here:	  young	  men	  around	  thirty	  years	  old,	  involved	  in	  small	  business	  and	  making	  music	  in	  their	  free	  time.	  They	  wear	  jeans	  and	  shirts;	  one	  wears	  a	  skullcap.	  All	  are	  Muslim	  except	  one,	  and	  all	  live	   in	   Farukhbazar	   except	   Basir.	   Over	   the	   hours	   we	   spent	   here,	   munching	  snacks	  (tiffin)	  and	  sipping	  tea	  while	  hiding	  from	  the	  pouring	  monsoon	  rains,	  we	  had	   intense	   discussions	   about	   the	   state	   of	   politics	   in	   India,	   and	   the	   role	   that	  Islam	  could	  or	  should	  play.	  	  It’s	   not	   going	   well	   in	   India,	   all	   agree	   on	   that.	   Politics	   is	   thoroughly	  corrupted;	  politicians	  are	  bad	  because	  once	  people	  start	  to	  accumulate	  wealth	  and	  power	   they	   become	   ‘blind’	   and	   only	  want	  more.	   They	   don’t	   actually	   care	  about	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  citizens.	  Muslims	  are	  in	  a	  particularly	  bad	  position	  because	   they	   are	  used	   as	   a	   vote-­‐bank:	   promises	   are	   always	  made	   and	   always	  broken.	   In	   the	  end,	   India	   is	   a	  Hindu-­‐state	   (Hindu-­‐rāṣṭra);	   the	  Hindus	   rule	   and	  Muslims	  don’t	   have	   the	   same	   rights	   (adhikār)	   as	  Hindus	  do.	  The	  main	   reason	  that	  Muslims	  can	  be	  easily	  swayed	  by	  politicians	  is	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  education	  among	  Muslims;	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  education	  is	  due	  to	  the	  bad	  economic	  (ārthik)	  situation	  of	  Muslims.	  It	  is	  a	  vicious	  circle.	  	  Having	  said	  this,	   they	  consider	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  lamentable	  state	  of	  both	  society	  and	  politics	  as	  being	  the	  lack	  of	  dharma.	  Ordinary	  people	  have	  lost	  their	   faith	   and	   therefore	   they	   don’t	   do	   good	   anymore.	   ‘Can	  Manmohan	   Singh	  [then	   Prime	   Minister]	   see	   everyone?	   No,	   only	   Allah	   can’.	   One’s	   heart/mind	  (man)	  needs	   to	  be	  controlled	  by	   fear	   for	  Allah.	  They	  give	   the	  same	  reason	   for	  the	   corruption	   of	   politics:	   the	   state	   does	   not	   accept	   dharma	   (dharma	   ‘accept’	  
kare	   nā)	   –	   in	  West	   Bengal	   the	   communists	   have	   ruled	   for	   34	   years,	   and,	   for	  instance,	  the	  BJP	  could	  not	  stay	  in	  the	  central	  Government	  because	  it	  is	  a	  Hindu	  party.	   Since	   dharma	   is	   not	   accepted	   in	   and	   by	   the	   government,	   politics	   has	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deteriorated.	  Worse	  still,	  because	  neither	  the	  government	  nor	  ordinary	  people	  fear	  god,	  everybody	  is	  in	  a	  risky	  situation	  (bipad	  obostha).	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   address	   the	   narrative	   of	   moral	   decay	   so	   prominent	   in	  Joygrami	   society.	   I	   discuss	   the	   local	   perception	   of	   the	   politico-­‐economic	  environment	  and	  the	  concomitant	  processes	  of	  vernacularisation.	  As	  elsewhere,	  while	   the	   ‘idea	  of	   India’	   (Khilnani	  1997)	  has	  taken	  root	   in	  people’s	  hearts	  and	  minds,	   celebrations	   of	   India’s	   democracy	   and	   secularism	   (among	   my	  interlocutors	   as	   much	   as	   among	   academics)	   are	   increasingly	   countered	   with	  lamentations	   of	   injustice	   drawing	   on	   reports	   of	   corruption	   and	   political	  criminalisation	   (see	   e.g.	   Béteille	   2005;	   Gupta	   1995,	   2002,	   2005;	   Michelutti	  2008;	   Parry	   2000).	   Basir	   and	   his	   friends	   make	   a	   seamless	   transition	   from	  couching	  injustice	  in	  secular-­‐liberal	  terms	  (Muslims	  deserve	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  Hindus)	  to	  considering	  injustice	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  dharma.	  If	  secularism	  and	   dharma-­‐as-­‐religion	   are	   considered	   contrasting	   and	   mutually	   exclusive	  categories,	  then	  these	  perceptions	  of	  injustice	  may	  seem	  incommensurable.	  The	  aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   rather	   than	   contrasting	   categories,	  they	   are	   embedded	   categories.	   A	   revival	   of	   dharma	   does	   therefore	   not	  necessarily	  exclude	  but	  indeed	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  premise	  for	  the	  support	  of	  secular-­‐liberal	  state	  policies.	  	  	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  as	  follows.	  Firstly,	  I	  introduce	  the	  theoretical	  framework,	  which	  draws	  on	  Jonathan	  Parry’s	  and	  Maurice	  Bloch’s	  (1982,	  1989)	  theory	  of	  short-­‐term	  and	  long-­‐term	  cycles	  of	  transaction.	  This	  theory	  allows	  me	  to	   consider	   political	   and	   economic	   practices	   not	   as	   pertaining	   to	   different	  domains	  of	  life	  but	  as	  pertaining	  to	  embedded	  cycles	  of	  transaction.	  Secondly,	  I	  show	  that	  narratives	  of	  inequality	  emerge	  out	  of	  complaints	  about	  corruption.80	  Following	   Parry	   (2000)	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   complaints	   indicate	   not	   (only)	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Complaining	  about	  politics	  at	  a	  tea	  stall	  after	  work,	  and	  in	  particular	  about	  corruption,	  is	  ubiquitous	  in	  India.	  Academic	  literature,	  local	  newspapers	  and	  ordinary	  conversation	  across	  the	  country	  suggest	  a	  ‘crisis	  of	  corruption’	  (Guhan	  1997:	  15;	  quoted	  in	  Parry	  2000:	  28).	  Corruption	  is	  a	  slippery	  and	  normative	  concept	  and	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  in	  detail	  the	  range	  of	  definitions.	  See	  e.g.	  Gillespie	  and	  Okruhlik	  (1991);	  Gupta	  (1995,	  2012);	  Haller	  and	  Shore	  (2005);	  Guhan	  &	  Paul	  (1997).	  I	  am	  here	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  what	  Parry	  (following	  Paul	  and	  Shah	  1997)	  has	  called	  ‘retail’	  corruption:	  ‘low-­‐level	  routine	  corruption	  of	  everyday	  experience’	  (2000:	  29).	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there	  is	  actual	  corruption,	  but	  (also)	  that	  the	  Joygramis	  have,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  internalised	   the	   universalistic,	   abstract	   values	   constitutionalised	   by	   the	   state.	  State	   ideology	   and	   classification,	   then,	   afford	   particular	   kinds	   of	   ethical	  evaluation	   and	   action.	   People	   do	   laud	   the	   good	   intentions	   behind	   welfare	  programs	   like	   MNREGA	   (state	   sponsored	   labour	   scheme)	   and	   governmental	  child	  development	   initiatives	   like	  the	  ICDS.81	  It	   is	  not	   ‘democracy’,	   ‘secularism’	  or	   the	   Indian	  government	  as	  such	   that	  are	   the	  object	  of	   critique,	  but	   the	  poor	  execution	   of	   the	   policies	   borne	   from	   these	   ideological	   frameworks.	   It	   is	  generally	  thought	  that	  politicians	  and	  people	  ‘doing	  party’	  are	  involved	  with	  the	  accumulation	   of	   private	   wealth	   and	   criminal	   activities	   and	   very	   little	   with	  bringing	  development	  to	  those	  who	  need	  it.	  Therefore,	  I	  interpret	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  villagers	  not	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  disjunction	  of	  the	  villagers’	  values	  and	  the	  state’s	   values,	   but	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   state	   actors	   and	   the	  criminalised	   network	   of	   ‘mediators’	   to	   act	   according	   to	   the	   values	   that	   it	   has	  successfully	  imbibed	  in	  its	  citizens.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  third	  section	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  infiltration	  of	  corrupt	  practices	  and	  an	  immoral	  market	  in	  the	  everyday	  life	  of	  ordinary	  citizens	  make	  the	  latter	  complicit	  in	  the	  vicious	  practices	  they	  critique.	  This	  complicity	  instils	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure.	  This	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure,	  in	  turn,	  inspires	  a	  desire	  for	  moral	  regeneration.	   	  Fourthly,	   I	   analyse	   the	   desire	   for	   moral	   regeneration	   as	   a	   critique	   of	   the	  disintegration	  of	  society	  due	  to	  the	  ideological	  juxtaposition	  of	  various	  spheres	  of	   life	   (politics,	   economics,	   and	   religion)	   in	   a	   modern	   state.	   Dharma,	   when	  categorized	   as	   religion,	   becomes	   disembedded	   from	   political	   and	   economic	  interactions,	  both	  between	  the	  state	  and	  citizens,	  and	  among	  citizens.	  Therefore	  these	   transactions	   become	   stripped	   of	   an	   ethical	   dimension.	   The	   lack	   of	   an	  ethical	  dimension	  framing	  the	  transactions	  results	  in	  the	  potential	  opportunity	  of	  the	  everyday	  violence	  of	  structural	  inequality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  See	   Gupta	   (2001)	   for	   a	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   the	   Integrated	   Child	   Development	   Services	  
(ICDS),	  locally	  known	  as	  anganwadi.	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Theoretical	  orientations:	  cycles	  of	  transaction	  	  Parry	   writes:	   ‘What	   I	   believe	   my	   own	   data,	   as	   well	   as	   much	   else	   in	   the	  ethnographic	  record,	  would	  suggest	  is	  that	  Hindu	  society	  has	  often	  seen	  itself	  as	  engaged	  in	  an	  endless	  battle	  against	  impending	  chaos	  and	  disintegration’	  (Parry	  1989a:	   513).	   Bringing	   together	   various	   strands	   of	   the	   work	   of	   Parry	   (1986;	  1989a;	  1989b;	  1994;	  2000)	  and	  Bloch	  and	  Parry	  (1982;	  1989)	  I	  will	  construct	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  analyse	  this	  battle	  against	  disintegration,	  which	  is	  just	  as	   prominent	   in	   Joygrami	  Muslim	   society	   as	   it	   is	   in	   the	   ‘Hindu	   society’	   Parry	  refers	  to.	  This	  battle	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  take	  place	  on	  two	  fronts.	  	  Firstly,	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters	  I	  have	  drawn	  on	  Parry’s	  (1989a,	  1994)	  argument	  that	  jāti	  is	  an	  ideological	  construction	  that	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  self	  from	  disintegration	  due	  to	  the	  fluid	  and	  volatile	  character	  of	  the	  person.	  The	  fluidity	  of	  the	  protean	  person	  is	  dangerous	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  social	  reproduction	  of	  the	  ethical	  community,	  and	  the	  person	  is	  therefore	  essentialised	  in	  a	  jāti.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  fear	  of	  chaos	  is	  not	  only	  inspired	  by	  the	  fragile	  constitution	  of	  the	  protean	  person,	  but	  also	  by	  people’s	  incessant	  struggle	  for	  physical	  survival	  and	   material	   acquisitions;	   this	   is	   the	   topic	   of	   this	   chapter.	   Individual	  competitiveness	  may	   result	   in	  what	   Hindus	   call	   the	   ‘law	   of	   the	   fishes’,	  which	  refers	   to	   the	  threatening	   image	  of	   ‘a	  world	   in	  which	  big	   fishes	  gobble	  up	   little	  ones	  without	  any	  restraint	  (Parry	  1994:	  113).’	  Both	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  protean	  person,	  and	  the	  ‘law	  of	  the	  fishes’	  are	  ‘symbolic	  elaborations	  of	  louring	  disorder	  which	   creates	   and	   sustains	   the	   world	   of	   order	   and	   regulation’	   (ibid:	   115).	  Although	   not	   using	   the	   idiom	   of	   the	   ‘law	   of	   the	   fishes’,	   the	   threat	   of	   radical	  inequality	   and	   exploitation	   equally	   features	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   cosmic	   order	  among	  Bengali	  Muslims.	  	  I	   will	   analyse	   the	   narrative	   of	  moral	   decay,	   corruption	   and	   disintegration	  within	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   embedded	   transactional	   spheres	   as	  developed	  by	  Bloch	  and	  Parry	  (1982,	  1989).	  Bloch	  and	  Parry	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish	   two	   symbolic	   transactional	   spheres	   in	   human	   society	   that	   are	   in	  interaction	  with	  each	  other:	   the	  symbolic	  and	  material	   transactions	  related	   to	  the	   long-­‐term	   reproduction	   of	   the	   social	   or	   cosmic	   order	   and	   the	   short-­‐term	  transactions	   related	   to	   individual	   competition	   and	   physiological	   necessity.	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These	   spheres	   are	   embedded	   in	  what	  Bloch	   (2008)	  has	   later	   come	   to	   call	   the	  transcendental	  and	  the	  transactional	  social,	  respectively,	  and	  which	  I	  discussed	  in	   the	   introduction.	   The	   observation	   that	   the	   two	   spheres	   of	   transactions	   are	  often	   antithetical	   creates,	   according	   to	   Bloch	   and	   Parry,	   ‘some	   absolutely	  fundamental	   human	  problems’	   (1989:	  28).	  The	  problem	   is	   that	   the	   individual	  cannot	  entirely	  transcend	  ‘the	  natural	  world	  of	  biological	  process	  or	  the	  social	  world	   of	   exchange.	   To	   refuse	   the	   first	   would	   be	   to	   jeopardise	   the	   physical	  continuity	   of	   the	   group,	  while	   to	   refuse	   the	   second	  would	   be	   to	   deny	   society	  itself’	  (1982:	  38-­‐39).	  	  So,	  ‘the	  ideology	  has	  to	  be	  put	  to	  work	  in	  that	  very	  world	  which	  it	  denies,	  and	  it	  must	  therefore	  be	  compromised’	  (Bloch	  and	  Parry	  1982:	  39).	  There	  is	  a	  limit,	  however,	  to	  the	  level	  of	  compromise:	  ‘When	  the	  short-­‐term	  cycle	   threatens	  to	  replace	  the	   long-­‐term	  cycle	   then	  the	  world	   is	  rotten’	   (Bloch	  and	   Parry	   1989:	   28).	   My	   employment	   of	   the	   model	   of	   two	   spheres	   of	  transactions	  is	  foremost	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  to	  give	  expression	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  my	   interlocutors	   try	   to	   cope	  with	  encountering	   injustice.	   I	   suggest	   that	  the	   social	   critique	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   implies	   that	   there	   has	   been	   too	  much	  compromise	   of	   the	   ethical	   narrative,	   and	   that	   therefore	   the	  world	   is,	   in	   their	  view,	  rotten.	  	  	  In	  the	  Bengali	  context,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  imagined	  cosmic	  order	  that	  could	  ideally	  be	  achieved	  if	  one	  lives	  according	  to	  dharma	  can	  only	  exist	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	   mundane	   reality	   it	   aims	   to	   transcend.	   In	   the	   preceding	   chapters,	   I	   have	  stressed	  that	  in	  the	  macro-­‐cosmic	  vision	  of	  Islamic	  dharma,	  ritual	  and	  everyday	  exchanges	   should	   be	   geared	   towards	   reproducing	   equality	   and	   solidarity.	  Exchanges	  are	  virtuous	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  balanced	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  reproduction	  of	   the	  cosmic	  order.	  However,	   the	   ideology	  of	  equality	  and	  solidarity	   through	   virtuous	   exchanges	   has	   legitimacy	   exactly	   because	   of	   the	  equal	   salience	   of	   the	   perception	   that	   people	   are	   disposed	   to	   individual	  competitive	   accumulation.	   The	   idea	   is	   that	   people	   cannot	   control	   themselves,	  but	   need	   dharma	   to	   control	   their	   desires,	   including	   the	   desire	   to	   accumulate	  power	   and	   wealth	   (at	   other	   people’s	   expense).	   Not	   unlike	   Parry’s	   Hindu	  interlocutors,	  my	  interlocutors	  expect	  others	  to	  be	  on	  a	  ‘single-­‐minded	  quest	  for	  material	   self-­‐gain’	   (Parry	   1994:	   113).	  Money	   in	   particular	   is	   thought	   to	  make	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people	  ‘blind’	  (andha)	  and	  create	  greed	  (lobh)	  and	  (violent)	  envy	  (hiṁsā).	  Yet	  as	  Parry	  points	  out	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Hindu	  cosmology,	  there	  can	  only	  be	  an	  ‘anti-­‐market’	  mentality	   if	   there	   is	  a	  conception	  of	  a	  market-­‐mentality	   to	  begin	  with	  (1994:	  49,	  113).	  Elsewhere,	   Parry	   has	   argued	   that	   Salvationist	   religions	   allow	   for	   ‘the	  ideological	  elaboration	  of	  a	  domain	  in	  which	  self-­‐interest	  rules	  supreme’	  (Parry	  1986:	  469),	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  domain	  of	  asceticism	  and	  unmotivated	  giving.	  This	  would	  imply	  that	  in	  certain	  situations,	  the	  sphere	  of	  short-­‐term	  transactions	  is	  entirely	   dis-­‐embedded	   from	   the	   sphere	   of	   long-­‐term	   transactions.	   I	   have	  suggested	   that	   the	   cosmopolitics	   of	   my	   interlocutors	   cannot	   easily	   be	  categorized	  as	  a	  Salvationist	  religion	  if	  analysed	  according	  to	  Parry’s	  theory.	  In	  this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   that	  my	  Muslim	   interlocutors	   do	   recognize	   a	  relatively	  autonomous	  sphere	  of	  political	  and	  economic	   transactions,	  but	   that,	  as	  in	  Hindu	  cosmopolitics,	  ultimately	  economic	  values	  (artha)	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  encompassed	  by	  and	  subordinated	  to	  dharma	  (Parry	  1989b:	  83).	  Currently,	  however,	   the	   pervasive	   idea	   is	   that	   ‘the	   politico-­‐economic	   domain	   of	  artha	   is	  increasingly	   adrift	   from	   its	  moral	  moorings	   in	   the	   religious	   realm	   of	  dharma’	  (Parry	  2000:	  30).	  	  The	  relative	  autonomy	  of	   the	  economic	  sphere	  means	   that	   the	  market	   is	  a	  relatively	   autonomous	  moral	   order.	   In	  my	   interlocutors’	   perceptions	   -­‐	   just	   as	  Fuller	   (1989)	   and	   Parry	   (1989b)	   both	   argue	   for	   South	   Asia	   in	   general	   -­‐	  monetary	  exchanges	  and	  the	  market	  do	  not	  have	  a	  negative	  moral	  connotation	  per	  se;	  rather	  the	  case	  is	  that	  particular	  forms	  of	  exchange	  (whether	  monetary	  or	  in	  kind)	  are	  morally	  perilous	  or	  immoral.	  There	  is,	  for	  example,	  a	  conception	  of	  an	   ideological	  difference	  between	  being	   radically	  equal	   in	   the	   face	  of	  Allah,	  and	  the	  acceptable	  complementary	  hierarchy	   in	   the	  spheres	  of	   labour	  and	  the	  market.	  Yet	  still	  certain	  ethical	  principles	  of	   justice	  and	  order	  (dharma)	  do	  set	  the	  ethical	  boundaries	   to	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  moral	  order	  of	   the	  market	   and	  policy.82	  It	   follows	  that	   there	   is	  no	  stark	  Polanyian	  contrast	  between	  either	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  In	  my	   perspective,	   informed	   by	   feminist	   and	   postcolonial	   critiques	   (see	   e.g.	   Bear	   et	   al	  2015;	   McKinnon	   &	   Cannell	   2013)	   the	   market	   is	   never	   a	   morally	   neutral	   space.	   Instead,	   the	  market	   is	  a	  moral	  order	  generated	   from	  particular	   forms	  of	   relationality;	   in	  other	  words,	   it	   is	  not	  confined	   to	   the	   transactional	   social	  but	   is	  embedded	   in	  a	  particular	   transcendental	   social.	  When	  the	  values	  of	  the	  moral	  order	  of	  the	  market	  discord	  with	  the	  values	  of	  the	  transcendental	  social	  of	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  people,	  it	  will	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  immoral	  (as	  in	  my	  interlocutors’	  
166	  	  
entire	   lack	   of	   boundaries	   between	   political,	   religious,	   and	   economic	   realms	  versus	  an	   ideological	  model	  of	  a	   liberated	  market	  economy,	  a	  secular	  political	  domain	  and	  a	  private	  religious	  realm.	  Rather	  than	  considering	  these	  domains	  as	  juxtaposed,	   I	   suggest	   that	   in	   my	   interlocutors’	   worldview	   they	   are	   relatively	  autonomous	   yet	   embedded	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  dharma	   is	   the	   underlying	  moral	  dimension	   of	   social	   life	   in	   all	   its	   aspects,	   which	   may	   include	   a	   free	   market	  economy	  and	  secular	  politics.	  The	  narratives	  of	  corruption	  I	  will	  analyse	  in	  this	  chapter	   imply	   that	   secular-­‐liberal	   state	   ideologies	   are	   not	   rejected	   in	   and	   of	  themselves,	   but	   rather	   that	   the	   corruption	   of	   political	   ideals	   in	   practice	   is	  rejected	   (see	   Parry	   2000;	   Gupta	   2012).	   My	   interlocutors	   do	   not	   conceive	   of	  their	  society	  as	  an	  ‘archaic	  society’	  (Mauss	  1966)	  antithetical	  to	  liberal	  capitalist	  modernity.	   Rather,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   implication	   is	   that	   dharma	   cannot	   be	  limited	  to	  the	  category	  religion	  but	  connotes	  justice	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  sense.	  In	  the	   cosmopolitics	   of	  my	   interlocutors,	   every	  human	  person	  has	   equal	  dignity;	  the	  inequality	  brought	  about	  by	  various	  forms	  of	  structural	  violence	  (including	  discrimination	   and	   exploitation)	   denies	   them	   their	   dignity.	   Inequality	   is	  therefore	  the	  hallmark	  of	  injustice.	  	  
Narratives	  of	  inequality	  ‘…in	  India,	  narratives	  of	  corruption	  become	  a	  pivotal	  mode	  for	  enabling	  rural	   citizens	   and	   bureaucrats	   to	   imagine	   the	   state	   as	   a	   translocal	   and	  multi-­‐level	   organization.	  Analysing	   stories	   of	   corruption	   gives	  us	   insights	  into	   how	   ordinary	   people	   construe	   and	   construct	   what	   state	   actions	   are	  considered	  legitimate,	  and	  how	  ideas	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens	  and	  subjects	  are	  constituted…Put	  simply,	  corruption	  and	  the	  narratives	  that	  surround	  it	  are	   central	   to	   the	   understanding	   that	   ordinary	   citizens	   have	   of	   the	   state’	  (Gupta	  2005:	  6-­‐7).	  	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  demonstrate	  how	  narratives	  of	  corruption	  revolve	  around	  a	   critique	   of	   political	   and	   bureaucratic	   practices	   that	   foster	   inequality	   and	  express	   an	  unsatisfied	  demand	   for	   substantive	   citizenship.	   I	  will	   then	   analyse	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  perception).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  this	  critique	  of	  the	  immorality	  of	  the	  market	  in	  fact	  implies	   that	   the	   market	   cannot	   be	   a-­‐moral,	   as	   a	   Polanyian	   model	   would	   suggest.	   There	   is	   a	  slippage	   in	   the	  work	  of	  Bloch	   and	  Parry	   (1989)	   as	   they	   at	   times	  do	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  market	   is	   confined	   to	   the	   transactional	   social.	   This	   is	   a	   normative	   rather	   than	   an	   empirical	  observation.	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the	  narratives	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  vein	  of	  Parry’s	  (2000)	  analysis	  of	  corruption	  rhetoric.	  Parry	  argues	  that	  the	  pervasive	  anti-­‐corruption	  discourse	  is	  testimony	  not	   only	   to	   the	   widening	   experience	   of	   corruption,	   which	   is	   ‘an	   almost	  inevitable	   corollary	   to	   the	   extended	   reach	   of	   the	   state’,	   but	   also	   to	   ‘an	  internalization	  of	  its	  norms	  and	  values’	  (2000:	  52;	  see	  also	  Gupta	  1995,	  2005).	  I	  follow	  Parry	   in	   this	   observation,	   although	   I	   add	   that	   it	   is	   better	   to	   speak	  of	   a	  vernacularisation	   of	   values,	   because	   there	   must	   be	   a	   resonance	   between	   the	  ‘universalistic	   notions	   of	   justice	   and	   equity’	   (Parry	   2000:	   46)	   already	  present	  (and	   constantly	   evolving)	   in	  particular	   localities	   and	   those	  propagated	  by	   the	  nation-­‐state	  (see	  also	  Fuller	  &	  Harriss	  2001).	  Following	  from	  this	  observation,	  I	  will	   suggest	   that	   the	  significant	   implication	   is	   that	   the	  secular	   liberal	   ideology	  and	   the	   Islamic	  dharma	   are	  not	   in	  principle	   considered	   incongruent,	   but	   they	  are	   in	   practice	   because	   of	   the	   degeneration	   of	   political	   practice	   to	   the	   short-­‐term	  transactional	  sphere.	  	  
Bribes,	  that’s	  what	  the	  police	  take	  Corruption	  is	  understood	  from	  a	  very	  young	  age.	  Akash	  and	  Bikash,	  the	  sons	  of	  Chompa	  (Wahed’s	  sister)	  and	  Hafiz,	  must	  be	  around	  six	  and	  eight	  years	  old.	  We	  are	  drawing	  in	  my	  notebook,	  when	  some	  scribbles	  I	  made	  earlier	  that	  day	  caught	   Akash’s	   attention.	   Some	   of	   the	   boys	   in	   the	   bicycle	   repair	   shop	   (a	  favourite	  local	  hang-­‐out)	  helped	  me	  with	  the	  different	  Bengali	  spellings	  of	  three	  very	  similar	   sounding	  words,	  one	  of	  which	   is	  ghuṣ,	  which	  means	  bribe.	  Akash	  points	  to	  the	  different	  words	  and	  says	  them	  out	   loud,	  and	  I	  ask	  for	  each	  word	  what	   it	   means.	   When	   we	   get	   to	   ghuṣ,	   and	   I	   ask	   him	   after	   the	   meaning,	   he	  answers	  outright:	  ‘that’s	  what	  the	  police	  eat/take’	  (yeṭā	  puliśerā	  khāy).83	  The	  general	   feeling	  is	  that	  the	  police	  are	  the	   ‘puppets’	  of	  the	  politicians,	  or	  that	  they	  work	  only	  for	  money.	  As	  Farok	  put	  it,	  ‘the	  police	  are	  for	  sale’	  (‘police’	  
becā	  hacche).	  Politicians	  themselves	  are	  not	  regarded	  any	  better.	  Dada	  explains	  and	  enacts	  politics	  to	  me	  as	  follows,	  while	  he	  is	  just	  rubbing	  his	  hair	  and	  beard	  with	  mustard	  oil:	  ‘Politics	  is	  dirty	  (Rāj'nīti	  māne	  naṅṛā	  nīti).	  It’s	  only	  the	  greedy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  In	   a	   study	   on	   corruption	   in	   West	   Bengal,	   Ruud	   (2000:	   283)	   points	   to	   the	   specifically	  negative	   connotation	   of	   the	   idioms	   ghuṣ	   (bribe)	   and	   ṭākā	  khāoyā	   (literally	   to	   ‘eat’	  money;	   to	  take	  money).	   It	  connotes	  the	  power	  gap	  between	  the	  bureaucrat	  and	  the	  poor	  peasant,	  where	  the	  peasant	  has	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  pay	  the	  sum	  demanded	  by	  the	  bureaucrat.	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(lobhī)	  who	   do	   politics.	   Dirty	   politics	   (naṅṛā	  nīti)	  means,	   those	  who	   have	   oil,	  will	   get	   some	  more	   oil,	   because	   they	   don’t	   need	   very	  much.	   Those	  who	  don’t	  have	  it,	  they	  won’t	  give	  it	  to,	  because	  they	  need	  too	  much.	  Politicians	  do	  like	  this	  with	  the	  poor	  [waving	  his	  hand	  as	  if	  to	  brush	  away	  a	  crowd	  of	  people],	  while	  for	  the	  rich	   they	  do	   this	   [he	  gets	  up	  and	  pulls	  a	  chair	  close	   to	  his	  stool].	  And	  that	  while	  Allah	  gave	  us,	  as	  the	  only	  ones,	  buddhi	  (intelligence)	  so	  that	  we	  could	  be	  aware	  of	  those	  who	  have	  less	  than	  ourselves’.84	  What	   emerges	   from	   Dada’s	   account	   of	   politics	   is	   that	   corruption	   is	  fundamentally	   a	  problem	  of	   inequality.	   Structural	   inequality	   is	   reproduced	  by	  politicians	   and	   pervasive	   throughout	   all	   civic	   services.	   For	   instance,	   the	  inequality	  inherent	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  medical	  system	  was	  made	  painfully	  clear	   by	   the	   reflections	   on	   the	   illness	   of	   Rahaman	   Saheb,	   who	   had	   been	   my	  generous	  host	  until	  he	  was	  defeated	  by	  diabetes	  in	  April	  2013.	  He	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  right	  treatment	  despite	  the	  effort	  of	  fellow	  maulānās	  to	  raise	  money	   to	   have	   him	   treated	   in	   a	   hospital	   in	   Chennai.	   During	   the	   last	   hours	   of	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  life,	  I	  ask	  his	  eldest	  son	  Nasiruddin	  why	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  access	  government	  support	  available	  for	  his	  medical	  treatment.	  Nasiruddin	   replies	  with	   characteristic	   sarcasm:	   ‘Do	  we	  have	   air	   conditioning?	  Do	  we	  have	  a	  car?	  Don’t	  you	  know	  that	  those	  things	  are	  only	  for	  the	  people	  who	  have	  an	  air-­‐conditioned	  car?	  Those	  are	  the	  people	  who	  need	  it,	  after	  all.	  We	  live	  in	  mud	  huts,	  we	  just	  eat	  rice,	  we	  are	  not	  important.	  The	  big/rich	  people	  (baṛo	  
lok),	  in	  their	  air-­‐conditioned	  cars,	  they	  need	  the	  medical	  treatment!’	  	  In	   the	   above	   conversations,	   as	   in	   numerous	   others,	   my	   friends	   agitate	  against	  the	  structural	  exclusion	  from	  substantive	  citizenship.	  The	  rural	  masses	  encounter	   the	   state	   only	   through	   ‘fixers’	   and	   ‘brokers’,	   local	   strongmen,	   and	  through	  the	  depoliticized	  channels	  of	  development	  (Hansen	  1999:	  51).	  Central	  to	   the	   gargantuan	   development	   state	   that	   modern	   India	   has	   become,	   is	   the	  panchayat	   (Ben.	   pañcāyat)	   system	   of	   local	   governance. 85 	  The	   idea	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  See	  for	  very	  similar	  rhetoric	  regarding	  politics	  in	  West	  Bengal:	  Ruud	  (2001).	  	  85	  The	  panchayat	  is	  the	  lowest	  level	  tier	  of	  democratically	  elected	  government	  officials,	  and	  in	   itself	   consists	   of	   three	   tiers:	   the	   gram	   panchayat	   (grām	   pañcāyat)	   the	   panchayat	   samiti	  
(pañcāyat	   samiti)	   and	   the	   zilla	   parishad	   (jelā	   pariṣad).	   The	   three-­‐tier	   panchayat	   system	   is	  administered	   under	   the	   Panchayat	   and	  Rural	   development	  Department	   of	   the	   government	   of	  West	  Bengal.	  The	  elected	  panchayat	  members,	  in	  collaboration	  with	  their	  ‘twin’	  of	  government	  
169	  	  
panchayat	   system	   was	   ‘to	   organize	   development	   along	   “unpolitical”	   lines,	   to	  utilize	  the	  innocent	  energy	  of	  the	  prepolitical	  communities	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  them	   for	   a	   later	   entry…into	   the	   national-­‐modern	   world	   of	   politics’	   (Hansen	  1999:	   51).	   In	   reality,	   the	   panchayat	   operates	   as	   a	   machinery	   of	   political	  patronage	   (Chatterjee	  2009)	   and	   continues	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   emergence	  of	  ‘shadow	  states’	   (Harris-­‐White	  2003:	  77).	   Just	  as	   in	   rural	  Uttar	  Pradesh	   (Brass	  1997)	   and	   rural	   Pakistan	   (Martin	   2009),	   competing	   networks	   of	   local	  strongmen	  colonize	  the	  local	  bureaucratic	  and	  political	  institutions,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  political	  party	  in	  power	  (Webster	  1992:	  134).	  The	  Left	  Front	  government	  in	  West	  Bengal	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  state	  governments	  to	  operate	  the	  panchayat	  system.	  A	  virtual	   ‘party	  society’	   (Bhattacharyya	  2009)	  was	   installed	  through	  a	  capillary	   network	   of	   ‘comrades’	   and	   ‘cadres’	   in	   every	   nook	   and	   corner	   of	   the	  state,	  to	  which	  the	  panchayat	  system	  was	  instrumental	  (Banerjee	  2010:	  3).	  The	  ‘party’,	   referring	   to	   the	   CPM	   in	   this	   context,	   has	   over	   the	   years	   successfully	  permeated	   every	   aspect	   of	   life.	   At	   every	   level,	   and	   behind	   every	   centrally	  employed	  bureaucrat	  or	  democratically	  elected	  official	  there	  is	  a	  party	  member	  who	   holds	   the	   reins	   (see	   also	   Jeffrey	   &	   Lerche	   2000;	   Harriss-­‐White	   2003;	  Corbridge	  et	  al.	  2005).	  Local	  party	  affiliates	  have	  been	  successful	   in	  keeping	  a	  loyal	  clientele	   for	  more	   than	   three	  decades	  by	  doling	  out	  basic	   life	  necessities	  rather	   than	  by	   struggling	   to	  ensure	   substantive	   citizenship	   for	  all.	  The	   lack	  of	  actual	  substantive	  citizenship	  and	  the	  everyday	  confrontation	  with	  corruption,	  however,	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   the	   ‘prepolitical	   communities’	   are	   not	   aware	   of	  what	   they	  are	  being	  excluded	   from.	  Likewise,	   it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	   they	  have	  not	   incorporated	   liberal	   values	   in	   their	   dharma.	   The	   following	   sections	   will	  illustrate	  this.	  	  
The	  system	  is	  fine,	  but	  the	  work	  isn’t	  good	  The	   police	   feature	   centrally	   in	   narratives	   of	   corruption.	   The	   police	   are	  central	   to	   the	   imagination	   of	   the	   state	   because	   they	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   state’s	   promise	   of	   protection:	   protection	   of	   life,	   liberty	  and	  property	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  citizens’	  allegiance	  to	  the	  state.	  However,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  officials,	  are	  responsible	   for	   local	  developmental	  projects,	   from	  a	  village	  water	  pump	  to	   large-­‐scale	  infrastructural	  projects.	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local	   strongmen	  with	   political	   clout	   have	   taken	   control	   over	   the	   police	   force,	  which	  means	  that,	  	  ‘rule	   in	   the	   countryside	   is	   not	   based	   on	   abstractions	   but	   control	   over	  resources	  and	  safety.	  It	  is	  a	  Hobbesian	  world	  in	  which	  security	  and	  safety	  are	   not	   provided	   by	   the	   state,	   but	   are	   themselves	   values—that	   is	   valued	  objects—integral	   to	   and	   inseparable	   from	   the	   struggle	   for	   power	   and	  influence’	  (Brass	  1997:	  92-­‐93).	  	  The	  promise	  of	  the	  state	  is	  broken	  when	  it	   is	  only	  people	  with	  money	  who	  are	  protected.	  A	  promise	  is	  an	  illocutionary	  ethical	  act	  (Lambek	  2010b;	  2013);	  the	  instantiation	  of	  ethical	  criteria	  to	  a	  relationship.	  The	  breach	  of	  the	  promise	  is	   the	   undoing	   of	   the	   ethical	   relationship.	   Due	   to	   the	   state	   not	   fulfilling	   its	  promise	  of	  protection,	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  is	  no	  longer	  embedded	  in	  the	   long-­‐term	   sphere	   of	   transactions	   but	   is	   entirely	   instrumentalised.	   The	  following	   vignette	   exemplifies	   the	   rhetoric	   around	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   state	   to	  protect	  its	  citizens.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  failure	  does	  not	  break	  down	  the	  ‘myth	  of	  the	  state’	  (Hansen	  2001).	  	  	  	  For	   the	   umpteenth	   time	   this	   evening	   there	   is	   a	   power	   failure,	   or,	   in	   local	  parlance,	  load	  shedding.	  I	  am	  staying	  the	  night	  at	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  house	  and	  I	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  Samsuddin	  to	  join	  me	  to	  catch	  a	  breeze	  at	  the	  pond	  in	   front	  of	   the	  house.	  After	   a	  while,	   one	  of	   the	  adolescent	  boys	   from	   the	  pāṛā	  joins	   us.	   Abu	   Kalam	  must	   be	   around	   16	   years	   old,	   he	   has	   been	   raised	   by	   his	  uncle	  here	  in	  Joygram	  and	  goes	  to	  school	  in	  Farukhbazar,	  after	  which	  he	  hopes	  to	  join	  the	  military.	  Abu	  Kalam	  mentions	  the	  rape	  of	  a	  few	  days	  ago.	  In	  the	  forest	  just	   outside	   Joygram,	   an	   Adivasi	   girl	   had	   been	   gang-­‐raped	   and	   violently	  attacked	  by	  five	  boys.	  Abu	  Kalam	  doesn’t	  think	  they	  will	  ever	  find	  or	  punish	  the	  boys;	  they	  did	  a	  post-­‐mortem	  but	  it	  is	  just	  a	  performance,	  to	  make	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  they	   do	   care	   about	   an	   Adivasi	   girl.	   Both	   the	   rape	   and	   the	   impunity	   of	   the	  perpetrators	   visibly	  upset	  both	  of	   the	  boys.	   I	   ask	   them	   to	   tell	  me	  more	   about	  what	  upsets	  them	  in	  their	  society.	  	  	  Abu	   Kalam	   starts	   agitating:	   ‘What	   I	   don’t	   like	   is	   that	   when	   someone	   has	  committed	   a	   crime,	   but	   they	   can’t	   find	   him	   or	   can’t	   arrest	   him,	   and	   then,	   for	  example,	  I	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  at	  the	  place	  of	  the	  crime	  and	  I	  didn’t	  do	  anything	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but	  then	  they	  arrest	  me.	  And	  just	  imagine	  I	  have	  six	  children	  and	  I	  am	  the	  only	  one	  with	  an	  income,	  then	  they	  also	  cannot	  survive.	  This	  I	  don’t	  like	  (e	  to	  bhālo	  
lāge	  nā).	  Or	  that	  they	  don’t	  even	  bother	  to	  find	  the	  criminal,	  for	  instance,	  when	  there	   would	   be	   a	   robbery	   in	   Samsuddin’s	   house	   and	   they	   just	   arrest	   Ahmed	  Saheb	  [the	  neighbour]	  because	  he	  just	  happens	  to	  live	  nearby’.	  Samsuddin	  adds	  in	  characteristic	  zealousness:	  ‘It’s	  because	  the	  dacoits	  give	  the	  police	  money	  so	  they	  will	  never	  be	  arrested,	  so	  the	  poor	  who	  can’t	  pay	  the	  police	  will	  be	  arrested	  instead,	   so	   that	   it	   looks	   like	   the	   police	   do	   good	   work.	   Moreover,	   those	   poor	  won’t	  have	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  court	  case,	  and	  even	  if	  they	  can,	  a	  case	  would	  last	  at	   least	   two	  years	  and	   in	   those	  years	  how	  can	   the	  wife	   and	   children	  eat?	  The	  police	   are	   supposed	   to	   ensure	   that	  we	   can	   live	   in	  peace.	  But	  now,	   the	  dacoits	  live	  in	  peace	  and	  we	  don’t’.	  In	  a	  murmur	  I	  comment,	  ‘what	  a	  terrible	  system…’	  to	  which	  Samsuddin	  vigorously	  says:	   ‘The	  police	  system	   is	  fine,	  but	  the	  work	  isn’t	  good	  ('Police	  system'	  ṭhik	  āche,	  kintu	  kāj	  bhālo	  nā).	  They	  don’t	  give	  punishment,	  they	  just	  take	  money’.	  He	  sits	  upright,	  waving	  his	  arms	  wildly,	  visibly	  upset	  and	  frustrated.	  	  	  Significantly,	  Samsuddin	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  system	  that	  is	  bad;	  it	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  proper	  implementation	  and	  execution.	  He	  carries	  on	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  result	   is	  a	   situation	  exactly	  opposite	   to	   the	   ideal:	   the	  dacoits	  are	   in	  peace,	  but	  ordinary	  citizens	  are	  not.	  It	  is	  the	  poor	  who	  are	  victimized	  most.	  Nevertheless,	  Samsuddin	  pledges	  allegiance	  to	  the	   ‘system’,	  and	  as	  I	  quote	  him	  saying	  in	  the	  opening	   vignette	   of	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis,	   his	  dharma	   obliges	   him	   to	  follow	   the	   law	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state.	  That	   is,	   the	   system	   is	  not	   incongruent	  with	  the	   ideal	   social	   order	   of	   the	   Islamic	   dharma;	   the	   state	   ideology	   can	   operate	  within	   a	   larger	   transcendental	   social.	   Yet	   this	   system	   has	   gone	   lopsided:	   the	  short-­‐term	   cycle	   of	   transactions	   is	   no	   longer	   rooted	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   cycle	   of	  transactions,	   so	   the	   abstract	   value	   of	   citizenship	   is	   subordinated	   to	   the	  competition	  over	  money	  and	  power.	  
‘This	  is	  not	  a	  democracy’	  	  The	  ‘system’	  that	  Samsuddin	  refers	  to	  is	  expected	  to	  operate	  according	  to	  a	  secular-­‐liberal	   ideology.	   In	   the	   critique	   on	   politics	   and	   corruption,	   Joygramis	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employ	  secular	  ideological	  frames	  and	  in	  fact	  demonstrate	  an	  unwavering	  faith	  in	   ideological	   constructions	   such	   as	   ‘democracy’.	   Take	   for	   example	   Irfan	  Khadim.	   He	   is	   a	   shareholder	   of	   the	   cattle	  market,	   involved	  with	   the	   party	   in	  power	  (TMC)	  and	  a	  local	  leader	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  NGO.	  Despite	  his	  involvement	  with	  politics,	  he	   is	  very	  critical	  about	  politicians:	  according	  to	  Irfan	  politicians	  ‘misuse’	   their	  power,	   try	  to	  make	  as	  much	  money	  as	  possible	  and	  immediately	  put	  this	  on	  their	  Swiss	  bank	  account.	  ‘If	  all	  that	  money	  on	  Swiss	  bank	  accounts	  had	  not	  been	  stolen	  by	   the	  politicians	  but	  used	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	   the	  poor,	  no	  Indian	  would	  have	   to	  be	   so	  poor	   anymore!	  But	   they	  are	   all	   cheaters.	   Is	   this	   a	  democracy?	  No,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  democracy’.	  	  When	  Irfan	  says	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  democracy,	  and	  therefore	  the	  poor	  remain	  poor,	   he	   implies	   that	   a	   well	   operating	   democracy	   would	   mean	   a	   proper	  distribution	  of	  wealth.	  Clearly,	  according	  to	  Irfan	  the	  ideal	  of	  democracy	  is	  being	  subordinated	   to	   individual	   gluttony	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   marginalized.	  Similarly,	   as	   the	   conversation	   below	   will	   demonstrate,	   Ahmed	   has	   an	  unwavering	  faith	  in	  the	  ‘idea	  of	  India’	  (Khilnani	  1997)	  but	  unlike	  Irfan	  he	  only	  grudgingly	  wants	  to	  admit	   that	  not	  everything	   is	   like	   it	  should	  be.	  He	  remains	  loyal	   to	   the	   Congress	   party,	   in	   his	   eyes	   the	   originators	   of	   the	   ‘idea	   of	   India’.	  Ahmed’s	   position	   is	   exemplary	   of	   a	   more	   wide	   spread	   tendency	   to	   attribute	  blame	  to	  the	  communist	  party	  specifically.	  	  	  On	   a	   regular	   afternoon,	   4pm,	   tea-­‐time,	   a	   gentle	   conversation	  with	   Ahmed	  and	  his	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  Jamirul	  takes	  a	  turn	  to	  politics.	  They	  reflect	  on	  how	  the	  CPM	  has	   ruined	  West	  Bengal,	  made	   it	   from	  one	  of	   the	  wealthiest	   states	   in	   India	   to	  one	  of	   the	  poorest,	   as	   they	   stalled	   any	   form	  of	   industrial	   advancement.	  Apart	  from	  the	  communist	  politics	  they	  oppose,	  they	  see	  the	  large	  population	  growth	  as	   an	   obvious	   problem	   for	   development.	   Ahmed	   does	   not	   seem	   entirely	  opposed	  to	  family	  planning,	  like	  in	  the	  days	  of	  emergency	  under	  Indira	  Gandhi,	  or	  in	  China.	  In	  China	  such	  things	  can	  work	  because	  there	  is	  only	  one	  party,	  but	  here	  the	  people	  would	  no	  longer	  allow	  for	  such	  dictatorship.	  But	  not	  that	  China	  is	  any	  better	   than	  India!	  No,	  Ahmed	  steadfastly	  maintains,	   ‘here	  public	  speech	  has	   power,	   there	   it	   has	   no	   power,	   there	   you’d	   be	   punished	   if	   you	   speak	   out	  freely,	   here	   you	   won’t’.	   Yet	   nothing	   is	   changing,	   because	   the	   people	   are	   not	  
173	  	  
‘united’.	   Jamirul	   jumps	   in	  with	   scepticism,	   ‘the	   only	   power	   people	   have	   is	   the	  
vote’.	  So,	  I	  ask,	  what	  is	  the	  benefit	  of	  free	  speech	  if	  it	  doesn’t	  actually	  have	  any	  power?’	  Ahmed	  gets	  annoyed,	  as	  he	  typically	  does	  when	  I	  challenge	  his	  bright	  picture	  of	  India.	  Yet	  he	  concedes,	  ‘the	  problem	  is	  that	  politics	  has	  become	  very	  corrupted’	  (rāj'nīti	  khub	  'corrupted'	  haye	  geche).	  Of	  the	  100	  rupees	  meant	  to	  go	  to	  the	  poor,	  only	  10	  rupees	  get	  to	  them’.	  Jamirul	  adds,	  ‘and	  they’re	  happy	  with	  that,	   because	   10	   is	   better	   than	   nothing,	   and	   they	   are	   ignorant,	   so	   they’ll	   give	  their	   vote.	   Take	   the	   people	  with	   the	   ration	   card,	   they’re	   supposed	   to	   get	   free	  rice	  every	  week,	  but	  even	  that	  they	  don’t	  get.	   It’s	  not	  only	  the	  rice	  dealer	  who	  takes	  it,	  everyone	  puts	  a	  little	  bit	   in	  his	  own	  pocket,	  and	  nothing	  is	  left	  for	  the	  poorest’.	  	  	  In	  this	  narrative	  of	  decay,	  Ahmed	  reflects	  positively	  on	  liberal	  values	  such	  as	  free	  speech	  and	  democratic	  participation.	  Ahmed’s	  position	  exemplifies	  Parry’s	  (2000)	  argument	  that	  anti-­‐corruption	  discourse	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  internalization	  of	   the	   abstract,	   universalistic	   values	   of	   the	   modern	   state;	   and,	   as	   Hansen	  suggests,	  of	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  ‘myth	  of	  the	  state’	  as	  the	  guarantor	  of	  a	  minimum	  of	   social	   order	   and	   justice	   (Hansen	   2001:	   222).	   Indeed,	   as	  Williams	   observes	  among	  Muslim	   Ansaris	   in	   Varanasi,	   ‘their	   expectations	   of	   the	   state	   to	   deliver	  basic	  provisions	  equally	  within	  society,	  despite	  a	  widespread	  recognition	  of	  its	  failure	  to	  actually	  do	  so,	  reflects	  a	  sustained	  faith	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  secular	  state’	  (2012:	  986;	  see	  also	  Fuller	  &	  Harriss	  2001).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  a	  dialectic	  process.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   in	  West	  Bengal	   the	   language	  of	   socio-­‐cultural	  and	  economic	   reform	  programs	  of	  the	  LF	  –	  anti-­‐casteism,	  social	  equality	  of	  the	  poor,	  literacy	  and	  land	  redistribution	   –	   infiltrated	   the	   villages	   as	   a	   by-­‐product	   of	   the	   intense	  politicisation	   of	   rural	   society	   under	   communist	   rule.	   Moreover,	   increasing	  corruption	   and	   mal-­‐governance	   notwithstanding,	   reforms	   of	   the	   communist	  government	   like	   land	   redistribution,	   security	   of	   tenancy	   rights,	   and	   political	  decentralisation	  have	  had	  their	   impact	  on	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  structures	   in	  rural	   Bengal	   (Rogaly,	   Harris-­‐White	   &	   Bose	   1999;	   Ruud	   2003).	   Due	   to	   these	  reforms,	   ‘all	   poor	   people	   irrespective	   of	   jāti	   [caste/community]	   have	  experienced	   enhancements	   in	   their	   social	   position,	   economic	   well-­‐being,	   and	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political	   representation’	   (Ruud	   1999:	   274).	   Thus	   rural	   people	   encountered	  particular	  ideas	  of	  justice	  and	  valued	  them	  insofar	  as	  they	  benefitted	  from	  them.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   CPM	  party	   affiliates,	   often	   including	   local	   government	  employees	  such	  as	  schoolteachers,	  mediated	  between	  the	  ‘society’	  of	  bhadralok	  and	   the	   rural	   communities,	   without	   breaking	   down	   entirely	   the	   various	   local	  ideological	  orientations.	  That	  is,	  the	  local	  understanding	  of	  justice	  continued	  to	  inform	   political	   action,	   under	   the	   rhetoric	   umbrella	   of	   a	   communist	   ideology	  (Ruud	   2003:	   154).	   So	   between	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   models	   of	   the	   peasant	  representatives	   of	   the	   CPM	   and	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	   party,	   there	   developed	   ‘a	  complex	  relationship	  of	  mutuality	  and	  shared	  values’	  (Ruud	  1999:	  270).	  	  As	  for	  Joygram,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  determine	  whether	  values	  of	  equality,	  solidarity,	  and	   redistribution	   of	   resources	   have	   their	   sources	   in	   Islam	   or	   in	   the	   state	  ideology,	   or	   are	   the	   result	   of	   processes	   of	   vernacularisation.	   Certain	   services	  and	  goods,	  such	  as	  care	  for	  the	  poor,	  may	  sometimes	  be	  considered	  ethical	  with	  explicit	   reference	   to	   the	   democratic	   constitution,	   and	   at	   other	   times	   with	  explicit	  reference	  to	  Islamic	  scriptures.	  The	  significant	  finding	  here,	  however,	  is	  that	   the	   secular	   democratic	   ideology	   is	   not	   considered	   incongruent	   with	   the	  Islamic	   dharma	   –	   there	   is	   a	   potential	   for	   mutuality.	   I	   suggest	   that	   Joygrami	  Muslims	  have	  incorporated	  the	  conceptual	  grammar	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  within	  their	   own	   cosmopolitics	  because	   there	  was	   the	  potential	   for	   resonance	   in	   the	  conceptualisations	  of	  justice	  and	  order.	  	  
Banality	  of	  evil	  	  Joygrami	   Muslims	   do	   not	   encounter	   corruption	   or	   vicious	   economic	  practices	  as	  phenomena	  external	  to	  them.	  Politics	  and	  the	  market	  enter	  into	  the	  everyday	   life	   of	   citizens,	   and	   corruption	  makes	   every	   citizen	   complicit	   in	   the	  reproduction	   of	   structural	   violence.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   ways	   in	  which	  the	  infiltration	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  villages,	  and	  particularly	  the	  scarcity	  and	  inescapable	  necessity	  of	  money	  creates	  the	  ‘horrendous	  possibility	  that	  the	  individual	  will	  become	  so	  embroiled	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  cycle	  that	  he	  will	  ignore	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  long	  cycle’	  (Bloch	  and	  Parry	  1989:	  27).	  Individuals,	  here,	  are	  not	   only	   politicians	   or	   brokers	   external	   to	   Joygram,	   but	   include	   ordinary	  Joygramis.	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In	   the	   section	   above	   I	   recount	   how	   Ahmed	   and	   his	   son-­‐in-­‐law	   Jamirul	  condemn	  the	  practice	  of	  rice	  distributors	  to	  take	  a	  share	  of	  the	  rice	  rather	  than	  distribute	   everything	   to	   the	   poor	   according	   to	   their	   entitlements	   as	   per	   the	  ration-­‐card	  or	  BPL	  card.	  In	  this	  part	  of	  Joygram,	  Munirul	  Malik	  is	  employed	  by	  the	  panchayat	  to	  manage	  the	  ration-­‐card	  distribution	  centre;	  he	  is	  the	  cousin	  of	  Ahmed’s	   other	   son-­‐in-­‐law.	   Some	  months	   after	   this	   conversation,	  Munirul	   had	  been	   caught	   obscuring	   enormous	   amounts	   of	   rice	   (100	   quintal,	   equivalent	   to	  10,000	   kilogram),	   which	   he	   had	   intended	   to	   sell	   on	   the	   market.	   Basir	   had	  intercepted	   Munirul	   in	   the	   process	   of	   bribing	   the	   panchayat	   leaders	   to	   keep	  silent.	   Sheik	   Muktar,	   a	   hawker	   from	   Lovokondo	   pāṛā,	   had	   also	   once	   caught	  Munirul	  doing	  ‘business’	  with	  the	  then	  panchayat	  president	  Laila	  Khadim	  (from	  Khadim	  pāṛā).	  Sheik	  Muktar	  was	  outraged	  when	  he	  told	  me	  the	  story,	  but	  when	  I	  asked	  him	  what	  he	  had	  done	  with	  the	  information,	  he	  said	  he	  had	  been	  given	  a	  quintal	   of	   rice	   to	   keep	   quiet;	   an	   offer	   he	   could	   not	   refuse	   in	   his	   insecure	  financial	  situation.	  	  The	   problem	   is,	   then,	   that	   corruption	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   politicians	   and	   the	  police	  but,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Jamirul,	  has	  spoiled	  the	  entire	  society	  (‘samāj	  naṣṭa	  
haye	  giyeche’)	  –	   indeed,	  because	  of	  corruption’s	   inescapable	  nature.	   I	  shall	  not	  recount	   every	   instance	   of	   violation	   of	   norms	   and	   laws;	   it	   is	   endless	   (see	   also	  Chatterjee	  2009).	  As	  Sheik	  Muktar	  summarised	  it:	  ‘Here	  with	  us,	  in	  West	  Bengal,	  I	  feel	  there	  is	  too	  much	  cheating.	  There	  are	  very	  few	  honest	  people.	  Nobody	  can	  stay	   clean.	   There	   is	   too	   much	   dirty	   business’	   (beśī	   dhāndhā	   āche).	   Hence,	  everyone	   is	   complicit	   and	   everyone	   is	   a	   victim,	   although	   in	   different	   degrees	  and	  at	  different	  levels.	  	  Emma	  Tarlo	  (2003)	  recounts	  that	  the	  large-­‐scale	  violence	  inflicted	  through	  sterilisation	   during	   emergency	   and	   its	   rapid	   normalisation	   and	   routinisation,	  was	  made	  possible	  because	   a	   large	  number	  of	   individuals	   participated	  within	  already	   existing	   power	   dynamics	   and	   social	   relationships.	   She	   suggests	   that	  emergency	   was	   a	   particular	   time	   in	   which	   such	   crimes,	   and	   the	   all-­‐encompassing	   complicity,	   could	   become	   ordinary.	   However,	   I	   feel	   that	   the	  situation	   she	   describes,	   despite	   its	   higher	   level	   of	   physical	   violence	   and	   far-­‐reaching	   consequences,	   is	   not	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   what	   I	   have	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observed	   in	   ordinary	   times.86 	  Perhaps,	   indeed,	   rural	   West	   Bengal	   is	   in	   a	  constant	   ‘state	   of	   emergency’,	   in	   the	   sense	   Walter	   Benjamin	   proposed	   (see	  Agamben	  1998).	  	  The	   ‘state	  of	   emergency’	   reached	  a	   climax	  during	   the	   ‘Saradha	   scam’.	  The	  Saradha	   Group	   used	   to	   run	   a	   Ponzi	   scheme	   through	   a	   conglomerate	   of	  more	  than	   200	   private	   companies	   that	   accumulated	   300	   billion	   INR	   through	  collective	   investments	  popularly	  known	  as	   ‘chits’.87	  When	   it	   collapsed	   in	  April	  2013	  and	  the	  money	  mysteriously	   ‘disappeared’,	   it	  soon	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  duped	   investors	  were	  among	   the	  most	  destitute	  of	   rural	  Bengalis,	  who	   had	   invested	   their	   petty	   savings.	   However,	   the	   middlemen	   were	   also	  duped.	  There	  was	  a	  middle	  man	  or	  two	  in	  almost	  every	  village,	   if	  not	  working	  for	   Saradha	   then	   for	   Golden	   Life	   or	   one	   of	   the	   other	   chit	   funds	   with	   equally	  promising	   names	   and	   that	   equally	   collapsed	   in	   a	   domino	   effect.	   The	   brokers,	  who	   had	   incited	   the	   villagers	   to	   sign	   up	   for	   the	   scheme	   and	   collected	   their	  payments	  (for	  a	  generous	  commission),	  were	  the	  first	  targets	  of	  outrage.	  Most	  of	   the	   duped	   villagers	   I	   spoke	   to	  were	   aware	   that	   they	  were	   victim	   to	   larger	  forces	  but	  because	   they	  had	  no	  other	   target	   for	   their	   anger	   and	  because	   they	  simply	   needed	   their	   money	   back	   for	   survival,	   the	   brokers	   were	   held	  responsible.	  Tarlo	  writes:	   ‘For	  it	   is	   in	  the	  ordinary	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  market	  that	   black	   and	   white	   merge	   into	   many	   shades	   of	   gray	   and	   notions	   of	  responsibility	   seems	   to	   become	   forgotten’	   (Tarlo	   2000:	   265).	   Worse	   still,	  responsibility	   is	  devolved	  onto	  kin	  and	  neighbour	  when	   ‘larger	   forces’	  are	  too	  abstract	   to	   directly	   hold	   accountable.	  Many	   brokers	   fled	   their	   homes.	   Others,	  who	   could	   afford	   it,	   paid	   the	   investors	   back	   from	   their	   own	   pocket,	   often	  bankrupting	  themselves.	  Either	  way,	   their	  position	  in	  the	  network	  of	  relations	  had	  become	  very	  suspicious.	  	  The	   muted	   violence	   of	   corruption	   and	   the	   state’s	   penetration	   into	   every	  sphere	  of	  life	  has	  thoroughly	  changed	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ordinary	  life	  and	  social	  relations	  are	  experienced.	  Because	  of	  the	  penetration	  of	  the	  corrupt	  market	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  See	  BBC	  News	  on	  ‘India’s	  dark	  history	  of	  sterilization’	  after	  15	  girls	  had	  died	  in	  state-­‐run	  sterilization	  camps	  in	  November	  2014	  (Biswas	  2014).	  	  87	  The	  newspapers	  screamed	  indignation:	  The	  Hindu:	  ‘Cheat	  funds,	  again’	  (Editorial	  2013);	  Daily	   Mail:	   ‘Anger	   mounts	   over	   Saradha	   fund	   crisis	   as	   thousands	   of	   depositors	   face	   ruin’	  (Bhabani	  2013).	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politics	   in	   the	   village,	   in	   forms	   of	   delegated	   responsibility,	   the	   scam	   is	   an	  instance	  in	  which	  the	   ‘grounds	  on	  which	  trust	   in	  everyday	  life	   is	  built	  seem	  to	  disappear,	   revealing	   the	   ordinary	   as	  uncanny	   and	   in	   need	   of	   being	   recovered	  rather	  than	  something	  having	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  world	  in	  which	  trust	   can	   be	   unhesitatingly	   placed’	   (Das	   and	   Kleinman	   2000:	   8,	   emphasis	   in	  original).	   The	   empty	   houses	   of	   the	   middle-­‐men	   (which	   reminded	   me	   of	   the	  empty	  houses	  of	  political	  workers	  of	   the	  opposition	  who	  regularly	  had	   to	   flee	  for	  safety	  during	  elections)	  definitively	  revealed	  ‘the	  ordinary	  as	  uncanny’.	  The	  ‘banality	   of	   evil’	  makes	   everyone	   suspicious.	   It	   is	   no	   longer	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  that	  fellow	  Muslims,	  even	  those	  in	  one’s	  own	  pāṛā,	  will	  use	  jñān/phronesis	  and	  make	  a	  balanced	   judgment	   in	  a	  particular	   situation	  –	  especially	  because	  what	  may	   seem	   to	  be	   the	   right	   choice	  may	   turn	  out	   to	  be	   terribly	  detrimental.	  The	  recovery	   of	   trust	   in	   everyday	   life	   implies	   the	   recovery	   of	   trust	   in	   people’s	  everyday	   judgments;	  and	  this	   is	  part	  of	   the	  broader	  project	  of	   the	  recovery	  of	  
dharma	  in	  everyday	  life.	  	  
The	  trouble	  with	  money	  This	   subsection	   will	   discuss	   the	   precarious	   nature	   of	   ordinary	   exchanges	  involving	  money.	  There	   is	  an	  apparent	  contradiction	  regarding	  money:	  on	   the	  one	   hand,	   the	   exchange	   of	   money	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	  ethical	   community	   and	   the	   cosmic	   order	   and	   it	   can	   foster	   solidarity;	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  exchange	  of	  money	  can	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  cosmic	  order	  and	  create	  exploitation.	  The	  role	  of	  money	  depends	  on	  whether	  money	   is	  handled	  according	  to	  dharma;	   in	  a	  corrupted	  monetary	  economy,	  money	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  further	  exploitation.	  People	  in	  a	  disadvantageous	  financial	  position	  are	  often	  forced	  in	  a	  position	  where	  they	  have	  to	  take	  part	  in	  monetary	  exchanges	  that	  do	  not	   foster	   solidarity.	   As	   such,	   their	   dignity	   and	   ethical	   autonomy	   are	  undermined.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  conversation	  it	  becomes	  explicit	  how	  Islamic	  normativity	  is	  being	  subordinated	  to	  material	  acquisition;	  and	  thus	  how	  the	  long-­‐term	  cycle	  is	  subordinated	   to	   the	   short-­‐term	   cycle	   of	   transactions.	   Sharing	   tea	   in	   Dada’s	  courtyard,	   Dada	   and	   his	   neighbour	  Hafizul	   jocularly	   discuss	   the	   controversial	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marriage	   of	   an	   Ahl-­‐I	   Hadith	   man	   with	   a	   Barelwi	   woman.	   Ahl-­‐I-­‐Hadith	   and	  Barelwi	   are	   two	   different	   Islamic	   sects,	   which	   are	   ideally	   endogamous.	   It	   is,	  however,	  not	  necessarily	  unethical	   to	  marry	  outside	  one’s	   sect;	   it	   depends	  on	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions.	  Hafizul,	  a	  Deobandi	  himself	  married	  to	  a	  woman	  from	  an	   Ahl-­‐i	   Hadith	   family,	   justifies	   his	   own	   marriage	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  outstanding	  piety	  of	  his	  wife’s	  family	  and	  the	  ideal	  unity	  of	  Muslims.	  Sectarian	  endogamy,	   Islamic	   piety	   and	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   Islamic	   ummah	   can	   all	   be	  considered	  situational	  ethical	  aspirations	  that	  are	  hierarchically	  ordered;	  with	  sectarian	  endogamy	  generally	  situated	  at	  the	  bottom.	  In	   this	   conversation	   between	   Hafizul	   and	   Dada,	   Hafizul	   recounts	   how	   the	  groom’s	  parents	  had	  first	  objected	  the	  marriage,	  until	  the	  woman’s	  parents	  had	  made	   a	   significant	   dowry	   offer.	   They	   comically	   re-­‐enact	   how	   the	   decorous	  presentation	   of	   such	   an	   obviously	   banal	   thing	   as	   a	   fat	   blaring	   goat	   had	  overridden	   the	   abstract	   pondering	   over	   sectarian	   differences	   of	   the	   groom’s	  father.	   Turning	   to	   me	   with	   callous	   scepticism,	   Hafizul	   says:	   ‘dharma	   is	   the	  servant	  of	  money’	  (dharma	  ṭākār	  golām).	  	  There	   is	   nothing	   very	   unusual	   about	   a	   marriage	   between	   members	   of	  different	   Islamic	   sects,	   or	   about	   the	   offering	   of	   large	   dowries	   to	   persuade	   a	  potential	  groom.	  But	  what	  Hafizul	  points	  out	  here	  is	  that	  a	  larger	  problem	  is	  at	  play.	  Dharma,	  that	  is,	  moral	  principles	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  virtuous	  judgement,	  has	  become	  subordinate	  to	  ‘money’,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  a	  goat.	  ‘Dharma	  ṭākār	  golām’	  is	  a	  common	  saying,	  in	  a	  typical	  reversal	  of	  the	  ideal.	  ‘Money’/‘ṭākā’	  serves	  here	  only	   as	   a	   metonym.	   The	   saying	   itself	   points	   to	   the	   moral	   peril	   in	   the	  subordination	   of	   the	   principles	   organising	   the	   long-­‐term	   cosmic	   order	   to	   the	  principles	  governing	  the	  sphere	   involving	   individual	  competition	  and	  survival,	  and	   the	   negation	   of	   virtuous	   judgement.	   But	   using	   a	   common	   saying	   also	  reveals	   that	   Hafizul	   and	   Dada	   do	   not	   (only)	   blame	   the	   groom’s	   father	  personally,	  but	  (also)	  consider	  him	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  vicious	  force	  of	  money	  –	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  clearly	  not	  unfamiliar	  to	  them.	  	  	  	  Several	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  felt	  that	  the	  majority	  in	  Joygram	  has	  become	  rich	  with	   dubious	   money,	   locally	   called	   ‘nambaro	   dui	   ṭākā’	   (number	   two	  money).	  ‘Nambaro	   dui	   ṭākā’	   includes	   both	   money	   acquired	   legally	   but	   against	   Islamic	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rules	   (hārām	   money)	   as	   well	   as	   money	   acquired	   via	   bribery,	   unlawfully	  obtained	  contracts,	  or	  the	  sale	  of	  government	  provided	  goods	  intended	  for	  the	  poor,	   to	  name	  a	   few	   instances,	  and	   includes	  money	  earned	  through	  degrading	  work	   in	   the	   informal	   economy.	   It	   is	   significant	   that	   the	   term	   ‘number	   two	  money’	   denotes	   a	   hierarchical	   ranking	   of	  work	   and	   labour,	   among	  Hindus	   as	  well	   as	   Muslims.	   A	   hierarchical	   division	   of	   labour	   and	   consequential	  hierarchical	   pay	   rates	   are	   not	   considered	   problematic	   in	   itself,	   but	   the	  discursive	  recourse	  to	  a	  hierarchical	  ranking	  of	  work	  points	  to	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	   the	   unequal	   distribution	   of	   work	   and	   opportunities	   for	   labour.	   As	   ‘second	  rate’	   citizens,	   Muslims	   are	   pushed	   to	   do	   ‘second	   rate’	   work,	   labour	   without	  dignity,	  against	  their	  own	  ethical	  ideal	  of	  equal	  dignity	  for	  all.	  The	  discourse	  of	  pollution	   is	  merged	  with	   this	   egalitarian	   ethic:	   ‘second	   rate’	  work	   is	  polluting	  and	   the	   money	   it	   bears	   is	   ‘dirty	   money’	   (naṅṛā	   ṭākā).	   Inequality	   is	   a	   non-­‐normative	  structural	  disposition	  that	  can	  be	  responded	  to	  in	  moral	  (solidary)	  or	  immoral	  (exploitative)	  ways.	  ‘Nambaro	  dui	  ṭākā’	  is	  money	  used	  for	  exploitative	  ends,	   and	   in	   ways	   that	   go	   against	   ideals	   of	   redistribution,	   solidarity	   and,	  ultimately,	  equality.	  	  	  Muslims	   are	   not	   only	   victims	   of	   exploitative	   usage	   of	  money	   but	   also	   the	  culprits.	   One	   afternoon,	   Irfan	   explains	   me	   why	   interest	   (sud)	   is	   hārām	   and	  therefore	   ‘nambaro	   dui	   ṭākā’:	   by	   asking	  more	   money	   back	   than	  was	   lent,	   the	  lender	  abuses	  the	  disadvantageous	  situation	  of	  the	  borrower,	  because	  someone	  would	  only	  borrow	  money	  when	  he	  is	  in	  a	  disadvantageous	  position.	  So	  interest	  goes	  against	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Islamic	  dharma:	  solidarity.	  We	  sit	  for	  a	  moment	   in	   silence,	   drinking	   our	   tea.	   Then	   he	   exclaims,	   visibly	   agitated:	   ‘the	  majority	  of	  the	  Muslims	  here	  are	  hārām,	  only	  money,	  money,	  money’.	  	  Irfan	   sees	   interest	   on	   loans	   as	   a	   particular	   instance	   where	   an	   unequal	  situation	   is	  abused	  and	   the	  marginalised	  exploited.	   Inequality	   is	  acceptable	  as	  long	  as	   it	  maintains	  a	  complimentary	  solidarity,	  yet	   interest	  abuses	   inequality	  for	  personal	  prosperity	  at	  the	  loss	  of	  another.	  According	  to	  Irfan,	  the	  majority	  of	  Muslims	  ‘here’	  have	  become	  so	  preoccupied	  with	  money	  that	  they	  forestall	  this	  moral	   rule;	   once	   again,	   dharma	   has	   become	   subordinate	   to	   individual	  accumulation	   of	   wealth.	   Many	   Joygramis	   would	   tell	   me	   that	   money	   feeds	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greediness	   (lobh),	   an	   emotion	   that	   can	   at	   times	   be	   overpowering.	   It	   makes	  people	  blind	  (andha).	  When	  overwhelmed	  by	  greediness,	  people	  can	  no	  longer	  see	   the	   necessity	   of	   prioritising	   the	   sphere	   of	   long-­‐term	   transactions	   over	  individual	  competition	  and	  accumulation.	  	  	  It	   is	  because	  money	  is	  such	  a	  key	  ingredient	  in	  the	  cycle	  of	  criminality	  and	  impunity,	   and	   such	   a	   tangible	   expression	   of	   inequality,	   that	   this	   ‘morally	  indeterminate	  instrument	  becomes	  something	  morally	  opprobrious’	  (Bloch	  and	  Parry	  1989:	  28).	  However,	  money	  is	  also	  a	  requirement	  for	  living	  according	  to	  
dharma	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  As	  Bloch	  and	  Parry	  explain:	  ‘maintenance	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   order	   is	   both	   pragmatically	   and	  conceptually	   dependent	   on	   individual	   short-­‐term	   acquisitive	   endeavour.	  Not	   only	   do	   the	   latter	   in	   fact	   provide	  much	   of	   the	  material	   wherewithal	  necessary	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	   the	  encompassing	  order,	  but	   it	  also	  has	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  this	  order	  can	  only	  perpetuate	  itself	  through	  the	  biological	  and	  economic	  activities	  of	  individuals’	  (1989:	  26).	  	  In	   other	   words,	   whereas	   the	   short-­‐term	   cycle	   of	   transactions	   requires	  compromises	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  cycle	  of	  transactions,	  the	  latter	  can	  only	  exist	  by	  virtue	   of	   the	   former.	   This	   idea	   is	   exemplified	   by	   a	   comment	   of	   Nasiruddin,	  Samsuddin’s	   eldest	   brother,	   who	   was	   educated	   at	   a	   Deobandi	   madrasa	   and	  occasionally	  works	  as	  an	  imam.	  Reflecting	  on	  my	  research,	  he	  says:	  ‘You	  want	  to	  know	  what	   our	   dharma	   is.	   And	  we	   can	   tell	   you	   that.	   But	   actually,	   we	   do	   the	  opposite	   (ām'rā	   tār	   ulṭo	   kari)’.	   The	   usually	   jocular	   and	   sarcastic	   young	   man	  suddenly	  seemed	  serious	  for	  a	  rare	  few	  minutes.	  He	  continues:	  ‘For	  example,	  we	  should	   be	   praying	   five	   times	   a	   day,	   we	   should	   not	   get	   angry,	   boys	   and	   girls	  should	  not	  make	  eye-­‐contact	  [he	  grins	  while	  looking	  me	  in	  the	  eyes],	  we	  should	  not	  play	   cards	   [alluding	   to	   the	  daily	   card	  games	  at	  his	  neighbours	  house],	  we	  should	  not	  drink	  alcohol	  [‘do	  you	  drink	  alcohol?’	  ‘Everybody	  drinks	  alcohol!’].’	  I	  ask	  him	  why	  he	   thought	   everyone	   is	  doing	   the	  opposite.	  He	   replied,	   pulling	   a	  pitiful	  face	  with	  a	  sarcastic	  grin:	  ‘we	  can’t,	  we	  don’t	  have	  money’	  (ām'rā	  pāri	  nā,	  
āmāder	  ṭākā	  nei).	  One	   does	   not	   necessarily	   need	   money	   for	   any	   of	   the	   normative	   practices	  Nasiruddin	  refers	  to.	  But	  I	  suggest	  that	  Nasiruddin	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘householder’s	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dilemma’	   (Das	   2014;	   Lambek	   2013):	   the	   difficulty	   of	   living	   in	   a	   world	   of	  biological	  needs,	  emotional	  desires	  and	  material	  demands.	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  do	  acknowledge	   the	   position	   of	   the	   householder,	   and	   the	   householder	   is	   not	  entirely	   discredited	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  moral	   high	   ground	   of	   the	   ascetic.	   It	   is	  recognized	   that	   acquisitive	   endeavours	   are	   necessary	   for	   the	   reproduction	   of	  solidarity,	   even	   though	   it	   may	   be	   contested	   in	   exactly	   what	   ways.	   Harmony	  requires	  money,	   but	   it	   requires	  money	   to	   be	   fairly	   distributed.	   As	   one	   of	  my	  friends	  put	  it,	  ‘If	  there	  is	  no	  money,	  one’s	  mind/heart	  is	  not	  quite	  right	  (ṭākā	  nā	  
thāk'le,	  man	  ṭhik	  thāke	  nā)’,	  and	  when	  in	  the	  past	  there	  was	  no	  money,	  people	  started	   arguing	   with	   each	   other.	   ‘Now	   that	   there’s	   money,	   everyone’s	  mind/heart	  is	  right’	  (man	  ṭhik	  thāke).	  I	  will	   address	   in	  more	   detail	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   difficulty	   of	   the	  householder,	  and	  the	  scepticism	  surrounding	  asceticism	  as	  a	  withdrawal	   from	  this-­‐worldly	  demands	  in	  chapter	  6.	  Here	  I	  merely	  want	  to	  point	  out	  that	  there	  is	  explicit	   space	   for	   entering	   individually	   accumulated	   wealth	   into	   long-­‐term	  circulation,	   through	   provisions	   like	   zakat	   (almsgiving).	   Islamic	   reformism	   in	  particular	  allows	  for	  economic	  pragmatism	  and	  pious	  sincerity	  to	  be	  merged	  (F.	  &	   C.	   Osella	   2009).	   I	   want	   to	   add,	   however,	   that	   particularly	   ‘dirty’	   money,	  requires	   a	   performative	   form	   of	   ‘moral	   laundering’	   not	   dissimilar	   to	   the	  ‘cooking’	  of	  money	  in	  a	  Malay	  fishing	  community	  described	  by	  Carsten	  (1989).	  Through	  such	  actions,	   the	  exchanges	   in	   the	   short-­‐term	  cycle	  are	   linked	   to	   the	  long-­‐term	  cycle,	  and	  are	  rendered	  morally	  positive.	  	  A	   group	   of	   Muslim	   entrepreneurs,	   involved	   in	   the	   corrupt	   coal	   business,	  directly	  related	  their	  financial	  prosperity	  to	  moral	  duty.	  They	  told	  me	  they	  came	  to	   Joygram	   for	  an	   Islamic	   congregation	  organised	  by	   the	   Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind	  because	  they	  want	  to	  learn	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  Muslim,	  to	  learn	  the	  ‘formula’	  of	   how	   to	   live	   as	   a	   Muslim.	   They	   say,	   ‘now	   our	   financial	   situation	   is	   good’	  (āmāder	  ārthik	  abasthā	  bhālo),	   so	  now	   it	   is	  our	  duty	   (dāyitva)	   to	  attend	   these	  congregations,	  learn	  about	  Islam,	  and	  go	  home	  and	  spread	  the	  word’.	  As	  among	  Muslim	  entrepreneurs	   in	  Malaysia	   (Sloane-­‐White	  2011),	  Kerala	   (F.	  Osella	  &	  C.	  Osella	  2009),	  and	  Southeast	  Asia	  (Rudnyckyj	  2009)	  economic	  pragmatism	  and	  a	  pious	   Muslim	   subjectivity	   are	   merged	   in	   the	   combined	   project	   of	   economic	  progress	  and	  moral	  ‘upliftment’	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community.	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  Nevertheless,	   the	   idea	   and	   the	   experience	   that	   corruption	   is	   all-­‐pervasive	  inspires	  an	  insidious	  scepticism	  towards	  moral	  righteousness	  irrespective	  of	  in	  whom	   it	  manifests.	  Nieghbours	  become	  suspicious	  of	  neighbours;	   kin	  become	  suspicious	   of	   kin.	   This	   is	   particularly	   the	   case	   when	   there	   is	   awareness	   that	  fellow	   Muslims	   are	   either	   suspiciously	   wealthy,	   or	   find	   themselves	   in	  marginalised	  positions	  where	  they	  are	  pushed	  to	  respond	  to	  poverty	  in	  morally	  demeaning	  ways.	  Money	  becomes	  a	  sign	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  subordination	  of	  short-­‐term	  acquisitive	  pursuits,	  and	  thus	  of	  immorality	  experienced	  and	  expressed	  as	  inequality.	  Money	  does	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  morally	  positive	  when	  it	  is	  used	   for	   the	   reintegration	   of	   the	   two	   cycles	   in	   the	   public	   domain;	   however	   it	  becomes	  morally	  negative	  when	  it	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  this.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  having	  to	  do	   labour	   that	   earns	   ‘nambaro	  dui	  ṭākā’	   this	   is	  most	   clearly	   the	   case:	   these	  labourers	  have	  to	  forsake	  their	  dignity	  and	  exploit	  themselves,	  and	  the	  result	  is	  ‘dirty	  money’.	  Moreover,	  the	  awareness	  that	  ‘we	  do	  the	  opposite	  of	  our	  dharma’	  instils	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure	  and	  scepticism,	  and	  reveals	  a	  lack	  of	  ethical	  autonomy.	  The	  latter	  point	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  6.	  	  
Modernity	  and	  the	  reintegration	  of	  social	  life	  	  In	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis	   I	   discussed	   the	   ambiguous	   relationship	  between	   politics	   and	   dharma	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   postcolonial	   anti-­‐politics	  discourse.	  Through	  processes	  of	  vernacularization,	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  have	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	   integrated	  political	  discourses	  and	  modern	  modes	  of	  organising	  social	  relationships	  and	  domains	  of	  life	  in	  their	  cosmopolitics,	  as	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated.	   However,	   the	  modern	   narrative	   of	   the	   Indian	  state	   is	   in	   itself	   incoherent	   and	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   create	   coherence	   Joygramis	  integrate	  modern	  narratives	  within	   their	   habitual	   holistic	   ideas	   of	   justice	   and	  order.	  As	  a	  result,	  people	  are	  drawing	  lines	  of	  separation	  between	  politics	  and	  
dharma	  and	   expressing	   desires	   for	   reintegration	   simultaneously.	   This	   section	  addresses	   the	   resulting	   rhetorical	   ambiguity	  and	  experiential	  uncertainty	   that	  transpire	  from	  ordinary	  conversations.	  As	  such,	  it	  goes	  some	  way	  in	  explaining	  why	   Islamic	   reformism	   is	   in	   itself	   an	   ambiguous	   response	   to	   the	   incoherence	  and	   uncertainty	   produced	   by	   the	   processes	   of	   vernacularisation	   between	  modern	  and	  local	  conceptualisations	  of	  justice.	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Politics	  and	  dharma	  	  Two	  of	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  sons,	  Fuaduddin	  and	  Wasim,	  say	  that	  taking	  money	  from	  the	  poor	  is	  not	  politics;	  it	  is	  party.	  Or,	  they	  correct	  themselves,	  it	  is	  kunīti,	  a	  term	  more	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  politics.	  Fuaduddin	  and	  Wasim	  explain	   that	   ‘kunīti	  means	  bad	  work,	   it	  means	   they	  do	   the	  opposite	   of	  good	  politics’.	  They	  go	  on	  to	  describe	  what	  good,	  wise	  politics	  would	  be	  like	  (for	  instance,	  providing	  good	  education	  for	  all	  children	  and	  providing	  clean	  drinking	  water).	  Yet	  when	   I	   ask	  whether	  doing	   these	  good	  works	   is	   like	  doing	  dharma	  they	   resolutely	   reject	   this	   idea.	   ‘Politics	   is	  one	   thing,	  dharma	   another’	  (rāj'nīti	  
ālādā,	  dharma	  ālādā),	  says	  Wasim,	  and	  Fuaduddin	  exclaims,	  as	  if	  explaining	  to	  a	  small	   child	   failing	   to	   understand,	   ‘that’s	   not	   dharma!	   That’s	   politics!’	   (aiṭā	  
dharma	  nay!	  aiṭā	  rāj'nīti!’).	  In	  this	  conversation,	  Fuaduddin	  and	  Wasim	  consider	  politics	  and	  dharma	  to	  be	   separately	   delineated	   realms	   of	   society.	   Similarly,	   Ruud	   observed	   that	  politics	   in	   his	   fieldsite	   in	  West	   Bengal	   was	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	   about	  worldly	  pursuits	  (artha);	  ‘politics	  is	  about	  power	  and	  not	  morality’	  (2001:	  134).	  This	   implies	   that	   people	   have	   become	   familiar	   with	   a	   legal	   model	   of	   society	  where	  politics	  and	  dharma	  are	  declared	  separate	  domains.	  The	  paradoxical	  role	  of	   the	   law	   in	   colonial	   power	   incited	   ‘the	   fundamental	   reordering	  of	   epistemic	  constructions	  of	  social	  reality’	  (Dirks	  1986:	  309)	  –	  the	  paradoxical	  anti-­‐politics	  discourse	  continues	  to	  do	  so.	  Nevertheless,	  even	  though	  politics	  and	  dharma	  are	  considered	  separate	  domains	  in	  certain	  contexts,	  it	  is	  more	  often	  assumed	  that	  the	  ethical	  source	  for	  politics	  is	  dharma.	  	  The	  immediate	  reference	  point	  for	  ‘bad	  politics’	  (kunīti)	  is	  the	  CPM.	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	   to	   criticise	   the	   CPM	   for	   not	   having	   a	   dharma.	   Although	   the	  communist	  leaders	  had	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  successfully	  played	  down	  communal	  categories,	  instead	  stressing	  class	  and	  party	  affiliation,	  most	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  now	   claim	   that	   they	   have	   been	   suffering	   economic	   deprivation	   and	   a	   lack	   of	  political	   representation	   because	   the	   communists	   are	   atheist;	   they	   did	   not	   do	  politics	  morally	  sustained	  by	  dharma	  and	  were	  instead	  accumulating	  their	  own	  wealth.	   The	   internalisation	   of	   values	   propagated	   by	   the	   state	   and	   growing	  political	   awareness	   has	   eventually	   turned	   against	   the	   LF	   (Bhattacharya	  2009;	  Chatterjee	  2009).	  It	  is	  considered	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  dharma	  that	  –	  after	  34	  years	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-­‐	  the	  CPM	  was	  defeated	  by	  the	  TMC.	  ‘The	  CPM	  doesn’t	  have	  dharma,	  that’s	  why	  that	  party	  is	  ‘useless’	  (CPM	  dharma	  nei,	  sei	  janya	  oi	  'party'	  bekār	  [term	  to	  denote	  general	  futility]),	  was	  an	  often	  heard	  phrase.	  Some	  felt	  that	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  only	  that	  the	  party	   itself	  was	   ‘atheist’	  (nāstik),	  and	   ‘goes	  with	  Karl	  Marx’	  (Karl	  
Marx	   niye	   cal’che)	   but	   also	   that	   they	   won’t	   let	   ordinary	   people	   be	   guided	   by	  
dharma.88	  The	  CPM	  would	  have	  prohibited	  people	  to	  follow	  their	  own	  dharma,	  as	   against	   the	   secular	   doctrine	   (‘secular	  māne,	   sabāi	  nijer	  dharma	  mānte	  pāre,	  
bāraṇ	   kar'te	   pāre	   nā.	   CPM	   kar'to’’,	   lit.	   ‘secularism	   means,	   everyone	   can	   obey	  their	  own	  dharma,	  you	  can’t	  prohibit	  that,	  that’s	  what	  the	  CPM	  did’).	  The	  detractors	  of	  the	  CPM	  blame	  the	  party	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  respect	  of	  people’s	  
dharma,	  whereas	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  CPM	  praise	  the	  party	  for	  its	  respect	  for	  local	  normativity.	  According	  to	  a	  small	  group	  of	  women	  from	  Mach	  Para,	  it	  was	  much	  better	  under	  the	  CPM.	  They	  complain	  that	  the	  TMC	  always	  gets	  the	  police	  directly	   involved,	   but	   the	   CPM	   sorted	   things	   out	   with	   the	   villagers	   first.	   The	  CPM	   knew	   the	   people	   of	   the	   village,	   so	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   police	   they	   would	  respect	  women	   in	  purdah.	  And	  when	  someone	   is	  considered	  guilty	  of	  a	  minor	  crime,	   the	   CPM	  would	   know	  what	   kind	   of	   punishment	  would	   be	   appropriate	  regarding	  the	  culprit’s	  financial	  condition,	  whereas	  the	  police	  would	  make	  him	  pay	  the	  standard	  fine	  regardless.	  	  	  It	  may	  be	  significant	  that	  the	  people	  who	  spoke	  out	  positively	  about	  the	  CPM	  were	  mainly	   women.	   The	   women	   quoted	   above,	   and	   including	   other	   women	  who	   suggested	   that	   the	  CPM	  had	  been	  better	   in	   giving	   proper	   punishment	   to	  those	  who	  deserve	   it,	   preferred	   political	   parties	   to	   operate	   according	   to	   local	  notions	  of	  justice.	  The	  more	  village	  life	  is	  integrated	  in	  the	  political-­‐legal	  system	  of	   the	   nation-­‐state,	   the	   more	   political	   relations	   are	   disembedded	   from	   the	  locality.	   The	  men	  may	  have	  had	  more	   access	   to	   abstract	   values	  of	   justice	   and	  equity,	   through	   education,	  media,	   and	   party	   propaganda,	   and	   expect	   political	  parties	   to	  operate	  accordingly.	  They	  reject	   the	  clientelism	  of	   the	  CPM.	   In	  both	  cases,	  what	  is	  understood	  as	  justice	  is	  expressed	  through	  the	  idiom	  of	  dharma.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  This	  assertion	  probably	  has	   its	  roots	   in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  then	  Chief	  Minister	  Buddhadev	  Bhattacharya	   in	  2004	  expressed	  himself	   against	   Islamic	  madrasas	   in	  a	   rather	  hostile	  manner,	  which	  gave	   rise	   to	  huge	  outrage	  among	   the	  Muslims	   in	  West	  Bengal.	  Few	  of	  my	   interlocutors	  referred	   explicitly	   to	   the	   event,	   but	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   news	   had	   been	   spread	   through	   the	  channels	   mentioned	   in	   chapter	   1:	   by	   the	   JUH	   and	   local	   public	   figures.	   See	   for	   an	   extensive	  discussion:	  Chatterjee	  (2006).	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Dharma,	  then,	  can	  denote	  an	  ethics	  of	  justice	  and	  order	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  an	   explicitly	   religious	   normativity.	   Good	   politics,	   rooted	   in	   dharma,	   does	   not	  mean	   Islamic	   politics.	   The	   Shari’a	   (Islamic	   law)	  does	  not	   have	   anything	   to	   do	  with	   politics	   in	   India,	   I	   was	   told	   repeatedly;	   good	   politics	   here	   must	   be	  according	  to	  the	  Indian	  law.	  	  Relating	  dharma	   to	  politics,	  Basir	   (by	   then	   the	   local	  TMC	   leader)	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  politics	  as	  care-­‐taking,	  a	  practice	  embedded	  in	  dharma	  as	  an	  ethics	  of	  care.	   One	   day	   he	   lashes	   out	   at	   the	   local	   CPM	   leader,	   talking	   to	   me	   in	   a	  conspiratorial	  whisper.	   ‘He	   is	  a	  very	  bad	  man.	  He	   is	  a	  communist,	   right,	   so	  he	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  god,	  he	  is	  an	  atheist.	  If	  you	  don’t	  have	  a	  god,	  you	  don’t	  have	  any	  values	   either,	   so	   how	   can	   you	   do	   good	   politics?’	   ‘But	   is	   there	   not	   some	  separation	   between	   politics	   [rāj'nīti]	   and	   dharma?’	   I	   ask.	   ‘Yes,	   we	   have	   that	  separation	  as	  well	  …	  it	  has	  become	  like	  that’,	  he	  says	  a	  little	  flustered.	  ‘Yet,	  doing	  politics	   is	   automatically	   doing	   dharma.	   Politics	   is	   taking	   care	   of	   people	   (sebā	  
karā),	   isn’t	   it?	   And	   that	   is	   dharma.	   And	   everything	   comes	   from	   god	   above	  [uparoyālā],	  so	  it	  wouldn’t	  be	  right	  to	  do	  politics	  without	  a	  god’.	  Basir	  explicitly	   locates	   the	  source	  of	  virtuous	  politics	   in	  dharma.	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  Basir	  favoured	  the	  Muslim	  jāti	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  Islamic	  dharma,	  but	   that	  his	  political	  action	   is	   infused	  with	   the	  ethics	  of	  dharma.	  For	  example,	  Basir	  was	  most	   preoccupied	  with	  Adivasis	   as,	   in	   Joygram,	   they	   suffered	  most	  from	  structural	   inequality,	  and	  because	  other	  politicians	  failed	  to	  demonstrate	  solidarity	  with	  Adivasis.	   In	  Basir’s	  perspective,	   the	  political	  work	  of	  an	  atheist	  politician	  would	  not	  display	  the	  values	  of	  equity	  and	  solidarity,	  as	  the	  values	  in	  themselves	  are	  dharma.	  	  
The	  market	  and	  dharma	  A	   similar	   ambiguous	   rhetoric	   accompanies	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   market	   being	  separated	  from	  dharma,	  yet	   ideally	  embedded	  in	  dharma.	   In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  story	  of	  Kelapot	  Khadim,	  one	  of	  the	  shareholders	  of	  the	  cattle-­‐market,	  because	  it	  is	  exemplary	  of	  a	  wide-­‐spread	  tendency.	  	  When	   I	   visit	   Kelapot	   Khadim	   at	   the	   cattle	  market	   in	   the	   early	   days	   of	  my	  fieldwork,	  he	  proudly	  comments	  on	  one	  of	  the	  cow	  traders	  being	  Hindu.	  Clearly	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assuming	  that	  I	  find	  that	  curious,	  he	  continues:	  ‘this	  is	  work	  (karma)!	  And	  that	  is	  dharma.	  Whatever	  you	  do	  outside	  of	  your	  work,	   like	  praying	  nāmāj,	  doesn’t	  have	   anything	   to	   do	  with	   the	  work.	   So	   both	  Hindus	   and	  Muslims	   can	   do	   this	  business,	  and	  they	  can	  do	  business	  with	  each	  other,	  no	  problem’.	  	  It	  may	  help	  Kelapot	  Khadim	  to	  not	  be	  bothered	  by	  his	  deep	  involvement	  in	  a	  corrupt	  business	  to	  keep	  it	  away	  from	  the	  ‘clean’	  space	  of	  dharma.	  The	  wealthy	  Khadim,	  who	  have	  invariably	  accumulated	  their	  wealth	  on	  the	  cattle	  market,	  are	  vigorously	   critiqued	   for	   their	   allegedly	   corrupt	  practices.	  The	   cattle	  market	   is	  WAQF	  land,	  which	  means	  that	   the	   land	  should	  be	  put	   to	  use	   for	   the	  benefit	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community.89	  Joygramis	  have	  no	  problem	  with	  the	  land	  being	  used	  for	   a	  market	   involving	   commercial	   transactions.	   Yet	   it	   is	   a	   recurrent	   point	   of	  gossip	  and	  critique	  whether	  the	  shareholders	  are	  actually	  using	  the	  land	  more	  for	  their	  own	  individual	  financial	  benefit	  and	  conspicuous	  consumption	  than	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Later	   on	   in	  my	   fieldwork,	   after	   he	   had	   undertaken	   Haj	   to	  Mecca,	   Kelapot	  Khadim	   took	  a	  different	   stance.	  He	  explained	  his	   sudden	  piety	  by	   referring	   to	  the	  business	  ethic	  over	  there,	  and	  his	  dismay	  over	  broken	  promises	  in	  business	  here:	   ‘Say,	   you	   have	   agreed	   with	   a	   salesman	   that	   the	   next	   day	   you	   will	   buy	  chicken	   from	   him	   for	   the	   price	   of	   700	   rupees.	   If	   the	   next	   person	   comes	   by	  offering	  to	  buy	  the	  same	  chicken	  for	  200	  rupees	  more,	  the	  salesman	  would	  take	  the	  offer	  immediately’	  negating	  the	  oral	  contractual	  agreement	  just	  made.	  What	  he	  was	  actually	  saying	  is	  that	  he	  is	  dismayed	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  ethical	  standards	  in	   business	   here.	   Previously,	   this	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   bother	   him	   as	   he	   confined	  business	  and	  labour	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  ‘market’	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  domain	  of	   dharma-­‐as-­‐religion.	   The	   experience	   of	   Haj	   inspired	   him	   to	   hierarchically	  reintegrate	  his	  life	  and	  order	  his	  daily	  life	  and	  work	  according	  to	  dharma,	  since	  
dharma,	  as	  he	  had	  been	  reminded,	  is	  a	  ‘total	  way	  of	  life’	  and	  cannot	  be	  restricted	  to	   ritual	   practice.	   Although	   still	   a	   shareholder	   of	   the	   cattle	   market,	   when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  On	  WAQF,	  see	  footnote	  24	  in	  chapter	  1.	  Profit	  made	  on	  a	  WAQF	  property	  should	  be	  used	  for	   charitable	   purposes	   or	   used	   for	   investment	   in	   the	   property.	   According	   to	   Masiruddin,	   in	  particular	  (private)	  WAQF	  properties	  the	  caretaker	  (musuali)	  is	  allowed	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  In	  any	  case,	   the	  musualis	   have	   to	   deposit	   a	   share	   of	   their	   profit	   in	   funds	   for	   religious	   festivals;	   the	  Banyan	  tree	  plantation	  at	   the	  cattle	  market	   land;	   the	  maintenance	  of	  hostels	   for	  pilgrims;	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  shrine	  and	  the	  Eid	  Ghat,	  among	  other	  things.	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working	  on	  the	  market	  his	  attitude	  expressed	  ambivalence	  and	  he	  became	  less	  involved	  with	  the	  actual	  handling	  of	  money.	  	  Kelapot	   Khadim	   differs	   in	   attitude	   and	   strategy	   from	   the	   coal-­‐mining	  entrepreneurs	  I	  talked	  about	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Those	  entrepreneurs	  would	  probably,	   if	   I	   had	   prompted	   them,	   consider	   dharma	   and	   work	   to	   be	  differentiated	   spheres.	   Yet	   they	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   profits	   gained	   by	  work	  can	  be	  re-­‐invested	   in	  the	   long-­‐term	  cycle	  of	   transactions	  and	  help	  them	  in	  the	  ‘upliftment’	   of	   the	   Muslim	   community.	   Kelapot	   Khadim	   takes	   a	   more	   ascetic	  path	  and	  turns	  his	  back	  to	  work	  almost	  entirely.	  The	  different	  attitudes	  reveal	  the	   variable	   ambivalence	   towards	   economic	   endeavour	   and	   the	   ambiguity	   on	  how	  to	  relate	  economic	  activity	  with	  a	  pious	  lifestyle.	  	  The	  desire	  to	  create	  coherence	  does	  not	  only	  apply	  to	  individual	  lives;	  it	  is	  a	  desire	  that	  foremost	  applies	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  is	  most	  clear	  in	  the	  specific	  critique	   my	   interlocutors	   direct	   at	   the	   CPM.	   The	   next	   section	   returns	   to	   the	  desire	  for	  reintegration	  on	  the	  societal	  level.	  	  
Re-­‐embedding	  dharma	  In	   the	  opening	  vignette	  of	   this	   chapter,	  Basir	  and	  his	   friends	   lamented	   the	  lack	   of	   dharma	   in	   society	   as	   a	  whole	   and	   in	   politics	   in	   particular.	   Like	   them,	  most	  Muslim	  Joygramis	  aim	  for	  a	  holistic	  social	  renewal,	  which	  would	  mean	  the	  reintegration	   of	   dharma	   in	   all	   aspects	   of	   life.	   I	   have	   argued,	   however,	   that	  modern	   categories	   have	   been	   vernacularised	   and	   become	   locally	   salient.	   As	   a	  result,	   the	   moral	   regeneration	   of	   society	   is	   not	   aimed	   at	   an	   ‘archaic’	   society	  without	  any	  distinct	  spheres.	  They	  are	  not	  ‘non-­‐moderns’,	  as	  Madam	  (1987)	  or	  Nandy	  (2007)	  would	  perhaps	  have	  put	  it.	  I	  will	  show	  this	  in	  comparison	  with	  a	  provocative	   article	   of	   Alpa	   Shah	   (2014),	  where	   she	   critically	   assesses	   Ranajit	  Guha’s	   analysis	   of	   the	  Birsa	  Munda	  movement	   around	  1900,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  understand	  the	  striking	  popularity	  of	  the	  Shiv	  Charcha	  sect	  (a	  sect	  of	  devotees	  to	  the	  Hindu	  Lord	  Shiva)	  in	  her	  fieldsite	  in	  the	  Maoist	  dominated	  hills	  in	  eastern	  India.	   She	   suggests	   that	   the	   Birsa	   Munda	   movement,	   which	   has	   been	   called	  ‘rebellious’	   or	   ‘anti-­‐colonial’	   may	   actually	   be	   better	   understood	   as	   a	   creative	  response	   to	   the	   ‘disintegrative	   forces	   of	   the	   Church	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	  postcolonial	  state’	  (Shah	  2014).	  The	  Adivasis	  aimed	  to	  reorder	  their	   lives	   ‘in	  a	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search	  for	  a	  more	  holistic	  world’	  (Shah	  2014).	  Similarly,	  she	  considers	  the	  Shiv	  Charcha	   sect	   ‘as	   a	   force	  of	   integration	   against	   the	   fragmentation	  brought	   into	  people’s	   lives	  by	   the	   spread	  of	  Maoist	   revolutionaries	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	  postcolonial	   state’	   (Shah	   2014).	   	   On	   one	   level	   of	   analysis	   the	   response	   of	  my	  interlocutors	  to	  the	  discordant	  experience	  of	  being	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  world,	  is	  not	   dissimilar	   to	   that	   of	   the	  Adivasis	   Shah	  describes.	   The	   holistic	   principle	   of	  
dharma	  structured	  a	  society	  where	  politics	  and	  religion	  were	  not	  conceived	  of	  as	  separate	  dimensions	  of	   life	  but	  formed	  ‘one	  conceptual	  and	  practical	  realm’	  (Shah	  2014),	  all	  together	  guided	  by	  values	  of	  redistribution	  and	  reciprocity	  that	  are	  central	  to	  dharma.	  	  A	  century	  later,	  however,	  the	  holistic	  conceptual	  realm	  has	  been	  reordered	  according	   to	   modern	   epistemological	   categories.	   As	   the	   conversations	   about	  politics	  and	  dharma	  make	  clear,	  there	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  distinct	  spheres	  in	  society:	  politics	  and	  the	  market	  are	  practically	  separate	  spheres,	  and	  religious	  and	   political	   institutions	   are	   practically	   separate.	   However,	   my	   interlocutors	  agitate	   against	   a	   reductionist	   understanding	   of	  dharma-­‐as-­‐religion,	   and	   argue	  for	  the	  revaluation	  of	  dharma	  as	  an	  underlying	  dimension	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  social	  life.	   According	   to	   the	   “moral	   narrative	   of	   modernity”	   (Keane	   2007),	   ‘to	   treat	  economics,	   politics,	   or	   even	  education	   in	  moral	   terms	   too	   seriously	   exhibits	   a	  failure	   to	   be	   modern’	   (Keane	   2010:	   79).	   The	   problem	   of	   this	   modern	   moral	  narrative	   is	   that	   morality	   is	   treated	   as	   the	   special	   concern	   of	   religion,	   and	  religion	  as	  a	  separate	  sphere	  (ibid.).	  In	  reality,	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  realms	  are	  always	  moral	  orders,	  notwithstanding	  the	  moral	  narrative	  of	  modernity.	  In	  the	   experience	   of	   my	   interlocutors,	   however,	   politics	   and	   the	   market	   are	  immoral.	   Lambek	   suggests	   that	   in	   the	   modern	   state,	   ‘bureaucracy	   has	  encroached	   on	   religious	   and	   family	   ritual,	   and	   law	   has	   overshadowed	   ethics’	  (2013:	   842).	   I	   suggest	   that,	   in	   my	   fieldsite,	   the	   impersonal	   bureaucracy	   and	  universalistic	  law	  are	  valued	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  and	  leave	  space	  for	  a	  separate	  sphere	   of	   religion,	   but	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   ethical	   criteria	   established	   in	  ritual	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  valid	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  bureaucracy	  and	  law.	  	  Parry	  rightfully	  criticises	  Dumont	  for	  positing	  a	  radical	  separation	  between	  the	   realms	   of	   dharma	   and	   artha	   (the	   realm	   of	   politico-­‐economic	   power)	   in	  Hindu	  thought	  (Parry	  1989b:	  83).	  He	  points	  out	  that	  artha	  has	  the	  more	  general	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meaning	  of	  ‘means’;	  as	  in,	  the	  means	  to	  sustain	  the	  moral	  order	  of	  dharma.	  Most	  significantly,	   ‘[w]hat	  Hindu	  thought	  rejects	  is	  that	  these	  means	  should	  become	  an	  ultimate	   end.	  Artha	  must	  be	  pursued	   in	   conformity	  with	   the	  hierarchically	  superior	  dictates	  of	  dharma’	  (Parry	  1989b:	  83).	  Despite	  the	  differences	  in	  moral	  content	  of	  the	  Hindu	  and	  the	  Muslim	  dharma,	  the	  idea	  that	  dharma	  is	  superior	  is	  the	  same.	  To	  consider	  the	  market	  or	  politics	  as	  a	  different	  realm	  ‘cuts	  it	  loose	  from	  its	  moral	  moorings	  and	  deprives	  it	  of	  real	  meaning	  […]	  and	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  it	  is	  this	  devaluation	  which	  has	  condemned	  the	  Indian	  polity	  to	  perpetual	  instability’	   (Parry	   1989:	   83).	   What	   Parry	   is	   getting	   at	   may	   be	   a	   much	   more	  universal	  ethical	  ideal,	  which	  he	  hints	  at	  when	  he	  says	  that	  ‘Mauss	  arrived	  at	  his	  now	  perhaps	  not	  so	  quaint-­‐sounding	  moral	  conclusion	  –	   that	   the	  combination	  of	  interest	  and	  disinterest	  in	  exchange	  is	  preferable	  to	  their	  separation’	  (Parry	  1986:	  469).	  My	  interlocutors	  astutely	  recognise	  the	  problem	  of	  separation.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  they	  argue	  that	  a	  politics	  without	  dharma	  is	  doomed	  to	  fail.	  	  Parry’s	  invocation	  of	  Mauss	  brings	  me	  to	  emphasise	  what	  I	  think	  is	  the	  most	  pervasive	   and	   perhaps	   most	   invisible	   form	   of	   structural	   violence:	   the	   sheer	  instrumentality	   that	   is	   pervading	   social	   life,	   and	   its	   inescapability.	   My	  interlocutors	   feel	   betrayed	   by	   the	   state	   for	   its	   instrumental	   approach	   to	   the	  exchanges	  to	  which	  they	  attach	  great	  moral	  significance.	  With	  instrumentality,	  I	  mean	   the	   perception	   that	   actions	   in	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   sphere	   are	  conceived	   of	   as	  means	   to	   ends	   that	   are	   not	   virtuous	   (accumulation	   of	  wealth	  and	   power),	   as	   opposed	   to	   virtuous	   actions	   that	   are	   an	   end	   in	   itself,	   in	   the	  Aristotelian	  sense.	  The	  moral	  principles	  of	  the	  Muslims	  (as,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  of	  any	  other	  jāti	  with	  a	  dharma,	  that	  is,	  of	  any	  moral	  person)	  do	  not	  resonate	  with	  that	  of	  the	  everyday	  politics	  they	  are	  confronted	  with	  and	  participate	  in.	  In	  the	  previous	   chapter,	   I	   have	   expounded	   on	   the	   fact	   that	  phronesis	   is	  meant	   to	   be	  guiding	  ‘the	  art	  of	  life’,	  that	  is,	  living	  according	  to	  ethical	  principles	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  because	  that	  is	  the	  direct	  enactment	  of	  justice	  and	  harmony.	  However,	  by	  cordoning	  off	  certain	  aspects	  of	  life	  from	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  called	  ‘religion’,	  the	   principle	   idea	   of	   the	   ‘art	   of	   life’	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   apply	   to	   those	   other	  spheres	  of	  life.	  	  The	  problem	  that	  my	  interlocutors	  encounter	  is:	  how	  to	  bring	  an	  element	  of	  
dharma	  back	  into	  the	  spheres	  of	  politics	  and	  economics	  when	  dharma	  has	  come	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to	  denote	  a	  particular	  religion?	  Even	  if	  it	  transpires	  from	  conversations	  that	  for	  my	  interlocutors	  dharma	  can	  mean	  an	  ethics	  of	  justice	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  sense,	  they	  performatively	   enact	  dharma	   in	   their	   specific,	   Islamic	  way,	   because	   they	  have	   also	   internalised	   the	   idea	   of	   dharma-­‐as-­‐religion.	   This	   is	   a	   contradiction	  that	   emerges	   from	   my	   ethnography	   and	   that	   I	   cannot	   solve	   theoretically,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  contraction	  that	  my	  interlocutors	  live	  with	  on	  an	  everyday	  basis.	  Moreover,	  as	  against	  the	  ‘undecidability’	  and	  uncertainties	  produced	  by	  Indian	  democratic	   governance,	   and	   the	   indeterminacies	   of	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	  (Hansen	   1999:	   16-­‐60),	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	   identity	   is	   further	   emphasised	   as	   an	  essentialised	   identity,	   despite	   its	   inherently	   fragile	   nature.	   However,	   Islam	   is	  not	   supposed	   to	   enter	   the	   political	   or	  market	   sphere	   too	  much	   in	   the	   Indian	  state	  and	  has	  to	  remain	  relatively	  private.	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  further	  confronted	  with	   and	   reinforce	   the	   idea	   that	  dharma	   is	   limited	   to	   the	   separate	   domain	   of	  religion.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  The	   ambiguous	   relationship	   between	   politics	   and	   religion	   has	   created	   a	  situation	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  unequal	  and	  unjust	  for	  the	  structurally	  excluded	  communities.	   I	   stress	   once	   more	   that	   my	   interlocutors	   are	   not	   traditional	  reactionaries	  who	  refuse	  to	  be	  modernised	  or	  rationalised.	  Islamic	  reformism	  is	  a	  highly	  rationalised,	  modern	  expression	  of	  dharma	  (see	  also	  chapter	  6).	  What	  they	  do	  react	  against,	  are	  ‘the	  flaws	  inherent	  in	  the	  governing	  discourse’,	  so	  well	  summarized	  by	  Hansen	  (1999:	  23):	  	  ‘the	   inherent	   contradictions	   and	   destructive	   character	   of	   capitalist	  production,	   the	   flaws	   and	   incompleteness	   of	   taxonomic	   schemes	   of	  classification	   incapable	   of	   comprehending	   the	   richness	   of	   natural	   and	  social	   life,	   the	   incapacity	  of	  any	  narration	  of	   the	   self	   and	   the	  collective	   to	  disclose	  fully	  the	  identity	  it	  purports	  to	  portray’.	  	  Furthermore,	  by	  not	  living	  up	  to	  the	  promises	  inherent	  in	  the	  foundational	  contract	   of	   the	   secular	   nation-­‐state,	   society	   is	   stripped	   of	   its	   very	   humanity,	  because	   it	   is	   fundamentally	   no	   longer	   an	   ethical	   or	   a	   humane	   society.	   In	   this	  unethical/inhumane	  system,	  not	  only	  politicians	  but	  also	  ordinary	  citizens	  have	  become	   ‘animals’,	   in	   Samsuddin’s	  words.	   They	   have	   to	   be	  made	   human	   again	  through	  a	  conscious	  cultivation	  of	  dharma.	  
191	  	  
Before	   I	   conclude,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   re-­‐introduce	   the	   arguments	   brought	  forward	   in	   chapter	   3.	   The	   ‘moral	   narrative	   of	   modernity’	   forces	   people	   to	  conceive	  of	   a	  world	  where	  dharma	   (as	   religion)	   is	   a	   separate	   realm,	  which	   in	  reality	   implies	   that	   people	   are	   curtailed	   of	   their	   ethical	   autonomy	   and	  disenfranchised	   of	   their	   dignity.	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   expression	   of	   a	   desire	   for	  reintegration	  of	  dharma	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  life	  is	  ultimately	  about	  the	  recovery	  of	  autonomy,	  which	  lays	  in	  the	  freedom	  that	  jñān	  offers,	  and	  is	  therefore	  originally	  and	  ultimately	  borne	  from	  relatedness,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  chapter	  3.	  It	  is	  only	  through	   a	  measure	   of	   autonomy	   that	   one	   can	   constitute	   oneself	   as	   an	   ethical	  being.	  In	  a	  perhaps	  paradoxical	  but	  corollary	  process	  the	  Muslims	  reclaim	  their	  autonomy	  from	  the	  unethical	  state	  through	  the	  submission	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  to	   Allah.	   Submission	   allows	   for	   the	   cultivation	   of	   jñān	   (wisdom/phronesis),	  which	   gives	   one	   the	   freedom	   to	   make	   the	   ethical	   choices	   necessary	   to	   re-­‐instantiate	   justice.	  This	  autonomy	  is	   ideally	  constantly	  re-­‐instantiated	  through	  virtuous	  exchanges,	  but	  exchanges	  are	  stripped	  of	  their	  moral	  component	  when	  they	   are	   isolated	   and	   become	   instruments	   of	   the	   short-­‐term	   cycle	   of	  transactions.	   As	   such,	   transactions	   seem	   to	   constantly	   reproduce	   inequality	  rather	  than	  equality	  –	  injustice	  rather	  than	  social	  justice.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  invoked	  Lambek’s	  argument	  that	  among	  the	  most	  significant	  ethical	  criteria	  are	   those	   that	  establish	   the	  humanity	  of	  persons	   ‘as	  being	   mutually	   subject	   to	   criteria	   and	   hence	   to	   be	   acknowledged	   as	   ethical	  subjects	   in	   their	   own	   right’	   (Lambek	   2010b:	   62);	   here	   I	   want	   to	   add	   that	   as	  ethical	   subjects,	   they	   have	   ‘dignity,	   not	   price’	   (ibid.).	   Furthermore,	   Lambek	  argues:	  	  ‘one	   of	   the	   chief	   criteria	   for	   maintaining	   that	   dignity	   entails	   granting	  dignity	   reciprocally	   to	   others	   by	   recognizing	   them	   as	   persons	   under	  comparable	  kinds	  of	  descriptions…by	  standing	  by	  one’s	  word	  to	  them…and	  generally	   submitting	   oneself	   to	   the	   criteria	   established	   by	   means	   of	   the	  acts	   one	   has	   undergone	   or	   undertaken	   and	   acknowledging	   the	  engagements	  of	  others’	  (Lambek	  2013:	  845).	  	  Dignity	  is	  what	  is	   lost	  first	  and	  foremost	  through	  one’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  social	   injustice.	  And	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	   the	   ‘banality	  of	  evil’	  has	  made	  the	  Joygramis	  deeply	  sceptical	  and	  critical	  of	  their	  environment.	  Modern	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political	   strategies	   may	   attempt	   to	   create	   an	   aura	   of	   legitimacy	   ‘by	   invoking	  discourses	  on	  order,	  security,	  justice,	  freedom	  and	  equality’	  (Hansen	  1999:	  21),	  but	  even	   though	   the	  discourses	  are	   imbibed	  by	   the	  citizens,	   the	  strategies	  are	  ultimately	  unconvincing	  because	  of	  the	  inadequate	  representation	  of	  reality	  and	  the	  deep	  incongruences	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  everyday	  life.	  The	  political	  ‘crisis	  in	   West	   Bengal’	   does	   ‘not	   indicate	   a	   lack	   of	   faith	   in	   local	   governmental	  institutions	  but	  rather	  a	  pervasive	  distrust	  in	  the	  moral	  authority	  of	  those	  who	  claim	   to	   mediate,	   on	   political	   grounds,	   the	   contending	   claims	   to	   livelihood,	  fairness	   and	   dignity’	   (Chatterjee	   2009:	   45).	   In	   the	   democratic	   arena,	   the	  foundations	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  power	  are	  contested	  and	  uncertain,	  and	  Muslims	  are	  cast	  as	  illegitimate	  contestants	  for	  power.	  Moreover,	  in	  poverty,	  there	  is	  no	  escaping	   the	  participation	   in	  an	   immoral	  politico-­‐economy	   if	  one	   is	   to	  survive	  biologically	   and	   socially.	   So	   how	   does	   one	   recover	   dignity,	   autonomy,	   social	  justice	  and	  a	  harmonious	  society?	  	  Joygrami	   Muslims	   resort	   to	   various	   discourses:	   Islamic	   discourses,	   South	  Asian	   ideologies	  of	  order	  and	   society,	   and	   the	   state’s	   ideologies	  of	   justice	  and	  equality,	   all	   become	   encompassed	   in	   dharma.	   This	   curious	   ideological	   mix	   is	  presented	  as	  a	  coherent	  cosmic	  order	  originating	  from	  the	  contract	  with	  Allah,	  in	   order	   to	   grant	   it	   legitimacy,	   certainty,	   and	   an	   aura	   of	   timelessness.	   	   These	  synthesised	   discourses	   are	   aesthetically,	   rhetorically	   and	   practically	   shaped	  according	   to	   an	   Islamic	   reformist	   discourse;	   I	   will	   discuss	   this	   in	   detail	   in	  chapter	  6.	  	  Here	   I	   want	   to	   conclude	   by	   stressing	   that	   the	   critique	   and	   resistance	  inherent	  in	  the	  Muslims’	  preference	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  ‘contract	  behind	  contracts’	  with	   Allah	   rather	   than	   with	   the	   state	   does	   not	   preclude	   that	   they	   enter	   into	  subordinate	   contracts	   with	   the	   state.90	  Parry	   paints	   a	   bleak	   picture	   of	   the	  future:	  in	  case	  the	  belief	  that	  corruption	  is	  all-­‐pervasive	  corrodes	  the	  faith	  in	  the	  ‘idea	   of	   India’,	   ‘the	  most	   likely	   outcome	   is	   that	   the	   power	   of	   the	   state	  would	  remain,	  that	  the	  victim	  would	  be	  democracy	  and	  the	  end	  result	  a	  new	  and	  more	  sinister	  species	  of	  corruption’	  (2000:	  53).	  On	  a	  more	  optimistic	  note,	  I	  suggest	  that	  another	  possibility	  is	  that	  dharma	  is	  reinterpreted	  as	  an	  ethics	  of	  order	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  The	  Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind	  has	  officially	  sanctified	  the	  mutual	  contract	  between	  the	  Indian	  state	  and	  Muslim	  citizens.	  The	  contract	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  Constitution,	  and	  Muslims	  are	  bound	  to	  live	  by	  the	  Constitution	  on	  this	  sanctified	  ground.	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justice	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  any	  particular	  religion.	  Dharma	  can	  as	  such	  be	  the	  source	   for	   an	   ‘overlapping	   consensus’	   to	   which	   ‘the	   idea	   of	   India’	   is	   central	  (Bilgrami	   2011;	   Taylor	   2011).	   The	   dynamic,	   segmentary	   nature	   of	   my	  interlocutors’	   ethical	   framework	  does	  allow	  relatedness	   to	  be	   forged	  with	   the	  Indian	   state,	   and	   rights	   and	   duties	   could	   be	   exchanged	   as	   part	   of	   a	   social	  contract	  even	  though	  the	  state’s	  actors	  and	  my	  interlocutors	  may	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   different	   ideological	   reasoning.	   The	   reasons	   for	   subscribing	   to	   the	  values	  enshrined	  in	   ‘the	  idea	  of	  India’	  (e.g.	  democracy,	  freedom	  of	  speech	  etc.)	  may	  vary	  across	  jātis,	  and	  across	  individuals.	  This	  is	  not	  problematic	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  a	  shared	  dharma,	  which	  embodies	  fundamental	  ethical	  principles	  of	   fairness	  and	   justice.	  A	  problem	  arises,	  however,	  when	  the	  state	  favours	  particular	  underlying	  reasons	  over	  others,	  or	  when	  the	  reasons	  of	  a	   particular	   community	   for	   subscribing	   to	   the	   shared	   ideology	   are	   not	  considered	  valid.	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  majoritarianism	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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  Fig.	  7.	  The	  bicycle	  repair	  shop,	  a	  favourite	  hangout	  of	  Joygrami	  men,	  located	  at	  the	  main	  road	  separating	  Khamaipur	  from	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  Joygram.	  	  	  
	  Fig.	  8.	  A	  meeting	  of	  the	  AIUDF.	  Siddiqullah	  Chowdhury	  Saheb	  is	  standing	  on	  the	  left,	  at	  the	  lectern.	  Manisha	  Banerjee	  is	  standing	  far	  right	  at	  the	  table.	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5.	   ‘Hindus	   and	   Muslims	   have	   become	   one	   jāti’:	  
Practising	  pluralism	  	  	   ‘This	   is	  neither	  a	  story	  of	  secularism	  nor	  of	  syncretism	  but	  rather	  one	  in	  which	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  everyday	  life	  allows	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  to	  receive	   the	   claims	   of	   each	   other	   that	   have	   arisen	   by	   the	   sheer	   fact	   of	  proximity,	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   relations,	   and	   the	   privileging	   of	   aesthetic	  immediacy	  of	  emotions	  even	  over	  the	  prohibitions	  emanating	  from	  various	  authoritative	   discourses	   of	   Islam	   and	   Hinduism.	   That	   we	   could	   consider	  this	  kind	  of	  relational	  life	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  perfectionism	  in	  its	  insistence	  on	  the	  ordinariness	  of	  relational	  life	  and	  in	  the	  willingness	  to	  be	  educated	  by	  each	  other	  -­‐	  that	  is	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  essay’	  (Das	  2010b:	  248).	  
Introduction	  	  Shahadat	  Hussain	  Mondal	   is	  a	  Muslim	  man	  in	  his	  sixties,	  who	  comes	  a	   few	  times	   a	  week	   on	   his	   bicycle	   from	  Farukhbazar	   to	   tutor	  Wahed’s	   daughters	   in	  general	   subjects.	   He	   is	   eloquent	   and	   relatively	   well-­‐educated,	   not	   a	   wealthy	  man,	  always	  dressed	   in	  a	   slightly	  stained	  pañjābi.	  Whenever	   I	  was	  around,	  he	  preferred	   to	   tutor	  me	   in	   Islamic	   theology	   rather	   than	   the	   girls	   in	   English.	   He	  particularly	   enjoyed	   pointing	   out	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   between	  Islamic	   and	   Christian	   theology	   (assuming	   my	   Christian	   dharma).	   In	   our	  conversations,	  an	  ostensible	  paradox	  that	   I	  came	  across	  repeatedly	  during	  my	  time	   in	   Joygram	   would	   often	   surface.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   he	   glorifies	   the	  supremacy	   of	   Islam	   and	   Muslims,	   while	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   he	   is	   keen	   to	  emphasise	   the	  unity	  of	   all	  mankind.	  He	  uses	   the	  analogy	  of	   the	  hand	   to	   show	  how	  we	  are	  all	  brothers	  from	  the	  same	  source	  (Adam).	  One	  of	  the	  fingers	  is	  the	  Muslim	  brother;	  one	  is	  the	  Hindu	  brother,	  and	  so	  on.	  He	  asked	  me	  rhetorically,	  ‘would	  it	  not	  be	  inconvenient	  to	  miss	  one	  finger?’	  It	  would	  be	  undesirable	  and	  inconvenient	  (asubidhā)	  to	  miss	  one	  finger,	  so	  the	  principle	  of	  pluralism	  is	  not	  only	  accepted	  but	  also	  welcomed.	  He	  acknowledges	  that	   in	   India	  the	  harmony	  between	   fingers	   (jātis)	   is	   sometimes	   hard	   to	   find,	   and	   he	   laments	   that	  ‘somewhere	   in	  history’	   it	  went	  wrong.	  According	   to	  him,	   there	   is	  no	  harmony	  anymore	  in	  society	  because	  ‘some	  people’	  have	  become	  too	  selfish.	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A	   couple	   of	   months	   later,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   who	   Shahadat	   Hussain	   had	   in	  mind	  when	  blaming	   ‘some	  people’	   for	  the	  disharmony	  in	  society.	  The	  old	  man	  surprised	   me	   by	   his	   presence	   at	   the	   Block	   Development	   Office	   ahead	   of	   the	  panchayat	  elections.91	  I	  am	  surprised	  not	  only	  because	  this	  is	  not	  usually	  a	  place	  for	  feeble	  old	  men,	  and	  less	  for	  men	  in	  white	  pañjābi	  preoccupied	  with	  matters	  of	  Islamic	  theology.	  The	  next	  time	  I	  see	  him	  at	  Wahed’s	  place	  he	  explains	  that	  he	  was	  there	  to	  oversee	  the	  filing	  of	  nominations.	  I	  ask	  him	  why	  he	  is	  involved	  with	  the	  dirty	  party	  work.	  He	  replies,	  deeply	  agitated	  and	  gesturing	  wildly:	  	  ‘I	  was	  there	  to	  prevent	  the	  CPM	  from	  filing	  their	  nomination,	  because	  for	  34	  years	   they	   tortured	  everyone	  who	  wouldn’t	   cooperate	  with	   them.	  So	  now	  we	   [TMC]	  won’t	   let	   them	  come	  back	  and	   take	   seats.	  They	   [CPM]	  are	  dangerous;	  they	  don’t	  obey	  any	  god.	  They	  don’t	  even	  obey	  Allah.	  They	  also	   burnt	  many	  Hindu	   houses,	   and	  would	   come	   at	   night	   to	   rape	   young	  girls,	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  alike.	  Against	   them,	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  have	  become	  one	  jāti’.	  Shahadat	  Hussain	  strikingly	  presents	  pluralism	  as	  a	  natural	  fact;	  as	  natural	  as	   different	   fingers	   on	   a	   hand.	   Disharmony	   in	   pluralism,	   in	   contrast,	   is	   a	  historical	  contingency.	  Significantly,	  there	  are	  ‘some	  people’,	  not	  members	  of	  a	  particular	  jāti,	  who	  have	  become	  selfish,	  and	  who	  put	  the	  harmony	  in	  society	  at	  risk.	   If	  pluralism	   is	  a	  natural	   feature	  of	   society,	  disharmony	  between	   jātis	   is	  a	  corollary	   to	  disharmony	   in	   society	  more	  generally.	  But	  Shahadat	  Hussain	  also	  demonstrates	   another	   possibility:	   that	   jātis	   unite	   against	   the	   disruptive	  elements.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   aim	   to	   analyse	   the	   different	   aspects	   involved	  with	  living	   in	   plurality	   that	   Shahadat	   Hussain	   alludes	   to.	   The	   Joygrami	   political	  landscape	   is	   not	   marked	   by	   intercommunal	   violence,	   nor	   is	   it	   marked	   by	  religious	  commonality.	  Therefore,	  the	  Joygrami	  situation	  requires	  –	  and	  allows	  -­‐	  me	  to	  provide	  a	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  vernacular	  experience	  of	  pluralism.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Candidates	  for	  the	  panchayat	  election	  file	  their	  nomination	  for	  the	  grām	  pañcāyat	  and	  the	  
pañcāyat	  samiti	   at	   the	  Block	  Development	  Office	   (BDO).	  The	  BDO	   is	  open	   for	  nominations	   for	  seven	   days.	   Every	   day,	   party	   ‘workers’	   (active	   members	   of	   the	   political	   parties)	   gathered	   in	  front	  of	  the	  BDO	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  candidates	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	  file	  their	  nomination.	  In	  the	  case	   of	   the	   panchayat	   elections	   in	   2013,	   only	   TMC	   candidates	   had	   been	   able	   to	   file	   their	  nomination	  for	  the	  lower	  two	  tiers	  of	  the	  panchayat	  in	  Farukhbazar	  Block.	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The	   outline	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   as	   follows.	   In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   I	  elaborate	  upon	  the	  research	  on	  peace	  processes	  in	  South	  Asia,	  while	  expanding	  the	  argument	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  so	  far.	  I	  consider	  the	  practice	  of	  pluralism	  through	  an	   analysis	   of	   exchange	   and	   reciprocity.	   Subsequently,	   I	   demonstrate	  that	  the	  ethical	  ideals	  of	  related	  personhood	  and	  dharma	  are	  at	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  generation	   and	   continuation	   of	   communal	   harmony.	   However,	   I	   suggest	   that	  these	   phenomena	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   isolated	   from	   the	   particular	   political	  environment.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter,	  the	  micro-­‐exchanges	  that	  foster	  communal	   harmony	   are	   contextualised	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   in	  West	  Bengal	  pluralism	  can	  only	  be	  properly	  understood	  when	  analysed	  against	   the	  foil	  of	  local	  political	  disharmony.	  	  In	   the	   third	   section,	   I	   address	   the	   positionality	   of	   the	   Muslim	   minority	  within	   the	   Hindu	   majority	   nation	   to	   account	   for	   the	   Muslims’	   burden	   of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  reproduction	  of	  harmony.	  The	  section	  demonstrates	  that	  secularism,	   as	   a	   state	   doctrine,	   is	   understood	   to	   imply	   state	   neutrality	   and	  equality	  of	  religious	  communities	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Hence,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  how	   the	   state’s	   failure	   to	   live	   up	   to	   this	   ideological	   commitment	   has	   severe	  consequences	  for	  the	  grassroots	  practice	  of	  pluralism.	  	  
Theoretical	  orientations:	  beyond	  peace	  and	  violence	  West	  Bengal	  provides	  an	  interesting	  case	  for	  a	  study	  of	  pluralism	  in	  practice,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  marked	  by	  ‘spaces	  of	  enmity’	  (Williams	  2011a)	  when	  it	  comes	  to	   communal	   antagonism	   and	   Joygram	   is	   not	   located	   in	   an	   area	   prone	   to	  communal	   riots. 92 	  Despite	   the	   increasing	   segmentation	   of	   the	   religious	  landscape	   and	   an	   intensified	   stress	   on	  differences	   rather	   than	   commonalities,	  communal	   antagonism	   was,	   until	   recently,	   almost	   absent.	   There	   is,	   however,	  widespread	  political	  violence,	  marked	  by	  party	  politics.	  	  Studies	  of	  pluralism	   in	   India	  have	  often	   focused	  on	  communalism	   in	  areas	  with	  a	  history	  of	  Hindu-­‐Muslim	  antagonism,	  and	  there	   is	  a	  plethora	  of	  studies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Unfortunately,	  West	  Bengal	   is	  rapidly	   losing	   its	  reputation	  as	   the	  state	  with	  a	  relatively	  low	  level	  of	  communal	  antagonism.	  See	  The	  Indian	  Express:	  ‘Communal	  clashes	  soar	  in	  Bengal’	  (Editorial	   2014);	   and	   First	   Post:	   ‘Why	   Mamata’s	   Bengal	   is	   seeing	   more	   communal	   clashes’	  (Jagannathan	  2014).	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on	  communal	  violence.93	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  another	  picture;	  one	  that,	  I	  anticipate,	  will	  bear	  resemblance	  with	  many	  other	  places	  in	  India	  not	  marked	  by	  a	  recent	  history	  of	  communal	  violence,	  but	  where	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  violence	  are	  an	  everyday	   threat	   to	   peace.	   The	   body	   of	   literature	   that	   has	   analysed	   pluralism	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  everyday	  negotiation	  of	  difference	  and	  commonality	  and	  the	  active	   production	   of	   peaceful	   coexistence	   –	   what	  Williams	   (2011a)	   has	   aptly	  called	  ‘processes	  of	  amity’	  -­‐	  has	  lain	  the	  foundations	  for	  my	  analysis	  in	  the	  first	  part	   of	   the	   chapter.	   I	   subsequently	   contribute	   to	   this	   body	   of	   work	   by	  contextualising	  communal	  peace	  with	  political	  violence.	  	  	  One	   line	   of	   research	   on	   peace	   processes	   has	   highlighted	   those	   places	   and	  moments	   of	   not	   just	   communal	   harmony,	   but	   active	   participation	   and	  cooperation.	   This	   is	   variably	   exemplified	   in	   the	   shared	   worship	   of	   deities	   or	  saints	   (Bigelow	   2010;	   Frøystad	   2012;	   Heitmeyer	   2011);	   intercommunal	  celebration	   of	   religious	   festivals	   (Assayag	   2004);	   and	   pilgrimage	   (Bigelow	  2010).	  The	  authors	  are	  keen	  to	  emphasise	  that	  the	  commonality	  or	  overlapping	  practices	   of	  worship	   are	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   ‘syncreticism’	   (which	   presupposes	   a	  common	  narrative	  which	  diverges	  from	  the	  ‘real’	  or	  ‘actual’	  Hinduism	  or	  Islam),	  but	   complex	   and	   negotiated	   forms	   of	   convergences	   and	   sharedness,	   an	  expression	  of	  ‘integrated	  acculturation’	  (Assayag	  2004)	  or	  ‘religious	  polytropy’	  (Carrithers	  2000),	  where	  overlapping	  or	  different	  meanings	  may	  be	  attached	  to	  a	   shared	   practice.	   This	   kind	   of	   religious	   pluralism	  may	   trump	   the	   discursive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   culmination	   of	   communal	   tension	   in	   riots	   in	   1992	   following	   the	  Ayodhya	  demolition	  and	  further	  violence	  in	  Gujarat	  in	  2002,	  there	  have	  been	  various	  attempts	  to	   explain	   Hindu-­‐Muslim	   violence	   in	   South	   Asia	   (Brass	   2003;	   Engineer	   1984,	   1989;	   Hansen	  1999;	  Jaffrelot	  2011;	  Varshney	  2002;	  Van	  der	  Veer	  1994;	  Wilkinson	  2006),	  often	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  Hindu	  nationalist	  politics.	  Although	  some	  works	  have	  tended	  to	  reify	  Hindu-­‐Muslim	  relations	  as	  inherently	  antagonistic	  and	  habitually	  violent,	  with	  reference	  to	  ‘cultural	  identity’	  (Kakar	  1996)	  or	  ethnicity	  (Tambiah	  1996,	  cf.	  Oza	  2006),	  most	  point	  to	  historical,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  circumstances	   to	   explain	   eruptions	   of	   violence	   (Appadurai	   2006;	   Brass	   2003;	   Das	   1995;	  Kapferer	   1988;	   Kakar	   1996;	   cf.	   Peabody	   2000).	   Significantly,	   is	   has	   been	   recognized	   that	   the	  police	   and	   judiciary	  made	   themselves	   guilty	   to	   state-­‐sponsored	   violence	   specifically	   aimed	   at	  the	  Muslim	  minority	  (Brass	  2003;	  Das	  1990;	  Mathur	  2008;	  Vadarajan	  2002).	  This	  is	  specifically	  the	  case	  in	  places	  where	  the	  BJP	  is	  strong	  (as	  during	  the	  riots	  in	  2002	  in	  Gujarat,	  see	  Engineer	  2003;	  Sarkar	  2002;	  Simpson	  2006),	  but	  limited	  neither	  to	  these	  places	  nor	  to	  explicit	  violence.	  Institutionalised	   practices	   of	   discrimination	   and	   implicit	   forms	   of	   victimization	   have	   been	  observed	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  places	  (Jeffery	  and	  Jeffery	  2006;	  Jeffrey	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Khan	  2007;	  Kirmani	  2008;	  Venkatesan	  2012;	  Williams	  2011a).	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reification	   of	   communal	   categories	   as	   well	   as	   other	   hierarchical	   social	  structures,	  as	  it	  points	  to	  the	  fluidity	  of	  identifications	  and	  forms	  of	  relatedness.	  	  In	   Joygram,	   I	   could	  observe	   the	  residues	  of	   the	   ‘religious	  polytropy’.	   It	  has	  been	  noted	   that	   in	   the	  past,	   various	   festivals	  would	  bring	  Bengali	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  together	  in	  joint	  celebration	  (Ahmad	  and	  Reifeld	  2004;	  Roy	  2014)	  not	  unlike	  the	  ‘integrated	  acculturation’	  described	  by	  Assayag	  (2004).	  The	  shrine	  at	  the	   cattle	  market	   in	   Joygram	   is	   still	   frequented	  by	  Muslims	   and	  Hindus	   alike;	  beliefs	   in	   ghosts	   abound	   across	   all	   jātis;	   and	   both	   Hindus	   and	  Muslims	  wear	  very	   similar	   amulets	   for	   the	   same	   ends,	   albeit	   blessed	   by	   different	   religious	  authorities.	  	  The	   religious	   landscape,	   however,	   has	   undeniably	   changed.	  The	  Deobandi	  imams	  preach	  against	  attending	  the	  shrine	  and	  they	  specifically	  forbid	  Muslims	  to	  prepare	  special	  sweets	  or	  rice	  pancakes	  (piṭhe)	  on	  Hindu	   festivals.	   In	  some	  households	   I	   could	   still	   observe	   practices	   that	   are	   increasingly	   considered	  ‘Hindu’	  and	  forbidden	  by	  Deobandi	  imams	  (for	  instance,	  red	  paint	  on	  the	  soles	  of	   women’s	   feet	   during	   wedding	   celebrations),	   but	   these	   practices	   would	  always	  be	  commented	  upon	  with	  condescension	  by	  the	  purportedly	  more	  pious	  Muslims	   in	   the	   village.	   In	   sum,	   peace	   is	   not	   maintained	   through	   the	   explicit	  commonality	  in	  ritual	  practices	  or	  worship.	  In	  exploring	  pluralism,	  this	  chapter	  is	   in	   line	   with	   recent	   works	   that	   have	   helpfully	   pointed	   out	   the	   need	   to	   pay	  attention	   to	   the	   production	   of	   peaceful	   coexistence	   beyond	   the	   obvious	  celebration	  of	   ‘religious	  polytropic’	   elements.	  What	   is	  most	   interesting	   for	  my	  argument	  here	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  dialogue	  and	  exchange,	  not	  only	  at	   the	   sacred	  moments	  of	  worship,	  but	  also	   in	   the	  mundane	  moments	   in	  the	  course	  of	  everyday	  life.	  	  Exchange	  is	  central	  to	  the	  studies	  of	  Frøystad	  (2005),	  Heitmeyer	  (2009)	  and	  Ring	   (2006)	   –	   and	   all	   of	   them	   point	   out	   that	   exchange	   does	   not	   go	   without	  saying.	  Focusing	  on	  everyday	  coexistence	  in	  a	  small	  town	  in	  Gujarat	  three	  years	  after	   the	   riots,	   Heitmeyer	   (2009)	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   daily	   exchange	   of	  gossip	   and	   the	   normative	   discourse	   of	   communal	   harmony	   (‘there	   is	   peace	  here’)	  contained	  suspicion	  and	  tension	  and	  forestalled	  the	  outburst	  of	  violence.	  Reciprocal	  exchange	  (len-­‐den)	  is	  also	  central	  to	  friendships	  between	  upper	  class	  families	   and	   their	   domestic	   servants	   in	   North	   India	   (Frøystad	   2005).	   The	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friendships	   build	   on	   both	   mutual	   affection	   and	   mutual	   utility,	   and	   although	  circumstances	  may	  at	  times	  threaten	  inter-­‐community	  or	   inter-­‐caste	  trust	  and	  hamper	  the	  routine	  of	  exchange,	  religious	  differences	  are	  often	  transcended	  in	  those	   very	   mundane	   acts	   of	   amity.	   Apart	   from	   friendships,	   and	   especially	   in	  urban	   contexts,	   different	   connections	   and	   identities	   may	   cross	   religious	  boundaries	  and	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  ‘network	  identities’	  that	  stimulate	  and	  require	  the	   active	   aversion	   of	   detrimental	   communal	   segregation	   (Mayaram	   2006;	  Heitmeyer	  2009).	  	  The	   studies	   discussed	   above	   go	   some	   distance	   in	   breaking	   down	   the	  opposition	  between	  peace	  and	  violence.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  ‘the	  recognition	  of	  religious	   identity	   does	   not	   necessarily	   denote	   conflict,	   but	   at	   times	   only	   an	  awareness	  of	  difference’	  (Gottschalk	  2000:	  151).	  In	  Joygram,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  awareness	  of	  difference	  is	  what	  allows	  for	  constant,	  active	  ‘peace-­‐management’,	  infused	   with	   tension.	   One	   study	   that	   has	   convincingly	   theorized	   more	  specifically	  the	  productive	  power	  of	  the	  ‘tension’	  that	  suspends	  both	  peace	  and	  conflict	  is	  Ring’s	  ethnography	  (2006;	  see	  also	  Williams	  2013).	  In	  the	  ethnically	  diverse	  Karachi	  apartment	  building	  that	  is	  the	  setting	  of	  Ring’s	  research,	  peace	  is	  not	  a	  taken	  for	  granted	  stasis,	  or	  the	  absence	  of	  tension.	  The	  women	  carry	  out	  the	   relentless	   and	   creative	   ‘labour’	   (Ring	   2006:	   178)	   of	   daily,	   neighbourly	  exchanges	  in	  which	  tension	  is	  sustained	  and	  managed	  rather	  than	  resolved,	  and	  of	  which	   a	   fragile	   peace	   is	   a	   residual	   product.	   I	   build	   upon	   the	  work	   of	   Ring	  (2006)	   to	   develop	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   constant	   management	   of	   the	  disorderly	  informal	  exchanges	  is	  an	  ethical	  end	  in	  itself	  rather	  than	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  a	  state	  of	  peace.	  	  As	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  2,	  there	  is	  a	  segmentary	  logic	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  becoming	  and	  belonging	  that	  are	  generated	  by	  exchanges.	  Here	  I	  expand	  that	  argument:	   just	   as	   various	   forms	   of	   exchanges	   generate	   the	   human	   person,	  networks	   of	   relatedness	   and	   the	   jāti	   community,	   exchanges	   also	   generate	   the	  plural	   society.	   Identifications	  generated	  by	  exchanges	   scale	  upwards	   from	   the	  
jāti	   to	   shared	   identifications	  with	   the	   local	  deś	   (land,	   soil,	  place),	  West	  Bengal	  and	  Bengali	  identity	  to	  the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state	  (see	  also	  Arumugam	  2011;	  Bear	  2007;	   Michelutti	   2008).	   Significantly,	   relationships	   of	   exchange	   emerge	   from	  shared	  moral	   substance	   and	   generate	   the	   differences	   and	   distinctions	  within,	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foremost,	  the	  essentialised	  jātis.	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2	  that	  while	  intra-­‐
jāti	   exchanges	   are	   to	   foster	   equality,	   inter-­‐jāti	   relationships	   of	   exchange	   are	  marked	  by	  hierarchy.	  Inter-­‐jāti	  exchange	  requires	  vigilance	  because	  the	  sharing	  of	  moral	  substances	  generates	  particular	  kinds	  of	  persons	  and	  determines	  the	  boundary	  and	  the	  hierarchical	  positionality	  of	  the	  jātis.	  The	  substance-­‐code	  that	  is	  exchanged	   is	  potentially	  polluting,	  physically	  and	  morally	  (Parry	  1989b),	   so	  exchanges	  are	  rife	  with	  tension.	  Therefore,	  and	  in	  an	  elaboration	  of	  the	  work	  by	  Ring	   (2006)	   and	  Bilgrami	   (2011),	   I	   suggest	   that	   communal	   relations	   in	   South	  Asia	   are	   marked	   not	   as	   much	   by	   ‘peaceful	   tolerance’	   as	   by	   the	   ‘toleration	   of	  tension’.	  	  From	   a	   political	   philosophy	   perspective,	   Bilgrami	   argues	   that	   toleration	  ‘presupposes	  disapproval	  of	  what	  is	  tolerated,	  and	  a	  condescending	  acceptance	  of	   what	   one	   disapproves’	   (2011:	   34).	   In	   the	   aspiration	   for	   peaceful	  multiculturalism,	  he	  argues,	  we	  need	  to	  ‘overcome	  disapproval’	  and	  go	  ‘beyond	  toleration’	  (ibid.).	  Drawing	  on	  Ring’s	  work,	  I	  suggest	  in	  contrast	  that	  the	  act	  of	  toleration,	   whether	   implying	   disapproval	   or	   acceptance,	   binds	   the	   pluralistic	  society.	  Toleration	  presupposes	  what	  Ring	  calls	  an	  ‘ethic	  of	  suspense’	  (2006:	  31,	  179-­‐80).	  The	  idiom	  of	  ethics	  points	  to	  the	  idea	  that,	  even	  though	  the	  exchanges	  between	  jātis	  are	  negotiations	  of	  hierarchy,	  these	  negotiations	  within	  the	  ‘cycles	  of	   reciprocity’	   may	   be	   an	   end	   in	   themselves	   rather	   than	   the	   means	   to	   other	  ends,	  such	  as	  status	  or	  various	  forms	  of	  capital	  (cf.	  Bourdieu	  1990:	  98ff).	  When	  people	  with	  various	  ideological	  commitments	  live	  in	  close	  proximity,	  the	  ‘art	  of	  life’	  (Lambek	  2010a)	  may	  be,	  indeed,	  ‘to	  sustain	  the	  tension	  of	  the	  specific	  social	  and	  cultural	  contradictions	  that	  exchange	  produces	  in	  this	  particular	  historical	  circumstance’	   (Ring	   2006:	   77).	   The	   moral	   imperative	   of	   reciprocity	   requires	  ‘active	  irresolution’	  (ibid.)	  to	  bind	  the	  plural	  environment	  and	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  fragmentation.	  In	  order	  to	  frame	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  tense	  toleration	  in	  Joygram,	  I	  draw	  on	  an	  exceptionally	  fine-­‐grained	  analysis	  by	  Venkatesan	  (2012),	  who	  explores	  the	  many	   layers	  of	   the	  subjectivity	  of	  one	  Muslim	  weaver	   in	  a	  South	   Indian	   town.	  She	   argues	   that	   episodic	   empathetic	   and	   antipathetic	   resonances	   with	   the	  ‘other’	   shape	   a	   ‘laminated	   subjectivity’.	   She	   follows	   Holland	   and	   Leander	  (2004),	   who	   ‘argue	   that	   a	   person	   or	   group	   is	   offered	   or	   afforded	   a	   social	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positioning	   which	   shapes	   them	   as	   a	   subject’	   (2012:	   416).	   Positioning	   may	  pertain	  to	  almost	  any	  kind	  of	  identification	  (class,	  gender,	  religion,	  occupation,	  and	   pedigree)	   and	   happens	   constantly,	   in	   daily	   encounters	   and	   interactions.	  Venkatesan	  suggests	  that	  the	  ‘micro-­‐production’	  of	  subjectivity	  through	  various	  negative	   and	   positive	   positionings	   is	   like	   the	   production	   of	   a	   cymbal:	   it	   is	  laminated	   layer	   by	   layer,	   and	   will	   therefore	   sound	   differently	   depending	   on	  where	   it	   is	   struck.	   In	   this	  process	   the	   laminated	  subjectivity	  of	   the	  positioned	  person	   emerges;	   a	   person	   with	   particular	   ethical	   affordances	   (Keane	   2015).	  This	  is	  not	  a	  passive	  process,	  however:	  	  ‘Thinking	   about	   subjectivity	   in	   this	   way	   acknowledges	   that	   it	   is	  simultaneously	   emergent	   and	   yet	   shaped	   by	   prior	   encounters	   and	  positionings	   and	   inflected	   by	   memory	   and	   learning.	   There	   is	   also	  conceptual	  space	  here	  for	  self-­‐positioning,	  in	  that	  people	  can	  and	  do	  decide	  what	   they	   want	   to	   actively	   respond	   to	   and	   build	   on’	   (Venkatesan	   2012:	  417).	  	  Through	  the	  analytical	  lens	  of	  ‘laminated	  subjectivity’	  I	  attend	  to	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  pluralism	  is	  conceived	  and	  practiced	  in	  Joygram.	  Jāti	  and	  dharma	  are	   the	   indigenous	   categories	   through	   which	   the	   pluralistic	   society	   is	  historically	   experienced	   and	   constituted,	   but	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   various	  ideological	  inclinations	  and	  ethical	  affordances	  are	  at	  play	  at	  different	  moments	  and	   in	  different	   situations.	   I	  will	  discuss	   the	  various	   forms	  of	   ‘resonance’	   that	  emerge	  in	  order	  to	  give	  a	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  actual	  cohabitation	  of	  Hindus	  and	   Muslims.	   I	   borrow	   the	   term	   ‘resonance’	   from	   Venkatesan	   to	   denote	   ‘a	  certain	  kind	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  embodied	  encounters	  with	  others	  and	  also	  to	  concerns,	  ideas	  and	  discourses	  that	  originate	  locally	  or	  from	  elsewhere’	  (2012:	  401).	   The	   idea	   of	   resonance	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   potential	   of	   mutual	  understanding,	   without	   there	   necessarily	   being	   shared	   religious	   practices.	  Indeed,	   Das	   argues	   that	   the	   shared	   use	   of	   concepts,	  words	   and	   gestures,	   and	  including	   the	   use	   of	   the	   other’s	   theological	   register,	   is	   not	   evidence	   of	  ‘syncretism’,	   and	   that	   ‘the	   issue	   at	   stake	   is	   not	   that	   of	   “belief”	   at	   all’	   but	   is	  evidence	   of	   shared	   registers	   and	   shared	   ethical	   affordances,	   ‘buried	   in	   the	  languages	   of	   ordinary	   men	   and	   women	   and	   that	   surfaces	   naturally	   in	   the	  contexts	  in	  which	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  are	  already	  committed	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  a	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common	  life,	  whether	  in	  engaging	  neighbourliness	  or	  in	  forging	  political	  actions	  to	   ward	   off	   the	   violence	   that	   is	   always	   present	   as	   a	   possibility’	   (Das	   2010b:	  241).	  	  As	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   ‘toleration	   of	   tension’	   suggests,	   resonance	   may	   imply	  disapproval	  as	  well	  as	  respect;	  antipathy	  as	  well	  as	  empathy.	  This	  observation	  is	   highly	   significant,	   because	   it	   shows	   that	   episodes	   of	   disharmony	   may	   be	  productive	   of	   long-­‐term	   harmonious	   pluralism.	   In	   fact,	   I	   suggest	   that	  disharmony	  may	  be	  necessary	  because	  the	  cosmogonic	  principle	  is	  relatedness	  from	  which	  separate	  identities	  and	  jātis	  need	  to	  be	  created.	  A	  lack	  of	  distinction	  may	   be	   threatening	   to	   the	   self.	   I	   use	   the	   idiom	   of	   the	   ‘narcissism	   of	   minor	  differences’	  (Blok	  1998)	  to	  explain	  why	  it	  may	  be	  productive	  for	  order	  to	  create	  difference.	   In	  sum,	   I	  suggest	   that	   the	  key	  to	  harmonious	  cohabitation	   in	  South	  Asia	  may	  be	  in	  the	  constant	  struggle	  for	  distinction	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  aspiration	  of	  a	  ‘brotherhood’	  that	  attempts	  to	  eliminate	  difference	  (Bilgrami	  2011).	  These	  communal	  negotiations	  take	  place	  in	  the	  shared	  ideological	  frame	  of	  dharma.	  The	  neighbourly	   exchanges	   in	   the	  Karachi	   apartment	  building	  do	  not	   take	  place	  in	  a	  vacuum	  (Ring	  2006:	  70-­‐1);	  nor	  do	  the	  inter-­‐jāti	  exchanges	  in	  Joygram.	  The	  micro-­‐level	   exchanges	   are	   affected	   by	   local	   factionalism	   and	   contain	   the	  tension	  between	  the	  state’s	  normative	  discourse	  of	  equality	  and	  secularism	  and	  the	   actual	   practice	   of	   communal	   discrimination.	   The	   experience	   of	   fear,	  exclusion,	  and	  discrimination	   is	   ‘folded	   into	  ongoing	  relationships’	   (Das	  2007:	  8)	  and	  affects	  the	  subjectivity	  and	  positionality	  of	  the	  Muslims	  in	  Joygram.	  	  According	   to	   popular	   perception	   In	   West	   Bengal,	   the	   practice	   of	   party	  politics	   ultimately	   lacks	   legitimacy	   (or	   at	   least,	   ethical	   validity)	   as	   it	   lacks	  ideological	   motivation	   and	   is	   therefore	   located	   outside	   the	   shared	   frame	   of	  
dharma.	   I	  anticipate	  that	  in	  most	  places	  in	  India	  violence	  related	  to	  power	  is	  a	  greater	  threat	  to	  everyday	  peace	  than	  communal	  violence.	  Communal	  violence	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  an	  expression	  of	  power	  struggles,	  rather	  than	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  ‘natural’	   communal	   antagonism	   or	   the	   inability	   of	   India’s	   ‘masses’	   to	   live	   in	  peaceful	  coexistence	  (see	  Kaur	  2005b:	  23	  -­‐	  27).	  To	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  communal	  aspects	   of	   violence,	   is	   to	   easily	   apply	   a	   ‘ready	   explanatory	   framework’	  (Mayaram	  1997);	   a	   powerful	   but	   deceiving	   ‘master	   narrative’	   (Pandey	  1990).	  The	   situation	  will	  be	  different	   in	  places	  where	  Hindu	  nationalist	   groups	  are	  a	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prominent	   feature	   of	   the	   public	   sphere.	   In	   places	   like	   Gujarat,	   a	   particular	  
dharma	   becomes	   legitimately	   associated	   with	   the	   state	   and	   with	   politics,	  making	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  entirely	  illegitimate.	  The	  deprecation	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
dharma	  and	  the	  discrimination	  of	  Muslims	  in	  West	  Bengal	  are	  less	  explicit,	  but	  it	   informs	  the	  Muslims’	   laminated	  subjectivity	  nevertheless.	  Muslims	  are	  more	  vulnerable	   and	   therefore	   carry	   the	   heaviest	   burden	   of	   responsibility	   in	   the	  reproduction	  of	  order	  in	  plurality.	  	  	  A	   caveat	   is	   in	  order.	   I	   appreciate	   the	   fact	   that,	   from	   the	  ethnographic	  data	  presented	  below,	  irreconcilable	  contradictions	  between	  the	  various	  ideological	  positions	  of	  my	   interlocutors	   emerge.	  Certain	  universalistic	   theological	   claims	  seem	  in	  practice	  only	  applicable	  to	  the	  Muslim	  jāti.	  It	  is	  generally	  assumed	  that	  any	   Salvationist	   religion	   will	   attempt	   to	   convert	   ‘nonbelievers’,	   because	   only	  believers	  will	   earn	   a	   place	   in	   heaven.	   As	   I	   have	   spelled	   out	   in	   chapter	   2,	   the	  ideological	  discrepancy	  is	  something	  people	  live	  with	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  It	  may	  at	  times	   seem	   to	   inspire	   scepticism,	   whereas	   at	   other	   times	   it	   seems	   to	   be	  unproblematic.	   	   It	   is	   unlikely	   for	   anyone	   to	   have	   a	   perfectly	   coherent	   value-­‐economy.	  Ordinary	  human	  cosmopolitics	  will	  contain,	  if	  not	  necessarily	  blatant	  inconsistencies,	   at	   least	   subtle	   inner	   conflicts,	   tensions	   and	   dissonances	  between	  values	  (Bilgrami	  2011:	  24).	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  therefore	  not	  to	  solve	  or	  reconcile	  the	  inconsistencies,	  but	  to	  bring	  them	  to	  the	  surface.	  	  
Toleration	  of	  tension	  	  As	  many	  others	  in	  Joygram,	  Masiruddin	  was	  always	  full	  of	  praise	  for	  India	  as	  a	   diverse,	   secular	   democracy.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   great	   examples	   of	   Mecca,	   he	  purported	  to	  dread	  not	  being	  able	  to	  live	  according	  to	  Islamic	  law,	  because,	  ‘this	  is	  a	  democracy,	  a	  secular	  country,	   isn’t	   it,	  so	  we	  can’t	  do	   it	   [obey	  Islamic	   law].	  Here,	   we	   have	   one	   law	   all	   together’	   (ekhāne	   to	   ‘democracy’,	   ‘secular	   country’,	  
kar’te	  pār’bo	  nā.	  Ām’rā	  sab	  ek’saṅge	  ek’ṭā	  āin	  āche).	  Within	   the	   confines	  of	   the	  Indian	  constitution,	  Muslims	  try	  to	  follow	  Islamic	  rules	  as	  much	  as	  they	  can,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  been	  better	  to	  live	  in	  an	  Islamic	  country,	  because	  ‘we	  could	  obey	  even	  better’	  (āro	  bhālo	  mānte	  pār’tām).	  Yet,	  in	  one	  breath	  he	  continues	  with	  an	  obvious	   sense	   of	   pride:	   ‘India	   is	   an	   enormously	   special	   place	   (Bhārat	   biśāl	  
‘special’	   jāygā),	   there	   are	   so	   many	   different	   religions,	   so	   many	   different	  languages,	   and	   all	   together	   we	   have	   one	   law!’	   Fantasies	   about	   a	   caliphate,	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common	   among	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   members,	   are	   largely	   utopic	   and	   barely	  impinge	  on	  the	  everyday	  pragmatics	  of	  life.	  	  
Plurality	  as	  a	  social	  fact	  	  Plurality	   is	  not	  an	  abstract	   idea	  but	  experienced	  every	  day	  in	  ordinary	  life.	  In	  West	  Bengal,	  members	  of	  different	   jātis	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  Bengalis,	  whether	  Hindu,	  Muslim,	  or	  of	  another	  jāti,	  share	   the	   same	   language,	  dress,	  musical	  preference,	   and	   love	   for	  mācher	  bhāt	  and	  ālu	  posta	  (rice	  with	  fish	  and	  potato	  curry	  with	  poppy	  seeds).	  Only	  someone	  very	  familiar	  with	  or	  native	  to	  the	  region	  can	  distinguish	  a	  Hindu	  and	  a	  Muslim	  daily	  labourer	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  Muslims’	  preference	  for	  chequered	  blue	  luṅgis),	  and	   will	   still	   often	   be	   proved	   wrong.	   At	   most	   tea	   (cā)	   stalls	   you	   will	   find	  different	   jātis	  mingle,	   smoking	   the	   same	   Bengali	   biṛis	  and	   drinking	   sweet	   tea	  from	  the	  much-­‐loved	  Bengali	  earthen	  cups.	  Women	  of	  different	  jātis	  chat	  in	  the	  queues	  for	  the	  shared	  water	  pump,	  or	  when	  they	  gather	  to	  pay	  the	  rent	  on	  their	  micro-­‐credit	   loans.	  Both	  men	  and	  women	  of	  all	   jātis	  meet	  weekly	  at	  the	  ration	  shops,	  sharing	  narratives	  of	  corruption.	  Public	  schools	  are	  attended	  by	  all	  jātis;	  here	  children	  are	  served	  free	  midday	  meals	  prepared	  by	  women	  from	  different	  
jātis.	  	  The	   everyday	   experience	   of	   plurality	   has	   resulted	   in	   the	   pervasive	  perception	   that	   diversity	   is	   a	   social	   fact.	   This	   is	   illustrated	   through	   my	  interlocutors’	  reflections	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  people.	   In	  a	  certain	  discourse,	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  over	  other	  dharmas	   is	  often	   emphasised,	   and	  Muslims	  may	  be	   considered	   to	   have	  more	   potential	   to	  become	   ‘good’.	   However,	   when	   someone’s	   character	   or	   actions	   are	   ethically	  evaluated,	   the	   jāti	   identity	   does	   not	   play	   a	   role.	   There	   are	   badmāśi	   people	  (crooks)	  from	  whichever	   jāti	  (ye	  kono	  jāti),	  and	  ‘bad	  people’	  would	  generically	  be	  called	  badmāś,	  without	  mention	  of	  the	  jāti.	  	  An	   elderly	   Muslim	   man,	   Sheik	   Farhan,	   asserts	   that	   there	   is	   a	   necessary	  balance	   between	   good	   and	   bad	   people,	   just	   as	   the	   interlocutors	   I	   quoted	   in	  chapter	  3,	  but	  he	  makes	  clear	  that	  this	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  jāti.	  We	  were	  sitting	  on	  the	  roadside	  near	  the	  Farukhbazar	  BDO	  during	  the	  filing	  of	  nominations	  for	  the	   panchayat	   elections,	   both	   dreading	   the	   violence	   that	   the	   elections	   bring	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about.	   I	   asked	   him	  what	   he	   thought	  made	   people	   commit	   such	   atrocities.	   He	  asked	  me	  exactly	  the	  same	  rhetorical	  question	  as	  Wasim	  had	  done:	  ‘Are	  all	  the	  fingers	  of	  a	  hand	  the	  same?	  If	  they	  were	  the	  same,	  you	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  put	  food	  in	  your	  mouth’.	  He	  continues:	  ‘In	  every	  place	  there	  are	  good	  people:	  in	  the	  mosque,	   in	   the	   Hindu	   temple,	   in	   the	   Sikh	   temple	   (masjide,	   mandire,	  
gurudwāre)…but	  like	  that	  there	  are	  also	  bad	  people.	  Allah	  has	  given	  humans	  the	  test;	  they	  can	  choose	  the	  path	  they	  take.	  The	  majority,	  however,	  take	  the	  wrong	  path’.	  	  	  At	   first	   glance,	   Farhan	   reiterates	   a	   paradox	   I	   often	   encountered:	   any	   jāti	  member	  can	  become	  good,	  yet	  one	  has	  to	  believe	  in	  Allah	  to	  become	  good.	  This	  conundrum	  is,	  however,	  not	  so	  paradoxical	  if	  ‘Allah’	  would	  be	  replaced	  with	  any	  other	  god,	  and	  Islam	  with	  any	  other	  dharma;	  Sheik	  Farhan	  explicitly	  links	  ‘good’	  people	   to	  various	   places	   of	  worship.	   So	   it	   is	   not	   Islam	  as	   such,	   but	  dharma	   in	  general	   that	   is	   indispensable	   for	  ethical	  behaviour.	  Clearly,	   living	  according	   to	  the	   rules	   of	   one’s	   particular	  dharma	   is	   not	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	  peaceful	  coexistence;	  rather	   it	   is	  considered	  contributory	  to	  a	  peaceful	  society	  as	   it	   provides	   the	  potential	   for	   ‘processes	  of	   amity’.	   Ethics	   is	  dharma,	   but	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  Islamic	  dharma.	  	  Both	  Shahadat	  Hussain,	  in	  the	  opening	  vignette,	  and	  Sheik	  Farhan	  consider	  plurality	  as	  a	  natural	  fact,	  and	  the	  balance	  between	  different	  jātis	  as	  a	  necessity	  for	   harmony	   and	   even	   survival	   (missing	   a	   finger	   one	   could	   not	   eat!).	  Significantly,	   neither	   Shahadat	   Hussain,	   nor	   Sheik	   Farhan	   links	   the	   lack	   of	  harmony	   in	   society	   or	   the	   presence	   of	   violence	   to	   a	   specific	   jāti.	   But	   when	  Farhan’s	   balance	   between	   good	   and	   bad	   people	   was	   distorted,	   Shahadat	  Hussain	   ’s	   harmony	   between	   jātis	  was	   as	  well.	   ‘The	  wrong	   path’,	   in	   Farhan’s	  words,	   is	  not	   the	  path	  outside	   Islam,	  but	  outside	  dharma:	   the	  problem	   is	   that	  ‘somewhere	  in	  history’	  people	  have	  gone	  off	  the	  path	  of	  dharma.	  	  Interestingly,	  in	  the	  transcendent	  world	  inhabited	  by	  djins	  (being	  of	  smoke	  mentioned	   in	   the	   Quran),	   there	   would	   be	   various	   jātis,	   just	   like	   here.	   I	   have	  mentioned	   in	   chapter	   2	   that	   Dada	   would	   occasionally	   enter	   in	   a	   state	   of	  possession	  by	   a	  djin,	   and	   in	   this	   state	   he	  would	  be	   able	   to	   visualise	   the	  djins’	  accounts	   of	   the	  world	   in	  which	   they	   inhabit.	   According	   to	  Dada,	   the	  world	   of	  
djins	  is	  a	  perfect,	  ideal	  version	  of	  our	  world.	  All	  people	  are	  good	  people	  –	  but	  not	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everyone	  is	  a	  Muslim.	  Indeed,	  different	  jātis	  live	  peacefully	  together.	  Even	  in	  the	  idealised	  world	  of	  djins,	  where	  everyone	   lives	  according	   to	  dharma,	   there	   is	  a	  pluralism	  of	  jātis.	  	  
The	  content	  of	  food	  	  The	   plural	   nature	   of	   society,	   both	   in	   its	   abstract	   sense	   of	   the	   society	   as	   a	  nation	  and	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  society	  as	  the	  practical	  everyday	  social	  environment,	  is	  a	  social	   fact	  and	  even	  a	  matter	  of	  pride.	  Yet	  at	  the	  everyday	  level,	  pluralism	  requires	  constant	  negotiation.	  	  	  A	   lot	   of	   the	  negotiation	  between	   jātis	  takes	  place	   through	   the	   exchange	  of	  food.	   Food	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   to	   be	   ‘a	   highly	   condensed	   social	   fact’,	   ‘a	  peculiarly	   powerful	   semiotic	   device’	   (Appadurai	   1981:	   494)	   and	   a	   highly	  significant	  substance	   for	  constituting	  kin,	  as	   I	  discussed	   in	  detail	   in	  chapter	  2.	  Sharing	   food	   is	   a	   dialectical	   process	   of	   unification	   and	   diversification:	   food	  unites	   bodies	   that	   eat	   together	   and	   distances	   bodies	   that	   don’t	   (Bloch	   1999:	  139).	  Food	  makes,	  unmakes	  and	  remakes	  relational	  worlds	  (Janeja	  2009:	  103).	  It	   follows	   from	   the	   fluid	   overlap	   of	   kinship	   and	   jāti	   that	   food	   is	   an	   equally	  important	  substance	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  jāti	  identity.	  	  
	  Bear	   (2007:	   194)	   demonstrates	   that	   food	  may	   sustain	   regional	   and	   racial	  senses	   of	   belonging:	   the	   Anglo-­‐Indian	   ‘cuisine’	   would	   reflect	   certain	   inherent	  characteristics	   that	   are	   different	   from	   both	   ‘Anglos’	   and	   Indians	   while	   still	  rooting	  Anglo-­‐Indians	   in	   Indian	  soil.	  Similarly,	   food	   is	  a	  means	   for	   the	  Bengali	  Muslims	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  Bengali	  Hindus	  in	  the	  one	  instance	  and	  to	   claim	  Bengali	   inheritance	   at	   a	   next	   instance.	  My	   interlocutors	  would	  never	  tire	  of	  stressing	  the	  importance	  to	  eat	  beef,	  as	  it	  distinguishes	  them	  as	  Muslims.	  They	  would	  invariably	  claim	  that	  beef	  tastes	  better	  than	  anything	  else,	  and	  that	  especially	  men	  need	  beef	   to	   ‘survive’.	  On	  religious	   festivals	  nearly	  all	  villagers	  consume	   beef,	   but	   on	   an	   ordinary	   day	   only	   a	   few	   can	   afford	   beef:	   the	  consumption	  of	  beef	  is	  also	  a	  symbol	  of	  wealth.	  Moreover,	  the	  Joygramis	  more	  acquainted	  with	   the	   ‘larger	  Muslim	  world’	  would	  make	  Mughal	   dishes	   rather	  than	  more	  regional	  meat	  dishes	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Islamic	  world	  outside	  Bengal	  (which	   is	  generally	  considered	   ‘higher’).	  However,	  when	  affines	  visit	  and	  rich	  food	  ought	  to	  be	  offered	  (cf.	  Inden	  and	  Nicholas	  1977:	  19),	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beef	   is	   optional	   whereas	   there	   should	   be	   at	   least	   fish	   and	   chicken:	   a	  confirmation	  of	  the	  Bengali	  jāti.	  Furthermore,	  rice	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  staple	  food	  but	   an	   identity	   marker	   of	   the	   jāti	   that	   cultivates	   the	   fertile	   paddy	   fields	   of	  Bengal,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  wheat	  cultivators	  in	  Western	  parts	  of	  India.	  	  	  Moreover,	  much	  like	  the	  Anglo-­‐Indians,	  the	  Muslims	  see	  specific	  features	  of	  a	  community	  as	  a	  result	  of	  food	  habits,	  and	  sometimes	  they	  even	  dreaded	  that	  the	   consumption	   of	   beef	   would	   make	   them	   ‘garam’	   (hot),	   a	   characterisation	  used	   negatively	   for	   hot-­‐headed	   people.	   To	   complicate	   the	  matter,	  my	  Muslim	  friends	   are	   aware	   that	   ‘hot’	   is	   a	   feature	   all	   too	   often	   used	   by	   non-­‐Muslims	   to	  describe	  the	  supposedly	  more	  ‘aggressive’	  and	  ‘wild’	  Muslim	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  ‘civilised’	   but	   effeminate	   Bengali	   Hindu.	   Blaming	   beef	   for	   hot-­‐headedness	  (making	   the	   trait	   transient	   rather	   than	   inherent)	   is	   a	   means	   to	   distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  racial	  character	  of	  the	  allegation.94	  If	  food	  reflects	  and	  alters	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  bio-­‐moral	  person,	  it	  follows	  that	  exchanging	  food	  between	  jātis	  is	  a	  very	  significant	  act.	  It	  is	  both	  a	  virtuous	  and	  a	  dangerous	  act,	  as	  it	  establishes	  commonalities	  and	  differences;	  proximity	  and	   distance.	   I	   will	   analyse	   the	   toleration	   of	   tension	   in	   exchanges	   in	   detail	  through	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘laminated	  subjectivity’	  of	  one	  woman,	  Habiba	  Bibi.	  	  
Habiba	  Bibi’s	  ‘laminated	  subjectivity’	  Habiba	   bibi,	   a	  woman	   in	   her	   forties	   and	   Dada’s	  wife,	   is	   a	  maternal	   figure	  who	  treated	  me	  as	  a	  daughter	   from	  the	  beginning	  of	   this	   fieldwork,	  caring	   for	  me	   as	   much	   as	   criticising	   me.	   She	   is	   curious	   to	   the	   point	   of	   nosy,	   and	   the	  information	  she	  has	  gathered	  throughout	  the	  day	  is	  translated	  in	  vicious	  gossip,	  articulate	   opinions	   and	   radically	   generalising	   statements.	   The	   statements	   do	  not	  always	   inform	  her	  practice	  as	  much:	   in	  any	  particular	  situation	  she	  shows	  herself	   to	  be	  both	  empathetic	  as	  well	  as	  pragmatic.	  She	  seemed	  to	   lament	  her	  relative	   lack	   of	   prosperity	   in	   Khadim	   Para	   and	  would	   cover	   her	   vulnerability	  with	   brag	   about	   her	   well-­‐to-­‐do	   affines.	   She	   cherishes	   local	   customs,	   whether	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Furthermore,	   given	   the	   significance	   of	   food	   as	   a	   constitutive	   substance,	   it	   may	   not	   be	  surprising	   that	  Bengali	  Muslims	   consistently	  use	   the	  Urdu	  word	   “pāni”	   instead	  of	   the	  Bengali	  word	  “jal”	   for	   ‘water’	  –	  one	  of	  the	  few	  words	  that	  distinguish	  the	  everyday	  speech	  of	  Muslims	  from	  Hindus	  in	  West	  Bengal.	  That	  is,	  together	  with	  nearly	  the	  entire	  kinship	  terminology.	  They	  would	  persistently	  say	  that	  it	  is	  because	  they	  are	  of	  a	  different	  jāti	  that	  they	  use	  a	  different	  kin	  terminology.	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Bengali	   or	   Islamic	   (and	   she	  makes	   little	   distinction	   unless	   she	   has	   picked	   up	  somewhere	   that	   she	   should	  make	   that	   distinction):	   she	   is	   a	   proud	   and	   skilled	  weaver	  of	  mats	  and	  an	  excellent	  cook;	  she	  sings	  ghazals	  and	  loves	  the	  dancing	  at	   weddings.	   She	   is	   ambivalent	   about	   the	   Islamic	   reformism	   her	   husband	  advocates:	  more	   than	   once	   I	   found	   them	   bickering	   about	   the	   prohibitions	   on	  shared	   Bengali	   customs.	   To	   please	   her	   husband	   and	   enhance	   her	   status,	   she	  started	  reading	  the	  Quran	   in	   the	  afternoons	  with	  a	  neighbour	  (taught	   to	   them	  by	  a	  local	  madrasa	  boy)	  but	  she	  showed	  very	  little	  interest.	  	  *	  On	   an	   April	   morning	   early	   in	  my	   fieldwork,	   I	   am	   sat	   with	   Habiba	   on	   her	  veranda,	   cutting	   vegetables	   for	   the	   lunch.	   She	   asks	  whether	  my	  parents	  don’t	  mind	  that	  I,	  as	  a	  Hindu,	  attended	  an	  Islamic	  congregation	  [which	  I	  had	  done	  the	  week	  before].	  I	  try	  to	  explain	  to	  her	  once	  again	  that	  I	  am	  not	  a	  Hindu	  as	  I	  don’t	  have	   a	  dharma.	   Habiba	   points	   out	   that	   this	   is	   not	   possible,	   so	   I	   ask	   her	  what	  
dharma	  means	  for	  her.	  She	  is	  not	  actually	  straightforward	  in	  her	  answer,	  needs	  to	  think	  some	  and	  mumbles	  some,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  like	  me	  having	  asked	  this	  question.	   The	   first	   point	   she	   mentions	   is	   to	   pray	   nāmāj	   five	   times	   a	   day,	  secondly,	  that	  Muslims	  don’t	  eat	  in	  Hindu	  houses.	  Muslims	  can	  share	  tea	  but	  not	  rice	   with	   Hindus,	   and	   neither	   would	   Hindus	   have	   rice	   in	   their	   houses.	   So	   to	  Habiba,	  the	  second	  most	  significant	  characteristic	  of	  her	  dharma	  is	  a	  prohibition	  on	   the	   exchange	  of	   food	  with	  Hindus.	   I	   press	  her	   further,	   asking	  whether	   she	  could	   also	   not	   have	   a	  meal	  with	   Christians,	   or	   any	   other	   jāti.	   She	   backed	   out	  somewhat,	   laughing	   and	   waving	   her	   hand,	   and	   eventually	   says:	   ‘Yeah	   yeah	  yeah…we	  can	  have	  a	  meal.	   If	  we	   feel	   like	   it	  we	  can	  have	   food’	   (He	  he	  he…bhāt	  
khete	  pāri.	  Bhālo	  lāg’le	  khete	  pāri).	  It	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  form	  this	  context	  what	  factors	   could	   convince	  her	   to	  eat	  a	  meal	  –	   the	  people,	   the	   food,	   the	  particular	  occasion?	  But	  what	   is	  clear	   is	   that	  one’s	  subjective	   judgement	  of	  a	  situation	   is	  very	   important	   in	   determining	   what	   the	   actual	   rules	   of	   dharma	   are.	   The	  following	  vignette	  will	  be	  illustrative.	  	  Habiba	  Bibi	  could	  not	  hide	  her	  pride	  when	  telling	  me	  that	  she	  and	  her	  family	  had	  been	  invited	  to	  a	  Brahmin	  wedding	  in	  the	  nearby	  town.	  After	  the	  wedding,	  I	  ask	   Habiba	   Bibi	   and	   Dada	   whether	   the	   Brahmin	   wedding	   was	   very	   different	  from	   a	   Muslim	   wedding.	   Half	   ridiculing	   and	   theatrically	   gesticulating,	   Dada	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explains	  the	  procedures:	  how	  the	  couple	  is	  attached	  to	  one	  another	  with	  a	  cloth,	  how	   they	  walk	   around	   the	   fire	   seven	   times,	  with	   some	   ghee	   here,	   some	  milk	  there…	  In	  a	  more	  serious	  tone,	  he	  proceeds:	  ‘and	  then	  they	  do	  what	  Muslims	  do	  as	  well,	   as	   it	   says	   in	   the	  Quran	  Sharif:	   they	  say	   that	   they	  will	   love	  each	  other,	  take	  care	  of	  each	  other,	   feed	  each	  other,	   that	  there	  won’t	  be	  anyone	  else.’	  And	  then	  there	  is	  food,	  of	  course.	  Habiba	  and	  her	  husband	  commented	  in	  great	  detail	  on	  all	   the	  dishes	  they	  had	  eaten	  (a	  very	  common	  thing	  to	  do	  after	  attending	  a	  wedding).	  A	  little	  later,	  however,	  after	  her	  husband	  had	  left	  the	  house,	  she	  told	  me	   with	   an	   expression	   of	   repulsion,	   that	   the	   food	   hadn’t	   been	   good,	   it	   had	  smelled	  bad,	  and,	  significantly,	  ‘those	  Hindus	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  prepare	  fish’.	  	  This	  vignette	   is	   significant	   in	  many	  ways.	  Clearly,	   the	   couple	   took	  pride	   in	  being	   invited	   to	   a	   Brahmin	   wedding,	   in	   a	   town.	   The	   consumption	   of	   large	  amounts	   of	   luxurious	   food	   enhances	   one’s	   capital,	   hence	   the	   detailed	  description.	   Even	   the	   prohibition	   of	   hārām	   food,	   which	   Dada	   had	   previously	  expounded	   to	   me	   as	   if	   of	   utmost	   importance,	   had	   been	   taken	   lightly.	   They	  hadn’t	  eaten	  meat,	  as	  the	  animals	  wouldn’t	  have	  been	  slaughtered	  in	  the	  hālāl	  manner,	  however	  they	  had	  eaten	  fish.	  Nevertheless,	  Habiba	  had	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  distance	  herself	  by	  deprecating	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  food.	  Moreover,	  she	  dismissed	  the	   Brahmans’	   superiority	   and	   re-­‐established	   a	   claim	   to	   the	   Bengali	   jāti	   by	  saying	  that	  the	  Brahmans	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  prepare	  fish	  well.	  Bengalis	  take	  great	  pride	  in	  the	  regional	  fish	  preparations,	  so	  especially	  for	  a	  woman	  usually	  confined	   to	   the	   kitchen	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   being	   more	   or	   less	   able	   to	  prepare	  fish	  gives	  one	  a	  more	  or	  less	  rightful	  claim	  to	  the	  Bengali	  identity.	  	  Habiba	   Bibi	   positions	   herself	   in	   a	   subordinate	   position	   to	   Brahmins	   by	  accepting	   their	   food	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   caste	   hierarchy	   of	   purity	   and	  pollution	   but	   quickly	   re-­‐positions	   herself	   as	   superior	   in	   the	   Bengali	   culinary	  landscape.	   The	   disapproval	   of	   the	   fish	   preparation	   of	   the	   Hindu	   cook	   at	   the	  wedding	   importantly	  demonstrates	   the	  resonance	  between	   the	  Brahmans	  and	  Habiba	   Bibi	   which	   is	   possible	   because	   of	   the	   shared	   positionality	   of	   being	  Bengali,	   expressed	   in	   culinary	   preferences.	   When	   this	   sense	   of	   mutuality	   is	  negated,	  Habiba	  Bibi	  gets	  upset,	  as	  the	  following	  vignette	  shows.	  	  *	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At	  the	  roadside,	  around	  the	  corner	  from	  the	  madrasa,	  there	  is	  a	  small	  pāṛā	  of	  five	  Hazra	  households	  (scheduled	  caste	  Hindus).	  The	  small	  houses	  are	  made	  of	  mud	   and	   kāṃcā	   (‘raw’)	   brick.	   One	   of	   the	   women	   living	   here,	   Sundori,	   is	   the	  distributor	  of	  wedding	  invitations	  in	  Khadim	  Para	  and	  Sheik	  Para	  –	  her	  husband	  is	   mentally	   and	   physically	   disabled	   and	   this	   work	   allows	   her	   to	   earn	   some	  money.	  This	  means	  that	  she	  gets	   to	  enter	  all	   the	  houses,	  and	  taken	  that	  she	   is	  very	   chatty	   she	   becomes	   a	  walking	   source	   of	   gossip	   the	  Muslim	  women	   (and	  myself)	  all	  too	  eagerly	  tap	  in	  to.	  Sundori	  passed	  by	  Habiba’s	  house	  earlier	  that	  morning	   to	  deliver	   a	  wedding	   invitation.	  They	  had	   seemed	  very	   friendly	  with	  each	   other,	   sitting	   together	   on	   the	   veranda	   and	   exchanging	   news	   and	   gossip.	  Sundori	   is	   barely	   literate,	   so	   Dada	   had	   helped	   her	   put	   the	   invitations	   in	   the	  sequence	  of	  the	  households,	  taking	  time	  to	  tell	  her	  how	  to	  go	  through	  the	  pāṛā	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  the	  right	  invitation	  to	  the	  right	  house.	  After	  Sundori	  has	  left	  the	  house,	   I	   ask	  Habiba	  Bibi	  whether	   they	   could	  have	   food	   together.	  No,	   says	  Habiba,	  and	  pulling	  her	  nose	  she	  adds	  that	  she	  did	  offer	  Sundori	  tea,	  ‘but	  she	  is	  very	  badmāś,	  she	  would	  not	  have	  anything	  here’.	  	  	  The	  Hindu	  woman	  would	  not	  want	  to	  enter	   in	  a	  relationship	  of	  reciprocity	  with	  Habiba;	  not	  only	  because	  she	  will	  not	  want	  to	  be	  indebted	  to	  Habiba,	  but	  also	   because	   she	   does	   not	  want	   to	   share	   a	   substance	  with	   a	   community	   that	  occupies	   a	   lower	   position	   within	   the	   hierarchical	   social	   order.	   Habiba	  recognizes	  this	  and	  condemns	  the	  refusal	  of	  exchange.	  Sundori	  entering	  Khadim	  Para	  is	  both	  literally	  and	  symbolically	  a	  significant	  act,	  as	  the	  very	  exchange	  of	  greetings	   and	   giving	   of	   directions	   ‘domesticates	   what	   is	   potentially	   an	  antagonistic,	   violence-­‐inviting	   space’	   (Ring	   2006:	   89).	   Khadim	  Para	  must	   feel	  like	   an	   antagonistic	   space	   to	   the	   Hindus	   (Hindus	   do	   not	   usually	   enter	   the	  Muslim	  pāṛās),	  which	  Sundori	  is	  allowed	  to	  domesticate	  by	  being	  employed	  to	  deliver	  the	  invitations.	  Vice	  versa,	  the	  symbolic	  space	  Sundori	  occupies	  by	  her	  presence	   is	   domesticated	   by	   her	   being	   in	   a	   subordinate	   (employee)	   and	  dependent	   (illiterate)	   position.	   While	   people	   may	   actively	   seek	   spaces	   of	  positive	   resonance,	   this	   is	   a	   continuous	   labour	   if	   one	   wants	   to	   remain	   in	   a	  hierarchically	  superior	  position	  and	  remain	  faithful	  to	  the	  theological	  norms	  of	  one’s	   dharma.	   However,	   the	   lack	   of	   exchange	   of	   tea	   continues	   to	   infuse	   the	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relationship	  with	  tension,	  as	  those	  with	  whom	  one	  has	  very	  little	  exchange	  are	  ‘dangerous	  strangers,	  potential	  ill	  doers’	  (Ring	  2006:	  89).	  	  *	  With	   the	   increasing	  puritanism	  of	   the	   Islamic	  normativity	  of	   the	  Deoband,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  what	  can	  and	  what	  cannot	  be	  shared	  become	  sharper,	  often	  much	  to	  Habiba	  Bibi’s	  discontent.	  Ahead	   of	   the	  most	   auspicious	   day	   in	   the	   life	   of	   the	   poet	   Jayadeva	   (a	   local	  Hindu	  festival),	  all	  Hindus	  prepare	  rice	  pancakes	  (piṭhe)	  to	  exchange	  with	  their	  affines.	   I	  had	  noticed	  that	   in	  some	  of	   the	  poorer	  households	   in	  Mach	  Para,	   the	  Muslim	  women	  were	  preparing	  piṭhe	  as	  well,	  and	  they	  would	  equally	  send	  those	  to	   the	   affines	   in	   other	   villages.	   I	   ask	  Habiba	   Bibi	  whether	   she	  would	   prepare	  
piṭhe.	  In	  a	  sullen	  mood,	  she	  answers	  that	  she	  won’t,	  because	  the	  maulānās	  had	  forbidden	  Muslims	  to	  prepare	  the	  special	  treats.	  ‘In	  the	  past,	  the	  elderly	  women	  would	  prepare	  the	  piṭhe.	  In	  my	  mother’s	  house	  [ancestral	  village],	  there	  they	  all	  do	   it,	   in	   Joydev	  everyone	  does	   it.	  But	  here	  we’re	  not	  allowed	  to’.	   I	   try	   to	  elicit	  from	   her	   why	   she	   thinks	   she	   is	   not	   supposed	   to	   prepare	   the	   pancakes	   any	  longer.	  She	  curtly	  maintains	  that	  one	  should	  do	  whatever	  the	  maulānās	  say.	  But,	  I	   ask,	   ‘isn’t	   it	   fun	   if	   Hindus	   and	  Muslims	   do	   things	   together?’	   She	   shakes	   her	  head.	  ‘We	  do	  our	  dharma	  and	  they	  do	  theirs.	  We	  fast,	  right,	  they	  don’t	  do	  that,	  so	  we	  shouldn’t	  do	  what	  they	  do	  either’.95	  	  In	  her	  interactions	  with	  Hindus	  she	  takes	  a	  situated	  position	  from	  within	  her	  ‘laminated	   subjectivity’;	   one	   layer	   of	   which	   is	   undergoing	   change	   with	   the	  influence	  of	  Islamic	  reformism	  in	  the	  village.	  As	  a	  Bengali	  woman	  who	  cherishes	  the	  traditions	  of	  her	  ancestors,	  Habiba	  Bibi	  is	  morose	  about	  the	  restrictions	  of	  this	   and	   other	   traditional	   practices.	   Even	   though	   the	   maulānās	   restrict	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   resonance	   with	   other	   jātis	   can	   be	   positive,	   there	   is	   still	  resonance.	   Distinction	   is	   most	   important	   when	   similarities	   abound;	   that	   is,	  when	  there	  is	  too	  much	  resonance,	  differences	  will	  be	  emphasised,	  or	  created.	  ‘It	  is	  those	  who	  imagine	  they	  have	  the	  most	  in	  common	  –	  or	  fear	  that	  they	  have,	  or	  fear	  that	  they	  may	  have	  come	  to	  have	  the	  most	  in	  common	  –	  who	  are	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  The	   prohibition	   of	   the	   maulānās	   to	   practice	   Hindu	   customs	   is	   a	   clear	   attempt	   at	  ‘authenticating	  Islam’	  (Deeb	  2006:	  20).	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likely	  to	  categorize	  each	  other	  as	  different’	  (Harrison	  2003:	  349).	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  point	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	   *	  When	  I	  talked	  with	  Habiba	  Bibi	  about	  women	  of	  different	  jātis	  in	  the	  context	  of	   the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state,	   another	   layer	   of	   her	   laminated	   subjectivity	   was	  revealed.	  We	  talked	  about	  the	  rape	  of	  a	  young	  student	  in	  Delhi,	  which	  by	  then	  had	   received	   widespread	   attention	   in	   the	   national	   and	   global	   media.	   Habiba	  Bibi	   is	   upset	   and,	   while	   roughly	   throwing	   potatoes	   in	   a	   pan	   with	   water,	   she	  exclaims:	   ‘Let	   them	  kill	   them	  [the	  perpetrators]!	  They	  now	  say	   they	  will	  hang	  them;	  that	  would	  be	  good.	  If	  they	  don’t	  do	  that,	  it	  would	  get	  worse.	  These	  days,	  women	   can’t	   even	   go	   out	   of	   the	   house	   anymore!’96	  I	   ponder	   out	   loud	   that	   it	  seems	   from	   the	  way	   those	   rapists	   treated	   the	  girl,	   that	  men	   think	  women	  are	  inferior,	   or	   worse,	   totally	   worthless.	   Habiba	   bites	   back:	  Hat!	   [exclaiming	   her	  disagreement]	  Women	  worthless??	  Women	  can	  do	  all	  kinds	  of	   things	  as	  well!’	  (meyer	  mūlya	  nei??	  Meyerā	  o	  sab	  kichu	  kār’te	  pāre).	   I	   ask	  her	  whether	   there	   is	  any	   difference	   between	   the	   women	   of	   different	   jātis.	   Again,	   she	   exclaims	   in	  committed	  tone:	  ‘all	  women	  are	  equal,	  Hindu,	  Muslim,	  mājhi	  [Adivasi].	  Everyone	  has	  equal	  value!	  (sabāi	  eki	  mūlya)’.	  	  	  	  The	  abstract	  equality	  of	  a	  women’s	  dignity,	  no	  matter	  what	  jāti	  she	  belongs	  to,	  is	  enacted	  in	  various	  encounters	  with	  the	  state.	  In	  education,	  most	  obviously,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  gatherings	  of	  the	  women	  for	  their	  micro-­‐credit	  loans	  and	  in	  the	  queue	  for	  the	  polling	  booth	  during	  elections	  (see	  also	  Banerjee	  2007).	  When	  the	  women	  gather	  to	  pay	  their	  dues	  to	  the	  micro-­‐credit	  loan,	  there	  is	  no	  observable	  segregation	  and	  the	  Hindu	  and	  Muslim	  women	  chat	  freely	  with	  each	  other.	  It	  is	  an	  instance	  where	  the	  tension	  is	  suspended	  as	  all	  find	  resonance	  in	  their	  legal	  and	  bureaucratic	  equality.	  	  
Diachronic	  subjectivity	  	  The	   laminated	   subjectivity	   of	   the	   subject-­‐in-­‐History	   should	   be	   conceived	  diachronically	   (Bilgrami	   2011:	   25-­‐26).	   There	   is	   no	   moment	   in	   time	   when	   a	  person’s	  subjectivity	  is	  static;	  instead	  it	  is	  continually	  undergoing	  change.	  One’s	  substantive	  values	  change	  in	  the	  process	  of	  history,	  when	  external	  reasons	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  At	  other	  moments,	  she	  would	  proudly	  state	  that	  Muslim	  women	  do	  not	  leave	  the	  house.	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the	   support	   of	   a	   particular	   ideological	   disposition	   become	   internalised	   and	  become	  internal	  reasons.	  The	  idea	  of	  women	  of	  all	   jātis	  being	  equally	  valuable	  may	   have	   a	   long	   history;	   it	  may	   be	   an	   idea	   that	   is	   injected	   by	   the	   nationalist	  ideology	  or	  by	  confrontations	  with	  the	  bureaucratic	  machinery	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  fundamental	  equality	  of	  all	  human	  beings	  may	  sometimes	  be	  justified	  by	  tracing	  a	   shared	   genealogy	   to	   Adam	   (as	   Shahadat	   Hussain	   	   does	   in	   the	   opening	  vignette);	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  Allah	  created	  all	  beings	  in	  His	  image;	  or	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   Indian	   constitution;	   the	   shared	   land	   (deś);	   shared	  Bengali	  heritage;	  or	   simply	   shared	  blood.	  People	  position	   their	   self	   in	  various	  discourses	   and	   tap	   into	   various	   socio-­‐cultural	   resources;	   whichever	   seems	  appropriate	  for	  a	  particular	  situation.	  	  In	  the	  Karachi	  apartment	  building,	  Ring	  (2006)	  recognizes	  the	  fluidity	  of	  the	  process	   in	   which	   various	   sensibilities	   become	   conflated	   and	   interpreted	  according	   to	   the	   context.	   For	   example,	   a	   lack	   of	   appropriate	   hospitality	   is	  evaluated	  with	   reference	   to	  various	  discourses:	   ‘While	   the	   failure	   to	  be	   “civil”	  is…an	  imagined	  function	  of	  residual	  primordial	  attachments,	  at	  other	  times	  it	  is	  precisely	  these	  attachments	  which	  are	  shown	  to	  enable	  “good	  citizenship”’	  (72).	  	  Civility	  towards	  other	  jātis	  is	  actively	  encouraged	  by	  the	  official	  discourse	  of	  the	  Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind,	  the	  Deoband	  madrasa	  and	  by	  local	  imāms	  educated	  at	  Deobandi	   madrasas.	   During	   a	   congregation	   organised	   by	   the	   local	   Deobandi	  madrasas,	   each	   speaker	   would	   emphasise	   the	   need	   for	   cordial	   behaviour	  towards	  other	  jātis:	  ‘If	  there	  is	  a	  rock	  on	  the	  road,	  one	  should	  move	  it,	  no	  matter	  who	   may	   be	   inconvenienced;	   it	   is	   something	   one	   should	   do	   for	   any	   human	  being’;	   ‘Judge	   others	   by	   their	   behaviour,	   not	   by	   their	   jāti’;	   ‘One	   should	   greet	  everyone	   with	   welcome	   [saying	   ‘welcome’	   in	   four	   different	   languages]	   and	  respect,	  no	  matter	  which	  jāti’;	  ‘One	  should	  not	  attack	  any	  other	  jāti’	  (kono	  jātike	  
āghāt	  dite	  nei);	  etcetera.97	  After	  Habiba	  Bibi	  had	  told	  me	  that	  the	  maulānās	  had	  forbidden	  Muslims	  to	  prepare	  rice	  pancakes	  on	  Hindu	  festivals,	  I	  had	  asked	  her	  whether	   they	   had	   said	   anything	   else	   regarding	   Hindus.	   ‘They’re	   not	   saying	  anything	  about	  the	  Hindus,	  they’re	  not	  saying	  anything	  bad	  about	  them.	  In	  fact,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  In	  2009,	   the	   Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind	  officially	  announced	  that	  Hindus	  should	  not	  be	  called	  
kafir	  (infidel)	  but	  simply	  non-­‐Muslims,	  lest	  kafir	   is	  interpreted	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  connotation.	  See	  Times	  of	  India:	  ‘Hindus	  can’t	  be	  dubbed	  ‘kafir’,	  says	  Jamiat’.	  This	  is	  part	  of	  a	  conscious	  effort	  to	  construct	  a	  public	  image	  of	  a	  ‘Hindu	  friendly	  Islam’,	  see	  below.	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they	   forbid	   violence	   against	   Hindus	   (mārā	   niṣedh	   kare)’.	   The	   speakers	   and	  
maulānās	   draw	  both	  on	  a	   theological	   and	  a	  political	   register;	   they	  evoke	  both	  the	   Sunnah	   and	   the	   discourse	   of	   nationalism,	   and	   both	   registers	   become	   the	  source	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  civic	  Muslim	  self,	  and	  of	  simple	  exchanges	  like	  greetings.	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  situation	  Ring	  describes:	  ‘Despite	   the	   plethora	   of	   hadith	   lauding	   the	   expression	   of	   neighborly	  affection,	  the	  nature	  of	  local	  exchange	  clearly	  answers	  not	  simply	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  religious	  humanism	  but	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  civility	  inherent	  to	  the	  national	  project.	   This	   civility,	   not	   surprisingly,	   constructs	   its	   universality	   as	   an	  unmarked,	  sharif,	  Urdu	  sensibility’	  (2006:	  70-­‐71).	  	  Joygramis	  are	  proud	  on	  the	  neighbourliness	  between	  jātis	  in	  West	  Bengal,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  hostile	  communal	  relationships	  found	  elsewhere	  in	  India.	  Several	   young	  men	   from	   Joygram	  have	  migrated	   to	   Tamil	   Nadu	   in	   search	   for	  labour,	  so	  Tamil	  Nadu	  is	  a	  common	  place	  of	  comparison.	  One	  of	  the	  stories	  was	  that	   one	   the	  men,	   Rohima	   Bibi’s	   son,	   had	   not	   been	   allowed	   to	   take	   part	   in	   a	  game	   of	   football,	   because	   he	   is	   Muslim.	   ‘In	   our	   ‘land’	   (deś)	   that	   would	   never	  happen!’,	  Rohima	  would	  claim	  smugly.	   It	  may	  be	  Bengalis	  who	  are	  on	  a	  moral	  high	   ground	   above	   the	   Tamils,	   or	   the	   Muslims	   who	   are	   more	   civil	   than	   the	  (Tamil)	   Hindus.	   In	   any	   case,	   there	   is	   pride	   to	   rise	   above	   ‘the	   “scourge”	   of	  parochialism’	   (Ring	   2006:	   71).	   Joygramis	   are	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   violent	  communalism	   elsewhere	   and	   this	   awareness	   informs	   their	   exchanges	   in	   the	  village;	   ’what	   we	   see	   here	   is	   an	   existential	   pressure	   to	   acknowledge	   and	  respond	  to	  the	  critical	  moments	  that	  are	  generated	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  household	  by	  events	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  macro	  level’	  (Das	  2013:	  219-­‐20).	  Habiba	  Bibi	  may	  herself	   not	   have	   travelled	   more	   than	   10	   miles	   beyond	   Joygram,	   yet	   the	  circulation	  of	  information	  add	  layers	  to	  her	  subjectivity	  and	  informs	  her	  actions	  and	   discursive	   justifications	   for	   practice.	   ‘Discursively	   and	   pragmatically,	  neighbourhood	   and	   neighbourly	   exchange	   are	   an	   important	   site	   where	   the	  boundaries	  of	  ethnic	  and	  national	  difference	  gets	  articulated	  and	  contested	  and	  where	  the	  content	  of	  this	  difference	  gets	  lived,	  so	  to	  speak’	  (Ring	  2006:	  70-­‐71).	  	  Habiba	   Bibi	   is	   able	   to	   position	   herself	   at	   times	   in	   a	   tense	   hierarchical	  relationship	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   jātis;	   at	   other	   times	   in	   a	   clearly	   bounded	   sphere	  separate	   from	  other	   jātis;	  and	  at	  again	  other	  moments	   in	  an	  equal	   (gendered)	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position	   in	   a	   shared	   sphere.	   She	   takes	   recourse	   to	   various	   idioms	   and	  dispositions;	   various	   layers	   of	   her	   laminated	   subjectivity.	   The	   positions	   may	  seem	   inconsistent	   but	   it	   is	   clearly	   not	   impossible	   to	   live	   with	   such	  inconsistencies.	   Nor	   is	   it	   a	   sign	   of	   hypocrisy	   per	   se.	   Inconsistency	   in	   value	  systems	   is	  probably	  more	  a	  default	   than	  an	  exception	   (Bilgrami	  2011:	   	  24).	   It	  depends	   on	   particular	   historical	   circumstances	   and	   ethical	   affordances,	  personal	   inclinations	   notwithstanding,	   whether	   some	   values	   take	   situational	  precedence	  over	  others,	  and	  some	  inconsistencies	  are	  resolved	  whereas	  others	  are	  created.	  	  
The	  resonance	  of	  dharma	  I	   will	   argue	   in	   this	   section	   that	   the	   ‘vernacular	   secular’	   emerges	   out	   of	   the	  common	   framework	   of	   dharma,	   which	   allows	   for	   a	   kind	   of	   ‘overlapping	  consensus’	   (Bilgrami	   2011;	   Taylor	   2011).	   As	   will	   become	   clear,	   the	   way	   in	  which	   the	   vernacular	   secular	   is	   conceived	   and	   the	   overlapping	   consensus	  established	  is	  rather	  different	  from	  the	  general	  conception	  of	  the	  secular	  in	  the	  West	  (Taylor	  2007).	  As	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2	  and	  3,	  exchanges	  establish	  one	  as	  a	  human	   person	   with	   dharma;	   Hinduism	   and	   Islam	   are	   different	   normative	  expressions	   of	   dharma,	   but	   the	   commonality	   in	   becoming	   and	   acting	   from	   a	  
dharma	   is	   key.	  Dharma	  allows	   for	   resonance	   and	   the	   ‘toleration	   of	   tension’.	   I	  consequently	  argue	   that	   the	  communal	   ‘other’	   is	   ‘within’	   rather	   than	   ‘without’	  (cf.	  Peabody	  2009).	  	  
Nerhuvian	  secularism	  /	  Dharma	  nirapekṣatā	  In	  West	  Bengal,	   different	   vernacular	   terms	   are	   used	   to	   denote	   the	   secular	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  politics	  but	  the	  most	  common	  term	  is	  dharma	  
nirapekṣatā,	  and	  I	  will	  explain	  this	  term	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  conversation	  I	  had	  with	  Ahmed	  and	  Rehan.	  Ahmed’s	  and	  Rehan’s	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  education	  and	  access	  to	  information	  (through	  newspapers	  and	  news	  channels)	  should	  be	  kept	   in	   mind.	   However,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   numerous	   conversations	   with	   other	  Muslim	  Joygramis	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  gist	  of	  his	  interpretation	  of	  secularism	  is	  fairly	  representative.	  In	  one	  of	  our	  conversations,	  Ahmed	  once	  again	  asserts	  that	  dharma	  is	  a	  necessity	   for	   knowing	   how	   to	   ‘be	   good’	   (‘dharmar	   prayojan	   āche’).	   I	   ask	   him	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how	  that	  works	  on	  the	   level	  of	  government	  (‘sarkār’),	  as	  (I	  say)	  I	   thought	  that	  there	   was	   no	   dharma	   in	   the	   government.	   His	   explanation	   of	   the	   absence	   of	  
dharma	  is,	  however,	  strikingly	  visual.	  According	  to	  Ahmed	  it	  just	  means	  that	  in	  a	  government	  office	  a	  Hindu	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  put	  up	  an	  image	  of	  a	  deity,	  as	  this	  goes	   against	   the	   Islamic	  prohibition	  of	   visual	   representations	  of	   living	  beings,	  and	  a	  Christian	  would	  also	  consider	  it	  blasphemous	  idolatry.	  Similarly,	  a	  Muslim	  would	  not	   be	   allowed	   to	   put	   up	   Islamic	   texts.	   I	   ask	   him	  whether	   this	   is	  what	  ‘secularism’	  means.	  He	  doesn’t	  know	  this	  English	  term,	  and	  deliberates	  with	  his	  son	  Rehan	   (who	  at	   this	  point	   in	   time	  has	   just	  passed	  class	  12	  and	  does	  know	  some	   English	   political	   terminology).	  What	   we	   have	   here,	   they	   conclude	   their	  deliberation,	   is	   ‘dharma	  nirapekṣatā’,	   which	  means,	   according	   to	   Ahmed,	   that	  anyone	   can	   do	   whatever	   makes	   them	   happy	   (‘ye	   yeṭā	   khuśi	   se	   seṭā	   kar’te	  
pār’be’),	  and	  that	  everyone	  is	  free	  to	  practice	  their	  own	  dharma	  and	  their	  own	  rules	  and	  norms	  (sabāi	  oder	  rīti-­‐nīti	  kare).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  people	  who	  work	  in	  the	  government	  do	  not	  have	  a	  dharma;	  ‘everybody	  has	  a	  dharma	  so	  of	  course	  the	  MPs	  do	  as	  well!’	  And	  that	  their	  work	  is	  informed	  by	  their	  particular	  
dharma	   is	   not	   a	   problem,	   he	   thinks,	   ‘kichu	   habe	   nā’	   (lit:	   nothing	   will	   happen	  from	  that)	   -­‐	  after	  all	   there	  are	  many	  Hindu	  MPs	  here	  as	  well.	   I	   try	  to	  elicit	  his	  thoughts	  on	  whether	   this	   is	  not	   actually	   creating	  a	  problem,	  whether	  he	   feels	  there	   is	   a	   Hindu	   rule	   (hinting	   to	   the	   BJP’s	   Hindutva	   politics)	   that	   may	   be	  detrimental	   for	   the	   Muslims.	   His	   mood	   suddenly	   turns	   chagrin,	   he	   mumbles	  something	  affirmative	  but	  unintelligible	  and	  turns	  away	  from	  me,	  not	  willing	  to	  further	   pursue	   this	   conversation.	   I	   felt	   that	   this	   was	   one	   of	   those	   moments	  where	  my	  own	  indignation	  clashed	  with	  my	  interlocutors’	  refusal	  to	  open-­‐up	  a	  can	  of	  worms.98	  	  Secularism	   is	   foremost	   understood	   to	   mean	   the	   aspiration	   for	   liberty	   of	  worship,	   and	   furthermore	   the	   equality	   of	   different	   religious	   communities.	   In	  Ahmed’s	  words:	  ‘Even	  though	  we	  Muslims	  are	  a	  minority,	  we	  are	  doing	  well	  in	  this	  country.	  We	  all	  have	  the	  same	  rights,	  don’t	  we!	  The	  Hindu	  has	  a	  ration-­‐card,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Ahmed	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  indifferent	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  Muslims	  under	  BJP	  rule:	  his	  much	  beloved	  brother	  lives	  in	  Ahmedabad	  in	  Gujarat,	  and	  lived	  there	  during	  the	  2002	  pogrom.	  On	  a	  visit	  to	  Joygram,	  his	  brother	  commented	  on	  his	  experiences	  of	  the	  pogrom	  piecemeal,	  but	  in	  the	  vein	   of	   Ahmed’s	   attitude	   emphasised	   the	   better	   work	   opportunities	   in	   Gujarat	   over	   West	  Bengal.	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so	  do	  I.	  The	  Hindu	  has	  a	  son	  at	  this	  school,	  so	  do	  I.	  The	  Hindu	  gives	  his	  vote,	  so	  do	  I.	  The	  Hindu	  receives	  a	  widow’s	  pension,	  so	  do	  I.	  The	  Hindu	  goes	  to	  the	  bazar	  in	  Farukhbazar,	  so	  do	  I.	  Equal!’	  	  Significantly,	   the	   vernacular	   idea	   of	   secularism,	   dharma	   nirapekṣatā,	   is	  premised	  upon	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  multifarious	  dharma	  and	  that	  there	  are	  religious	  communities	  to	  start	  with.	  Indeed,	  the	  lack	  of	  dharma	  rather	  than	  the	  presence	  of	  dharma	  is	  considered	  problematic,	  not	  only	  at	   the	   level	  of	  politics	  but	  also	  at	  the	  level	  of	  society	  and	  economics	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  Since	  this	  point	  has	  already	  been	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  here	  I	  intend	  to	  develop	  it	  a	  step	  further	   and	  assert	   that	  dharma	   is	   the	   shared	   ground	   for	   ethical	   action,	   across	  
jātis.	  	  A	  salient	  means	  for	  the	  negotiation	  of	  similarity	  and	  difference	  is	  food,	  as	  I	  have	  previously	  illustrated.	  What	  is	  important	  here	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  food	  is	   a	   salient	   element	   in	   exchanges	   for	  all	   jātis.	   Even	   though	   food	   is	   a	  means	   to	  distinction,	   the	   inherent	   danger	   in	   the	   exchange	   of	   substances	   is	   foremost	   a	  shared	   social	   value.	   This	   resonance	   fosters	   the	   potential	   for	   toleration.	   This	  became	  very	  clear	  when	  Sohini	  passed	  away.	  Sohini	  was	  an	  old	  woman	  from	  the	  Adivasi	  pāṛā	  just	  opposite	  the	  madrasa.	  She	  was	  considered	  senile,	  her	  old	  body	  wrinkled	  and	  bent.	  Her	  husband	  had	  passed	  away,	  and	  her	  son	  was	  a	  drunkard	  who	  had	  gone	  elsewhere.	  She	  did	  not	  have	   any	   other	   relatives,	   so	   to	   get	   by	   she	   did	   odd	   jobs	   in	   several	   Khadim	  households,	   ranging	   from	   plucking	   chicken	   to	   massaging	   the	   back	   of	   Basir’s	  mother.	  She	  would	  get	   free	  meals	  and	  cash	   for	  emergencies	   in	  return	  and	   the	  Khadims	  prided	  themselves	  in	  their	  charitable	  behaviour	  towards	  her.	  After	  her	  death,	  Basir’s	  mother	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  Khadims	  seemed	  genuinely	  moved.	  Dada	  collected	  money	  from	  all	  the	  Khadims	  so	  her	  neighbours	  could	  give	  her	  a	  dignified	  cremation	  ceremony.	  Otherwise,	  Dada	   thought,	   they	  would	  have	   just	  burned	  her	  body	  somewhere,	  and	   the	  dogs	  would	  have	  eaten	   it	   -­‐	  an	   idea	   that	  was	  so	  repulsive	  Dada	  could	  not	   let	   it	  happen.	   ‘With	  this	  money’,	  he	  says	  with	  satisfaction,	   ‘they	   can	   buy	   the	   wood	   and	   alcohol	   for	   a	   proper	   cremation’.	   I	  chuckle	   about	   the	   fact	   that	  Muslims	   give	  money	   for	   alcohol.	   Dada,	   otherwise	  vehemently	  opposed	  to	  the	  consumption	  of	  alcohol,	  doesn’t	  seem	  disturbed	  by	  this	  idea	  though;	  ‘they	  drink	  a	  lot,	  and	  they	  drink	  at	  their	  funeral.	  We	  just	  give	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them	  the	  money	  so	  they	  can	  do	  the	  funeral	  the	  way	  it’s	  supposed	  to	  be	  for	  them,	  so	  if	  they	  want	  to	  buy	  alcohol,	  fine,	  let	  them	  go	  ahead!’,	  he	  says	  without	  a	  sign	  of	  resentment.	  	  There	   is	   undeniably	   an	   element	   of	   patronage	   here;	   nevertheless,	   it	   is	  significant	  that	  Dada	  not	  only	  tolerates	  the	  customs	  of	  another	   jāti	  but	  is	  even	  willing	  to	  support	  them	  –	  particularly	  on	  an	  instance	  so	  clearly	  informed	  by	  the	  other	   jāti’s	  own	  dharma.	   I	  suggest	  he	  supports	  the	  consumption	  of	  alcohol	  not	  
despite	   it	   being	   part	   of	   the	  dharma	   of	   the	   other	   jāti,	   but	  because	   it	   is,	   in	   this	  contest,	  part	  of	  their	  dharma.	  He	  would	  never	  support	  drinking	  alcohol	  on	  any	  other	  occasion.	  	  
Hindu-­‐Muslim	  brotherhood	  The	  resonance	  of	  dharma	  across	  jātis	  allows	  for	  the	  ethical	  imagination	  of	  a	  ‘Hindu-­‐Muslim	   brotherhood’	   (Hindu	   Muslim	   bhāi	   bhāi),	   which	   is	   a	   strong	  normative	   discourse,	   almost	   like	   a	   preordained	   script,	   across	   South	   Asia	  (Hussain	  2008;	  Williams	  2013:	  237).	  I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  brotherhood	  among	  different	   jātis	   in	   India	   does	   not	   presuppose	   the	   elimination	   of	   difference.	  Similarity	  is	  potentially	  dangerous,	  as	  Blok	  (1998)	  argues	  in	  an	  article	  drawing	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  Freud’s	  notion	  of	   ‘the	  narcissism	  of	  minor	  differences’.	  I	  return	   to	   Blok’s	   theory	   after	   I	   have	   discussed	   in	   more	   detail	   Bilgrami’s	  argument	  regarding	  brotherhood.	  	  Bilgrami	   (2011)	   critically	   assesses	   the	   ethical	   ideal	   of	   brotherhood	   in	   a	  paper	   that	   aims	   to	   offer	   an	   alternative	   conceptualisation	   of	   secularism,	   with	  ample	  reference	  to	  the	  Indian	  case.99	  He	  argues	  that	  fraternal	  relations	  between	  members	   of	   different	   faiths	   is	   one	   of	   the	   three	   goods	   sought	   after	   by	   secular	  aspirations	   (the	   other	   two	   being	   liberty	   of	   worship	   and	   equality	   of	   different	  faiths)	  (Bilgrami	  2011:	  6).	  Toleration,	  according	  to	  Bilgrami,	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	   fostering	  of	   fraternal	  relations.	  He	  points	  out	   that	   to	  say	  “you	  must	  be	  my	  brother”	   is	   paradoxically	   refusing	   the	   other	   one’s	   truth	   so	   as	   to	   convince	   the	  other	  of	  my	  truth	  (ibid.:	  27).	  He	  argues	  against	  relativist	  pluralism	  as	  a	  valuable	  basis	   for	   peaceful	   secularism	   because	   it	   has	   an	   excluding	   attitude	   in	   that	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  See	   the	   SSRC	   blog	   ‘The	   Immanent	   Frame’	   for	   a	   wide-­‐ranging	   discussion	   of	   Bilgrami’s	  working	  paper.	  http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/secularism-­‐its-­‐content-­‐and-­‐context/	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allows	   each	   person	   to	   have	   her	   own	   truth.	   The	   problem	   of	   this	   attitude,	  according	   to	   Bilgrami,	   is	   that	   it	   perpetuates	   tension	   through	   condescending	  toleration,	  rather	  than	  confronting	  condescension	  in	  an	  aspiration	  for	  peace.	  If	  one	   aims	   for	   truly	   secular	   pluralism,	   the	   sentiment	   of	   toleration	   should	   be	  replaced	  by	  either	  indifference	  or	  respect	  (ibid.:	  28).	  In	  contrast,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  containment	  and	  the	  very	  toleration	  of	  tension	  may	  be	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  process	  of	  peace	  to	  be	  continued	  (Ring	  2006).	  Fraternal	  relations	  may	  only	  be	  achieved	   if	   one	   does	   allow	   for	   the	   other’s	   truth,	   by	   constructing	   boundaries	  rather	  than	  breaking	  them	  down.	  My	   contention	   is	   based	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   personhood	   and	   relatedness	  developed	   in	   chapter	   2.	   Bilgrami	   (2011)	   seems	   to	   base	   his	   argument	   on	   the	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  separation	  between	  persons	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome.	   It	  has	  been	  suggested	   that	   in	  a	  Euro-­‐American	  cosmopolitics,	  relations	   between	   persons	   come	   after	   the	   fact	   of	   individual	   personhood,	   and	  plurality	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   individual	   human	   agents	   among	   whom	   there	   may	   be	  socially	   constructed	   ties	   (Strathern	   1992). 100 	  If,	   however,	   we	   take	   the	  cosmogony	   of	   the	   Joygramis	   as	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   our	   analysis,	  we	   have	   to	  entertain	  the	  thought	  that	  instead	  there	  may	  be	  a	  fundamental	  sameness	  from	  which	  particular	  selves	  and	  subjectivities	  need	  to	  be	  generated.	  Similarity	  must	  be	   undone	   to	   generate	   the	   self.	   Distinction	   is	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   social	   self	  (Bourdieu	  1984),	  so	  ‘it	  is	  not	  the	  differences	  but	  the	  loss	  of	  them	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  violence	  and	  chaos’	  (Girard	  1979:	  51	  in	  Blok	  1998:	  33).	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2,	  essentialised	   jātis	  need	  to	  be	  generated	  out	  of	   the	  chaos	  of	   the	  bio-­‐moral	   substance.	   Differences	   and	   distinctions	   emerge	   from	   relationships	   of	  exchange	   within	   a	   shared	   bio-­‐moral	   substance	   rather	   than	   from	   initial	  separation	   of	   substances	   or	   identities.	   The	   toleration	   of	   tension	   is	   therefore,	  importantly,	  not	  foremost	  the	  fostering	  of	  commonalities	  but	  the	  negotiation	  of	  distinction,	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	   hierarchies,	   disapproval	   and	  condescension.	   The	   often	   tense	   negotiations	   take	   place	   within	   ‘a	   network	   of	  reciprocity	   and	   offers	   groups	   the	   occasion	   to	   distinguish	   themselves	  within	   a	  common	  framework’	  (Blok	  1998:	  37),	  the	  latter	  in	  this	  case	  being	  dharma.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  is	  an	  ideological	  postulation	  that	  may	  not	  reflect	  people’s	  actual	  experience,	  neither	  in	  the	  West	  nor	  elsewhere.	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In	  Joygram,	  there	  may	  at	  times	  be	  explicit	  respect,	  at	  times	  indifference,	  and	  at	   times	   outright	   condescension.	   The	   disapproval	   and	   condescension	   are	  palpable	   in	   the	   rejection	   of	   relations	   of	   exchange,	   but	   also	   throughout	   the	  discourse	  of	  all	  jātis	  about	  the	  other	  jātis.	  There	  would	  be	  ample	  talk	  about	  the	  ‘stupidity’	  of	  Hindus	  for	  their	  worship	  of	  idols,	  and	  the	  ‘dirtiness’	  of	  Adivasis	  for	  their	   dietary	   and	   hygienic	   habits	   (and	   there	   is	   no	   lack	   of	   similarly	  condescending	   rhetoric	   about	  Muslims).	   Yet,	   for	   the	  perpetuation	  of	   harmony	  these	  kinds	  of	  disapprovals	  are	  not	  necessarily	  harmful	  because	  what	  matters	  is	  that	   all	   are	   bound	   together	   in	   an	   ‘ethic	   of	   suspense’.	   On	   this	   basis,	   the	  ‘vernacular	  secular’	  emerges.101	  	  The	   narcissism	   of	   minor	   differences	   also	   has	   the	   potential	   for	   violent	  escalation	   (Blok	   1998).	   In	   the	   justifications	   of	   violence	   towards	   Hindus	   in	  Ahmedabad,	   as	   recounted	   by	   Ghassem-­‐Fachandi	   (2009:	   46),	   ‘images	   of	  invasion’	  were	   consistently	   invoked.	   The	   images	   relate	   to	   particular	   forms	   of	  dangerous	  exchange:	  ingestion,	  penetration	  and	  dissection.	  ‘Images	  of	  invasion’	  stress	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  dangerous	  nature	  of	  exchange;	  but	  also	  point	  to	  inter-­‐jāti	  relatedness	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   exchange	   to	   be	   so	   precarious	   (see	   also	   Kaur	  2005b).	   This	   relatedness	   is	   hinted	   at	   in	   Peabody’s	   rendering	   of	   the	   sacrificial	  element	  in	  rioting:	  	  ‘sacrifice,	   as	   an	   act	   of	   regeneration	   is	   premised	   on	   foundations	   that	  recognize	   some	   degree	   of	  mutuality,	   inter-­‐subjectivity,	   and	   identification	  between	  the	  sacrificer	  and	  the	  victim.	  Within	  this	  cosmology	  sacrifice	  is	  an	  act	  of	   reabsorption,	   incorporation,	  and	  encompassment	  of	   the	  victim	   into	  the	  sacrificer,	   albeit	  within	  a	  position	  of	   clear	   subordination’	   (2009:	  395-­‐396,	  drawing	  on	  Hubert	  and	  Mauss	  1964;	  see	  also	  Tambiah	  1996).	  	  The	  sacrificer	  and	  the	  victim	  are	  fundamentally	  related;	  therefore	  the	  need	  for	  violent	   separation	   and	   subjugation	   occurs.	   I	   will	   return	   to	   the	   potential	   for	  violence	   when	   the	   trope	   of	   brotherhood	   negates	   differences	   or	   assumes	   too	  much	  similarity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  ‘real	  enemies’,	  as	  some	  interlocutors	  say	  it,	  are	  not	  the	  Hindus	  but	  the	   Jews,	   or	   the	   Americans	   and	   the	   English.	   The	   narcissism	   of	   minor	   differences	   between	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	   is	  contained	   in	  an	  ethics	  of	  proximity	  and	  suspense,	  whereas	   there	   is	  no	  measure	  to	  contain	  the	  narcissistic	  warring	  between	  Muslims	  and	  Jews	  (see	  also	  Blok	  1998:	  47).	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What	  unites	  all	  the	  resonances	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  is	  their	   ideological	  reference	  point:	   the	   ideology	  of	   the	  bio-­‐moral	  protean	  person;	   the	   ideology	  of	  secular	  liberalism;	  the	  shared	  theological	  registers.	  They	  are	  all	  incorporated	  in	  
dharma,	   in	   the	   ethics	  of	   order	   and	   justice,	   and	   ‘the	  other’	   is	   expected	   to	  have	  
dharma	   too.	   The	   next	   section	   will	   argue	   that	   political	   violence	   is	   a	   more	  immanent	   threat	   to	   the	   secular	   order	   than	   communal	   violence,	   because,	   as	  explained	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   politics	   is	   conceived	   to	   lack	   dharma.	  Especially	   when	   political	   differences	   appear	   more	   salient,	   Muslims	   stress	  commonalities	  between	  jātis,	  as	  the	  opening	  vignette	  already	  anticipated.	  	  
The	  threat	  of	  party	  politics	  	  Aleyah	  Bibi	  is	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  woman	  from	  Mondal	  Para	  who	  is	  well	  informed	  about	   the	  political	  situation.	  During	  the	  build-­‐up	  to	   the	  panchayat	  elections	   in	  2013,	   she	  complains	  about	   the	  violence	  elections	   instigate.	   ‘The	  violence	   is	   so	  useless’,	  she	  says	  dismayed,	  ‘in	  the	  end,	  the	  ministers	  rule,	  and	  they	  are	  all	  the	  same	  kind	  of	   thieves,	   only	   thinking	  of	   themselves,	   and	  not	  doing	  anything	   for	  them,	  the	  poor	  villagers.	  ‘They	  are	  sitting	  in	  their	  air-­‐conditioning,	  drinking	  tea	  together	  but	  you	  and	  I	  get	  in	  a	  fight’.	  When	  I	  ask	  her	  whether	  there	  is	  violence	  between	   Hindus	   and	   Muslims	   she	   waves	   my	   question	   away.	   ‘It	   isn’t	   Hindu-­‐Muslim	   trouble.	   It’s	   all	   party	   -­‐	   party’	   (Hindu-­‐Muslim	   jhāmelā	   nay.	   Sab	   ‘party-­‐
party’).	  	  When	   the	   statement	   ‘there	   is	   peace	  here’	   is	   uttered	   in	  Gujarat	   (Heitmeyer	  2009),	   it	   can	   readily	   be	   understood	   to	  mean	   ‘peace	   as	   opposed	   to	   communal	  violence’.	   I	   naively	   interpreted	   my	   interlocutors’	   similar	   statements	   (‘ekhāne	  
śānti’)	  as	  such;	  but	  I	  was	  always	  mistaken,	  as	  what	  was	  meant	  was	  always	  that	  in	  a	  neighbouring	  village	  there	  was	  more	  violent	  party	  politics	  than	  here,	  in	  this	  ostensibly	  peaceful	  Joygram.102	  This	  only	  had	  to	  be	  made	  explicit	  to	  me;	  for	  all	  others	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   ‘trouble’	   or	   ‘fighting’	   (jhāmelā,	   mārāmāri)	   refers	   to	  violent	  party	  politics	  rather	  than	  to	  communal	  violence.	  This	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  situation	   in	   places	   with	   a	   recent	   history	   of	   intense	   communal	   violence,	   for	  instance	   in	   Ahmedabad	   (Gujarat),	   where	   political	   violence	   rather	   than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  The	   only	   exception	   to	   this	   rule	   is	   when	   explicit	   comparisons	   were	   made	   with	   other	  states,	  such	  as	  Gujarat,	  or	  Tamil	  Nadu,	  where	  a	  Muslim	  boy	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  play	  football	  with	  his	  Hindu	  peers.	  Yet	  this	  was	  more	  often	  cast	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘we	  are	  good	  and	  they	  are	  not	  good’.	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communal	  violence	  is	  the	  aberration	  of	  order,	  and	  political	  violence	  is	  what	  the	  people	  in	  power	  are	  blamed	  for	  (Ghassem-­‐Fachandi	  2009).	  I	  feel	  that	  in	  West	  Bengal,	  therefore,	  the	  trope	  ‘Hindu-­‐Muslim	  brotherhood’	  is	   not	   only	   or	   foremost	   meant	   to	   contain	   the	   tension	   ‘within’	   but	   rather	   the	  tension	  ‘without’	  –	  it	  is	  not	  as	  much	  of	  a	  protection	  of	  the	  jātis	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  of	  all	  jātis	  against	  an	  ‘external	  evil’.	  The	  vicious	  and	  violent	  nature	  of	  party	  politics,	   in	  West	  Bengal	  particularly	  associated	  with	   the	   communist	  parties,	   is	  the	   dangerous	   example	   of	   what	   a	   lack	   of	   dharma	   leads	   to.	   Against	   this,	   jātis,	  with	   dharma,	   stand	   united.	   Williams	   (2013:	   244)	   argues	   that	   in	   Varanasi,	  violence	  would	  also	  be	  discursively	  rendered	  external	  and	  alien	  to	  a	  particular	  social,	   political	   or	   economic	   arrangement	   (e.g.	   violence	   as	   external	   to	   the	   silk	  industry).	   Building	   upon	   the	   argument	   developed	   in	   chapter	   4,	   I	   suggest	   that	  the	   idea	   of	   externality	   has	   a	   different	   meaning	   in	   West	   Bengal;	   externality	  comes	  to	  mean	  external	  to	  dharma.	  The	  fear	  of	  violence	  is	  an	  existential	  fear	  of	  chaos:	  when	  the	   long-­‐term	  cycle	   is	  replaced	  by	   the	  short-­‐term	  cycle	  (cf.	  Parry	  1989a).	   Vernacular	   negotiations	   of	   justice	   are	   being	   contrasted	   to	   ‘external’	  penetrations	   of	   injustice	   in	   a	   local	   and	   contemporary	   elaboration	   of	   the	  nationalist	   project,	   which	   purported	   to	   ‘construct	   the	   [moral]	   community	   …	  against	  the	  cold	  monster	  of	  the	  state’	  (Hansen	  2005:	  121).	  What	  is	  most	  salient	  in	  my	  fieldsite	  and	  possibly	  beyond,	  is	  dharma	  against	  no-­‐dharma,	  rather	  than	  Hindus	  against	  Muslims.	  In	   everyday	   life,	   the	   experience	   of	   disorder	   is	   not	   tainted	   foremost	   by	  hidden	   communal	   antagonism	   but	   by	   the	   lingering	   tension	   between	   political	  parties	  and	  those	  vying	  for	  power.	  Party	  politics	  divide	  people	  into	  supporters	  or	  loyalists	  to	  one	  party	  or	  another;	  this	  identification	  is	  highly	  relevant	  when	  it	  comes	   to	   everyday	   survival	   as	   it	   guarantees	   access	   to	   resources	   and	  opportunities.	   However,	   it	   also	   localizes	   the	   tension	   between	   parties	   in	   the	  village	   –	   one’s	   neighbours	   can	   be	   enemies	   if	   they	   support	   another	   party.	   The	  tension	   that	   penetrates	   the	   villages	   may	   be	   deliberately	   used	   to	   instigate	  communal	   violence	   –	   even	   if	   there	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   correlation	   between	  communities	  and	  parties.	  The	  pogroms	  elsewhere	  are	  usually	  considered	  to	  be	  orchestrated	   by	   power-­‐hungry	   politicians	   and	   hired	   goons	   –	   the	   vernacular	  analysis	  is	  qualitatively	  similar	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  Brass	  (2003).	  According	  to	  the	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Joygramis	   with	   whom	   I	   discussed	   the	   riots	   in	   Gujarat,	   the	   riots	   were	   over	   a	  political	   issue,	   not	   over	   a	   religious	   issue	   (that	   is,	   not	   an	   issue	   of	   dharma)	  (‘rāj’naitik	   byāpār,	   dharma	   byāpār	   nay’).	   In	   West	   Bengal,	   ‘routine	   violence’	  (Pandey	  2006b)	  is	  related	  to	  party	  politics;	  and	  it	  is	  party	  politics	  that	  inspires	  fear,	  guides	  action	  and	  is	  most	  salient	  in	  everyday	  life.	  	  The	   fear	  of	  political	   violence	  may	   inspire	  one	  not	  only	   to	   talk	  about	   inter-­‐communal	   brotherhood	   but	   also	   to	   actively	   maintain	   peace	   between	  communities	  as	  this	  is	  within	  one’s	  capability;	  whereas	  peace	  between	  political	  parties	  seems	  an	  unachievable	  illusion.	  Both	  in	  action	  and	  discourse,	   jātis	  may	  become	  united	  against	  the	  political	  enemy,	  who	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  personification	  of	  bad	  politics	  and	  lacks	  dharma.	  I	  talk	  with	  one	  of	  the	  in-­‐laws	  of	  my	  friend	  from	  Joygram	  while	  we	   visit	   his	  wife’s	   village	   nearby.	   The	   village	   is	   a	   reflection	   of	  Bengal’s	  plurality:	  there	  are	  various	  Hindu	  castes,	  including	  Brahmins;	  there	  are	  both	  Hanafi	   and	  Ahl-­‐i-­‐Hadith	  Muslims;	   and	  Adivasis.	   The	  man	   says	   that	   there	  are	  no	  problems	  at	  all	  between	  the	   jātis	  here.	   If	   there	   is	  rioting	  at	  all,	   it	   is	  not	  because	  of	   jāti	  or	  dharma,	  but	  because	  of	  political	  power	  struggles.	  Moreover,	  he	   adds,	   if	   there	   does	   happen	   to	   be	   inter-­‐communal	   trouble	   (jāti	   dharma	  
jhāmelā),	   this	   will	   be	   resolved	   (mīmāṁsā	   haye	   yāy).	   Whereas	   conflict	   over	  political	  power	  will	  always	  be	  there,	  it	  cannot	  be	  resolved.	  Although	  communal	  violence	  is	  dangerous	  and	  deplorable,	  his	  optimistic	  tone	  of	  voice	  when	  talking	  about	   inter-­‐communal	   trouble	   contrasts	   notably	   with	   his	   bitter	   voice	   of	  helplessness	  when	  mentioning	  the	  perpetual	  political	  violence.	  	  
The	  dissonance	  of	  the	  political	  order	  Before	   I	   conclude,	   I	   want	   to	   briefly	   elaborate	   on	   the	   actual	   historical	   and	  political	  marginalization	  of	  Muslims	  in	  India.	  Harmonious	  pluralism	  is	  a	  practice	  inspired	  by	  an	  ethical	  ideal,	  by	  fear	  of	  chaos,	  and	  also	  by	  the	  minority’s	  fear	  of	  exclusion.	   It	   has	   been	   recognized	   that	   the	   strong	   Bengali	   identity	   excludes	  Muslims	   by	   default,	   leaving	   the	   Bengali	   Muslim	   to	   be	   ‘a	   living	   oxymoron’	  (Chatterji	   1996:	   16;	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   regional	   identity	   is	   by	   default	   Hindu	   is	  similar	  in	  most	  other	  states).	  So	  the	  Bengali	  Muslims	  are	  a	  priori	  excluded	  from	  membership	  to	  the	  Bengali	  jāti	  –	  and	  they	  are	  always	  in	  a	  hierarchically	  ordered	  –lower-­‐	   position	   to	   the	   Hindus.	   I	   have	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	  that	   state	   ideologies,	   including	   secularism,	   are	   supported,	   but	   that	   the	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politicians	  and	  government	  officials	  are	  not	  conceived	  of	  as	  complying	  with	  the	  ideals.	  	  Like	   the	   South	   Indian	   Muslim	   weaver	   (Mohammad)	   who	   features	   in	  Venkatesan’s	  ethnography	  (2012),	  most	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  are	  aware	  of	  Hindu	  hegemony	  and	  aware	  of	  their	  vulnerability	  as	  a	  minority.	  Following	  the	  negative	  positioning	   as	   an	   excluded	   ‘other’,	   Muslims	   have	   a	   heightened	   sense	   of	  responsibility	  in	  the	  toleration	  of	  tension.	  Venkatesan	  (2012)	  acknowledges	  the	  amount	  of	  work	  Mohammad,	   the	  Muslim	  mat	  weaver	   in	  Tamil	  Nadu,	  put	   into	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  public	  image	  of	  himself	  (and	  other	  mat	  weavers)	  ‘that	  was	  designed	   to	   portray	   what	   [Venkatesan]	   came	   to	   dub	   a	   ‘Hindu	   friendly	   Islam’	  (2012:	   420).	   She	   stresses,	   however,	   that	   this	   labour	   does	   not	   compromise	  Mohammad’s	  commitment	   to	  and	  genuine	  belief	   in	   the	  possibility	  of	  harmony	  and	   tolerance	   between	   Hindus	   and	  Muslims.	   His	   pragmatic	   awareness	   of	   the	  Muslims’	   fluctuating	   position	   of	   vulnerability	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   extra	  labour	  involved	  with	  ‘toleration	  of	  tension’	  that	  Muslims	  undertake.	  	  	  	  The	  awareness	  of	  the	  precarious	  positionality	  of	  Muslims	  as	  a	  minority	  is	  at	  times	   expressed	   in	   a	   fear	   for	   retaliation.	   Dada	   and	   I	   talked	   about	   the	  slaughtering	   of	   cows	   –	   arguably	   one	   of	   the	  most	   contentious	   inter-­‐communal	  issues.	  We	  were	   squatting	   in	   front	   of	   his	   house	  while	   he	  was	   taking	   a	   break	  from	   chopping	   wood	   for	   Qurbani,	   which	   was	   to	   take	   place	   in	   two	   days.	   I	  broached	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   ban	   on	   cow	   slaughter,	   and	   he	   commented	   on	   the	  unfairness:	   ‘So	  maybe	   the	  cow	   is	  holy	   for	   them,	   it	   is	   like	  a	   ṭhākur	   (deity).	  But	  then	  we	  could	  also	  say	  that	  the	  goat	  is	  sacred	  to	  us.	  The	  goat	  is	  very	  dear	  to	  us:	  it	   was	   very	   special	   to	   the	   Prophet,	   and	   it	   was	   his	   favourite	   animal,	   he	   really	  loved	   them’	   (Dada	   himself	   takes	   care	   of	   his	   goats	   as	   if	   they	  were	   his	   pets,	   or	  even	  children,	  feeding	  them	  milk	  or	  even	  tea	  by	  hand).	  ‘So	  then	  we	  could	  say	  it	  hurts	  us	  if	  they	  kill	  a	  goat	  only	  for	  the	  sacrifice.	  Then	  wouldn’t	  there	  be	  a	  riot?	  Surely	   there	   will	   be	   a	   riot!’	   He	   continued	   to	   mumble	   half	   in	   jest	   about	   how	  Hindus	  worship	  just	  about	  anything,	  how	  even	  a	  cow	  becomes	  a	  deity	  (ṭhākur).	  ‘Well,	  let	  them	  go	  ahead	  with	  their	  silly	  practices’,	  he	  concluded,	  ‘but	  let	  us	  also	  do	   our	   thing’.	   Dada	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   a	   problem	   with	   the	   theological	  differences	   in	   themselves.	  What	   is	   problematic	   is	   the	   lack	  of	   compliance	  with	  secular	   aspirations:	   liberty	   of	   worship	   and	   equality	   of	   faiths.	   If	   laws	   protect	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certain	  faiths	  but	  not	  others,	  then	  laws	  surpass	  the	  toleration	  of	  tension	  within	  the	   village	   and	   the	   distinctions	   of	   Muslims	   become	   illegitimate	   rather	   than	  negotiable.	  	  On	   another	   occasion	   Dada	   similarly	   said	   that	   there	   would	   be	   trouble	   if	  Muslims	   would	   start	   telling	   Hindus	   that	   it	   isn’t	   right	   to	   worship	   images	   and	  idols,	  as	  it	  is	  said	  in	  the	  Quran.	  ‘And	  if	  you	  would	  tell	  them	  they	  should	  become	  Muslims,	  they	  would	  surely	  hit	  you!	  They	  can	  come,	  and	  voluntarily	  convert	  to	  Islam.	   But	  we	   can’t	   pressure	   them.	   It	   says	   in	   the	  Quran’.	  The	  Tablighi	   Jamaat	  members	  similarly	  say	  that	  they	  don’t	  approach	  Hindus	  because	  that	  would	  be	  trouble,	   ‘there	  would	   be	   a	   riot!	   (dāṅgā	  habe!).’	   Significantly,	   the	   Quran	   is,	   for	  Dada,	  the	  source	  for	  civic	  nationalism,	  as	  is	  the	  Hadith	  in	  the	  example	  I	  quoted	  above	  from	  Ring	  (2006).	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  fear	  and	  threat	  in	  these	  accounts,	  because	  the	  Muslims	  know	  that	  as	  a	  minority	  they	  are	  more	  vulnerable.	  	  Many	  Muslims	  I	  spoke	  to	  seek	  protection	  in	  the	  law:	   ‘we	  are	  a	  minority,	  so	  the	   law	  is	  good	  for	  us’,	   in	  particular	  the	   ‘law’	  that	  gives	  every	  citizen	  the	  right	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  practice	  their	  own	  religion	  (cf.	  Williams	  2011a,	  2012,	  2013	  for	  similar	  observations	  among	  Muslims	  in	  Varanasi).	  They	  include	  specifically	  the	  ‘law’,	  as	  they	  put	  it,	  which	  forbids	  one	  to	  speak	  bad	  about	  another	  religion.	  For	   example,	   it	   is	   ‘beāini’,	   unlawful,	   to	   say	   something	   against	   the	   cremation	  practices	   of	   Hindus.	   Similarly,	   Muslim	   Joygramis	   accuse	   the	   BJP	   and	  Modi	   in	  particular	  to	  be	  ‘beāini’,	  unlawful.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Ayodhya	  mosque,	  Muslims	  had	   to	   react;	   not	   only	   to	   protect	   their	   mosque	   but	   also	   to	   act	   against	   the	  unlawful	   practices	   of	   the	   politicians.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   here	   that	   they	   don’t	  accuse	  Hindus	   in	   general	   –	   they	   particularly	   accuse	   the	   practices	   of	  Hindutva	  politics.	   They	   don’t	   see	   the	   attack	   on	   the	   mosque	   as	   having	   been	   plotted	   by	  Hindus	   or	   Hinduism	   in	   a	   generalized	   sense;	   it	   is	   only	   a	   certain	   section	   of	  unlawful	   politicians	   that	   receive	   the	   blame.	   Ironically,	   they	   hold	   on	   to	  ‘secularism’	   as	   to	   a	   blade	   of	   grass,	   and	   become	   the	   greatest	   defenders	   of	   a	  system	  that	  continues	  to	  exclude	  them.	  	  Ahmed	  points	  out	  that	  the	  mutual	  invitations	  to	  weddings	  serve,	  indeed,	  to	  avoid	   communal	   confrontations.	   ‘We	  may	   live	   in	   different	  pāṛās	   here,	   but	  we	  invite	  each	  other	  to	  weddings.	  And	  if	  the	  Hindus	  are	  collecting	  money	  for	  a	  pūjā,	  I	  will	  give	  20,	  50	  rupees.	  I	  could	  say	  no,	  but	  that	  would	  only	  give	  trouble.	  And	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communal	   rows	   are	   very…dangerous	   (sāmpradāik	   jhagrā	  khub….’dangerous’).’	  It	   is	   very	   different,	   Ahmed	   asserts,	   from	   other	   rows;	   a	   quarrel	   in	   the	  neighbourhood	  or	  between	   communities	   is	   totally	  different.	  A	  neighbourhood	  quarrel	   (paribeśer	   jhagrā)	   is	   between	   two	   people,	   and	   a	   third	   can	   come	   in	  between	   and	   patch	   up	   the	   quarrel.	   This	   is	   much	   more	   difficult	   when	   it	   is	   a	  communal	  dispute	  (sāmpradāik	  	  jhagrā).	  	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  research	  with	  Muslim	  Ansaris	  involved	  with	  the	  silk	  industry	  in	   Varanasi,	   Williams	   (2013)	   argues	   that	   the	   reproduction	   of	   peace	   relied	  heavily	   on	   mutual	   economic	   dependency.	   She	   stresses,	   however,	   that	   even	  though	  all	  parties	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  peaceful	  management	  of	  distinctions	  and	  boundaries	   for	   a	   shared	   economic	   fate,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Muslim	   economic	  marginalisation	   and	   Hindu	   political	   dominance,	   ‘the	   responsibility	   for	  reproducing	   peace	   appeared	   to	   rest	   more	   substantially	   on	   the	   shoulders	   of	  Muslims…who	   responded	   through	   strategies	   grounded	   in	   pragmatism,	  acceptance	   and	   resilience’	   (Williams	   2013:	   246).	   The	   normative	   and	  ‘normalizing’	   discourse	   here	   is	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   Hindu-­‐Muslim	   brotherhood,	  which	   serves	   simultaneously	   as	   a	   prescription,	   a	   reflection	   and	   a	   veil	   for	   the	  hierarchically	  structured	  economic	  interdependency.	  	  The	   normative	   trope	   of	   communal	   brotherhood	  may	   be	   effective	   to	   unite	  
jātis	   in	  the	  struggle	  against	  vicious	  politics,	  but	   it	  also	  carries	  the	  potential	   for	  violent	   friction	   between	   jātis.	   Even	   though	   we	   are	   inclined	   ‘to	   consider	   the	  fraternal	   bond	   as	   a	   model	   of	   an	   affective	   relationship’	   (Blok	   1998:	   39),	  competition	   may	   arise	   particularly	   among	   brothers	   as	   they	   have	   the	   most	  rights,	   functions	   and	   obligations	   in	   common.	   This	   observation	   brings	   me	   to	  consider	   the	   impact	   of	   processes	   of	   vernacularisation	   on	   the	   toleration	   of	  tension.	  	  The	   aspiration	   of	   the	   liberal	   political	   ideology	   to	   promote	   equality	   as	  similarity	   (Girard	   1979:	   49	   quoted	   in	   Blok	   1998:	   39)	   may	   actually	   have	   an	  adverse	   effect	   on	   order	   and	   peace	   in	   a	   plural	   society.	   In	   practice,	   the	  constitutional	  ideal	  of	  equality	  does	  not	  imply	  equal	  dignity,	  but	  the	  elimination	  of	  difference.	  As	  a	  result,	  I	  suggest	  that	  distinction	  is	  increasingly	  sought-­‐after	  in	  theology	   because	   of	   the	   purported	   legal	   and	   bureaucratic	   equality	   in	   the	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spheres	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  market,	  and	  the	  actual	  negation	  of	  difference,	  and	  as	  such,	  of	  the	  dignity	  of	  those	  who	  deviate	  from	  the	  hegemonic	  script.	  As	   I	  have	  pointed	  out	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   ‘religion’	   is	  categorized	  as	  a	  separate,	   private,	   sphere	   in	  modern	   society.	   So	  whereas	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	  there	   is	   ideally	   equality	   regardless	   of	   one’s	   religion,	   the	   private	   sphere	   of	  religion	   becomes	   the	   space	   where	   distinction	   can	   be	   cultivated.	   This	   is	   very	  clearly	  happening	  in	  India.	  The	  ‘authentication	  of	  Islam’	  (Deeb	  2006),	  that	  is,	  in	  this	   case,	   the	   purification	   of	   Islam	   from	  Hindu	   elements,	   is	   a	   prime	   example.	  What	   this	   means	   in	   practice,	   is	   that	   distinction	   becomes	   dogmatic,	   since	  theology	   is	   non-­‐negotiable.	   Islamic	   reformism	   limits	   the	   kind	   of	   exchanges	  possible	  so	  that	  distinction	  cannot	  be	  generated	  out	  of	  negotiation	  but	  becomes	  a	  static	  state	  of	  being.	  	  In	  a	  mutually	  reinforcing	  process,	  the	  Islamic	  and	  Hindu	  reformist	  projects	  therefore	   reproduce	   the	   homogenisation	   and	   ‘freezing’	   of	   communities	   in	   the	  postcolonial	   project.	   In	   the	   latter	   project,	   rural	   people	   are	   categorised	   in	  religious	  communities	  rather	  than	  being	  treated	  as	  individual	  citizens.	  Equality	  becomes	   a	   matter	   of	   equality	   between	   communities.	   Those	   communities	  become	   homogenised	   and	   politicised	   in	   the	   modern	   bureaucracy	   (Tambiah	  1996).	   ‘The	   relatively	   small	   scale,	   ‘face-­‐to-­‐face’	   communities	   of	   the	   past	   have	  given	   way	   to	   the	   relatively	   large-­‐scale,	   bureaucratised	   communities	   of	   the	  present.	   These	   are	   lived	   in	   but	   perhaps	   not	   lived	   as	   they	   once	   used	   to	   be’	  (Pandey	  2001:	  203,	  emphasis	  in	  original),	  which,	  I	  suggest,	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  less	   space	   for	   the	   everyday	   negotiations	   to	   contain	   tensions.	   The	   boundaries	  and	  distinctions	  become	  frozen	  in	  time	  and	  they	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  recognized	  as	  ‘products	  of	  human	  interaction	  and	  the	  human	  imagination’	  (ibid.:	  203-­‐4).	  	  Even	  if	  one	  would	  accept	  the	  problematic	  ideal	  of	  equality	  of	  groups	  (rather	  than	  of	   individual	  citizens),	  this	  is	  an	  ideal	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  market	  do	  not	  live	  up	  to	  (as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  SCR	  2006).	  Moreover,	  the	  state	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  an	  arbiter	  who	  promotes	  the	  idea	  of	  religious	  tolerance	  in	  a	  pluralist	   society,	   through	   the	   guarantee	   of	   liberty	   to	  worship	   and	   equality	   of	  faiths	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  ‘However,	   there	   is	   a	   considerable	   gap	   between	   these	   pluralist	   intentions	  and	   the	   actual	   functioning	   of	   the	   Indian	   state.	   While	   it	   is	   evident	   that	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conflicting	  communities	  do	  resort	  to	  negotiation,	  arbitrated	  by	  the	  state,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  state	  does	  not	  transcend	  society.	  Indeed,	   if	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  view	  of	  the	  state	  in	  India	  it	  is	  that	  “others”	  have	  captured	  it	  and	  use	  it	   against	   “us”.	   […]	   When	   a	   pluralist	   state	   can	   no	   longer	   project	   its	  transcendent,	   arbitrational	   image,	   conflict	   can	   only	   be	   solved	   through	  violence’	  (van	  der	  Veer	  1994:	  23).	  	  This	   is	   the	  tension	  that	  Ahmed	  implicitly	  refered	  to	  when	  he	  said	  that	   in	  a	  neighbourhood	  quarrel,	  a	  third	  person	  can	  come	  in	  between	  and	  negotiate.	  He	  said	  this	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  in	  a	  communal	  row.	  Ideally,	  the	  objective	  third	  party	  should	  ultimately	  be	  the	  state,	  but	  in	  reality	  it	  cannot	  be	  trusted	  to	  have	  this	   ‘transcendent,	  arbitrational	   image’.	  Whereas	   the	  efforts	   to	  maintain	  peace	  of	   the	   villagers	   do	   work	   out	   in	   practice,	   those	   of	   the	   state	   are	   not	   equally	  effective.	  	  When	   the	   state	   fails	   to	   deliver	   equally	   to	   all	   communities,	   the	   potential	  danger	   is,	   then,	   that	   communities	   will	   vie	   with	   one	   another	   for	   rights	   and	  recognition.	   In	  West	  Bengal,	  during	   the	  years	  after	  my	   fieldwork,	   this	  has	  had	  detrimental	   effects.	  The	  TMC	   is	  now	  perceived	  as	  appeasing	  Muslims,	   inciting	  the	   anger	   of	   other	   communities.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   further,	   and	  more	  dangerous,	  communalisation	   of	   the	   society.	   To	   a	   certain	   extent,	   the	   lack	   of	   faith	   in	   a	  ‘transcendent	   state’	   motivates	   the	   responsibility	   to	   continue	   to	   negotiate	   in	  harmony.	  Differences	   and	  hierarchies	   can	  be	   effectively	  negotiated	  within	   the	  village,	  and	  the	  tension	  sustained.	  However,	  if	  differences	  and	  boundaries	  result	  in	   the	   lack	   of	   access	   to	   resources	   and	   opportunities,	   the	   tension	   becomes	  unbearable.	  Masiruddin	  sums	  it	  up	  very	  well:	  ‘Secularism	  is	  very	  good!	  It	  means	  that	  we	  are	  all	  equal.	  But…secularism	  is	  not	  happening	  (‘Secularism’	  khub	  bhālo!	  
Māne,	  sabāi	  samān.	  Kintu…’secularism’	  hacche	  nā).’	  Secularism	  is	  not	  ‘happening’	  because	  the	  official	  discourse	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  Hansen’s	  rendering	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  secular	  tolerance	  will	  be	  useful	  here:	  	  ‘Secular	  tolerance	  was…part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  civilizing	  mission	  of	  the	  modern	   state	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   masses	   who,	   until	   they	   were	   sufficiently	  educated,	  had	  to	  remain	  under	  the	  paternalist	  tutelage	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  under	  the	  supposedly	  responsible	  leadership	  of	  what	  in	  Indian	  political	  discourse	   is	   known	   as	   “educated	   sections.”	   This	   discursive	   structure	  has	   also	   perpetuated	   the	   dominant	   contemporary	   interpretation	   of	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riots	   and	   breakdowns	   of	   civic	   order	   as	   the	   handiwork	   of	   ubiquitous	  criminals,	  land	  grabbers,	  and	  goondas	  (muscle	  men)	  –	  an	  interpretation	  which,	   needless	   to	   say,	   remains	  hugely	  useful	   for	   the	  political	   parties	  and	  agencies	  of	  state	   in	   this	  escalating	  politics	  of	  violence’	   (1999:	  54-­‐55).	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that,	   in	  contrast	   to	  the	  official	  discourse	  that	   implies	  secular	  tolerance	   is	   something	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   executed	   by	   the	   state	   over	   the	  ‘uneducated’	  and	  ‘uncivilised	  masses’,	  it	  is	  the	  rural	  citizens	  who	  do	  the	  labour	  of	   the	   toleration	   of	   tension	   from	   their	   complex,	   laminated	   subjectivities.	   The	  secular	  practice	  of	  the	  state	  is	  a	  hurdle	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  peace	  in	  the	  villages	  as	  community	  boundaries	  are	  reified	  and	  secular	  ideals	  not	  complied	  with.	  The	  ‘breakdown	  of	  civic	  order’	  is	  in	  fact	  interpreted	  as	  the	  handiwork	  of	  politicians,	  or,	  indeed,	  of	  guṇḍās	  working	  for	  state	  agencies.	  As	  a	  result,	  political	  parties	  and	  agencies	  of	  state	  are	  increasingly	  delegitimised.	  	  The	   responsibility	   to	  maintain	   civic	   order	   is	   therefore	   displaced	   from	   the	  unreliable	  state	  to	  the	  communities,	  and	  the	  responsibility	  to	  continue	  to	  bear	  the	  increasing	  tension	  is	  particularly	  strong	  for	  the	  Muslims,	  as	  they	  feel	  most	  unprotected	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  awareness	  of	  their	  positionality	  as	  a	  minority	  in	  a	  Hindu	   majority	   nation-­‐state	   creates	   an	   impetus	   for	   Muslims	   to	   engage	   in	  exchanges	  and	  to	  continue	  to	  negotiate	  plurality.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  one	  tries	  to	  live	  according	  to	  dharma	  –	  dharma	  is	  the	  source	  of	  virtue.	  A	  more	  pious,	  puritan	  Islamic	   lifestyle	   is	   inspired	   both	   by	   the	   increasing	   need	   to	   find	   distinction	   in	  theology	  and	  the	  increasing	  need	  to	  live	  ethically	  inspired.	  A	  strict	  adherence	  to	  Islamic	   reformism,	   then,	  may	   be	   considered	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   continue	   peaceful	  pluralism	  in	  India.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  observation	  that	   Islamic	   reformism	   is	   a	   particular	   mode	   of	   engagement	   with	   the	   idea	   of	  modern	  citizenship.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	   conclusion,	   I	   will	   outline	   two	   apparently	   contradictory	   suggestions.	  Firstly,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  despite	  peaceful	  pluralism,	  Muslims	  are	  aware	  of	  their	  position	  as	  a	  marginalized	  minority.	  The	  paradox	   is	   that	  marginalization	  feeds	  into	  the	  impetus	  of	  exchange	  to	  negotiate	  peace	  and	  to	  ‘tolerate	  tension’.	  Part	  of	  the	  ethical	  project	  of	  Islamic	  reformism,	  then,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  effort	  to	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strengthen	  one’s	  dharma	  to	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  bearing	  this	  responsibility,	  and	  to	   be	   included	   in	   the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state.	   Secondly,	   however,	   I	   suggest	   that	  Islamic	   reformism	   may	   ultimately	   have	   a	   reverse	   effect.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   a	  puritan	   Islamic	   lifestyle	   and	   disposition	   goes	   against	   the	   grain	   of	   the	   South	  Asian	  ideology	  of	  sociality.	  It	  increasingly	  denies	  fundamental	  relatedness	  with	  non-­‐Muslim	   jātis.	   This	   is	   a	   process	   that	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   communal	  politics,	   which	   often	   in	   the	   name	   of	   secularism	   emphasise	   the	   religious	  differences	  between	   jātis	  over	  and	  above	   the	  shared	  elements	  of	  dharma.	  The	  result	  may	  be	  an	  increasing	  essentialisation	  and	  corollary	  segregation	  of	  jātis,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  very	  reason	  that	  motivated	  Muslims	  to	  reform	  themselves	  and	  their	  community.	  It	  is	  an	  ethical	  tragedy	  that	  Muslims	  become	  the	  perpetuators	  of	  their	  own	  marginalization.	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6.	   Ethical	   transitions:	   Joygrami	   context,	   global	  
resonances	  
Introduction	  	  Masiruddin	  Khadim	   is	  a	   relatively	  wealthy	  businessman	  and	  an	  occasional	  participant	  of	  the	  Tablighi	  Jamaat.	  He	  is	  the	  eldest	  son	  of	  Abu	  Bakr	  Khadim,	  by	  his	  second	  wife	  (both	  wives	  have	  passed	  away).	  Abu	  Bakr	  is	  the	  caretaker	  of	  the	  shrine	   of	   Ma	   Champa,	   located	   at	   the	   land	   now	   used	   for	   the	   cattle	   market.103	  Since	  he	   is	  of	   the	  caretaker	   lineage,	  his	   family	  runs	  a	  part	  of	   the	  cattle	  market	  independently.	   The	   family	   owns	   a	   relatively	   large	   amount	   of	   rice	   paddy	   land,	  which	  is	  mainly	  managed	  by	  Masiruddin’s	  younger	  brother	  Wahed.	  Masiruddin	  owns	  a	  house	   in	  Barakpur,	  where	  he	  spends	  about	  half	  his	  time,	  with	  his	  wife	  and	  two	  sons.	  Besides	  running	  several	  small	  businesses,	  he	   is	  a	  contractor:	  he	  has	   obtained	   the	   tender	   to	   collect	   levies	   for	   the	   transport	   of	   cattle	   over	   the	  bridge	   just	   outside	   Farukhpur.	   Masiruddin	   is	   not	   actively	   involved	   with	   any	  political	   party	   but	   is	   prominently	   present	   at	   important	   political	   events.	   He	  closely	   follows	   the	   news	   regarding	   Siddiqullah	   Chowdhury	   Saheb’s	   political	  party	   and	   attends	   any	   local	   Islamic	   congregations,	   in	   particular	   those	   of	   the	  Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind.	  	  One	   day	   I	   ask	   Masiruddin	   to	   tell	   me	   why	   he	   joined	   the	   Tablighi	   Jamaat.	  Masiruddin	  narrates	  that	  he	  was	  an	  ordinary	  boy,	  who	  didn’t	  give	  Islam	  much	  thought.	  He	  had	  been	   living	   the	   ‘lifestyle’,	   and	  with	  a	  big	   smile	  on	   this	   face	  he	  shows	   me	   pictures	   to	   testify.	   Like	   many	   rural	   boys	   aspiring	   for	   urban	  masculinity,	  he	  had	  his	  pictures	  taken	  in	  a	  studio,	  wearing	  a	  transparent	  shirt,	  tight	  jeans,	  large	  sunglasses,	  and	  a	  clean-­‐shaven	  chin.	  On	  several	  pictures	  he	  can	  be	  seen	  with	  groups	  of	  similarly	  dressed	  friends,	  many	  of	  them	  Hindu.	  Together,	  they	  had	   gone	  many	  places:	  Kolkata,	  Delhi.	   Although	  he	   is	   a	   tad	   embarrassed	  about	  his	  previously	  un-­‐Islamic	   lifestyle,	  he	  proudly	  comments	   that	  he	   looked	  like	  the	  actor	  Salman	  Khan	  in	  those	  days.	  	  At	   some	   point	   in	   his	   twenties,	   he	   started	   on	   a	   quest	   for	   ethical	   guidance:	  however	  exciting	  his	  life	  was,	  he	  felt	  a	  moral	  void.	  Inspired	  by	  his	  Hindu	  friends,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Khadim	   is	   a	   name	   originally	   from	   Persia,	   meaning	   guardian,	   attendant.	   From	   being	  guardians	  of	   the	  shrine	  of	  Champa	  Bibi	   (Ma	  Champa),	   the	  Khadims	  have	  evolved	   in	  being	   the	  guardians	  (musualis)	  of	  the	  WAQF	  property	  that	  includes	  both	  the	  shrine	  and	  the	  cattle	  market.	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he	  started	  to	  read	  the	  Hindu	  scriptures,	  and	  afterwards	  the	  Christian	  Bible.	  He	  tells	  me	   that	   he	   realised	   that	   the	  Hindu	   scriptures	   do	  not	   provide	   any	  norms	  and	  values,	  and	   that	   the	  Bible	   is	  written	  by	  humans,	  so	   it	   is	  not	  very	  valuable	  either.	   He	   came	   to	   the	   realisation	   that	   the	   Quran,	   directly	   given	   by	   Allah,	  provides	  such	  a	  complete	  system	  for	  life,	  both	  scientific	  and	  ethical,	  that	  he	  had	  to	   follow	   the	   ‘right	   path’	   and	   immerse	   himself	   in	   Islam.	  Masiruddin	  went	   for	  four	   months	   to	   the	   global	   headquarters	   of	   the	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   in	   Delhi	   and	  changed	  his	  lifestyle:	  he	  now	  wears	  a	  white	  kurta,	  prays	  five	  times	  a	  day,	  fasts	  during	  Ramadan	  and	  attends	  all	  important	  local	  Islamic	  congregations.	  	  He	  continued,	  however,	  to	  work	  as	  a	  contractor	  and	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  local	  patronage	  appearing	  on	  political	  stages.	  For	  Masiruddin,	  these	  practices	  are	  not	  anathema	  to	  his	  strong	  belief	  that	  Islam	  is	  a	  ‘total	  way	  of	  life’,	  as	  he	  would	  say.	  In	  fact,	  his	  revaluation	  of	  Islamic	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  did	  not	  only	  provide	  him	  with	  the	  techniques	  for	  self-­‐cultivation,	  but	  also	  with	  a	  morally	  higher	  status	  in	  the	  marketplace	  and	  the	  political	  landscape.	  	  	  Masiruddin	   firmly	   believes	   that	   a	   better	   society	   begins	   with	   becoming	   a	  better	  person	  individually.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  he	  speaks	  very	  highly	  of	  the	  mission	   schools.	   Masiruddin’s	   eldest	   son	   is	   a	   high	   achieving	   student	   at	   the	  Barakpur	   secondary	   school,	   but	   he	   is	   soon	   to	   be	   sent	   to	   an	   Islamic	   Mission	  school	   elsewhere	   so	   that	   he	   can	   be	   highly	   educated	   in	   general	   subjects	  while	  being	   inculcated	  with	   self-­‐discipline,	  modesty	   and	   piety.	   For	  Masiruddin,	   it	   is	  important	   that	   the	  mission	   education	   does	   not	   only	   benefit	  Muslims,	   but	   the	  entire	  country.	  ‘The	  Muslims	  lag	  behind,	  and	  thanks	  to	  the	  mission	  schools	  they	  will	   ‘rise	  up’	   (piche	  theke	  uṭhe	  yāy).	   India	   is	   a	  democratic	   country,	   and	   I	   am	  a	  part	  of	  this	  country,	  so	  if	  I	  study	  better,	  if	  I	  can	  do	  a	  government	  job	  (cākri)	  well,	  then	  that’s	  good	  for	  all	  of	  India.	  Muslims	  can’t	  lag	  behind’.	  	  	  This	   chapter	   explores	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   Tablighi	   Jamaat	   (TJ)	   and	   other	  expressions	  of	  Deobandi	  reformist	  Islam	  in	  Joygram.	  Foremost	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Muslim	  Joygrami	  cosmopolitics	  elucidated	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  3	  are	  informed	  by,	  and	  in	  turn	  inform,	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  structures	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5.	  Simultaneously,	   I	  evaluate	  the	  global	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resonance	  of	   these	  themes.	  Throughout	   the	  thesis	  so	   far,	   I	  have	  demonstrated	  that	   Joygramis	   express	   a	   desire	   for	   moral	   regeneration.	   Moral	   regeneration	  involves	  a	   revaluation	  of	  dharma	   as	  an	  ethics	  of	   justice	   in	  all	  aspects	  of	   life;	  a	  project	  that	  stands	  in	  an	  ambiguous	  relationship	  to	  the	  modern	  categories	  that	  have	  been	  incorporated	  into	  the	  social	  imagination.	  The	  revaluation	  of	  dharma	  is	  most	  visibly	  expressed	  in	  the	  ethical	  transitions	  related	  to	  Islamic	  reformism.	  The	  expression	  of	  moral	  regeneration	  is	  Islamic	  because	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  are	  already	  essentialised	  in	  the	  Muslim	   jāti,	  and	  ethical	  practice	  is	  conceived	  to	  be	  possible	  only	  after	  one	  is	  generated	  as	  a	  human	  person	  through	  submission	  in	  faith.	  This	  chapter	  also	  investigates	  in	  detail	  the	  aspirations	  and	  implications	  of	  the	   ethical	   transitions	   currently	   taking	   place	   in	   Joygram.	   I	   maintain	   that	   the	  ethical	  renewal	  in	  Joygram	  is	  not	  essentially	  or	  exclusively	  Islamic;	  it	  is	  shaped	  within	   particular	   ethical	   affordances	   and	   in	   fact	   has	   resonances	   with	   other	  renewal	  or	  regeneration	  movements	  elsewhere.	  	  	  At	   the	   outset,	   I	  want	   to	   emphasise	   that	   not	   all	   Joygramis	   are	   equally	   self-­‐consciously	   reformist.	  Most	  of	   the	   time,	   the	  majority	  of	   the	   Joygrami	  Muslims	  ‘live	   Islam’,	   bound	   up	   with	   other	   aspects	   of	   life,	   and	   as	   part	   of	   a	   more	  encompassing	   aspiration	   to	   ‘live	   well’	   (Marsden	   2005,	   2009).	   Yet,	   a	   growing	  number	   of	   young	   men	   in	   Joygram	   join	   the	   TJ,	   and	   those	   who	   do	   not	   are	  influenced	   by	   their	  Da’wa	   (proselytisation).	   The	   imams	   in	   local	   mosques	   are	  Deobandi,	   the	   local	  madrasas	   follow	   the	  Deobandi	   curriculum,	   and	   the	   Jamiat	  Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind	  frequently	  organises	  gatherings	  including	  sermons.	  Even	  though	  not	  everyone	  holds	  a	  coherent	  reformist	  Islamic	  theology,	  I	  can	  positively	  assert	  that	   every	  Muslim	   in	   Joygram	   is	   influenced	  by	   reformism	   to	   some	  extent	   and	  most	   are	   consciously	   aware	   of	   the	   changes	   in	   ritual	   practices	   and	   Islamic	  doctrine.	  I	  refer	  to	  those	  Joygramis	  as	   ‘reformists’	  or	   ‘Deobandi’	  who	  explicitly	  call	  themselves	  Deobandi,	  who	  dress	  accordingly,	  and	  who	  explicitly	  reflect	  on	  their	   Islamic	   practice	   in	   line	   with	   the	   reformist	   doctrine,	   including	   both	   lay	  Muslims	   and	   clergy.	   Furthermore,	   I	   focus	   in	   this	   chapter	   on	   male	   Muslim	  Joygramis,	   since	   it	   is	   almost	   exclusively	   men	   that	   are	   explicitly	   Deobandi	  reformists	  or	  TJ	  participants.	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The	   chapter	   is	   outlined	   as	   follows.	   Firstly,	   the	   theoretical	   orientations	   are	  offered	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  perceived	  relationship	  between	  Islamic	  reformism	  and	  modernity.	  Secondly,	  the	  literature	  on	  Islamic	  reformism	  is	  contextualised	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Hansen	  (2009)	  and	  Comaroff	  (2008).	  These	  two	  works	  provide	  two	  contrasting,	   and	  globally	   salient	  models	  of	  personhood.	  However,	   an	  ethics	  of	  conviction,	   whether	   ‘cool’	   and	   rational	   (Hansen	   2009)	   or	   ‘uncool’	   and	  passionate	  (Comaroff	  2008)	  is	  central	  to	  both	  models.	  Third	  I	  explore	  whether	  Islamic	   reformism	   in	   Joygram	   resonates	   with	   global	   ideals	   of	   modern	  personhood	   and	   the	   ethics	   of	   conviction.	   	   Focusing	   on	   moral	   failure	   and	  responsibility,	  I	  explore	  how	  joining	  the	  TJ	  imbues	  participants	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth.	   This	   stress	   upon	   responsibility	   appears	   strongly	   linked	   to	   an	  apolitical	  theology	  of	  individual	  self-­‐reform.	  	  The	   fourth	   step	   in	   this	   chapter	   explores	   the	   mystical	   and	   embodied	  elements	  of	  the	  Islamic	  practice	  of	  the	  TJ.	  This	  combination	  of	  the	  rational	  and	  the	   mystical	   demonstrates	   the	   unique	   and	   yet	   globally	   resonant	   modality	   in	  which	   the	   Joygrami	  Tablighis	   produce	  modernity.	   The	   fifth	   step	  discusses	   the	  multiple	  complex	  ways	  in	  which	  becoming	  a	  reformed	  Muslim	  demands	  change	  within	  or	  a	  withdrawal	  from	  exchange	  practices	  generative	  of	  relatedness	  and	  ethical	   personhood.	   I	   reveal	   the	   ambiguous	   and	   ambivalent	   ways	   in	   which	  Tablighis	  interact	  with	  traditional	  patronage	  between	  the	  nearby	  hamlets,	  and	  reciprocal	   exchange	   between	   households,	   seeking	   to	   transform	   whilst	  nonetheless	   becoming	   embroiled	   in	   these	   exchanges.	   These	   observed	  interactions	  crystallise	   in	  the	  sixth	  concentration	  of	  how	  changes	   in	  aesthetics	  are	   related	   to	   ethical	   transformations.	   Exchanges	   in	   the	   community	  demonstrate	  clearly	  that	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  conviction	  within	  the	  village	  lead	  to	  accusations,	  struggle	  and	  considerable	  tensions;	  I	  will	  call	  these	  instances	  of	  ‘extra-­‐ordinary	  ethics’.	  	  	  The	   final	   section	  discusses	   the	   struggle	   to	   improve	   ‘culture’	   in	  order	   to	  be	  included	   in	   the	   modern	   Indian	   citizenry.	   I	   conclude	   by	   exploring	   how	   the	  particular	  struggle	  of	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  to	  navigate	  local	  and	  modern	  ideologies	  offers	  implications	  for	  their	  position	  within	  the	  secular	  Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  	  
Theoretical	  orientations:	  a	  global	  grammar	  of	  modern	  personhood?	  
236	  	  
The	   TJ	   and	   the	   Deoband	   are	   among	   the	   numerous	   South	   Asian	   Hindu	   and	  Islamic	   reformist104	  movements	   that	   originated	   around	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   19th	  century	   in	   interaction	   with	   British	   colonialism,	   Christian	   missionaries	   and	  Hindu	   reformism	   (see	   e.g.	   Ahmad	   2009;	   Bhatt	   2001;	   Hansen	   1999;	   Metcalf	  1989;	   Sikand	   2002;	   Van	   der	   Veer	  &	   Lehmann	   1999).	   The	  Deobandi	   school	   of	  thought	  originates	   in	   the	  Darul	  Uloom	  Deoband	   Islamic	   seminary	   in	  Northern	  India	   (Ahmad	   2009;	   Metcalf	   1989).	   Its	   doctrine	   is	   spread	  mainly	   through	   its	  vastly	  expanding	  network	  of	  madrasas	  (Gupta	  2009)	  and	  through	  the	  network	  of	   the	   TJ.	   The	   TJ,	   a	   transnational	   voluntary	   movement	   of	   lay	   preachers,	  originated	   in	  1927	   in	  Mewat,	  near	  Delhi,	  and	  has	  since	  spread	  to	  all	  countries	  where	   Muslims	   live	   (Masud	   2000b;	   Sikand	   2002).	   The	   presence	   of	   the	   TJ	   in	  West	  Bengal	  has	  been	  limited	  until	  recent	  decades	  but	  is	  rapidly	  growing.105	  	  Some	   of	   the	   scholarly	   work	   on	   Islamic	   reformism	   reproduces	   a	   common	  perception	   that	   arises	   from	   the	   Western	   media,	   particularly	   after	   the	   9/11	  attacks,	  namely	  that	  Islam	  and	  in	  particular	  reformist	  Islam,	  is	  the	  ‘antimodern	  antithesis’	   to	   liberal,	   secular	  modernity	   (Deeb	  2006:	  4).106	  Alternatively,	   it	  has	  been	  emphasised	  that	  reformist	  Islam	  is	  inherently	  modern	  because	  of	  a	  variety	  of	   aspects	   considered	   essential	   to	   it:	   Islam	   has	   rationalised	   and	   modernised	  from	   within	   as	   a	   result	   of	   mass	   education,	   new	   media	   technologies	   and	  increased	   literacy	   (Eickelman	   1992;	   Eickelman	   &	   Anderson	   1999;	   Starrett	  1998).	   In	   dialogue	   with	   modernity,	   these	   scholars	   argue,	   Muslims	   have	  developed	   a	   ‘heightened	   self-­‐consciousness’	   of	   Islam	   as	   a	   religious	   ‘system’	  (Eickelman	  &	  Piscatori	  1996:	  39;	  Robinson	  2008:	  276).	  Furthermore,	  Robinson	  argues,	  there	  is	  an	  end	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  past;	  a	  new	  emphasis	  on	  human	  will;	  growing	  individualism;	  and	  a	  process	  of	  secularisation	  (2008:	  261).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Following	  Masud	  (2000c:	  xxix)	  I	  include	  under	  the	  category	  reformism	  both	  revivalism	  (‘restoration	  of	  the	  religious	  tradition’)	  and	  faith	  renewal	  (the	  renewal	  of	  a	  faith	  corrupted),	  but	  not	   Islamic	   modernism	   (the	   reformation	   of	   traditional	   Islam	   to	   meet	   the	   challenges	   of	  modernity).	  The	  Deoband	  and	  the	  TJ	  engage	  in	  faith	  renewal.	  	  	  105	  I	  was	  told	  in	  interviews	  (with	  Siddiqullah	  Chowdhury	  Saheb)	  and	  conversations	  (with	  TJ	  participants,	  maulānās	  and	  ordinary	  Muslims)	   that	   the	  TJ	  and	   the	  Deoband	  had	  hardly	  any	  public	  presence	  until	  the	  eighties.	  Since	  then,	  many	  Bengali	  Muslims	  have	  gradually	  converted	  from	  Barelwi	  to	  Deobandi	  Islam.	  	  106	  See	  el-­‐Aswad	  (2013);	  Morey	  &	  Yaqin	  (2011)	  for	  media	  representations	  of	  Islam;	  see	  for	  critiques	   e.g.	   Devji	   (2005);	   Iqtidar	   (2011);	   Mahmood	   (2009);	   Masud	   et	   al.	   (2009);	   Moallem	  (2002).	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Although	  I	  sympathise	  with	  many	  of	  these	  observations,	  this	  scholarship	  on	  Islam	   remains	   problematic	   as	   it	   reproduces	   the	   idea	   that	   modernity	   is	   a	  singular	  and	  coherent	  project	   that	  originates	   in	  and	  spreads	   from	  the	  West	   to	  other	   places	   and	   ‘that	   Muslims	   are	   presented	   as	   having	   to	   ‘engage’	   with	  modernity,	  an	  external	  force	  encroaching	  on	  and	  disrupting	  their	  lives’	  (Soares	  and	  Osella	  2009:	  4).107	  The	  work	  on	  piety	  movements	  in	  Cairo	  (Mahmood	  2005;	  Hirschkind	   2006)	   and	   Lebanon	   (Deeb	   2006)	   demonstrates,	   instead,	   that	   the	  kind	   of	   modernity	   that	   arises	   from	   public	   piety	   has	   vernacular	   origins	   and	  meanings,	  and	  is	  indigenously	  produced	  rather	  than	  a	  weaker	  copy	  of	  Western	  modernity.	  	  Similarly,	  studies	  of	  participation	  in	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  TJ	  have	  highlighted	  various	  motivations	  and	  effects:	  alternative	  modes	  of	  globalisation	  (Noor	   2014),	   cosmopolitanism	   (Horstmann	   2007b),	   secularity	   (Metcalf	   2003)	  as	  well	  as	  new	  modes	  of	  religiosity	  (Janson	  2013).	  These	  alternative	  modes	  of	  being	   in	   the	   world	   have	   in	   turn	   locally	   salient	   political	   effects,	   contesting	  intergenerational	   (Janson	  2013),	   gendered	   (Amrullah	  2011;	   Jasani	   2013;	  Nisa	  2014)	  and	  class	  power	  structures	  (Sikand	  2002).	  These	   works	   are	   valuable	   in	   their	   dismantling	   of	   a	   singular	   modernity.	  However,	   more	   attention	   should	   be	   paid	   to	   individual	   variability	   and	   local	  conflict.	  I	  have	  found	  that	  in	  my	  fieldsite,	  Muslims	  engage	  with	  reformist	  Islam	  (the	  TJ	  in	  particular)	  in	  much	  more	  ambiguous	  and	  ambivalent	  ways	  than	  some	  studies	  of	  the	  TJ	  suggest	  (see	  for	  instance	  the	  studies	  in	  Masud	  2000a;	  but	  see	  also	   Horstmann	   2007a).	   Indeed,	   several	   studies	   have	   emphasised	   the	   often	  inconsistent	   and	  erratic	  perception	  of	   and	  engagement	  with	   reformist	   Islamic	  discourse	   and	   practices	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   both	   traditional	   and	   modern	  practices	   and	   narratives	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   (e.g.	   Bayat	   2007;	   Marsden	   2005;	  Schielke	   2009,	   2010;	   Simpson	   2008;	   Starrett	   2010).	   In	   the	   vein	   of	   the	   latter	  scholarship	  on	  ‘lived’	  Islam,	  I	  explore	  in	  detail	  the	  life	  trajectories	  of	  three	  men	  (Masiruddin,	  Wahed,	   and	   Faizul)	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   to	   the	   forefront	   individual	  variability	   and	   pragmatic,	   situational	   motivations.	   Moreover,	   to	   demonstrate	  the	  lack	  of	  ideological	  coherence	  in	  Joygram,	  and	  in	  fact	  bring	  to	  the	  surface	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107 	  Interestingly,	   Hansen	   (1996:	   n.33)	   makes	   the	   explicit	   comparison	   between	   the	  postcolonial	   episteme	   that	   posits	   the	   postcolonial	   as	   the	   ‘incommensurable	   Other’	   and	  Huntington’s	  thesis	  of	  the	  clash	  of	  civilization.	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tension	  and	  incomprehension	  between	  villagers,	  I	  explore	  in	  detail	  two	  conflicts	  that	  arose	  in	  Joygram	  due	  to	  the	  reformist	  drive	  of	  the	  TJ.	  	  	  Notwithstanding	   contrasting	   motivations	   and	   ambivalent	   experiences,	   the	  narratives	  of	  many	  of	  the	  Tablighis	  equally	  show	  commonalities	  underlying	  the	  variability;	   commonalities	   in	  modes	  of	   conviction	  and	   in	  aspirational	   attitude,	  and	  their	  narratives	  grow	  more	  coherent	  as	  their	  conviction	  grows.	  Differences	  in	  motivations	  do	  not	  undo	  the	  remarkable	  congruence	   in	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	   the	   TJ	   across	   the	  world,	   from	   South	   Asia	   (Metcalf	   2001;	   Siddiqi	   2012)	   via	  Southeast	   Asia	   (Horstmann	   2007a;	   Noor	   2014)	   and	   Africa	   (Ahmed	   2008;	  Janson	   2013)	   to	   Europe	   and	   North	   America	   (see	   Masud	   2000a;	   Pieri	   2015).	  Across	   the	   world,	   TJ	   practice	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   a	   ‘dialectic	   between	  individual	  self-­‐fashioning	  and	  engagement	  with	  global	  processes’	  (Janson	  2013:	  263).	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   underlying	   the	   variability	   in	   individual	   self-­‐fashioning,	   the	   ‘engagements	   with	   global	   processes’	   reveal	   shared	   modes	   of	  conviction	  and	  models	  of	  personhood.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   embed	   the	   analysis	   of	   Joygrami	   reformism	   into	   a	   wider	  framework,	   I	   draw	   upon	   the	   work	   of	   Hansen	   (2009)	   and	   Comaroff	   (2008).	  Thomas	  Blom	  Hansen,	  in	  an	  article	  that	  traces	  the	  development	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  an	   ethics	   of	   sincerity	   and	   an	   ethics	   of	   conviction	   into	   a	   modern	   ‘political	  theology	   of	   conviction’,	   argues	   that	   the	   ideal	   of	   a	   proper	   self	   ‘equipped	   with	  interiority	   and	   conviction’	   has	   become	   a	   globally	   influential	  model	   (2009:	   2).	  The	   theology	   of	   conviction	   requires	   transcendence	   of	   the	   lower	   self	   and	  expunging	  of	  the	  unreflexive	  traditions	  and	  conventions	  of	  the	  past,	  to	  acquire	  ‘purer,	  more	  modern,	  more	  interiorized	  and	  more	  reflexive	  modalities	  of	  belief,	  religious	   practice,	   political	   aspiration	   and	   cultural	   sensibility’,	   in	   order	   to	  become	  modern	  individuals	  guided	  by	  ‘well-­‐defined	  and	  purified	  cultural,	  moral	  or	  religious	  principles’	  (ibid.:	  20).	  	  Comaroff	   (2008)	   critically	  evaluates	   the	  proposition	  of	  Hansen.	  Across	   the	  globe,	  she	  observes	  a	  ‘rejection	  of	  the	  cool	  passion	  of	  modern	  reason’	  (ibid.:	  3),	  expressed	   in	   a	   ‘hankering	   for	   transcendent	   imperatives’;	   a	   yearning	   ‘for	   a	  theologico-­‐politics	   that	  can	   inspire	  a	  bloodless	  world	  with	  sublime	  conviction’	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(ibid.:	   9).	   This	   ‘anti-­‐modernist’	   revival	   expresses	   ‘a	   discomfort	   with	   secular	  notions	  of	  society,	  politics	  and	  morally-­‐neutral	  public	  life,	  a	  desire	  to	  erase	  the	  line	   between	   the	   metaphysical	   and	   the	   mundane’	   (ibid.:	   4).	   This	   tendency	   is	  most	   visibly	   present	   in	   revitalised	   faiths	   but	   also	   in	   the	   (post-­‐structuralist)	  scholarship	   that	   re-­‐values	   theology	   and	   revives	   an	   attention	   for	   affect.108	  Whether	   in	   scholarship,	   in	   neo-­‐Pentecostalism	   or	   in	   policy,	   Comaroff	   (2008)	  observes	  a	  move	  away	  from	  social	  reason	  to	  metaphysical	  reason,	   to	  empathy	  and	  ethics	  in	  the	  market	  and	  in	  politics;	  and	  a	  revaluation	  of	  public	  emotion,	  the	  magical	  and	  the	  transcendent.	  	  While	   both	   frameworks	   tend	   to	   universalise	   Western	   themes,	   without	  necessarily	  finding	  proximate	  actors	  and	  agencies	  through	  which	  these	  themes	  can	   be	   shown	   to	   have	   been	   transmitted,	   their	   discussions	   of	   sincerity,	  conviction	  and	  authenticity	   are	  nonetheless	  useful	   as	   a	  heuristic	   lens	   through	  which	  to	  explore	  the	  particularities	  of	  Joygram,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  global	  resonance	  of	  the	  themes	  discussed.	  Despite	  the	  critiques	  on	  the	  scholarly	  reproduction	  of	  a	  singular	  Western	  modernity	   addressed	   above,	   it	   equally	   has	   to	   be	   recognized	  that	  normative	  modern	  imaginaries	  (Taylor	  2004)	  have	  travelled	  and	  travel	  the	  world	   to	   villages	   such	   as	   Joygram	   with	   colonial	   bureaucracies,	   via	   mass	  migration	   and	   electronic	   mediation	   (Appadurai	   1996).	   The	   ‘multiple	  modernities’	  (Eisenstadt	  2000;	  cf.	  Hefner	  1998)	  neither	  only	  have	  their	  onset	  in	  Western	   modernity,	   nor	   emerge	   elsewhere	   in	   isolation.	   Moreover,	   Hansen	  emphasises	   that	   these	   proscriptive	   notions	   of	   modern	   personhood	   ‘exist	   as	  moral	   discourses	   that	   enunciate	   cultural	   ideals	   rather	   than	   deep	   and	   fixed	  cultural	   ideas’	   (2009:	   19,	   emphasis	   in	   original).	   In	   this	   light,	   I	   will	   take	   both	  Hansen’s	   and	   Comaroff’s	   models	   to	   be	   ideal-­‐types	   to	   explore	   the	  vernacularisation	  of	  modern	  aspirations.	  	  	  The	  encounter	  with	  modern	   ideals	  of	  personhood	   through	  participation	   in	  transnational	   movements	   like	   the	   TJ,	   and	   engagements	   with	   global	   forms	   of	  Islamic	  reformism	  offers	  new	  kinds	  of	  ethical	  affordances	  to	  Muslim	  Joygramis.	  What	   I	   foremost	   want	   to	   point	   out	   here	   is	   that	   the	   tendencies	   of	   modern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  We	  could	  include	  anthropologists’	  recent	  interest	  in	  embodied	  virtue	  ethics,	  and	  a	  call	  for	  a	  genuine	  engagement	  of	  anthropology	  with	  theology	  (Fountain	  &	  Lau	  2013).	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conviction	   are	   not	   exclusive	   to	   Islamic	   reformism.	   The	   work	   on	   piety	  movements	  has	  been	  critiqued	   for	  having	  a	   ‘re-­‐exoticisation	  effect,	  which	  sets	  reformism	  as	  a	  uniquely	  ‘Muslim’	  way	  to	  be	  modern’	  (F.Osella	  &	  C.	  Osella	  2008:	  319).	  In	  South	  Asia,	  Islamic	  reformism	  developed	  in	  close	  interaction	  with	  and	  shares	   many	   resemblances	   with	   Hindu	   reformist	   movements	   (Metcalf	   1989;	  Masud	   2000b).	   Janson	   (2013:	   259-­‐265)	   observes	   that	   in	   Gambia,	   the	   TJ	   and	  Pentecostalism	   mutually	   influence	   each	   other,	   and	   some	   of	   the	   young	   men	  involved	  with	  the	  TJ	  refer	  to	  themselves	  as	  ‘born-­‐again	  Muslims’.	  Janson’s	  work	  draws	   attention	   to	   the	   need	   to	   embed	   the	   analysis	   of	   Islamic	   reformism	   in	   a	  wider	   framework.	   Recent	   decades	   have	   seen	   many	   forms	   of	   regeneration	  movements	   and	   of	   cultural,	   moral,	   and	   religious	   revivalism	   and	   reformism,	  among	   for	   instance	   Australian	   Aborigines	   (Cowlishaw	   2012);	   Buddhists	   in	  Southeast	   Asia	   (Cohen	   2000);	   and	   including	   liberation	   theologies	   in	   Latin	  America	   (Smith	   1991);	   and	   charismatic	   and	   fundamentalist	   Christian	  movements	   in	   the	   USA	   (Harding	   2000;	   Luhrmann	   2012)	   and	   elsewhere	  (Coleman	  2000;	  Gifford	  2004;	  Meyer	  1998;	  Robbins	  2004b).	  	  	  I	   suggest	   that	   reformist	   aspirations	   in	   Joygram	   are	   the	   result	   of	   a	  hermeneutics	   between	   the	   local	   cosmopolitics,	   the	   politico-­‐economic	  environment	  and	  globally	  circulating	  models.	  The	  aspirations	  of	  Tablighis	  and	  reformist	  Muslims	  in	  Joygram	  are	  a	  complex	  combination	  of	  ‘cool’	  and	  ‘uncool’	  passions;	   of	   modern,	   global	   forms	   of	   reflexive,	   interiorised	   conviction	   with	  embodied	   virtue	   ethics	   and	   desires	   for	   mystical	   transcendence.	   Globally	  circulating	  models	   of	  modern	   personhood	   are	   not	   simply	   imitated	   but	   create	  new	   ethical	   affordances	   (Keane	   2015)	   and	   articulates	   a	   new	   grammar	   to	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘the	  subject’,	  including	  new	  kinds	  of	  ‘ethical	  autonomy	  and	  aesthetic	  self-­‐invention’	  (Asad	  2003:	  225).	  	  Despite	   the	   resonance	   with	   modern	   conviction,	   reformism	   in	   Joygram	  ultimately	  defies	  a	  categorization	  as	   ‘modern’	  or	   ‘secular’	  or	  even	   ‘religious’	   in	  the	  ‘Western’	  sense	  because	  it	  is	  rooted	  in	  dharma.	  Dharma,	  I	  have	  argued,	  is	  an	  ethics	  of	  order	  and	  justice	  that	  entails	  a	  holistic	  macro-­‐cosmic	  vision	  as	  well	  as	  a	  locally	  particular	  virtue	  ethics.	  Indeed,	  the	  ethical	  transitions	  in	  Joygram	  entail	  political	   aspirations	   of	   embedding	   ideologically	   separated	   spheres	   of	   life	   in	   a	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dharma	   of	   justice	   and	   order	   that	   defies	   any	   binary	   oppositions	   of	  sacred/secular,	  private/public	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  The	  curious	  combination	  of	   ‘cool’	  and	  ‘uncool’	  conviction	  in	  India	  is	  rooted	  in	   local	   cosmopolitics,	   yet	   is	   simultaneously	   a	   creative	   response	   to	   the	  ambiguous	  modernity	  produced	  in	  the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  the	   introduction	   to	   this	   thesis,	   postcolonial	   India	   never	   displayed	   a	   seamless	  separation	   of	   the	   sacred	   and	   the	   secular:	   in	   the	   postcolonial	   anti-­‐politics	  discourse	  the	  communities	  were	  meant	  to	  be	  the	  harbourers	  of	  sacred	  morality	  and	   the	   source	   of	   public	   ethics.	   ‘Religious	   convictions	   were	   not	   a	   liability	   in	  public	  life,	  but	  rather	  a	  sign	  of	  moral	  consistency	  and	  patriotism’	  (Hansen	  2000:	  258).	  However,	   ‘religious	  culture’	  should	  not	   infiltrate	  the	  secular	  space	  of	  the	  Indian	   state.	   This	   paradox	   simultaneously	   denied	   the	   communities	   the	  aspirations	  for	  modern	  personhood,	  as	  modern	  citizenship	  remained	  at	  an	  arm-­‐length	  distance	   from	   the	   reified	   communities,	   particularly	   from	   those	  deviant	  from	   the	   hegemonic	   (Hindu)	   script.	   Islamic	   reformism	   makes	   Muslims	   even	  more	   obviously	   different	   from	   the	   hegemonic	   national	   culture,	   so	   even	   less	  eligible	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  Muslims	  in	  Joygram	  find	   themselves	   in	   ‘an	   impossible	   double-­‐bind:	   faced	   with	   a	   choice	   between	  being	   charged	   as	   ‘bad	   Muslims’	   if	   they	   ignore	   the	   call	   to	   reform	   or	   as	   ‘bad	  Indians’	  if	  they	  choose	  to	  follow	  reform’	  (F.Osella	  &	  C.Osella	  2008:	  251).	  Taking	  this	   ‘double-­‐bind’	   into	   account,	   I	  want	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   tragedy	   of	   failure:	   the	  aspirations	  for	  modern	  personhood	  are	  a	  priori	  curtailed	  by	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  Indian	  secular	  modernity.	  
Narratives	  of	  conviction	  	  The	   brothers	   Masiruddin	   and	   Wahed,	   and	   their	   kinsman	   Faizul	   are	  exemplary	   figures	  when	  reflecting	  upon	  narratives	  of	  conviction	   in	  relation	   to	  reformist	  Islamic	  movements	  in	  Joygram.	  I	  have	  briefly	  recounted	  Masiruddin’s	  story	   in	   the	   opening	   vignette.	   To	   reiterate,	   for	   Masiruddin,	   the	   TJ	   first	   and	  foremost	   involved	   a	   revaluation	   of	   the	   ethics	   and	   ritual	   practice	   of	   Islam,	   yet	  this	  did	  not	  signify	  a	  radical	  break	  with	  his	  past.	  The	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  TJ	  and	  the	  more	   pious	   disposition	   were	   woven	   in	   with	   his	   life	   as	   a	   businessman	   and	   a	  proud	   citizen	   of	   India.	   The	   stories	   of	   Wahed	   and	   Faizul	   are	   rather	   different.	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However	   different	   the	   narratives,	   they	   bring	   to	   the	   forefront	   two	   key	  characteristics	  of	  reform	  in	   Joygram.	  Firstly,	   the	  motivations	   for	   joining	  the	  TJ	  are	   grounded	   in	   a	   sense	   of	   moral	   failure	   and	   responsibility	   for	   the	   moral	  regeneration	  of	   the	  Muslim	  community.	  Secondly,	   the	  stories	  are	  marked	  by	  a	  gradual	   inculcation	   of	   an	   embodied,	   pious	   conviction,	   and	   a	  withdrawal	   from	  previous	  practices.	  	  
Wahed	  Khadim	  	  The	  first	  time	  I	  met	  Wahed	  he	  made	  a	  charismatic	  appearance,	  in	  his	  clean	  white	   pāñjābi,	  white	   trousers	  and	   white	   ṭupi,	   a	   wild	   beard	   and	   hair	   growing	  down	  the	  back	  of	  his	  neck.	  His	  charisma	  grew	  as	  he	  told	  me	  about	  the	  TJ	  with	  visceral	  enthusiasm.	  His	  father	  Abu	  Bakr,	   in	  a	   locally	  unusual	  green	  version	  of	  the	  Islamic	  dress,	  with	  similar	  long	  hair	  and	  a	  grey	  goatee,	  seemed	  to	  listen	  to	  him	  in	  a	  similar	  subdued	  manner	  as	  I	  did.	  When	  I	  asked	  Abu	  Bakr	  whether	  he	  participated	   in	   the	   TJ	   as	   well,	   the	   answer	   is	   that	   no,	   ‘I	   stay	   at	   the	   shrine	  
(āstānā)’,	  and	  they	  showed	  me	  a	  dusty	  picture	  of	  a	  colourful	  tomblike	  structure	  with	  the	  father	  posing	  in	  front.	  Wahed’s	  smile	  suddenly	  turned	  uncomfortable.	  It	  soon	  became	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  this	  household,	  with	  the	  guardian	  of	  a	  tomb	  and	  two	   TJ	   participants	   under	   one	   roof,	   was	   the	   exemplary	   micro-­‐cosmos	   of	   the	  larger	  ethical	  transitions	  taking	  place	  in	  Joygram.	  	  	  	  Wahed	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  join	  the	  TJ	  in	  Joygram,	  some	  eight	  years	  ago.	   He	   says	   he	   had	   felt	   inspired	   by	   the	   TJ	   on	   an	   encounter	  with	   a	   group	   of	  travelling	  preachers	  on	   a	   visit	   in	   a	  nearby	  village.	  Together	  with	   a	   young	  day	  labourer	   called	   Ibrahim,	   he	   is	   the	   driving	   force	   behind	   the	   TJ’s	   activities	   in	  Joygram.	  In	  his	  daily	  life,	  Wahed	  is	  foremost	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  paddy	  fields,	  and	  spends	  his	  Saturdays	  in	  the	  office	  at	  the	  cattle	  market,	  yet	  his	  involvement	  with	   the	   TJ	   and	   the	   outings	   (Ar:	   khuruj)	   are	   gradually	   taking	   up	   more	   time.	  During	  my	  nineteen	  months	  in	  the	  village,	  he	  went	  twice	  for	  a	  four-­‐month	  tour	  to	  Delhi;	  every	  month	  for	  three	  days	  to	  nearby	  villages;	  and	  a	  few	  times	  for	  forty	  days	   to	   villages	   in	   other	   districts	   in	   West	   Bengal.	   As	   he	   is	   probably	   the	  wealthiest	  of	  the	  regular	  participants,	  he	  acts	  as	  a	  patron:	  whenever	  groups	  of	  Tablighis	   from	   other	   villages	   visit	   Joygram,	   he	   takes	   care	   of	   most	   of	   the	  expenses	   of	   food	   and	   his	   house	   is	   the	   place	   where	   meals	   are	   prepared.	   He	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greatly	   enjoys	   the	   solidarity	   among	   the	   Tablighis,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Da’wa	  (proselytization)	   itself.	   He	   is	   a	   passionate	   speaker	   and	   an	   austere	   teacher	   of	  reform	  to	  the	  other	  villagers,	  which	  is	  not	  always	  appreciated.	  	  His	  wife	  Pompa,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  women	  to	  wear	  a	  burqa	  when	  going	  outside	  of	  the	  hamlet,	  also	  participates	  in	  the	  TJ;	  she	  has	  gone	  for	  two	  three-­‐day	  tours	  during	  my	   stay	   (in	   contrast	   to	  Masiruddin’s	   wife,	   who	  works	   as	   a	   nurse	   and	  barely	   cares	   to	   even	   cover	   her	   hair).	   Pompa	   showed	   a	   genuine	   interest	   in	  learning	   the	   Hadith,	   and	   spent	   her	   rare	   spare	   time	   reading	   it.	   I	   increasingly	  overheard	  her	  passing	  on	  to	  other	  women	  in	  the	  hamlet	  what	  she	  had	  learned	  on	  the	  outings,	  with	  a	  newly	  gained	  confidence.	  She	  never	  again	  appeared	  in	  a	  sari	   or	   a	   nightgown,	   instead	   wearing	   a	   salwar	   kāmeez	   at	   all	   times,	   albeit	  somewhat	  grudgingly.	  	  Wahed	  has	  applied	  for	  a	  place	  at	  the	  Al-­‐Hilal	  Mission	  School	  in	  Joygram	  for	  his	  eldest	  daughter,	  long	  before	  its	  doors	  were	  open.	  His	  youngest	  daughter	  will	  attend	   the	  girls’	  madrasa	   that	  has	   recently	  opened	   in	  a	  nearby	  village.	  He	  has	  great	  plans	  for	  his	  only	  son:	  he	  shall	  be	  highly	  educated	  both	  in	  Islamic	  subjects	  as	  well	  as	  in	  general	  subjects,	  so	  that	  he	  can	  succeed	  in	  life,	  but	  foremost,	  so	  that	  he	  can	  spread	  Islam	  across	  the	  world,	  since	  he	  will	  be	  fluent	  in	  both	  Arabic	  and	  English.	  	  Initially,	   Wahed	   had	   been	   very	   enthusiastically	   congenial	   towards	   me.	  Although	   his	   hospitality	   and	   friendliness	   never	   dwindled,	   he	   increasingly	  adopted	   the	   ‘proper’	   Islamic	   attitude	   of	   distance	   towards	  women:	   he	   did	   not	  come	  to	  sit	  next	  to	  me	  anymore	  and	  avoided	  eye	  contact	  and	  jocular	  chit-­‐chat.	  Especially	   in	   public	   he	   hardly	   acknowledged	   my	   presence,	   initially	  apologetically,	   but	   increasingly	  more	   sternly.	   In	   our	   continuing	   conversations	  about	   Islam,	   he	   ever	  more	   emphasised	   the	   centrality	   of	   imān	   (belief)	   and	   the	  afterlife.	   His	   attitude	   changed	   not	   only	   towards	   me.	   After	   another	   three	   day	  meeting	  with	  the	  TJ,	  he	  entered	  home	  with	  a	  formal	  Salaam	  Aleikum,	  eliciting	  a	  giggling	   response	   from	  his	  wife.	  He	   lectures	  her	  on	   the	  Hadith,	   and	  scolds	  his	  father	  for	  singing	  Arabic	  verses	  without	  knowing	  the	  meaning.	  Wahed	  became	  ever	  more	  aware	  of	  Islamic	  aesthetics,	  and	  whereas	  Masiruddin	  would	  continue	  to	  occasionally	  wear	   jeans	  or	  a	  shirt,	  Wahed	  only	  dressed	   in	  a	  standard	  white	  
pāñjābi.	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Faizul	  Mondal	  Faizul	  has	  an	  altogether	  different	   story.	  He	  used	   to	  be	  professional	  dancer	  and	   appeared	   in	  music	   videos.	   The	  work	   required	   him	   to	   go	   to	  Mumbai	   and	  Delhi,	  and	  other	  major	  Indian	  cities.	  All	  the	  pictures	  and	  even	  his	  shiny	  clothes	  are	   kept	   in	   a	   box,	   and	   like	   Masiruddin	   he	   seems	   proud	   about	   his	   previous	  achievements.	  He	  also	  ran	  a	  dance	  school	  in	  Barakpur,	  where	  he	  met	  and	  fell	  in	  love	  with	  his	  wife	  Titli,	  a	  girl	  from	  Farukhbazar	  who	  went	  to	  boarding	  school	  in	  Barakpur.	  	  Despite	  the	  pride	  he	  could	  not	  hide,	  he	  told	  me	  he	  felt	  he	  was	  living	  a	  sinful	  life.	   One	   night	  when	   he	  was	   back	   in	   Joygram,	   and	   just	   three	  months	   before	   I	  arrived	   in	   the	   village,	   he	   had	   visited	   the	   graveyard	   (mājār)	   beside	   the	   shrine	  and	   the	   cattle	  market.	  An	  angel	  had	  appeared	   to	  him.	  The	  angel	  had	   told	  him	  that	   he	   should	   stop	   his	   sinful	   life	   and	   follow	   the	   right	   path	   to	   Allah.	   Faizul	  immediately	   quit	   the	  dancing	   job	   and	  moved	  back	   to	   the	   small	  mud	  house	   in	  Joygram	  he	   inherited	   from	  his	  mother.	  He	  started	  wearing	  a	  ṭupi	   (skullcap)	  at	  all	   times,	  and	   jocularly	   introduced	  himself	   to	  me	  as	   ‘ṭupioyālā’	   (‘the	  man	  with	  the	   ṭupi’)	   on	   our	   first	   encounter.	   His	   disposition	   and	   behaviour	   changed	  radically	   over	   the	   next	   nineteen	   months.	   Initially,	   he	   would	   not	   cease	   to	  passionately	  tell	  me	  about	  the	  virtues	  of	  Islam,	  and	  expand	  on	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muhammad.	  After	  his	   initiatory	   four	  months	  with	   the	  TJ	   in	  Delhi,	  his	  disposition	  became	  increasingly	  sober	  and	  pious,	  even	  though	  the	  flicker	  of	  passion	   in	   his	   eyes	   never	   dwindled.	   Like	  Wahed,	   his	   greetings	   became	  more	  solemn	  and	   ‘properly’	   Islamic.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  he	  became	  more	   involved	   in	  the	  cattle	  market,	  where	  he	  had	  been	  doing	  odd	  jobs,	  and	  he	  grew	  from	  a	  jumpy	  village	  boy	  to	  a	  respectable	  businessman.	  He	  remained	  extremely	  friendly	  and	  hospitable,	  and	  continued	  to	  teach	  me	  about	  Islam	  whenever	  I	  visited	  him,	  but	  there	   was	   less	   of	   our	   youthful	   banter.	   His	   ‘uncool’	   passion,	   inspired	   by	   the	  revelation	  of	  the	  angel,	  gradually	  changed	  into	  a	  cool	  passion	  of	  conviction.	  	  Meanwhile,	   Titli	   rapidly	   grew	   from	   an	   adolescent	   girl	   in	   a	   pious	   woman,	  who	  cherished	  her	  purdah	  like	  no	  other	  woman.	  She	  was	  very	  happy	  Faizul	  had	  become	  a	  dedicated	  Muslim.	  His	  previous	  glamorous	  cosmopolitan	  lifestyle	  had	  inspired	  her	  with	   fear	   that	  he	  would	  meet	  other	  girls	  but	  now	  she	  could	  trust	  him.	  She	  started	  a	  Bachelor’s	  degree	  but	  did	  not	  seem	  to	   like	   it	  or	  care.	  She	   is	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happy	   at	   home,	   she	   says,	   although	   she	   deeply	   enjoyed	   the	   occasional	   outings	  with	  the	  TJ	  she	  undertook.	  When	  I	  came	  back	  from	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  TJ	  headquarters	  in	   Delhi,	   she	   greeted	  me	   piously:	   she	   took	  my	   hands	   in	   her	   and	   said	   Salaam	  
Aleikum,	   then	   eagerly	   asked	   me	   how	   it	   was.	   I	   answered	   that	   I	   had	   been	  overwhelmed	  and	  inspired	  by	  the	  warm	  friendliness	  of	  the	  women.	  She	  looked	  me	  deep	   in	   the	   eyes,	  with	   teary	   eyes	  herself,	   and	   said	   from	  her	  heart:	   ‘I’m	   so	  happy	  to	  hear	  it.	  Now	  you	  understand’.	  	  
Moral	  failure	  and	  responsibility	  	  One	  of	  the	  aspects	  that	  unite	  the	  three	  stories	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure	  or	  void,	  in	  which	  conviction	  arrives	  as	  a	  ‘turning	  point	  that	  enables	  one	  to	  become	  a	   full	   person’	   (Hansen	   2009:	   14),	   not	   unlike	   Tablighis’	   narratives	   in	   Gambia	  (Janson	  2013:	  264)	  or	  Pentecostal	  testimonies	  in	  the	  USA	  (Luhrmann	  2004).	  As	  Hansen	   points	   out,	   ‘[s]uch	   narratives	   of	   becoming,	   of	   reaching	   fullness	   and	  maturity	   by	   acquiring	   a	   larger	   point	   of	   view,	   do	   indeed	   have	   a	   structure	   that	  seems	   to	   repeat	   the	   Christian…story	   of	   living	   in	   sin	   and	   darkness	   before	  encountering	   the	  miracle	   of	   truth’	   (2009:	   14).	   In	   Faizul’s	   case,	   the	  miracle	   of	  truth	   was	   indeed	   a	   miracle,	   and	   involved	   surrender	   to	   sacred	   authority	  (Comaroff	  2008:	  3).	  Underlying	  these	  stories	  are	  pragmatic	  motivations	  as	  well,	  and	  I	  will	  attend	  to	  pragmatism	  in	  a	  later	  section.	  But	  what	  matters	  here	  is	  not	  the	  actual	   formation	  of	   the	  self	  but	  the	  constructed	  narrative	  through	  which	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  self	  is	  created.	  	  	  In	  an	  essay	  on	  the	  ‘moral	  and	  spiritual	  striving	  in	  the	  everyday’,	  particularly	  regarding	  the	  physical	  proximity	  of	  Muslims	  and	  Hindus,	  Das	  (2010b)	  observes	  that	  Hindus	   located	  themselves	   in	   ‘a	  kind	  of	  natural	  history	  of	  morality’	  when	  explaining	   the	  ethical	   impossibility	  of	   their	   actions	  with	   reference	   to	  kaliyuga	  (time	  of	  moral	  decline).	  Muslims	   took	  an	  active	  stance	  of	  moral	   responsibility	  for	  the	  time	  of	  fitna	  (equally	  meaning	  moral	  decline):	  ‘the	  sense	  that	  the	  time	  of	  
fitna	  was	  their	  own	  creation	  imbued	  their	  actions	  with	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  moral	  disquiet,	   if	   not	   failure’	   (Das	   2010b:	   242).	   The	   sense	   of	   personal	  moral	   failure	  among	  Muslims	   inspires	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   better	   society	   starts	   with	   improving	  oneself;	   this	   is	   the	   official	   discourse	   of	   the	   TJ.	   Metcalf	   recounts	   that	   ‘some	  Tablighis,	   in	  fact,	  will	  emphasize	  Muslim	  failure	  to	  live	  morally	  as	  the	  cause	  of	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recent	  Muslim	  suffering	   today	  …	   in	  contrast	   to	   those	  more	  public	   figures	  who	  explicitly	  condemn	  Christian,	  Zionist,	  and	  other	  oppression’	  (2003:	  146).109	  	  The	  traction	  of	  this	  discourse	  is	  obvious	  if	  we	  listen	  to	  Sheik	  Anisul,	  himself	  not	   a	   TJ	   participant	   or	   particularly	   pious	   in	   everyday	   life.	   For	   him,	   politics	  means	   trouble	   and	   violence	   (golmāl,	  mārpiṭ),	   and	   he	   doesn’t	   like	   it	   a	   bit.	   He	  particularly	  does	  not	  believe	   that	  politics	   is	   the	  way	   to	  a	  more	   just	   society.	   ‘If	  you	  want	  to	  do	  good,	  and	  want	  a	  better	  society,	  then	  you	  first	  have	  to	  become	  a	  better	   person	   yourself,	   then	   the	   society	  will	   improve	   as	  well.	   That’s	  what	   the	  [Tablighi]	  Jamaat	  people	  say’.	  Clearly,	  the	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure	  and	  individual	  responsibility	   does	   not	   only	   come	   from	   an	   antipathy	   to	   the	   violence	   in	   one’s	  environment,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  one’s	  own	  involvement.	  As	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  4,	  politics	  is	  trouble,	  the	  economy	  is	  vicious;	  but	  when	  corruption	  has	  seeped	   into	   every	   corner	   of	   society,	   engagements	   with	   the	   immoral	  environment	  are	   inevitable.	  One	  cannot	   locate	  oneself	  outside	  the	  narrative	  of	  moral	   decay.	   Moreover,	   there	   is	   ample	   complaint	   (among	  Muslim	   Joygramis)	  that	   Muslims	   are	   poorly	   educated;	   that	   they	   just	   want	   to	   farm	   rather	   than	  progress;	   that	   those	   Muslims	   who	   are	   educated	   are	   ‘hinduised’	   and	   have	  forgotten	  Islam;	  that	  Muslim	  boys	  work	  as	  gunmen;	  that	  they	  just	  want	  money;	  and	  generally	  that	  they	  live	  up	  to	  the	  stereotype	  of	  being	  ‘badmāś’.	  It	  is,	  at	  least	  in	   part,	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   Muslims	   themselves	   that	   the	   bhadralok	   still	  rules	   West	   Bengal;	   and	   that	   they	   suffer	   from	   violence	   and	   exclusion.	   This	  narrative	   always	   has	   the	   same	   conclusion:	   Bengali	   Muslims	   have	   forgotten	  Islam,	   and	   they	   need	   to	   be	   reminded	   of	   the	   ethics	   and	   the	   ritual	   practices	   of	  Islam.	  	  	  	  The	   official	   doctrine	   of	   the	   TJ	   is	   generally	   considered	   apolitical	   (Ali	   2003;	  Janson	   2013;	   Reetz	   2006)	   and	   ‘for	   millions	   of	   participants,	   the	   injunction	   to	  disseminating	  individual	  moral	  reform	  is	  the	  movement’s	  only	  mission’	  (Metcalf	  2003:	  146).	  I	  will	  problematize	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  TJ	  is	  ‘apolitical’	  later	  in	  this	  chapter;	  nonetheless,	   I	  have	   found	  that	  most	  of	   the	  TJ	  participants	   in	   Joygram	  prefer	  staying	  away	  from	  direct	   involvement	   in	  politics.	  Wahed	  could	  at	   times	  become	  enthusiastic	  about	   the	  political	  party	  of	  Siddiqullah	  Chowdhuri	  Saheb	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  This	  discourse	  has	   a	   long	  history	   as	   the	   Islamic	   scholars	   in	   colonial	   India	   considered	  ‘the	   primary	   reason	   for	   the	  Muslim	  decline	   had	   been	   believers’	   neglect	   of	   God’s	   law’	   (Hefner	  2007:	  18).	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(PDCI/AIUDF),	   but	   when	   I	   asked	   why	   he	   did	   not	   join	   the	   party	   himself,	   he	  answered,	  ‘I	  do	  Jamaat’.	  Not	  that	  the	  TJ	  forbid	  him	  to	  do	  politics,	  but	  he	  reckons	  that	   ‘without	   ‘good	   people’	   you	   can’t	   do	   good	   politics;	   even	   Siddiqullah	   may	  have	  great	  ideas	  but	  won’t	  get	  anywhere	  if	  the	  people	  are	  not	  ‘good’’.	  So	  Wahed	  attempts	   to	   create	   the	   ‘good	   people’,	   and	   leave	   the	   politics	   to	   others.	   This	  indeed,	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  TJ	  official	  discourse:	  any	  kind	  of	  reform,	  including	  reform	  of	  the	  nation	  or	  the	  society,	  should	  start	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual,	  not	  at	  the	  level	  of	  political	  structures	  (Ali	  2003:	  179).	  	  Islamic	   organizations	   do	   not	   have	   much	   choice	   but	   to	   focus	   on	   apolitical	  individual	   reform.	   The	   TJ	   and	   the	   Deoband	   have	   public	   legitimacy	   only	   as	   a	  ‘benign’,	   ‘cultural-­‐religious’	   organization,	   and	   ‘the	   discourse	   of	   politics	   must	  obey	   the	   tacit	   rhetorical	   rules	   of	   generality	   and	   vagueness:	   to	   encourage	  morality	   in	   society	   at	   large,	   to	   criticize	   selfishness	   in	   public	   life,	   to	   deplore	  moral	  decay	  and	  divisive	   tendencies’	   (Hansen	  2000:	  259;	  cf.	  Metcalf	  1989).	   In	  this	   vein,	   the	  TJ	   and	   the	  Deoband	   focus	  on	  moral	   regeneration	   and	  education	  within	  the	  community	  and	  do	  not	  usually	  engage	  in	  any	  political	  rhetoric.	  	  	  In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  space	  for	  ethical	  autonomy	  in	  the	  ethno-­‐theology	  of	   Joygrami	  Muslims:	  Allah	  has	   given	  humans	   the	   capacity	   for	  
jñān/phronesis	  (practical	  judgement)	  in	  order	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  wrong	  and	  the	  right	  path.	  The	  autonomy	  that	  emerges	  from	  divine	  submission	  is	  central	  to	  the	   individual	   reform	   project.	   The	   idea	   that	   Allah	   has	   given	   Muslims	   the	  capacity	   for	  virtuous	   judgement	  means	   that	  Muslims	  have	  a	   responsibility	   for	  their	   own	   choices	   and	   for	   the	   consequences	   of	   their	   judgement.	   There	   is	   a	  dialectic	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  community	  here:	  one	  has	  to	  make	  the	  choice	   for	   oneself,	   through	  one’s	   own	   jñān	  (judgement),	   but	   one	  Muslim	  with	  real	  imān	  (faith)	  could	  save	  the	  world	  and	  there	  is	  a	  responsibility	  for	  the	  moral	  health	  of	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  (see	  Asad	  2003:	  90).	  	  The	   sense	   of	   moral	   failure	   is	   strongly	   related	   to	   a	   geographical	   moral	  hierarchy.	  Although	  scholars	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘Great’	  and	  ‘Little’	  traditions,	  and	  centres	   and	   peripheries	   in	   world	   religions,	   this	   is	   how	   reformist	   Muslims	   in	  Joygram	  see	  it	  themselves.	  West	  Bengal	  is	  the	  periphery,	  far	  removed	  from	  the	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‘real	   Islam’	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   the	  Muslim	  world,	  Mecca,	   or	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   TJ	  (Delhi)	   and	   areas	   closer	   to	   the	   centre	   in	   geography	   and	   practice.	  Wahed	   and	  other	  Tablighis	  are	  stirred	  when	  talking	  about	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  (Northern	  India):	  ‘There	  the	  situation	  of	  Muslims	  is	  much	  better	  than	  here.	  It	  looks	  like	  an	  Islamic	  place’;	   they	  wear	   Islamic	  dress;	   the	  women	  are	   all	   in	  purdah;	   and	   the	   Islamic	  rules	  are	  obeyed.	  Whereas	  here	  in	  West	  Bengal,	  the	  ‘Muslims	  are	  very	  far	  from	  Islam’,	  especially	  the	  ‘dumb’	  (bokā)	  people	  visiting	  the	  shrine.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  previous	  lack	  of	  madrasas	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  of	  maulānās,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  TJ.	   In	   contrast,	   in	  UP	   the	  Deoband	  madrasa	  was	   founded,	  which	   instructs	  and	  spreads	  the	  ‘real	  Islam’	  (saṭhik	  Islām).	  	  Masiruddin	   in	   particular	   also	   glorifies	   Al	   Qaeda	   and	   Taliban	   as	   the	   most	  peaceful	  people	  in	  the	  world;	  the	  living	  example	  of	  Muslims	  struggling	  to	  follow	  the	   right	   path	   against	   the	   evil	   infiltrations	   of	   (Western)	   capitalism	   and	  consumerism.	   In	   his	   view,	   the	   Taliban	   and	  Deoband	   are	   the	   same.	   Indeed,	   as	  Hansen	   observes	   as	   well,	   Bin	   Laden’s	   credibility	   lies	   in	   his	   narrative	   of	  renunciation	  rather	  than	  in	  his	  words,	  and	  he	  has	  become	  an	  exemplary	  figure	  for	   Masiruddin	   and	   others	   because	   he	   ‘demonstrates	   pure	   political	   love,	  sincerity	  and	  also	  a	  sovereign	  disregard	  for	  danger	  and	  death’	  (2009:	  18).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Joygramis	  are	  eager	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  liberal	  democracy	  of	  India,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  distance	  oneself	  from	  the	  image	  of	  the	  ‘bad’	  or	   disloyal	   Muslim.	   Masiruddin	   deeply	   lamented	   the	   suspicion	   and	   bad	  stereotypes	  of	  Muslims,	  in	  India	  and	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  wanted	  to	  demonstrate	   that	   Islam	   is	   peaceful,	   and	   that	   Muslims,	   if	   they	   follow	   Islam	  properly,	  foster	  peace	  instead	  of	  violence.	  	  
The	  recovery	  of	  dignity	  and	  the	  search	  for	  solidarity	  	  The	  above	  section	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  oppositions	  inherent	  in	  the	  ‘double-­‐bind’	   of	   ‘bad	   Muslim’	   or	   ‘bad	   Indian’	   have	   various	   corollary	   and	   seemingly	  irreconcilable	   oppositions,	   depending	   on	   the	   context	   (see	   chapter	   1)	   and	   the	  audience	   (F.Osella	   &	   C.Osella	   2008:	   253):	   the	   educated	   bhadralok	   versus	   the	  uneducated	  Muslim;	  the	  indigenous	  Hindu	  versus	  the	  disloyal	  Muslim;	  the	  pious	  (Arabic)	  Muslim	  versus	  the	  wicked	  (Bengali)	  Muslim;	  and	  as	  I	  shall	  demonstrate	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in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   ascetic,	   civilised	   and	   rational	  Muslim	   Joygrami	   versus	   the	  poor,	  uncivilized	  and	  ‘stupid’	  Muslim	  Joygrami.	  	  The	  cultivation	  of	  a	  pious	  self	  can	  only	  overcome	  some	  of	  these	  oppositions,	  and	   reproduces	   other	   oppositions.	   Moreover,	   the	   various	   forms	   of	  marginalization	   have	   become	   inherent	   to	   the	   racialised	   and	   (de-­‐)moralised	  identifications.	   Yet,	   even	   if	   the	   politico-­‐economic	   and	   social	   marginalization	  cannot	  be	  undone	  that	  easily,	  the	  practice	  of	  self-­‐renewal	  itself	  recovers	  a	  sense	  of	   dignity	   and	   self-­‐worth.	   The	   sense	   of	   marginalization	   and	   the	   involvement	  with	  morally	  degrading	  political	  and	  economic	  practices	  have	  disenfranchised	  Muslims	  from	  their	  moral	  dignity	  and	  ethical	  autonomy	  (see	  chapter	  4).	  The	  TJ	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  personal	  construction	  of	  an	  ethical	  narrative.	  All	  Muslims,	   and	   not	   only	   those	   who	   have	   access	   to	   the	   bhadralok	   spaces	   of	  education	   and	   ‘civilization’,	   have	   access	   to	   the	   potential	   to	   reform	   and	   to	  transcend	  themselves,	  above	  their	  older	  ‘inferior’	  self.	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   TJ	   offers	   new	   spaces	   of	   solidarity	   and	   equality.	   The	   TJ	  demonstrates	   a	   Sufi	   style	   of	   leadership,	   which	   ‘might	   be	   characterised	   by	  personal,	   charismatic	   and	   moral	   authority,	   based	   on	   chastity	   and	   sanctity	   as	  recognised	  by	  others,	  on	  erudition	  in	  the	  formal	  principles	  and	  sources	  of	  Islam,	  [and]	  on	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Qur'ân,	  hadîth	  and	  the	  Sunna’	  (Reetz	  2006:	  37).	  The	  election	  of	  leadership	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  merit	  makes	  a	  significant	  break	  with	  hierarchical	   structures,	   such	   as	   those	   commonly	   found	   in	   Sufi	   circles,	   and	  unequal	   power	   relations	   associated	  with	  wealth	   or	   descent	   (Ali	   2003).	   In	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   I	   quoted	   the	   Deobandi	   preacher	   who	   had	   encouraged	  Muslims	   to	   judge	   others	   according	   to	   their	   behaviour,	   not	   upon	   their	   jāti.	   He	  continued	  by	  saying	  that	  wealth,	  descent	  or	  class	  should	  not	  play	  a	  role	  either.	  It	  imputed	  the	  Tablighis,	   in	  particular	  the	  day	   labourers,	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  dignity,	  which	  they	  did	  not	  find	  in	  anything	  else.	  To	  reiterate	  my	  point	  in	  chapter	  4,	  as	  ‘second	  rate’	  citizens,	  many	  Muslims	  (and	  other	  minorities	  and	  low	  castes)	  are	  inevitably	  engaged	  in	  exploitative	  work,	  and	  have	  to	  earn	   ‘second	  rate’	  money	  with	   their	   ‘second	   rate’	   jobs.	   During	   Tabligh	   congregations	   and	   during	   the	  proselytizing	  outings	  such	  hierarchies	  and	  structures	  of	  exploitation	  do	  not	  play	  a	  role	  (see	  also	  Metcalf	  2003).	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As	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  in	  most	  studies	  on	  the	  TJ,	  one	  cannot	  underestimate	  the	   importance	   of	   cosmopolitan	   opportunities	   and	   the	   inter-­‐state	   (if	   not	  international)	  network	  that	  the	  TJ	  offers	  to	  its	  participants	  (Noor	  2014;	  Masud	  2000a;	   Sikand	   2002).	   What	   transpires	   to	   be	   the	   most	   important	   for	   my	  interlocutors	   is	   the	   inclusivity	   and	   ethics	   of	   equality	   that	   mark	   the	  cosmopolitanism	  of	  the	  TJ.	  After	  his	  first	  four	  months	  tour	  with	  the	  TJ	  to	  Delhi	  and	   other	   places,	   Faizul	   was	   deeply	   impressed	   by	   the	   variety	   of	   people	   who	  participated	   in	   the	  TJ.	  What	  he	  had	  enjoyed	  most	  was	   the	   fact	   that	  everybody	  would	   sit	   and	   talk	   together,	   doctors	   and	   engineers	   side	   by	   side	  with	   farmers	  and	   day	   labourers	   such	   as	   himself.	   Friendships	   were	   forged	   across	   all	  hierarchies.	  With	  pride,	  TJ	  participants	  claim	  that	  on	  those	  meetings	  and	  on	  the	  preaching	   tours,	   the	   men	   share	   a	   deep	   sense	   of	   solidarity;	   one	   of	   the	   day	  labourers	   reflected	   with	   a	   gaze	   that	   told	   volumes	   of	   his	   experience,	   ‘it	  felt…very…very	  special,	  extraordinary’	  (khub	  'special',	  asādhāraṇ).	  	  The	  value	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  and	  equality	  within	  the	  TJ	  network	  has	  to	  be	  understood	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	   incessant	   violence	  of	  marginalization	  and	  condescension	   of	   (particularly	   poor)	  Muslims,	   yet	   also	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	  suspicious	   position	   in	   the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state.	   In	   the	   normative	   space	   of	  solidarity	   that	   is	   produced	   by	   the	   TJ	   (and	   that	  which	   extends	   from	   the	   small	  congregations	   to	   the	   Islamic	  ummah	   as	   a	  whole),	  Muslims	  do	  not	  have	   to	   feel	  suspect	  for	  their	  convictions	  and	  practices,	  and	  are	  full,	  legitimate	  persons.	  The	  nation-­‐state	  -­‐	  as	  an	  instrumental	  structure	  rather	  than	  an	  imagined	  community	  –	  is	  being	  subordinated	  to	  the	  moral	  project	  of	  the	  global	  ummah	  (cf.	  Hirschkind	  2006:	  118).	  	  
Conviction:	  reason	  and	  mysticism	  	  	  	  Hansen	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   TJ	   is	   a	   perfect	   example	   of	   a	   political	  theology	  of	  conviction	  by	  taking	  a	  Gujarati	  TJ	  preacher	  in	  South	  Africa	  as	  one	  of	  the	  characters	   in	  his	   illustrative	  stories.	  This	  section	  evaluates	  whether	   the	  TJ	  as	  lived	  in	  Joygram	  is	  equally	  exemplary	  of	  a	  political	  theology	  of	  conviction.	  It	  will	   demonstrate	   the	   resonances	   between	   Joygrami	   reformism	   and	   global	  modes	  of	  conviction	  as	  well	  as	  the	  limits	  of	  resonance.	  	  Hansen	   argues	   that	   in	   ‘our	   global	   modernity,	   self-­‐making	   is	   almost	  invariably	   concerned	  with	  expunging	  of	   the	  past	   and	   the	  embarrassing	  habits	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and	   predilections	   of	   one’s	   community’	   (Hansen	   2009:	   20).	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	  central	  tenets	  of	  the	  TJ	  and	  of	  the	  Deoband	  is	  the	  purification	  of	  Islam	  from	  un-­‐Islamic	   and	  un-­‐Sunni	  practices,	   as	  has	  been	  observed	  over	  decades	  of	   Islamic	  reform	  (Metcalf	  1989;	  Sikand	  2002).	  There	   is	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  objectification	  and	  rationalisation	  of	  Islam	  among	  the	  reformists	  as	  they	  ‘seek	  to	  improve	  and	  reform,	   they	   seek	   to	   expunge	   the	   lower	   self,	   the	   base	   desires,	   traces	   of	   an	  irrelevant	   past,	   embarrassing	   servitude’	   (Hansen	   2009:	   19).	   I	   have	   given	  various	  examples	  of	   the	   ‘authentication’	  of	   Islam	  (Deeb	  2006)	   throughout	   this	  thesis;	   later	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   give	   specific	   examples	   of	   the	   rejection	   of	  ‘embarrassing	  habits’,	  in	  particular	  dowry	  exchange	  and	  shrine	  worship.	  	  The	  rejection	  of	  ‘unreflexive’	  customary	  practices	  is	  justified	  with	  reference	  as	  much	  to	  science	  and	  logic	  as	  to	  Islamic	  ethics.	  Similarly,	  the	  commitment	  to	  the	  Truth	  of	  the	  Quran,	  the	  logic	  of	  self-­‐discipline	  and	  the	  associated	  aesthetics	  are	  rationalised	  to	  a	  high	  degree.	  Masiruddin	  in	  particular	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  scientific	  value	  of	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  Quran	  and	  the	  Hadith,	  and	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  Quran	  is	  the	  original	  source	  of	  bijñān,	  science.	  For	  example,	  one	  time	  Wahed	  explained	  to	  me	  that	  when	  one	  gets	  angry,	  the	  Quran	  advises	  us	  to	  sit	  down	  in	  order	  to	  calm	  down,	  and	  if	  one	  is	  still	  angry,	  to	  lie	  down.	  Masiruddin	  was	  quick	  to	  add	  that	  this	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  blood	  circulation;	  that	  the	  blood	  rushes	  to	  the	  head	  when	  one	  gets	  angry,	  and	  that	  sitting	  down,	  or	  even	  lying	  down,	  makes	  the	  blood	  circulate	  in	  a	  slower	  pace	  again.	  On	  another	  occasion,	  he	  explained	  to	  me	  how	  even	  a	  banal	   thing	   such	  as	  drinking	  water	  was	  prescribed	  on	  a	   scientific	  basis	  by	  the	  Quran;	  one	  should	  put	  the	  glass	  of	  water	  at	  the	  lips	  (and	  not	  pour	  the	   water	   in	   the	  mouth	   as	   is	   common	   in	   India,	   because	   of	   rules	   of	   pollution	  among	   Hindus)	   and	   only	   swallow	   when	   the	   head	   is	   in	   upright	   and	   slightly	  diverted	   position.	   The	   reason	   is	   that	   otherwise	   oxygen	  would	   enter	  with	   the	  water,	  which	   could	   create	   gas	   problems.	   According	   to	  Masiruddin,	   the	   Quran	  and	  Hadith	   give	   sixty	   scientific	   reasons	   for	   an	   untrimmed	   beard	   and	   a	   clean-­‐shaven	  upper	   lip,	  and	  the	  mode	  of	   Islamic	  prayer	   is	  scientifically	   justified	  as	  a	  healthy	  exercise.	  None	  of	  this	  undoes	  the	  sacred	  nature	  of	  the	  scriptures	  of	  the	  ritual	  practices.	  Rather,	  science	  is	  sacralised	  by	  its	  attribution	  to	  Allah.	  As	  I	  have	  explained	   in	   detail	   in	   chapter	   3,	   the	   brain	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   heart/mind)	   is	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essential	   for	   ethical	   judgement,	   and	   the	   brain	   is	   created	   by	   Allah	   so	   positive	  intellectual	  endeavour	  is	  given	  a	  sublime	  quality.	  	  The	  rationalization	  and	  ‘scientification’	  of	  Islam	  by	  Joygramis	  is	  inspired	  by	  other	  Tablighis	  and	  Deobandi	  imams,	  and	  it	  is	  common	  for	  sermons	  to	  circulate	  via	  Bluetooth	  on	  mobile	  phones	  (see	  also	  Hirschkind	  2006),	  and	  by	  Zakir	  Naik	  on	  Peace	  TV.110	  As	   the	  website	   explains,	   ‘Dr	   Zakir	   clarifies	   Islamic	   viewpoints	  and	  clears	  misconceptions	  about	  Islam,	  using	  the	  Qur’an,	  authentic	  Hadith	  and	  other	   religious	   Scriptures	   as	   a	   basis,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   reason,	   logic	   and	  scientific	   facts’.111	  Zakir	   Naik	   is	   very	   popular	   among	  Muslims	   in	   Joygram	   and	  men	  and	  women	  alike	  say	  they	  are	  becoming	  aware	  of	  their	  un-­‐Islamic	  ‘stupid’	  (bokā)	   practices	   of	   the	   past	   and	   try	   to	   change	   their	   lifestyle	   according	   to	   the	  guidelines	  offered	  on	  Peace	  TV.	  	  	  This	   kind	   of	   ‘scientification’	   of	   Islam	   has	   corollaries	   in	   Hinduism	   (Bénéï	  1998)	  and	  Christianity	  (Cunningham	  2010).	   It	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  response	  to	   the	   need	   to	   justify	   oneself	   in	   light	   of	   scientific	   scepticism	   of	   the	   value	   of	  religious	   scriptures	   (see	   Masud	   2000c:	   xiii	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   19th	   century	  scientism	  on	  reformism	  in	  India).	  Attaching	  a	  scientific	  value	  to	  the	  scriptures	  allows	  the	  rural	  Muslims	  to	  make	  universalistic	  truth	  claims	  that	  those	  who	  are	  poorly	   educated	   in	   general	   subjects	   are	   not	   otherwise	   allowed	   to	   make.	   The	  eagerness	  of	  someone	  like	  Masiruddin	  to	  find	  scientific	  knowledge	  in	  the	  Quran	  suggests	   that	   he	   is	   familiar	   with	   the	   modernist	   condescension	   of	   irrational	  belief.	   In	  his	   aspiration	   to	  be	   accepted	  as	   a	  modern	   citizen,	   he	  would	  need	   to	  distance	  himself	   from	   the	   irrational	   believer.	  However,	   by	   assigning	   objective	  scientific	  value	  to	  the	  practices	  prescribed	  by	  the	  Quran,	  he	  can	  at	  once	  be	  pious	  and	  modern.	  	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  rationalization	  of	   Islam,	   I	  want	  to	  account	   for	  the	   fact	  that	   the	  TJ	  makes	  a	  novel	  combination	  of	  both	  reformist	  and	  mystic	  elements.	  The	   teachings	   are	   reformist	   or	   orthodox	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   TJ	   seeks	   to	  emulate	   the	   lifestyle	   of	   the	   Prophet	   Muhammad	   as	   exactly	   as	   possible,	   and	  interprets	   the	   scriptures	   literally.	  Yet,	   the	  TJ	   theology	  and	  practice	  has	   strong	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  The	  website	  of	  Peace	  TV:	  http://www.peacetv.tv/en-­‐gb/	  111	  http://www.peacetv.tv/en-­‐gb/speakers/dr-­‐zakir-­‐naik.	  Accessed	  6.10.2015.	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Sufi	   roots	   (Ali	   2003;	   Reetz	   2006).112	  The	   magical	   and	   the	   mystic,	   and	   the	  overwhelming	  emotion	  of	  being	  in	  unity	  with	  god	  are	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  conviction	  the	  Tablighis	  preach.	  The	  magical	  moment	  of	  the	  appearance	  of	   the	  angel	   for	  Faizul	   is	  highly	  significant	   in	  his	  narrative.	  There	  was	  another	  mystical	  story	   that	  was	  circulating	   in	   the	   Joygram	  as	  an	   important	  moment	  of	  truth	  and	  revelation:	  one	  Tablighi	  had,	  during	  a	  small	  congregation,	  started	  to	  float	   above	   the	   ground.	   It	   happened	   in	   a	   village	   not	   far	   from	   Joygram,	   and	  Wahed	   and	   Faizul	   had	   rushed	   to	   the	   location.	   It	   was	   a	   moment	   that	   deeply	  strengthened	  the	  conviction	  of	  the	  young	  men.	  	  Most	  significant	  for	  my	  discussion	  is	  the	  focus	  on	  achieving	  a	  state	  of	  piety	  and	   spirituality	   in	   the	   hearts	   and	   minds	   of	   Muslims	   through	   faith	   and	   ritual	  practice	  (Horstmann	  2007b;	  Metcalf	  2003).	  Parkin	  (2000:	  12-­‐22)	  has	  made	  the	  distinction	   between	   orthodox	   and	   mystic	   prayer:	   the	   former	   presupposes	   a	  radical	   separation	   between	   the	   worshipper	   and	   god	   (implying	   ontological	  dualism);	  the	  latter	  presupposing	  a	  unity	  of	  the	  worshipper	  and	  god	  (implying	  ontological	  monism)	  (see	  also	  Reetz	  2006:	  46).	  The	  TJ,	  Ali	  (2013)	  argues,	  can	  be	  considered	   ontologically	   monist.	   Indeed,	   Masiruddin	   and	   Wahed	   were	   most	  vocal	  on	  the	  need	  for	  a	  faith	  that	  cannot	  be	  put	  in	  words	  –	  the	  faith	  in	  the	  unity	  with	  Allah,	  which	  can	  only	  be	  experienced	  through	  practice.	  	  Even	   though	  worldliness	   is	   subjugated	   to	   the	   sovereignty	  of	  Allah	  and	   the	  afterlife	   features	   prominently	   in	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   TJ,	   it	   encourages	   a	  move	  away	   from	   text-­‐	   and	   rule	  based,	   externally	   enforced	  morality	   to	   an	   embodied	  ethics	   that	   unites	   this	   world	   and	   the	   afterlife	   in	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	   moral	  order	  (see	  also	  Ali	  2003:	  180).	  That	  is,	  the	  Hadith	  is	  followed	  closely	  because	  it	  provides	   exemplary	   guidelines	   on	   how	   to	   cultivate	   virtuous	   character;	   and	  salvation	   only	   follows	   from	   virtuous	   behaviour	   in	   this	   world.	   As	   I	   have	  suggested,	  practices	  are	  not	  either	  this	  worldly	  or	  otherworldly	  directed	  in	  the	  virtue	  ethics	  of	  Joygrami	  Muslims.	  	  The	   emphasis	   is	   on	   orthopraxy	   rather	   than	   orthodoxy	   based	   upon	   texts	  (Janson	  2013:	  11).	  That	  is,	  even	  though	  the	  passionate	  Da’wa	  of	  the	  Tablighis	  is	  central	   (cf.	   Hansen	   2009:	   15-­‐16),	   the	   teachings	   are	   based	   on	   exemplarity	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Sufism	  is	  tolerated	  and	  integrated	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  the	  ‘right’	  kind	  of	  Sufism,	  based	  on	  the	  Shari’a,	   the	  Quran	   and	   the	   Sunnah	  and	  does	  not	   involve	  pir	  and	   shrine	  worship	   (Reetz	  2006:	  35).	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behaviour	   rather	   than	   upon	   texts.	   Tablighis	   try	   to	   embody	   the	   Sunnah	  (Prophet’s	   tradition)	   in	   their	   embrace	   of	   an	   Islam	   that	   is	   highly	   affective	   and	  sensory	  (cf.	  Hirschkind	  2006).	  	  	  The	  combination	  of	  rational,	   logical,	  embodied	  and	  mystic	  elements	  makes	  Islam	  valuable	   as	   a	   ‘total	  way	  of	   life’,	   as	   Joygramis	  would	   always	   tell	  me.	  The	  totalizing	   nature	   of	   Islam	   includes	   a	   defiance	   of	   some	   well-­‐established	  modernist	  binaries:	   the	  sacred	  and	   the	  secular;	   rational	   science	  and	   irrational	  belief;	   this	   world	   and	   the	   afterlife.	   This	   kind	   of	   binary	   thinking	   has	   been	  pervasive	  in	  anthropology	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Islam	  but	  is	  not	  easily	  applicable	   to	   the	   Islamic	   tradition	   (Asad	   2003:	   224).	   Some	   Tablighi	   women	  compared	   life	   in	   this	   world	   with	   my	   study	   at	   university:	   it	   is	   a	   ‘mere’	  preparation	  for	  the	  life	  afterwards	  but	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  essential	  and	  valuable.	  Therefore,	  the	  scriptures	  provide	  guidance	  on	  every	  aspect	  of	  this-­‐worldly	  life.	  The	  orientation	  of	   Islam	   is	  not	  exclusively	  otherworldly	  but	  encompasses	   this	  world.	  Reformist	   Muslims,	   then,	   aspire	   for	   a	   kind	   of	   sublime	   conviction	   that	   is	  highly	   rationalised	   and	   purified,	   but	   that	   is	   equally	   embodied	   and	   mystical.	  From	   the	   accounts	   of	   Hansen	   (2009)	   and	   Comaroff	   (2008),	   cool	   and	   uncool	  passions	   appear	   as	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin	   and	   are	   in	   a	   complex	  dialectic	  with	   each	   other.	   Hansen	   is	   likely	   to	   agree:	   ‘One	   may	   argue	   that	   if	   western	  intellectual	   history	   is	   marked	   by	   an	   emergent	   episteme	   bent	   on	   universalist	  reason,	   the	   same	   history	   is	   also	   marked,	   and	   enriched,	   by	   the	   existence	   of	  another,	   though	   weaker,	   romanticist	   episteme’	   (1996:	   60).	   In	   Hansen’s	  narrative	  of	  conviction,	  however,	  the	  romantic	  episteme,	  central	  to	  the	  ethics	  of	  sincerity,	   becomes	   subjugated	   in	   the	   aspiration	   for	   a	   universalistic,	   rational	  truth.	  It	  appears	  from	  the	  conviction	  and	  practice	  of	  the	  reformists	  Muslims	  in	  Joygram,	  in	  contrast,	  that	  there	  are	  not	  two	  opposing	  epistemes,	  but	  rather	  an	  episteme	  in	  which	  the	  sacred	  and	  the	  romantic,	  and	  the	  rational	  and	  the	  logical	  are	  inseparably	  bound.	  Reason	  is	  sacred,	  and	  the	  sacred	  is	  logical.	  	  
Withdrawal	  from	  exchange	  	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	   the	  young	  men	  and	  women	  in	   Joygram	  are	  drawn	  to	  the	   TJ	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   recover	   their	   autonomy	   and	   dignity	   in	   the	   face	   of	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politico-­‐economic	   marginalization.	   However,	   while	   regaining	   dignity	   and	  autonomy	   from	   the	   unethical	   practices	   in	   their	   environment,	   they	   also	   gain	  autonomy	   from	   the	   bio-­‐moral	   exchanges	   in	   the	   village.	   Therefore,	   the	  purification	  of	  Islam	  from	  un-­‐Islamic	  elements	  has	  far	  stretching	  consequences	  for	   ethical	   practice.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   shall	   suggest	   that	   even	   though	   Joygrami	  virtue	   ethics	   can	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   encapsulate	   an	   ethics	   of	   conviction,	  problems	  and	  resistance	  arise	  when	  convictions	  change	  the	  proscriptive	  ideal	  of	  a	  virtuous	  person.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  when	  convictions	  make	  one	  turn	  away	  from	  everyday	  responsibilities	  to	  one’s	  neighbours	  and	  kin,	  and	  entail	  a	  withdrawal	  from	   the	   virtuous	   exchanges	   that	   reproduce	   the	   cosmopolitical	   ideals.	   I	  consider	  these	  moments	  instances	  of	  ‘extra-­‐ordinary	  ethics’.	  	  The	   practice	   that	   reformist	   Islam	   agitates	   against	   most	   is	   shirk	   (religious	  mediation),	   including	   the	  worship	   of	  pir	   in	   shrines.113	  Masiruddin	   and	  Wahed	  rejected	   their	   father’s	  practice	  of	  mediation	  between	  pir	   and	  worshipper,	   and	  they	  taught	  him	  that	  even	  though	  he	  could	  still	  welcome	  and	  advise	  both	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  at	  the	  shrine,	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  guarantee	  them	  the	  efficacy	  of	  his	  power	   (as	   the	   power	   is	   with	   Allah)	   and	   he	   was	   no	   longer	   allowed	   to	   accept	  money	   for	   his	   services.	   Masiruddin	   explained	   the	   disapproval	   of	   shirk	   as	  follows:	  ‘Islam	  is	  a	  like	  a	  complete	  system,	  like	  when	  rain	  falls	  and	  it	  evaporates	  and	  goes	  back	  to	   the	  sky	   to	  materialize	   in	  rain	  again.	  So	  you	  can	  only	  directly	  worship	  Allah,	  not	  via	  a	  mediator.’	  	  The	   shrine	   is	   moreover	   the	   central	   locus	   of	   a	   ‘traditional’114	  system	   of	  patronage	   involving	   several	   celebrations	   that	   the	   TJ	   opposes.	   The	   most	  significant	   is	   the	   celebration	   of	   Muharram.115	  Deobandi	   Islam	   maintains	   that	  Muslims	   should	   fast	   for	   two	   days	   on	   this	   auspicious	   day,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  traditional	   fighting	   with	   bamboo	   sticks,	   self-­‐flagellation,	   and	   processions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  A	  pir	   is	  a	  Sufi	  saint	  or	  spiritual	  guide,	  or	  the	  descendent	  of	  a	  saint	  believed	  to	  possess	  spiritual	   powers.	   After	   the	   pir’s	   death,	   her/his	   body	   is	   usually	   buried	   in	   a	   tomb	   or	   shrine	  (dar'gā,	   or	  āstānā)	  where	   s/he	   continues	   to	   be	  worshipped.	  Pir	  worship	  was	   until	   recently	   a	  widespread	  popular	  practice	  in	  West	  Bengal	  (Roy	  2014).	  	  	  114	  I	   use	   the	   term	   ‘traditional’	   here	   to	   refer	   to	   practices	   that	   are	   ‘pre-­‐reform’.	   I	   am	  well	  aware	  that	  these	  practices	  are	  themselves	  dynamic	  and	  may	  include	  ‘invented	  traditions’.	  	  115	  Muharram	  is	  technically	  the	  first	  month	  of	  the	  Islamic	  calendar,	  but	  in	  common	  speech	  refers	   to	   the	   10th	   day	   of	   this	   month.	   On	   this	   day,	   the	   Day	   of	   Ashura,	   Shia	   Muslims	   typically	  mourn	   over	   and	   replicate	   the	   sufferings	   of	   Hussain	   ibn	   Ali;	   Sunni	   Muslims	   usually	   fast	   in	  commemoration	  of	  Moses’	  victory	  over	  the	  Eqyptian	  pharaoh.	  The	  Muslims	  in	  my	  fieldsite	  are	  all	  Sunni,	  but	  the	  practice	  of	  Islam	  in	  West	  Bengal	  has	  historically	  included	  Shia	  as	  well	  as	  Sunni	  practices	  (cf.	  Freitag	  1989;	  Jaffrelot	  1998;	  Zahab	  2008).	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involving	   music	   and	   dance.	   In	   their	   capacity	   as	   caretakers	   (musualis)	   of	   the	  WAQF	   property,	   however,	   they	   have	   to	   invest	   a	   part	   of	   the	   profits	   in	   the	  celebration,	   and	   provide	   the	   (blessed)	   food,	   hire	   musicians,	   and	   arrange	  medical	   assistance.116	  The	   Khadims,	  most	   of	   who	   are	   explicitly	   Deobandi	   and	  considering	  themselves	  the	  more	  reformed,	  educated	  and	  civilised,	  oppose	  the	  traditional	  celebration	  but	  grudgingly	  admit	   that	   ‘it	  has	   to	  be	  done	  because	  of	  the	  market’.	  If	  they	  would	  not	  continue	  this	  form	  of	  patronage,	  they	  fear	  that	  the	  ‘public’	  (the	  poor,	   ‘uncivilised’	  and	   ‘unreformed’	  Muslims	  in	  the	  village)	  would	  protest.	   Indeed,	   Joygramis	   from	   other	   hamlets	   who	   participate	   in	   the	  celebrations	  greatly	  enjoy	  it	  and	  steadfastly	  maintain	  that	  they	  would	  not	  let	  the	  Khadims	   stop	   their	   stick	   fights.	   They	   attach	   significance	   to	   the	   stick	   fights	  because	  it	  is	  a	  tradition,	  a	  skill	  passed	  on	  from	  father	  to	  son	  for	  generations.	  It	  is	  fun,	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   dharma	   (eman-­‐i	   majā,	   dharma	   byāpār	   nay).	   Some	   do	  acknowledge	  that	  (in	  particular)	  the	  alcohol	  abuse	  involved	  is	  a	  deviation	  from	  
dharma,	  but	  they	  consider	  this	  aspect	  an	  eccentricity	  that	  does	  not	  hamper	  their	  aspirations	   for	   good	   culture	   (see	   below),	   including	   ethical	   Muslimness	   and	  modern	   subjectivity.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   for	   Wahed	   it	   was	   a	   crucial	   matter	   of	  
dharma.	  He	  was	  particularly	  upset	  about	  the	  sacrilegious	  practices	  and	  refused	  to	  contribute	  his	   share	  –	  which	   in	   turn	   incurred	  him	   the	  grudges	  of	   the	  other	  Khadims.117	  	  Besides	   shirk,	   any	   practices	   deemed	   Hindu	   are	   resolutely	   rejected,	   and	   I	  have	   mentioned	   some	   examples	   in	   previous	   chapters.	   One	   of	   the	   most	  consequential	  acts	   is	   the	  rejection	  of	  dowry,	  as	   the	  exchange	  of	  dowry	   is	   fully	  integrated	  in	  village	  life.	  Customarily,	  the	  girl’s	  family	  would	  pay	  a	  dowry	  to	  the	  groom’s	  family,	  a	  custom	  that	  has	  grown	  out	  of	  proportion	  with	  lakhs	  of	  rupees	  (thousands	  of	  pounds),	  fridges	  and	  bicycles	  now	  being	  demanded	  from	  the	  new	  in-­‐laws.	  Islamic	  law,	  however,	  opposes	  this	  practice,	  so	  the	  reformist	  Deobandis	  argue	   against	   it,	   calling	   it	   a	   ‘bad	   Hindu	   influence’.	   I	   will	   recount	   in	   detail	   a	  conflict	  that	  occurred	  due	  to	  the	  withdrawal	  from	  a	  dowry	  exchange.	  	  
A	  ‘Jamaat’	  wedding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  On	  WAQF:	  see	  footnote	  24	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  	  117	  The	  next	  year	  I	  was	  told	  over	  the	  phone	  that	  the	  traditional	  celebration	  of	  Muharram	  was	  abandoned	  altogether.	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On	   a	   fateful	   day	  during	   the	  month	   of	  Ramadan,	  Rahaman	   Saheb	  had	  been	  sitting	  with	   his	   sons	   on	   the	   road	   side,	  when	   their	   neighbours	   (Kairul	   and	   his	  sisters	  and	  mother)	  had	  come	  up	  to	  them	  and	  started	  shouting	  abusive	  words	  (gālāgāl),	  even	  calling	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  a	  pig’s	  son.	  This	  had	  infuriated	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  sons	  who	  retaliated	  with	  physical	  violence.	  It	  was	  a	  shocking	  event,	  as	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  sons	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  exemplars	  of	  pious	  behaviour.	  The	  conflict	   revolved	   around	   the	   marriage	   of	   Kairul’s	   brother	   Azizul,	   but	   was	  fundamentally	  about	  the	  reformist	  withdrawal	  from	  customary	  exchanges.	  	  	  	  Azizul	  was	  a	  devout	  TJ	  participant,	  and	  in	  this	  capacity	  very	  close	  to	  the	  sons	  of	  Rahaman	  Saheb	  who	  occasionally	  joined	  the	  TJ	  as	  well.	  Azizul	  got	  married	  to	  a	  girl	  he	  had	  fallen	  in	  love	  with,	  against	  the	  will	  of	  his	  mother,	  who	  opposed	  the	  marriage	   because	   the	   girl’s	   family	   was	   very	   poor.	   So	   while	   his	   mother	   was	  hoping	  Azizul	  would	  marry	   a	  wealthier	   girl	   and	   she	  would	  earn	   two	   lakhs	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  a	  son,	  Azizul	  followed	  Islamic	  rule	  and	  married	  the	  girl	  he	  had	  fallen	  in	  love	  with	  without	  any	  money	  being	  exchanged.	  The	  wedding	  had	  been	  small	   and	   sober,	   a	  proper	   Islamic	  wedding,	   Jāmāter	  biye	   as	   they	  would	   say.	   It	  had	   taken	   place	   only	   at	   the	   girl’s	   house	   and	   not	   at	   both	   households,	   as	   is	  traditionally	   the	   case.	   It	   had	   also	   not	   involved	   the	   distribution	   of	   food	   in	   the	  relevant	  pāṛās.	  	  The	  fury	  of	  Azizul’s	  family	  was	  directed	  at	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  family	  because	  Nasiruddin	  (Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  eldest	  son)	  had	  taken	  Azizul	  to	  meet	  the	  girl	  and	  Jamiruddin	  (Rahaman	  Saheb’s	  second	  eldest	  son)	  had	  married	  the	  couple,	  but,	  Jamiruddin	  claims,	  only	  after	  it	  was	  uniformly	  approved	  during	  a	  local	  meeting	  of	  the	  TJ.	  	  Mediated	  by	  Basir	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  a	  party	  representative,	  the	  two	  families	  eventually	  reconciled.	  They	  remained	  mutually	  hostile	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  my	  fieldwork,	   however,	   and	   Kairul’s	   anger	   did	   not	  wane.	  Months	   later,	   I	   prompt	  him	   to	   tell	  me	  why	   he	   and	   his	  mother	   had	   been	   so	   upset	  with	   the	  marriage.	  Firstly,	   he	   says,	   ‘my	  mom	  didn’t	   even	   see	   her	   face!	  And	  how	   can	  he	   choose	   a	  wife	   my	  mom	   hasn’t	   even	   seen	   yet!’	   Then	   he	   points	   to	   the	   shack	   behind	   us.	  ‘Their	  house	  is	  like	  that.	  They	  can’t	  offer	  their	  guests	  anything,	  not	  even	  a	  place	  to	  sit,	  not	  even	  a	  tea.	  They	  can’t	  offer	  any	  respect.’	  Then	  there	  is	  of	  course	  the	  dowry.	  Already,	  he	  explains,	  Azizul	  has	  gotten	  in	  trouble.	  His	  affines	  have	  urged	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the	  couple	   to	   leave	   the	  house,	  because	   they	  do	  not	  have	   the	  means	   to	   sustain	  them.	  Azizul’s	  wife	  is	  pregnant	  but	  Azizul	  has	  hardly	  any	  income	  and	  isn’t	  able	  to	   provide	   his	   wife	   and	   baby	   with	   either	   a	   house	   or	   food.	   ‘If	   he	   would	   have	  gotten	   a	   dowry,	   he	   could	   have	   started	   a	   small	   business,	   invest	   the	   money	  somehow	  and	  have	  a	  regular	  income.	  But	  he	  didn’t	  think	  about	  it,	  that	  when	  you	  need	  50	  rupees	   to	   feed	  one	  person,	  you	  need	  100	   for	   two	  people	  and	  150	   for	  three	  people.	  Think	  of	   the	  price	  of	   tomatoes,	  20/kg,	  or	  potatoes,	  10/kg,	   there	  are	  so	  many	  costs	  involved	  in	  feeding	  a	  family.	  But	  now	  he	  realizes,	  now	  he	  has	  come	  back	  home	  because	  he	  isn’t	  fed	  there,	  and	  he	  walks	  in	  like	  a	  dog	  with	  his	  tail	   in	  between	  his	   legs,	  eats,	  and	  walks	  out	   like	  a	  dog	  again.’	  Kairul	  displays	  a	  sinister	   smile.	   ‘And	   they	   [Rahaman	   Saheb’s	   family]	   will	   also	   understand	   that	  they	  made	  a	  mistake,	  that	  you	  shouldn’t	  create	  trouble	  in	  other	  people’s	  family.	  Now	  that	  Azizul	  is	  in	  big	  trouble,	  they	  will	  all	  realize;	  they	  made	  a	  mistake.’	  
Extra-­‐ordinary	  ethics	  The	   vignette	   above	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   withdrawal	   from	   traditional	  practices	   and	   local,	   ‘Hinduised’	   customs	   can	   create	   considerable	   tension	  between	   villagers	   and	   relatives.	   Below,	   I	   gradually	   address	   potential	  motivations	   for	  withdrawal,	   and	   eventually	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   an	   instance	  of	  ‘extra-­‐ordinary	   ethics’,	   which	   has	   more	   far-­‐stretching	   consequences	   than	  exclusive	  attention	  to	  pragmatic	  motivations	  would	  reveal.	  	  The	  withdrawal	  from	  traditional	  exchange	  practices	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	   change	   towards	   an	   individualistic	   economy	   disembedded	   from	   local	  exchanges.	  In	  particular	  changes	  in	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  rituals	  may	  signify	  a	  new	  kind	  of	   individual	   freedom,	  without	   the	  demands	  and	  costs	  of	   traditional	   exchange	  relationships	   (Horstmann	   2007a;	   Janson	   2013)	   and	   expensive	   patronage	   like	  on	   the	   festival	   of	   Muharram.	   The	   official	   doctrine	   of	   the	   TJ	   condemns	   the	  materialism	   they	   associate	  with	  Western	  modernity	   (Masud	   2000c:	   xxix),	   but	  reformist	   Islam	  does	  not	  per	   se	   condemn	  material	   pursuits,	   and	   individual	  TJ	  participants	   may	   find	   ways	   to	   combine	   piety	   with	   prosperity.	   Individual	  prosperity	   may	   be	   included	   in	   a	   broader	   ethical	   narrative:	   among	   reformist	  Muslims	  elsewhere	  economic	   success	   can	  be	   considered	  a	   virtuous	  act	   that	   is	  part	   of	   the	   production	   of	   the	   ‘proper’	   Muslim	   (F.Osella	   &	   C.Osella	   2009;	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Rudnyckyj	   2009)	   as	   in	   some	   expressions	   of	   revitalised	   and	   charismatic	  Christianity	  (Coleman	  2000;	  Comaroff	  2008).	  	  I	   do	  not	  want	   to	   romanticize	   the	  motivations	   for	   change	  or	   underplay	   the	  pragmatism	  involved.	  It	  may	  be	  true	  that	  for	  some	  of	  the	  wealthier	  participants	  in	   Joygram	   reformist	   Islam	   offers	   a	   ‘social	   framework	   that	   legitimises	   the	  pursuit	  of	   individualised	   lifestyles’	  (Janson	  2013:	  263),	  and	  in	  a	   later	  section	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  this	  may	  be	  partly	  the	  case	  for	  Masiruddin.	  However,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  individualistic	  lifestyle	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  pursuit	  for	  most	  reformist	  Joygramis.	  There	  are	  more	  complex	  ethical	  transitions	  that	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  out,	  whether	  ethical	  reform	  is	  an	  explicit	  motivation	  or	  an	  implicit	  consequence.	  	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  there	  is	  a	  resonance	  with	  the	   ‘householder’s	  dilemma’	  (Das	  2014;	  see	  e.g.	  Burghart	  1983;	  Dumont	  1980;	  Laidlaw	  1995;	  Madan	  1988;	  Parry	  1994).	  The	  householder’s	  dilemma	  is	   the	  dilemma	  of	  how	  to	  balance	  religious	  conviction	   with	   the	   demands	   of	   everyday	   life.	   Householders	   are	   inevitably	  embroiled	   in	   sinful	   worldly	   activities	   for	   their	   survival,	   so	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  attain	  the	  goal	  of	  moral	  perfection.	  A	  renouncer	  dedicates	  his	  or	  her	  life	  to	  the	  sublime	  Truth	  and	  is	  considered	  closer	  to	  salvation.	  Some	  Tablighis	  and	  devout	  Deobandis	  aim	  for	  a	  level	  of	  salvationist	  asceticism,	  and	  the	  seasonal	  and	  annual	  travels	  of	  the	  Tablighis	  offer	  a	  space	  for	  temporary	  renunciation	  (Masud	  2000c:	  xviii).	   However,	   at	   home	   they	   cannot	   entirely	   escape	   ‘the	   social	   world	   of	  interdependence	   and	   relationships	   of	   exchange’	   (Parry	   1994:	   269).	   Kairul	  makes	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  Azizul	  has	  disregarded	  not	  only	  his	  mother’s	  authority,	  but	   also	   the	   normative	   relationships	   of	   exchange.	   In	   his	   account	   of	   the	   story,	  Kairul	   sounds	  very	  pragmatic:	   the	  disregard	  of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  material	  or	  monetary	  goods	  and	  services	  are	  customarily	  exchanged	  risks	  the	  survival	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  household.	  Azizul	  himself,	  and	  the	  Tablighis	  who	  supported	  him,	  may	  come	  closer	   to	  salvation	   in	   their	  renunciation	  of	   ‘the	  social	  world	  of	  interdependence’,	   but	   they	   have	   put	   Azizul’s	   mother	   in	   a	   situation	   where	  survival	   rather	   than	   salvation	   is	   the	  main	  worry.	   In	   this	   light,	  Azizul	   could	  be	  considered	  selfish	  and	  individualistic;	  a	  whimsical	  badmāś.	  	  However,	   the	   seemingly	  disproportionate	  outrage	  of	  Kairul’s	   family	  points	  to	   a	   deeper	   issue	   which	   comes	   closer	   to	   Parry’s	   observation	   that	   ‘salvation	  turns	   its	  back	  on	  society	  and	  disregards	   its	  basic	  axioms’	   (Parry	  1994:	  269).	   I	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have	  argued	  in	  chapter	  3	  that	  Joygrami	  Muslims	  embrace	  an	  ethics	  that	  is	  best	  understood	   as	   a	   virtue	   ethics;	   a	   virtue	   ethics	   that	   is	   visceral	   rather	   than	  interiorized,	  and	  is	  strongly	  related	  to	  the	  ethic	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  exchange.	  The	  goal	  is	   ideally	   not	   an	   abstract	   utopia	   (as	   is	   the	   case	   of	   an	   ethics	   of	   conviction);	  reciprocal	   exchange	   itself	   is	   the	   source	   of	   well-­‐being	   and	   productiveness	   (cf.	  Parry	  1986:	  465)	  and	  as	  such,	  the	  enactment	  of	  virtue	  and	  the	  ‘art	  of	  life’.	  The	  withdrawal	   from	   reciprocal	   exchange	   is	   an	   act	   of	   disregard	   for	   the	  cosmopolitics	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  exchange	  and	  therefore	  threatens	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  social	  generation	  of	  ethical	  persons.	  In	  their	  aspiration	  for	  the	  cultivation	  of	  ethical	  Muslimness,	  the	  reformists	  who	  withdraw	  from	  exchanges	  disregard	  the	  (re)production	  of	  generative	  Muslimness.	  	  Reformism	   is	   by	   implication	   a	   reconfiguration	   of	   what	   is	   considered	  virtuous;	   of	  what	   is	  khuśi	   (happiness/virtue).	   If	  dharma	   is	   the	  potential	   of	   an	  ethics	  of	  order	  and	  justice,	  then	  reformism	  does	  not	  only	  re-­‐establish	  order	  but	  also	   re-­‐configures	   how	   the	   potential	   for	   order	   and	   justice	   can	   be	   realized.	   It	  centralizes	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   person:	   a	   person	   generated	   by	   the	   individual	  pursuit	   of	   ethical	   transformation	   rather	   than	   through	   exchanges	   within	  relatedness.	   Whereas	   the	   ‘monadic	   modern	   person’	   and	   the	   ‘discontinuous	  
personage’	   (Lambek	   2013)	   were	   both	   already	   valid	   constructs	   in	   Joygrami	  cosmopolitics,	   the	   relative	   salience	   is	   shifting	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   continuous	  modern	   person.	   In	   the	   process	   of	   objectification,	   rationalisation	   and	  individualisation,	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	   discontinuous,	   protean	   person	   loses	  significance.	   Even	   though	   salvation	   is	   possibly	   more	   important	   for	   the	  reformists,	  they	  do	  not	  neglect	  this-­‐worldly	  virtue.	  However,	  the	  locus	  of	  virtue	  is	  the	  individual	  rather	  than	  relatedness.	  Conviction,	  for	  some	  of	  the	  Tablighis,	  is	  totalizing,	  and	  for	  them	  ‘being	  ethically	  good	  and	  sincere	  in	  one’s	  care	  for	  the	  ‘neighbour’	  [is]	  in	  this	  view	  of	  no	  real	  consequence	  if	  not	  embedded	  in	  a	  larger	  vision	  of	  transformation’	  (Hansen	  2009:	  16).	  In	  their	  desire	  to	  transform	  their	  society	   to	   a	   properly	   Islamic	   one,	   and	   in	   their	   desire	   for	   salvation,	   Azizul,	  Nasiruddin	   and	   Jamiruddin	   disregarded	   the	   care	   for	   the	   relationships	   within	  the	  village;	  and	  Wahed	  disregarded	  both	  the	  people	  of	  other	  hamlets	  who	  were	  denied	  his	  contribution	  to	  Muharram,	  and	  disregarded	  solidarity	  with	  the	  other	  Khadims.	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The	   Tablighis	   are	   mainly	   opposed	   to	   practices	   that	   would	   have	   been	  influenced	  by	  Hinduism	  –	  but	  they	  would	  usually	  give	  an	  extended	  justification	  as	   to	  why	   this	   ‘Hindu’	  practice	   is	  not	  virtuous,	  whereas	   the	   Islamic	  practice	   is	  virtuous,	  with	  reference	  to	  science,	  or	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  traditional	   practices	   are	   inappropriate	   in	   the	   current	   social	   and	   economic	  conditions.	  The	  reformists	  would	  say	  that	  they	  prefer	  a	  small	  and	  inexpensive,	  one-­‐day	   Islamic	  wedding	   as	   opposed	   to	   several	   days	   of	   reciprocal	  meals	   and	  celebration	  as	  the	  villagers	  can	  simply	  not	  afford	  it;	  and	  they	  oppose	  the	  dowry	  because	  it	  is	  exploitative.	  	  In	   this	   light,	   I	   suggest	   that	   reformism	   in	   Joygram	   does	   not	   (only)	   oppose	  practices	  because	  they	  have	  a	  different	  conception	  of	  virtue,	  but	  (also)	  because	  those	   practices	   are	   actually	   –upon	   reflection	   -­‐	   no	   longer	   considered	   virtuous	  within	   its	   own	   ideological	   frame.	   Ideally,	   reciprocal	   exchanges	   take	   place	  between	   equals	   –	   perhaps	   not	   equals	   in	   wealth	   and	   power	   but	   certainly	   in	  dignity	   and	   fundamental	   human	   value.	   I	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   an	   implicit	  recognition	   among	   the	   reformist	   Muslims	   that	   the	   staggering	   inequality	   in	  wealth	  and	  power	  within	  Joygram	  is	  eroding	  the	  equality	  between	  humans.	  As	  mentioned,	  material	   inequality	   is	   not	   necessarily	   problematic	   per	   se;	   but	   it	   is	  problematic	   if	   it	   erodes	   the	   principle	   of	   equal	   human	   dignity.	   The	   exchanges	  have	   become	   instrumentalised	   and	   disembedded	   from	   the	   long-­‐term	   cycle	   of	  transactions.	  This	   is	  very	  clear	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Muharram.	  As	   the	  power	  of	  Abu	  Bakr	   as	   a	   spiritual	   leader	   is	   slowly	   eroding,	   Haji	   Saheb	   (as	   boss	   of	   the	   cattle	  market)	  and	  the	  other	  shareholders	  are	  increasingly	  taking	  charge	  of	  the	  ritual	  patronage.118	  The	  result	  is	  an	  increasingly	  instrumentalised	  patronage,	  depleted	  from	  spiritual	  meaning,	  and	  deeply	  corrupted	  at	  that.	  Everyone	  in	  Joygram	  was	  aware	  that	  the	  shareholders	  kept	  a	  double	  account,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  profits	  that	  on	  paper	  are	  set	  aside	  in	  ‘charitable	  funds’	  would	  directly	  disappear	  in	  the	  shareholders’	   pockets.119	  What	   the	   reformists	   aim	   to	   instantiate	   once	   again	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Abu	   Bakr	   had	   fought	   a	   court	   case	   of	   fifteen	   years	   with	   Haji	   Saheb	   over	   who	   is	   the	  designated	  caretaker	  (musuali)	  of	  the	  WAQF	  property.	  He	  lost,	  and	  only	  retained	  the	  rights	  over	  the	  shrine,	  the	  mazaar	  and	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  cattle	  market.	  	  	  119	  The	  musualis	  have	   to	  provide	  official	  accounts	   to	   the	  State	  WAQF	  Board.	  They	  do	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  tax	  over	  the	  profits	  set	  aside	  in	  charity	  funds.	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the	  principle	  of	  equality	  as	  central	  to	  dharma.120	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  different	  kind	  of	   equality:	   equality	   between	   autonomous	   individuals	   rather	   than	   equality	   in	  relatedness.	  	  	  The	   irony	   is	   that	  when	  exchange	   is	   not	  between	  equals,	   some	   can	  opt	   out	  whereas	  others	   are	  dependent	   on	   it.	   The	   rich	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  Deobandi	  and	  to	  refuse	   to	  engage	   in	  exchange	  practices.	  Azizul	   is	  not	  at	  all	  wealthy	  and	  cannot	  afford	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  exchange	  relationships.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  suggest,	   Kairul	   is	   deeply	   upset	   about	   the	   fate	   of	   his	   brother:	   he	   is	   not	   just	  
badmāś,	  but	  he	  made	  a	  mistake,	  a	  mistake	  that	  may	  prove	  to	  have	  grave	  effects.	  	  	  In	   light	   of	   this	   analysis,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   violent	   conflict	   over	   Azizul’s	  wedding	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  fear	  for	  conflict	  over	  the	  end	  of	  Muharram)	  is	  a	  moment	  of	  ‘extra-­‐ordinary	  ethics’;	  an	  instant	  in	  which	  ethics	  become	  explicit:	  	  ‘[T]he	   “ordinary”	   implies	   an	   ethics	   that	   is	   relatively	   tacit,	   grounded	   in	  agreement	   rather	   than	   rule,	   in	   practice	   rather	   than	   knowledge	   or	   belief,	  and	  happening	  without	  calling	  undue	  attention	  to	  itself.	  When,	  by	  contrast,	  ethics	  does	  become	  explicit,	  that	  is	  generally	  (1)	  in	  respect	  to	  its	  breaches;	  (2)	  with	  regard	  to	  ethical	  problems	  or	  issues	  in	  which	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  unknown	  or	  hotly	  contested;	  (3)	   in	  prophetic	  movements	  and	  social	  or	  ethical	   renewal;	   and	   (4)	   among	   priestly	   classes	   attempting	   to	   rationalize	  and	  educate’	  (Lambek	  2010a:	  2).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  hotly	  contested,	  because	  of	  a	  movement	  of	  ethical	  renewal,	  which	  is	  attempting	  to	  rationalize	  the	  uneducated	  Muslims.	  In	  a	  time	  of	  conversion,	  ethical	   transformation,	  or	  ethical	  breach	  –	   those	  moments	  when	   ethics	   become	   explicit	   -­‐	   the	   contradictions	   and	   compromises	   that	   one	  lives	  (and	  always	  have	  and	  always	  will	  live)	  with	  come	  to	  the	  surface	  (Engelke	  2004;	  Janson	  2015;	  Robbins	  2004a).	  That	  is,	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  that	  reformism	  is	  an	   invasion	   in	  a	  coherent	  cultural	  system	  (see	  F.Osella	  &	  C.Osella	  2008a)	  or	  a	  complete	   ‘break	  with	   the	   past’	   (see	  Meyer	   1998).	   I	   have	   already	   emphasised	  that	   Joygrami	  Muslims	   live	  with	  contradictory	   ideologies	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120 	  Ironically,	   the	   reformists	   opposing	   the	   corrupted	   patronage	   and	   the	   corrupted	  shareholders	  are	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  same	  people:	  all	  Khadims	  blaming	  their	  neighbour	  and	  kin.	  I	  do	  not	   think	  that	   they	  are	  necessarily	  disingenuous	  or	  hypocritical	  (although	  I	  do	  not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  are)	  but	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  they	  cannot	  help	  themselves:	  money	  makes	  one	  blind.	  Many	  Khadims	  do	  acknowledge	  this	  blind	  pursuit	  of	  wealth	  and	  power	  and	  therefore	  say	  they	  need	  to	  reform	  themselves	  before	  anything	  else.	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the	   gradual	   transformations	   that	   reformism	   brings	   about	   make	   those	  contradictions	   more	   prominent.	   At	   this	   moment	   of	   extra-­‐ordinary	   ethics	   the	  reformists	  continue	   to	  act	  within	  a	  virtue	  ethics	  of	  order	  and	   justice	  but	   their	  virtue	   ethics	   does	   not	   attach	   the	   same	   significance	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   bio-­‐moral	  exchange.	  	  
Aesthetics	  and	  performance	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  obvious	  and	  visible	  changes	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  stories	  of	  the	  three	  men,	  and	  which	  could	  be	  observed	  in	  Joygram	  more	  generally,	   is	  the	  changing	   aesthetics	   involved	   with	   the	   ‘conversion’	   to	   reformist	   Islam.	   It	   was	  quite	  a	  sight	  to	  see	  a	  troupe	  of	  TJ	  practitioners	  walk	  through	  the	  village.	  They	  would	  walk	  with	  brisk	  steps,	  usually	  dressed	  meticulously	  in	  long	  white	  pāñjābi	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  ṭupis	  (skullcaps),	  with	  their	  upper	  lips	  shaved	  and	  their	  beards	  waving,	   as	   is	   the	  prescribed	  aesthetic	  of	   the	  Deoband.	  They	  would	  have	  stern	  looks	  on	  their	  faces,	  gaze	  averted	  (when	  meeting	  them	  in	  groups,	  even	  of	  those	  with	  whom	  I	  was	  close	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  their	  houses,	  I	  could	  not	  expect	  more	  than	   a	   stern	   Salaam	   Aleikum,	   if	   I	   was	   lucky).	   Their	   appearance	   was	   one	   of	  cleanliness	   and	   aesthetic	   awareness.	   This	   is	   in	   stark	   contrast	   with	   the	   usual	  dress	  of	  agricultural	  labourers:	  a	  luṅgi121	  or	  gām’chā	  and	  a	  vest.	  	  I	   found	   Faizul	   several	   times	   in	   his	   room	   working	   on	   his	   appearance.	   He	  would	  iron	  his	  kurtā	  with	  utmost	  care	  and	  he	  would	  not	  let	  a	  single	  hair	  make	  its	  way	   on	   his	   upper	   lip.	   He	   had	   brought	   a	  waistcoat	   and	   a	   green	   scarf	   from	  Delhi,	  and	  he	  had	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  wrapping	  the	  scarf	  around	  his	  head	  that	  would	   make	   him	   look	   particularly	   charismatic.122	  When	   I	   announced	   that	   I	  would	   visit	   the	   ‘world	  market’	   of	   the	  TJ	   as	   Joygramis	   call	   the	   headquarters	   in	  Delhi,	  he	  was	  quick	  to	  ask	  me	  to	  bring	  him	  a	  ṭupi;	  the	  one	  he	  brought	  last	  time	  had	  discoloured.	  	  Small	  adjustments	  to	  dress	  may	  make	  someone	  look	  ‘closer	  to	  Islam’	  as	  one	  tries	   to	   emulate	   the	   aesthetics	   of	   the	  Prophet	  Muhammad.	  To	  wear	   a	   specific	  ‘scent’,	   for	   instance,	   is	   ssunnā,	   and	   though	   I	   had	  already	  noticed	   that	  madrasa	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  A	   luṅgi	   is	  a	  waistcloth,	  usually	  stitched	  to	  form	  a	  large	  tube	  of	  cloth.	  Joygrami	  Muslim	  men	  usually	  wear	  a	  blue	  checked	  luṅgi,	  with	  a	  white	  vest.	  	  122	  The	   turban	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   a	   practice	   at	   the	   Deoband	   madrasa	   in	   the	   early	   20th	  century,	  where	  the	  best	  students	  would	  be	  honoured	  by	  having	  a	  turban	  wrapped	  around	  their	  head	  (Metcalf	  1989).	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Islamic	   scholars	   like	  Rahaman	  Saheb’s	   family	  would	   always	   carry	   a	  miniscule	  bottle	   of	   scent	   with	   them,	   it	   became	   increasingly	   popular	   among	   the	   TJ	  participants,	   too.123	  Wahed’s	  sudden	  and	  abundant	  use	  of	  scent	  was	  the	  object	  of	  great	  mockery	  of	  his	  father.	  The	  application	  of	  black	  khol	  (kājal)	  on	  the	  lower	  eyelid	   is	   another	   sunnā.	   The	   Prophet	   had	   prescribed	   to	   apply	   khol	   because	   it	  would	  make	  the	  eye-­‐white	  brighter	  and	  the	  eyesight	  as	  strong	  and	  clear	  as	  an	  eagle’s.	  The	  young	  men	  seemed	  to	  be	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  black	  line	  under	  their	  eyes	   in	   combination	  with	   the	   long	  white	  dresses	  made	   their	   appearance	  even	  more	  charismatic.	  To	  follow	  the	  Sunnah	  closely	  sometimes	  means	  to	  compromise	  on	  previous	  aesthetic	   preferences.	  Soon	   after	   coming	   back	   from	   a	   short	   tour	   with	   the	   TJ,	  Wahed	  had	  suddenly	  cut	  his	  hair,	  which	  had	  curled	  well	  down	  the	  back	  of	  his	  head	   and	   had	   been	   an	   exact	   resemblance	   of	   his	   father’s	   hairstyle.	   He	   said	   it	  hadn’t	   been	   right	   to	   wear	   his	   hair	   long,	   and	   since	   he	   learned	   from	   the	   TJ	   to	  follow	  the	  Prophet’s	  exemplary	  behaviour	  closely	  he	  had	  cut	  his	  hair	  short.	  For	  similar	  reasons,	  he	  had	  changed	  his	  stiffened,	  gold	  lace	  embroidered	  ṭupi	   for	  a	  simpler	  one.	  I	   later	   learned	  from	  Samsuddin	  that	  the	  haircut	  was	  a	  crucial	  and	  very	  precise	  matter.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  the	  same	  length	  on	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  head;	  for	  a	  young	  Muslim	  it	  should	  preferably	  be	  between	  one	  and	  two	  centimetres.	  Only	  an	   older,	   learned	   scholar	   has	   the	   right	   to	   wear	   his	   hair	   long.	   The	   same	  with	  
ṭupis;	  the	  stiffened,	  high	  ṭupis	  with	  elaborated	  embroidery	  should	  be	  avoided	  by	  young	  Muslims	  and	  hafiz.124	  If	  a	  younger	  or	   less	  educated	  Muslim	  would	  wear	  his	  hair	   long	  or	  wear	  a	  high,	  embroidered	   ṭupi,	  not	  only	  had	  he	   failed	   to	  obey	  the	  Sunnah	  closely,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  vanity	  and	  pretention.	  	  Following	   from	   the	   above,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   aesthetics	   of	   the	   TJ	   is	   a	  multivocal	  symbol	  that	  can	  not	  only	  be	  interpreted	  but	  also	  employed	  in	  various	  ways,	  depending	  on	  the	  actor	  and	  the	  audience.	  Firstly,	  the	  ironed	  white	  dress	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  The	   small	   bottles	  would	  often	  have	  Arabic	   text	   on	   them	  and	  are	   considered	  better	   if	  they	   are	   imported	   from	   an	   Islamic	   country,	   preferably	   Saudi	   Arabia.	   Arifuddin	   asked	   me	  whenever	  I	  went	  to	  Delhi	  to	  bring	  him	  scent;	  though	  the	  same	  scents	  were	  available	  locally,	  he	  considered	   the	   brands	   available	   in	   Delhi	   more	   properly	   Islamic.	   It	   is	   fairly	   uncommon	   for	  ordinary	   villagers	   to	   wear	   any	   scent,	   except	   for	   the	   body	   spray	   (deodorant)	   that	   is	   slowly	  becoming	  popular	  among	  the	  more	  ‘modern’/urban-­‐influenced	  youth.	  Body	  spray	  and	  scent	  are	  considered	  two	  entirely	  different	  things.	  124	  Hafiz	   is	   the	   lowest	   degree	   of	   Islamic	   scholarship.	   A	  hafiz	   is	   someone	  who	   knows	   the	  Quran	  by	  heart.	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can	   be	   a	   symbol	   of	   status	   as	   it	   distinguishes	   one	   from	   the	   tillers	   of	   the	   soil.	  Secondly,	   the	   body	   and	   those	   aesthetics	   of	   dress	   can	   be	   employed	   as	   a	  technique	   for	   cultivating	   the	   inner	   self	   and	   reveal	   its	   inner	   potentiality	  (Mahmood	  2005:	  166)	  since	  dress	  has	  performative	  force	  (Tarlo	  1996;	  Tarlo	  &	  Moors	  2013)	  and	   is	   constitutive	  of	   the	  self	   (Miller	  2010).	  By	  dressing	   like	   the	  Prophet	  Muhammad,	   one	   commits	   oneself	   to	   the	   self-­‐discipline	   involved	  with	  behaving	  like	  the	  Prophet.	  Initially,	  Wahed	  would	  display	  a	  hesitant	  smile	  while	  making	  use	  of	  specifically	  Islamic	  (and	  non-­‐Bengali	  but	  Urdu	  or	  Arabic)	  terms	  and	  gestures.	  Over	   the	   course	  of	  my	   fieldwork,	   he	   gained	   confidence	   and	   lost	  the	   initial	   insecure	  hesitation;	   he	   seemed	   to	   have	   internalised	   the	   values	   that	  were	  initially	  exterior	  performances.	  	  	  Mahmood’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   exterior	   performance	   as	   a	   means	   to	  transform	   the	   interior	   self	   applies	   to	   some	   Tablighis,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   the	   entire	  explanation.	   So	   thirdly,	   I	   suggest	   the	   public	   performance	   of	   piety	   and	  authenticity	  itself	  can	  be	  the	  end	  of	  aesthetics.	  I	  found	  resonance	  with	  Grosso’s	  observation	   that	   ‘in	  Tunis,	  performance	   [of	  ethical	  personhood]	  appears	   to	  be	  oriented	   towards	  cultivating	   social	   relationships	  and	   towards	  maintaining	   the	  impression	   of	   morality	   in	   an	   atmosphere	   marked	   by	   the	   fear	   of	   moral	  breakdown’	  (2013:	  249);	  an	  analysis	  particularly	  appropriate	  for	  Masiruddin.	  	  Although	  many	  aspects	  of	  Masiruddin’s	  lifestyle	  changed,	  he	  continued	  to	  do	  the	  same	  work	  and	  for	  this	  work,	  being	  a	  Tablighi	  is	  almost	  like	  a	  useful	  asset	  to	  him.	   This	   is	   especially	   so	   in	   the	   contractor	   business,	   which	   is	   commonly	  assumed	  to	  be	  corrupt;	  contractors	  are	  immoral,	  greedy	  people	  only	  out	  to	  fill	  their	  own	  pockets.	  Being	  a	  business	  man	  and	   contractor,	   and	  walking	  around	  with	   sunglasses	   and	   transparent	   shirts	  would	  make	   it	   very	   easy	   for	   others	   to	  consider	  him	  to	  be	  badmāś.	  It	  is	  much	  better	  for	  his	  social	  status,	  and	  as	  such	  for	  his	   economic	   opportunities,	   to	   look	   like	   a	   dedicated	   Muslim.	   His	   aesthetics	  almost	  seemed	  to	  give	  him	  an	  a	  priori	  protection	  from	  critique.	  Hardly	  anyone	  dared	   to	  openly	   talk	   to	  me	  about	  business,	  or	  would	  do	  so	  with	  an	  apologetic	  expression	   on	   their	   face.	   Masiruddin,	   instead,	   jocularly	   expounded	   the	   shady	  aspects	  of	  obtaining	  a	   tender,	   adding	   self-­‐evidently,	   ‘well,	   that’s	  how	  business	  goes’	  (eṭā	  to	  byab'sā).	  He	  was	  himself	  equally	  critical	  of	  the	  corrupt	  political	  and	  economic	  environment,	  but	  he	  admits	  that	  involvement	  is	  inescapable.	  So,	  while	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going	  about	  business	   as	  usual,	   the	  participation	   in	   the	  TJ	   gave	  him	  a	   sense	  of	  dignity	   and	   respect,	   while	   performing	   respectability	   to	   the	   public	   eye.	  Masiruddin	   seemed	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   performativity	   of	   his	   ‘ethical	  Muslimness’:	   he	   would	   sometimes	   greet	   me	   with	   a	   flat	   hand	   by	   his	   face	   (a	  ‘proper’	   Islamic	   greeting	   but	   very	   unusual	   gesture	   amongst	  Muslims	   in	  West	  Bengal),	   but	   could	   never	   avoid	   a	   self-­‐mocking	   smile.	   That	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	  sincerity	  of	  his	  commitment;	  he	  did	  actively	  try	  to	  cultivate	  a	  virtuous	  character.	  However,	  his	  aesthetics	  served	  more	  purposes	  than	  the	  cultivation	  of	  the	  inner	  self.	  	  For	  Joygrami	  Tablighis	  and	  devout	  Deobandis,	  the	  ‘public’	  is	  the	  Muslims	  in	  the	   village,	   amidst	   whom	   one	   acts	   as	   an	   exemplary	   figure,	   as	   well	   as	   other	  Muslims	   and	   non-­‐Muslims	   in	   the	   wider	   public	   sphere.	   It	   is	   the	   performative	  establishment	  of	  criteria:	   the	  dress	   tells	   that	   ‘I	  am	  a	  Muslim,	  you	  can	  evaluate	  me	  accordingly’	   (see	  Lambek	  2010b).	  The	  public	  performance	   in	   turn	   impacts	  the	   self-­‐cultivation:	   one	   has	   to	   now	   act	   according	   to	   the	   criteria	   the	  performance	  establishes.	  The	  performance,	  however,	  is	  not	  always	  convincing.	  
The	  sincerity	  of	  the	  householder	  	  Grosso	  observes	  a	  situation	  in	  Tunis	  where	  ‘ethical	  personhood	  has	  become	  dislocated;	   the	   exterior	   is	   no	   longer	   perceived	   to	   be	   a	   ‘true’	   reflection	   of	   the	  inward	   disposition,	   of	   whether	   someone	   is	   believed	   to	   be	   a	   ‘good’	   or	   ‘bad’	  person’	  (2013:	  249).	   In	  similar	  ways,	  the	  sincerity	  of	  the	  Tablighis	  and	  devout	  Deobandis	   in	   Joygram	   is	   questioned.	   Tropes	   of	   irony	   and	   mockery	   are	   very	  common	  in	  Joygram,	  and	  the	  Tablighis	  were	  not	  spared.	  The	  Tablighi’s	  attitude	  was	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  condescending	  and	  pretentious,	  with	   too	  much	  importance	  attributed	  to	  aesthetic	  performance	  rather	  than	  to	  an	  actual	  Islamic	  lifestyle.	   It	   was	   somewhat	   common	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   supposedly	   pious	   ones	   as	  
nāmājīs,	   roughly	   translatable	   as,	   ‘those	   who	   pray	   a	   lot’,	   or	   as	   dāṛioyālā	   or	  
ṭupioyālā	   (‘he	   who	   wears	   a	   beard’,	   ‘he	   who	   wears	   a	   ṭupi’,	   with	   sarcastic	  undertone).	   Basir’s	   younger	   brother	   Rafiq,	   who	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   committed	  Muslim	  but	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  find	  it	  at	  all	  problematic	  that	  he	  occasionally	  drank	  alcohol,	  met	  girls	  and	  was	  involved	  in	  various	  dubious	  businesses,	  one	  day	  said	  to	   me:	   ‘those…nāmājīs…many	   just	   show	   off…they	   don’t	   do	   it	   sincerely.	   Does	  
267	  	  
anyone	  really	  pray?	  Nobody	  does’.	  With	  undisguised	  sarcasm	  he	  commented	  on	  the	   transformation	   of	   the	   boss	   of	   the	   cattle	   market	   after	   his	   Haj	   to	   Mecca:	  everyone	   knew	   he	  was	   a	   corrupted	   exploiter,	   ‘but	   now	   he	   has	   become	   good.	  
Ṭupi,	   beard…	   (Ekhan	   kintu	   bhālo	   haye	   giyeche.	   Ṭupi,	   dāṛi…).’	   I	   exclaimed	   in	  feigned	   surprise:	   ‘So	   those	  who	   go	   on	  Haj	   and	  wear	   ṭupis	  and	   beards	   are	   the	  ones	  who	   are	  most	  badmāś!’	  He	   laughed	  nodding	   his	   head,	   ‘yes,	   now	  you	   got	  it…’.	  	  Dada	   was	   also	   critical	   about	   the	   TJ	   participants	   being	   ‘very	   nāmājī’	  who	  would	  only	  be	  pious	   ‘to	  show	  off’	  (dekhānor	  janya)	  yet	  would	   fail	   to	  apply	   the	  lessons	  of	  Islam	  in	  everyday	  life.	  The	  small	  house	  of	  Dada’s	  family	  is	  right	  next	  to	  Wahed’s	  house,	  and	  one	  day	  one	  of	  Wahed’s	  regular	  labourers	  came	  to	  Dada	  crying.	  He	  had	  been	  working	  all	  day	  for	  Wahed,	  but	  he	  had	  not	  been	  given	  any	  food,	  not	  even	  a	  cup	  of	  tea,	  he	  complained.	  I	  overheard	  Dada	  grumbling,	   ‘he	  is	  working	  with	   the	   [Tablighi]	   Jamaat,	   but	   in	   his	   own	  house	   he	   doesn’t	   care	   for	  people’.	  It	  may	  well	  have	  been	  that	  Wahed	  only	  punished	  the	  labourer	  today	  as	  he	   was	   obviously	   very	   drunk.	   Nevertheless,	   Dada	   immediately	   took	   the	  opportunity	  to	  see	  an	  incongruity	  between	  the	  public	  performance	  of	  piety	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  actual	  virtuous	  behaviour.	  	  	  Interestingly,	   Wahed	   was	   more	   often	   the	   object	   of	   scepticism	   than	  Masiruddin.	   According	   to	   many	   Joygramis,	   Wahed	   is	   somewhat	   good	  considering	   his	   Islamic	   lifestyle	   and	   appearance	   (‘ṭupi	   dāṛi	   pare’,	   wearing	   a	  skullcap	  and	  beard)	  but	  his	  sincerity	  in	  relations	  to	  other	  villagers	  was	  doubted.	  Masiruddin	  is	  ‘good	  in	  every	  aspect’	  (sab	  dike	  bhālo).	  	  Masiruddin	   and	   Wahed	   are	   somewhat	   comparable	   to	   the	   two	   brothers	  (Rafiq	   and	   Yaqub)	   featuring	   in	   a	   vignette	   of	   Hansen	   (2009:	   21-­‐22)	  meant	   to	  illustrate	  the	  tension	  between	  an	  ethics	  of	  sincerity	  and	  an	  ethics	  of	  conviction.	  The	   vignette	   demonstrates	   the	   quandary	   and	   sense	   of	   failure	   that	   can	   result	  from	   the	   compromises	   that	   the	   desiring	   self	   and	   everyday	   life-­‐demand	  of	   the	  politics	  of	  conviction.	  ‘The	  element	  of	  tragedy,	  betrayal	  and	  inevitable	  failure	  in	  these	   stories	   points	   to	   perhaps	   the	   central	   paradox	   of	   political	   love	   –	   that	   it	  never	   can	   be	   consummated	   and	   even	   less	   realized.	   Its	   realization…is	   always	  thwarted	  by	  betrayals	  of	   the	   cause,	   selfishness,	   greed	  and	  hypocrisy’	   (Hansen	  2009:	  27).	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Rafiq,	   Hansen	   tells,	   is	   a	   big	   man	   committed	   to	   Muslim	   solidarity	   in	   a	  practical	  way,	  managing	  a	   large	  network	  of	   kin,	   business	  partners	   and	  ethno-­‐religious	  institutions;	  Yaqub	  is	  a	  devout	  Tablighi,	  a	  man	  of	  conviction	  who	  has	  surrendered	  his	  entire	  life	  to	  the	  ‘unattainable	  goal’	  of	  ‘perfect	  ethical	  conduct’.	  Hansen	  draws	  out	  the	  inner	  conflict	  of	  Rafiq,	  who	  ‘preferred	  to	  commit	  himself	  to	   an	   ethics	   of	   sincerity	   and	   to	   provide	   neighbourly	   service	   to	   his	   own	  community’	  yet	  doubted	  whether	  his	  conviction	  was	  strong	  enough	   in	   light	  of	  Yaqub’s	  ostensible	  moral	  high	  ground.	  	  Masiruddin’s	  decision	  to	  become	  a	  Tablighi	  may	  well	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  his	  brother’s	  earlier	  conversion	  and	  pious	  lifestyle;	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  many	  Joygramis	   are	   caught	   in	   a	   similar	   ‘inner	   conflict’	   (Parry	   1994:	   270)	   between	  renunciation	  and	  the	  life	  of	  the	  householder	  –	  when	  their	  sense	  of	  moral	  failure	  impels	   them	  to	  cultivate	  piety	  yet	   they	  are	  not	  sure	  how	  to	  combine	  this	  with	  everyday	   demands.	   I	   have	   discussed	   the	   householder’s	   dilemma	   regarding	  withdrawal	  from	  exchanges	  in	  the	  previous	  section;	  here	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  out	  the	  implications	  of	   Joygramis’	   scepticism	  of	   renunciation	   for	  our	   interpretation	  of	  the	  householder’s	  predicament.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  scepticism	  of	  the	  Joygramis	  points	  to	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  ethics	  in	  everyday	  life.	  This	  is	  what	  Das	  (2014)	  has	  called	  ‘the	  difficulty	  of	   reality’.	   The	   Tablighis,	   not	   unlike	   the	   Jains	   described	   by	   Laidlaw	   (1995),	  would	  be	  the	  first	  to	  admit	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  emulating	  the	  Prophet’s	  exemplary	  behaviour	  is	  impossible,	  and	  they	  would	  humbly	  admit	  that	  they	  themselves	  are	  only	   ‘more	   or	   less	   good	   Muslims’	   (moṭāmōti	   bhālo	  Muslim).	   However,	   in	   the	  praise	  for	  Masiruddin	  and	  scorn	  of	  Wahed,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  moral	  predicament	  of	  the	  householder	  is	  more	  difficult	  than	  the	  renouncer’s	  and	   hence	   more	   praiseworthy:	   ‘that	   it	   is	   not	   because	   the	   renouncer’s	  otherworldly	   aspirations	   are	   impossible	   for	   the	   householder	   to	   follow	   (they	  are),	  but	  that	  it	  is	  inhabiting	  the	  world,	  sustaining	  it,	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  ethically	  much	  more	  difficult	  task’	  (Das	  2014:	  488-­‐9).	  The	  complaints	  of	  the	  Joygramis	  go	  beyond	   the	   kind	   of	   complaints	   recounted	   by	   Hansen	   (2009:	   22);	   that	   it	   is	  expensive	   to	   take	   care	   of	   such	   a	   pious	   brother.	   It	   is	   putting	   in	   question	   the	  sincerity	  and	  value	  of	  piety	  itself.	  The	  ethics	  of	  conviction	  is	  appreciated	  as	  long	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as	   it	   is	   compromised	   by	   the	   consideration	   of	   the	   immediate	   consequences	   of	  one’s	  acts	  (cf.	  Fassin	  2014:	  433).	  	  There	  is	  an	  affinity	  here	  with	  what	  Grosso	  calls	  ‘dislocated	  personhood	  –	  the	  perception	   that	   performance	   and	   exteriority	   may	   be	   a	   mask	   concealing	   an	  individual’s	   true	  self’	   (2013:	  59).	  Aspiration	   for	  a	  modern	  ethical	  self	   involves	  new	   markers	   for	   virtuous	   personhood,	   which	   results	   in	   ambiguity	   and	  scepticism	   in	   the	   environment.	  This	   is	   particularly	   salient	   in	   the	  margins	   of	   a	  corrupted	   society	   where	   everyone	   seems	   to	   be	   at	   risk	   to	   become	   badmāś.	  Gilsenan	   talks	   about	   a	   situation	   where	   young	   men	   at	   the	   periphery	   fall	  vulnerable	   to	   scepticism,	   because	   they	   have	   internalized	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  their	  marginalized	  position.	  ‘There	  was	  a	  pessimism	  not	  least	  about	  the	  performative	  powers	  of	  language.	  It	  was	  as	  if	  words	  no	  longer	  were	  or	  did	  and	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  and	  do	  what	   they	  were	   supposed	   to	  have	  done	  (Gilsenan	   1988:	   220).	   As	   in	   Joygram,	   ‘[a]mbiguity	   had	   become	   central,	   irony	  sometimes	   appeared	   omnipresent’	   (ibid.).	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   attitude	   of	  Joygramis	   towards	   Masiruddin	   was	   less	   ambiguous	   and	   sceptical,	   and	   more	  respectful,	   because	   he	   was,	   in	   Das’	   words,	   still	   inhabiting	   and	   sustaining	   the	  world.	   He	  was	   not	   pretending	   that	   his	   piety	  was	   uncompromising;	   rather,	   he	  made	   balanced	   judgements	   between	   otherworldly	   devotion	   and	   this-­‐worldly	  demands.	  	  I	  wonder,	   however,	   to	  what	   extent	  Masiruddin’s	   performance	   is	   beneficial	  for	   him	   outside	   Joygram	   and	   the	   cattle	   market	   business	   where	   Muslims	   are	  relatively	  powerful.	   In	  his	   attempt	   to	  buy	   a	  house	   in	  Kolkata,	   he	   encountered	  the	  harsh	  reality	  of	  exclusion:	  he	  could	  only	  buy	  in	  Muslim	  ‘ghettos’.	  His	  Islamic	  performance	  hampered	  rather	  than	  helped	  him	  in	  gaining	  access	  to	   legitimate	  space.	  Through	  dress,	  ‘people	  are	  involved	  in	  making	  classifications	  as	  well	  as	  in	  simply	   following	   them’	   (Tarlo	   1996:	   7);	   this	   involves	   the	   dual	   process	   of	  identification	   and	   differentiation	   (ibid:	   15).	   The	   Tablighis	   want	   to	   show,	  particularly	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  suspicion,	  that	  Muslims	  are	  peaceful,	  generous	  and	   modest	   through	   their	   aesthetic	   performance	   and	   virtuous	   conduct.	  However,	   their	   Islamic	   dress	   further	   classifies	   them	   as	   Other,	   and	   as	   a	  dangerous	  Other,	  not	   indigenous	   to	   Indian	   soil.	   I	  will	   elaborate	  on	   this	   aspect	  below.	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Improving	  culture	  	  Although	  ‘doing	  Jamaat’,	  as	  Joygramis	  put	  it,	  is	  sometimes	  a	  straightforward	  form	  of	  ethical	  self-­‐fashioning,	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  motivaitons	  are	  more	  complex.	  It	  can	  be	  a	  form	  of	  ethical	  self-­‐fashioning	  to	  counter	  one’s	  partaking	  in	  a	  vicious	  economy.	  But	  it	  may	  also	  be	  a	  strategy	  of	  coping	  and	  an	  escape	  from	  economic	  exclusion	   and	   exasperation,	   symbolically	   as	   well	   as	   literally;	   or	   a	   symbol	   of	  cultural	  capital	  and	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  social	  and	  economic	  capital.	  What	  unite	  the	  motivations	   of	   the	   Tablighis	   are	   aspirations	   for	   a	   modern,	   more	   dignified	  personhood.	  There	   is	  one	  more	  aspect	  that	   I	  have	  so	  far	  not	  paid	  attention	  to,	  and	  that	  transpires	  foremost	  from	  Masiruddin’s	  narrative:	  the	  desire	  to	   ‘uplift’	  the	  community.	  Being	  a	  ‘bad	  Muslim’	  is	  tightly	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  Muslims	   lack	   adequate	   ‘culture’	   (used	   in	   English).	   Improving	   culture	   by	  becoming	  a	  better	  Muslim	  should,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  reformists,	  make	  Muslims	  more	  attractive	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  	  Muslims	   are	   acutely	   aware	   that	   they	   have	   to	   cultivate	   themselves	   as	   a	  particular	   kind	   of	   modern	   Muslim	   citizen	   in	   order	   to	   make	   demands	   on	   the	  state.	  The	  Association	  SNAP	  observed	  in	  a	  summary	  of	  their	  survey	  findings:	  	  ‘the	   issues	   raised	   by	   the	   Muslims	   did	   not	   in	   any	   way	   take	   the	   form	   of	  demands	   for	  benefits	  or	   favours	  on	  religious	  ground;	  rather	   the	  demands	  were	  unambiguously	  connected	  with	  democratic	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  –	  equitable	   opportunity	   for	   self-­‐development	   and	   representation	   at	   all	  spheres	  of	  social	  life’	  (Association	  SNAP	  and	  Guidance	  Guild	  2014:	  8).	  The	  pervasive	   idea	   is	   that	  one	  has	   to	  make	  oneself	  an	  asset	   to	   the	  nation	  and	  live	  lawfully	  before	  one	  can	  gain	  recognition	  and	  make	  demands	  upon	  the	  state.	  Deobandi	   trained	   imams	  or	  TJ	  members	  would	  not	  only	  encourage	  a	  stronger	  obedience	   to	   Islamic	  normativity,	  but	  also	   to	   Indian	   law.	  The	   law	   is	   indirectly	  encompassed	  in	  the	  Islamic	  normativity	  as	  it	  is	  a	  sin	  to	  not	  obey	  Indian	  law,	  and	  disobedience	  of	  the	  law	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  afterlife.125	  	  Moreover,	   relegated	   to	   the	   margins	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state,	   they	   have	   to	  constantly	  assert	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  (secular)	  nation-­‐state:	  the	  discourse	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  A	  mufti	  (Islamic	  legal	  scholar)	  of	  the	  Deoband	  madrasa	  I	  spoke	  to	  at	  the	  TJ	  headquarter	  in	  Delhi	  confirmed	  that	   ‘it	  is	  a	  sin	  not	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  of	  the	  country	  where	  a	  Muslim	  lives’.	  Even	  travelling	  on	  a	  bus	  without	  a	  ticket	  is	  a	  great	  sin	  (Urdu	  guna)	  and	  would	  cost	   ‘forty	  days	  good	  work’	  in	  the	  accounting	  system	  for	  the	  afterlife.	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the	   Jamiat	   Ulema-­‐e-­‐Hind	   persistently	   emphasises	   the	   Muslims’	   loyalty	   to	   the	  ‘idea	  of	  India’.	  There	  are	  seven	  requirements	  to	  becoming	  a	  member	  of	  the	  JUH,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  The	  JUH	  draws	  its	  legitimacy	  from	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  Independence	  and	  the	  organisation	  is	  very	   careful	   not	   to	   tread	   on	   Hindu	   sentiments	   or	  make	   conspicuous	   political	  statements.	  Williams	  found	  that	  in	  Varanasi,	  Muslims	  actively	  engaged	  with	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  secularism	  because	  it	  offers	  spaces	  of	  recognition	  and	  participation	  in	   the	   face	   of	   majoritarian	   discriminatory	   practices	   (Williams	   2012:	   991).	   In	  Joygram,	  as	  in	  Varanasi	  ‘…being	  a	  ‘good	  Muslim’	  and	  a	  ‘good	  Indian	  citizen’	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  and	  it	  is	  ‘by	  emphasising	  the	  latter	  that	  [Muslims	  seek]	  to	  realise	  justice	  and	  the	  public	  recognition	  of	  the	  former’	  (Williams	  2012:	  989).	  	  In	   seeking	   to	   become	   a	   good	   Indian	   citizen,	   Joygrami	   Muslims	   seek	   to	  improve	  ‘culture’,	  which	  is	  an	  idiom	  used	  to	  denote	  both	  democratic	  civility	  and	  Islamic	  moral	  righteousness.	  I	  will	  explain	  more	  in	  detail	  what	  this	  idiom	  entails	  after	  the	  following	  vignette.	  	  Nafiz	   Mondal,	   a	   hawker	   from	   Lovokondo	   who	   had	   recently	   changed	   his	  working	  class	  lungi	  and	  vest	  for	  white	  Islamic	  garments	  and	  aspired	  to	  join	  the	  TJ	  if	  his	  means	  would	  allow	  him	  to	  do	  so,	  told	  me	  once	  that	  the	  culture	  here	  is	  better	   than	   in	   Pakistan.	   In	   Pakistan,	   he	   says,	   people	   are	   very	   antagonistic	  (birodhī).	   ‘If	  you	  slap	  someone	  there,	   they	  will	  slap	  you	  back.	  Here,	   if	  you	  slap	  someone,	   he	   will	   ask,	   ‘why	   did	   you	   slap	   me’?	   Here,	   the	   culture	   is	   a	   little	   bit	  better	   (ekhāne,	   'culture'	   ekṭu	   bhālo)’.	  Why,	   I	   ask?	   ‘There	   is	   a	   better	   rule	   here	  (ekhāne	  beśi	  bhālo	  cālāno	  hay).	  There,	  the	  government	  is	  making	  a	  mess.	  Here,	  there	  was	  Indira	  [Gandhi],	  and	  Rajiv	  [Gandhi]’.	   ‘But	  that	  was	  quite	  a	   long	  time	  ago?’	   I	   ask.	   ‘That’s	   right,	   and	   the	   current	   government	   isn’t	   as	   good.	   But	   it’s	  already	   in	   the	   society’,	   Nafiz	   responds,	   implying	   that	   the	   culture	   of	   argument	  and	   dialogue	   rather	   than	   of	   violence	   has	   already	   been	   internalised	   in	   India’s	  citizens.	   I	   press	   him	   further	   on	   this:	   ‘how	   do	   Indian	   people	   acquire	   culture?’	  Education,	  Nafiz	  says.	   Indeed,	  he	  sends	  his	  son	  to	  the	  High	  Madrasa	  so	  he	  can	  learn	  Arabic,	  and	  ‘will	  learn	  good	  culture’	  (bhālo	  'culture'	  śikh'be).	  	  Williams	  suggests	  that	   in	   ‘seeking	  the	   ‘right’	  kind	  of	  recognition	  within	  the	  state	  and	  society,	  Muslim	  citizenship	  is	  negotiated	  through	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  being	   in	   society	   that	   reflects	   forms	   of	   civility,	   connection	   and	   inclusion’	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(Williams	  2012:	  991).	  In	  Joygram,	  I	  found	  that	  the	  idiom	  used	  to	  denote	  modern	  civility	   is	  often	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  concept	  culture.	  Culture	   is	   locally	   infused	  with	  Islamic	  connotations;	   indeed,	  I	  suggest	  that	  Islamic	  reformism	  becomes	  a	  salient	  vehicle	  through	  which	  to	  cultivate	  the	  rational,	  reflexive	  subjectivity	  that	  allows	   for	   inclusion	   in	   the	   civilised	   citizenry.	   So	   if	   education	   allows	   one	   to	  cultivate	  culture,	  for	  Muslims	  it	  is	  Islamic	  education	  in	  particular	  that	  allows	  for	  the	   cultivation	   of	   culture,	   which	   includes	   the	   inculcation	   of	   civility.	   In	   other	  words,	   for	  Muslims,	   the	   ‘way	   of	   being’	   that	   reflects	   civility	   is	   Islamic;	   for	   this	  reason	  a	  High	  Madrasa	   is	  a	  vehicle	   through	  which	   to	  educate	  a	  culture	   that	   is	  not	  fundamentally	  different	  to	  the	  culture	   inculcated	  in	  the	  Indian	  citizenry	  by	  national	   leaders.	   Similarly,	   the	   rhetoric	   around	   the	   mission	   schools	   focuses	  around	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘good	   culture’	   (bhālo	   'culture')	   in	   the	   ambition	   to	   include	  Muslims	  in	  the	  (respectable)	  Indian	  citizenry.	  The	  next	  subsection	  will	  explain	  how	  this	  vernacular	  use	  of	  the	  idiom	  ‘culture’	  differs	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘culture’	  in	  the	  Indian	  nationalist	  project.	  	  	  
Culture	  and	  anti-­‐politics	  The	   idea	   that	   culture	   provides	   the	   moral	   backbone	   to	   the	   project	   of	   the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state	   is,	  at	   first	   face,	  a	  seamless	  reproduction	  of	  the	  anti-­‐politics	  discourse	  (Hansen	  1999;	  2000).	   In	   India,	  moral	  projects	  are	  the	  responsibility	  of	   the	   communities,	   which	   supposedly	   remain	   unspoiled	   by	   politics	   and	   the	  economy.	  The	  communities,	  indeed,	  have	  to	  foster	  ‘good	  culture’.	  It	  is	  important	  to	   recognise	   that	   the	   idiom	  of	  culture,	  when	  employed	  by	  my	   interlocutors,	   is	  infused	   with	   not	   only	   Islamic	   content	   but	   also	   with	   aspirations	   for	   modern	  personhood.	   That	   is,	   ‘culture’	   in	   the	   anti-­‐political	   discourse	   has	   a	   different	  meaning	   from	   ‘culture’	   in	   the	   Joygrami	   discourse.	   The	   paradoxes	   of	   the	  Muharram	  celebrations	  highlight	  the	  problem	  of	  this	  disjunction.	  	  The	   State	   WAQF	   Board126 	  is	   one	   of	   the	   institutions	   that	   continue	   the	  postcolonial	  policy	  of	  anti-­‐politics,	  as	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  Indian	  Muslims	   form	   a	   static	   and	   coherent,	   unpolitical	   cultural	   community	   (Hansen	  2000:	  269).	  Through	  such	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  state	  funded	  ‘secular’	  madrasas,	   the	   responsibility	   to	   ‘control’	   the	   ‘irrational	  masses’	   is	  delegated	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  See	  footnote	  24	  in	  chapter	  1.	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the	   civilised	   leaders	   of	   the	   community.	   Muharram	   may	   be	   hollowed	   out	   of	  spiritual	  meaning	  and	  become	  a	  case	  of	  profitable	  tax	  avoidance	  and	  a	  display	  of	  power	   inequality,	   but	   on	   the	   surface	   it	   looks	   like	   the	   timeless	   celebration	   of	  Indian	  syncretic	  culture.	  	  Through	   such	   institutions,	   Muslims	   are	   ‘thrown	   back’	   into	   a	   supposedly	  unified,	   ‘elevated	   unpolitical	   cultural	   community	   based	   on	   the	   values	   of	   the	  Koran,	   Hadiths	   and	   the	   Personal	   Law’	   (Hansen	   2000:	   269).	   The	   irony	   of	  Muharram	   is	   that	   it	   is	   Indian	   law	   that	   draws	   the	   shareholders	   of	   the	   cattle	  market	  inevitably	  back	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  ‘traditional’	  ritual	  patronage.	  The	  other	  villagers	   participate	   in	   the	   celebrations	   because	   it	   is	   ‘fun’	   not	   because	   of	   its	  religious	   value,	   and	   it	   comes	   to	   signify	   an	   aberration	   in	   their	   aspirations	   for	  good	   culture	   and	   a	   civilised,	   reformed	   lifestyle,	   rather	   than	   a	   reflection	   of	  culture.	  	  The	  complexity	  of	   the	  Muharram	  celebrations	  demonstrates	   that	   in	   reality	  there	  never	  was	  a	  negotiation	  ‘between	  reified	  cultural	  communities	  with	  fully	  formed	   notions	   of	   morality	   and	   public	   ethics	   and	   a	   state	   driven	   by	   ‘reason’’	  (Hansen	  2000:	  269).	  I	  want	  to	  highlight	  two	  points	  in	  this	  regard.	  Firstly,	  culture	  is	   not	   static,	   reified	   and	   community-­‐bound;	   for	   my	   interlocutors	   the	   concept	  implies	  modern,	  passionate	  convictions	  with	  global	  resonances.	  Secondly,	  good	  
culture	  becomes	  a	  vehicle	  for	  demands	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  civilised	  citizenry.	  Improving	  culture	  means	  civilising	  and	  governing	  oneself	  ‘in	  morality	  as	  well	  as	  law…as	   befits	   the	   citizen	   of	   a	   secular,	   liberal	   society’	   (Asad	   2003:	   226).	   So	  whereas	  Hansen	  argues	  that	  the	  TJ,	  like	  other	  cultural-­‐religious	  organisations,	  is	  ultimately	  inward	  looking	  and	  informed	  by	  ‘anti-­‐political	  notions	  of	  purification	  of	  the	  community’	  (2000:	  264),	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  TJ	  could	  equally	  function	  as	  a	  vehicle	   for	   the	  outward	   looking	  aspiration	   to	   cultivate	  modern	  civility.	  The	  TJ	  
becomes	   a	   form	   of	   ‘anti-­‐politics’	   that	   reproduces	   the	   bifurcated	   framework	   of	  ‘dirty’	  politics	   and	   ‘clean’	   Islam	  because	  of	   its	   limited	   space	  of	  navigation,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  the	  motivation	  for	  most	  of	  the	  (rural)	  participants;	  in	  fact	  it	  curtails	  their	  intentions	  for	  holistic	  renewal.	  	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   TJ	   doctrine	   is	   officially	   apolitical	   but	   it	   necessarily	   has	  political	   consequences.	   Wahed,	   for	   instance,	   steered	   clear	   of	   politics,	   but	   his	  aspirations	  are	  unmistakably	  political.	  He	  has	   learned	  at	  a	  recent	  TJ	  gathering	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the	   following	  analogy:	   the	  Muslims	  are	   like	  a	   football,	  and	  the	  political	  parties	  are	   kicking	   it,	   playing	   it	   around	   amongst	   each	   other.	   They	   can	   do	   so	   only	  because	  the	  ball	  is	  empty.	  If	  there	  were	  a	  stone	  inside,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  kick	   it	   around.	   Only	   a	   stronger	   belief	   and	   relationship	   to	   Allah	   can	  make	   the	  Muslims	  like	  a	  stone,	  and	  until	  they	  are,	  the	  community	  will	  be	  just	  a	  vote-­‐bank	  for	  the	  parties	  without	  having	  to	  really	  improve	  their	  conditions.	  Obviously,	  the	  analogy	   reproduces	   the	   ideological	   reification	   of	   communities.	   Having	  internalised	   this	   narrative,	   the	   community	   does	   become	   the	   vehicle	   through	  which	   to	   demand	   recognition	   by	   the	   state.	   Communities	   increasingly	   demand	  legal	   recognition,	   ethical	   policy	   and	   moral	   economic	   practices	   and	   as	   such	  desire	  to	  enter	  the	  public	  sphere.	  However,	  as	  ‘cultural’	  communities	  reified	  in	  time	  and	  space,	  they	  are	  denied	  this	  entrance.	  	  
Post-­‐secular	  aspirations	  	  Metcalf	  has	   suggested	   that	   ‘the	  Tablighi,	   living	  his	   everyday	   life	   in	   society,	  can	   be	   constructed	   as	   truly	   ‘secular’	   (2010:	   178)	   because	   of	   the	   private,	  interiorised	   and	   individualised	   character	   of	   the	   religious	   practice.	   The	   TJ,	  because	  of	  what	  is	  perceived	  as	  political	  ‘quietism’	  (Moosa	  2000:	  218),	  and	  their	  ‘hatred’	   of	   politics	   (Kepel	   2000:	   203)	   may	   indeed	   ‘mesh’	   better	   in	   secular	  polities	   such	   as	   South	   Africa	   (Moosa	   2000:	   221),	   European	   countries	   (Kepel	  1997)	  and	  India	  than	  explicitly	  political	   Islamic	  organisations.	  Yet,	   I	   think	  that	  the	  situation	  is	  not	  only	  more	  complicated,	  but	  also	  that	  calling	  them	  ‘secular’	  is	  problematic	   as	   this	   is	   a	   normative	   statement	   that	   already	   assumes	   different	  domains	  in	  society.	  Therefore,	  this	  categorisation	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  complexity	  of	   the	   motivations	   and	   experiences	   of	   Joygrami	   Tablighis,	   who	   are	   informed	  both	  by	  a	  specific	  local	  cosmopolitics	  that	  defies	  such	  a	  separation	  of	  domains,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  globally	  circulating	  ideals.	  My	  interlocutors,	   I	  venture	  to	  suggest,	  are	   perhaps	   better	   called	   postsecular	   or	   postliberal	   in	   that	   they	   are	   familiar	  with	   modern	   secular	   and	   liberal	   ideologies	   but	   go	   beyond	   them	   in	   their	  motivations	  and	  aspirations.	  Reformist	   Islam	  should	  not	  be	  misunderstood	  as	  pre-­‐modern,	  anti-­‐secular	  or	  secular,	  because	  it	  encompasses	  those	  ideologies	  in	  vernacularized	  forms	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  different	  ideal	  conception	  of	  society.	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My	  reasoning	  is	  as	  follows.	  The	  nature	  of	  reformist	  Islam	  does	  not	  fit	  well	  in	  the	   perception	   of	   a	   society	   as	   divided	   into	   separated	   domains.	   As	   argued	   in	  chapter	  4,	  the	  moral	  regeneration	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  community	  should	  eventually	  drive	  a	  more	  encompassing	  reform	  of	  the	  entire	  society.	  If	  dharma	  is	  the	   ethics	   of	   order	   and	   justice	   in	   all	   aspects	   of	   life,	   economic	   and	   political	  activities	   automatically	  would	   become	   embedded	   in	  dharma.	   In	   the	   reformist	  project,	  Islam	  is	  a	  total	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  comes	  to	  semantically	  occupy	  all	  that	  is	  
dharma.	   Different	   aspects	   of	   life	   become	   associated	  with	   sacred	   propositions	  (see	   Rappaport	   1999),	   and	   as	   such	   ‘religious	   cosmological	   order	   expands	   its	  domains	   to	  encompass	  secular	  or	  mundane	  and	  social	  cosmologies’	   (el-­‐Aswad	  2012:	  13).	  The	  sacred,	  then,	  is	  not	  only	  the	  ‘ultimate	  source	  and	  arbiter	  of	  social	  order’	  within	   the	   supposedly	   static	   community,	   but	   also	   ‘the	   very	   locus	   from	  which	  to	   issue	  authoritative	  challenges	  to	  conventional	  order	  and	  domination’	  (Lambek	   2000:	   312):	   it	   is	   a	   challenge	   to	   an	   ordering	   of	   modern	   society	   into	  sacred	   and	   secular	   spaces,	   where	   secular	   politics	   and	   a	  market	   economy	   are	  disembedded	  from	  the	  religious	  realm.	  	  
The	  limits	  to	  public	  conviction	  	  I	   have	   argued	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   the	   Joygrami	   reformists	   display	   a	  combination	  of	   cool	  and	  uncool	  passionate	  conviction,	  which	   is,	  however,	   less	  public	   than	   the	   convictions	   described	   by	   either	   Hansen	   (2009)	   or	   Comaroff	  (2008).	  The	  ‘global	  modality	  of	  action’	  (2009:	  18)	  Hansen	  describes	  has	  militant	  aspects.	  The	  ethics	  of	   conviction	  among	  Tablighis	   in	   Joygram	  does	  not	  have	  a	  militant	   aspect,	   because	   –	   even	   if	   they	   would	   aspire	   to	   this	   –	   they	   well	  understand	  that	  a	  militant	  Islamic	  conviction	  has	  no	  public	  legitimacy	  in	  India,	  and	   is	   thoroughly	  counterproductive	   to	   the	  goal	  of	  a	  better	  society	  within	   the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state.	  They	  enact	   their	  conviction	  within	   the	   legitimate	  confines	  of	  ‘anti-­‐politics’.	  Preaching	  and	  individual	  self-­‐cultivation	  as	  a	  means	  to	  a	  better	  society	  are	  acceptable	   forms	  of	  cultural	  exhortation	  and	  expression.	  However,	  they	   cannot	   make	   explicit	   political	   statements	   (Hansen	   2000:	   259).	   Taking	  seriously	   the	  aspirations	  of	   the	  TJ	  participants,	  which	  have	  global	   resonances,	  the	   introspective	   mode	   of	   conviction	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	   narrow	   space	   of	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navigation	   –	   within	   the	   hegemonic	   conception	   of	   ‘culture’	   -­‐	   that	   the	   Indian	  nation-­‐state	  allows	  for	  Muslims.	  	  Tragically,	   the	   aspirations	   of	   the	   reformist	   Muslims	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   a	  counterproductive	  effect.	  Governing	  and	  civilising	  the	  self	  is	  encouraged	  among	  the	   upper	   classes,	   but	   the	   ‘lower	   classes,	   constituted	   as	   the	   objects	   of	   social	  welfare	  and	  political	  control,	  are	  placed	   in	  a	  more	  ambiguous	  situation’	   (Asad	  2003:	   226).	   The	   current	   predicament	   is	   that	   the	  masses	   of	   the	  majority	   have	  gained	   legitimacy	   in	   their	  quest	   for	   ‘sacred	  sovereignty’	   (Comaroff	  2008).	  The	  rhetoric	  of	  Hindutva	  bodies	  combine	  a	  militant	  political	  theology	  of	  conviction	  infused	  with	  uncool	  passion,	  mobilizing	  masses	  with	  sacred	  symbols	  and	  myth	  (Kaur	  2005b:	  22)	  and	  this	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  dangerous	  combination.	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  non-­‐Muslim	  Indians,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Arabic	  education	  at	  a	  madrasa	   is	  providing	  a	  Muslim	  hawker’s	  son	  with	  the	  culture	  required	  to	  be	  included	   in	   the	   civilized	   citizenry.	   Similarly,	   the	  maulānās	   in	   Joygram,	   already	  used	   to	   a	   suspicious	   gaze,	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   marginalization	   –	   rather	   than	  respect	  -­‐	  that	  the	  carefully	  groomed	  aesthetic	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  reformists	  will	  bring	  them:	  ‘the	  rule	  of	  the	  government	  is:	  don’t	  give	  anything	  to	  the	  ones	  with	  
ṭupis	  and	  beards’	  (sarkārer	  'rule'	  hacche:	  ṭupi-­‐	  dāṛi-­‐oyālāke	  kichu	  nā	  dite).	  	  
Conclusion	  In	  order	   to	  embed	  the	  practices	  of	  reformist	  Muslims	   in	  a	  global	  context,	   I	  have	  drawn	  on	  the	  work	  of	  two	  scholars	  who	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  we	  can	  observe	   a	   global	   (anti-­‐/post-­‐)modern	   political	   theology	   of	   conviction.	   Hansen	  argues	   that	   the	   (close	   to)	   ‘global	   ideals	  of	  proper	  modern	  personhood’	   (2009:	  20)	   entail	   the	   cool	   passion	   of	   reasoned,	   interiorized	   conviction;	   Comaroff	  responds	  that	   ‘in	  recent	  decades	  the	  hegemony	  of	  this	  rationalist	   ideology	  has	  been	   disturbed’	   (2008:	   2)	   and	   observes	   an	   upsurge	   of	   ‘uncool	   passion’	   that	  deconstructs	  the	  liberal	  ideology	  of	  secular	  reason.	  I	  want	  to	  conclude	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  these	  models	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  Comaroff	   suggests	   that	   ‘it	   is	   arguable	   that	   a	   discourse	   of	   submission	   to	  sacred	   authority,	   of	   relinquishing	   self-­‐determination	   to	   mysterious	   will	   and	  passion…subverts	   the	   ideology	   of	   rational,	   free	   choice,	   and	   the	   image	   of	   the	  reflective,	   selective	   subject	   that	   is	   central	   to	   liberal	   understandings	   of	  principled	   belief’	   (2008:	   3).	   On	   the	   contrary,	   I	   have	   demonstrated	   that	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‘submission	  to	  sacred	  authority’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  stand	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  rational,	  free	  and	  willed	  subject.	  Drawing	  on	  elements	  already	  developing	  in	  the	  local	   cosmopolitics,	   reformism	   in	   Joygram	   emphasises	   that	   the	   rational	  reflective	  agent	  is	  generated	  by	  submission	  to	  visceral	  faith.	  Da’wa	  is	  merely	  the	  communication	  of	   the	  message	  of	  Truth,	   after	  which	   the	   listener	  has	   to	  make	  the	   free	   choice	   to	   convert	   –	   from	   jñān	   in	   one’s	   mind/heart	   (see	   also	   Masud	  2000c:	  xx).	  So	  in	  their	  aspirations	  for	  dignified	  personhood,	  Joygrami	  reformist	  Muslims	   produce	   their	   own	   challenges	   to	   the	   hegemonic	   understanding	   of	  modernity.	  	  Comaroff	  (2008)	  reminds	  us	  time	  and	  again	  that	  ‘uncool	  passion’	  is	  not	  new,	  that	  modernity	  never	   really	  was	  disenchanted,	   and	   that	   revivalist	  movements	  have	   come	   and	   gone	   over	   centuries	   and	   that	   their	   manifestations	   are	   tightly	  bound	  up	  with	  historical	   socio-­‐economic	   conditions.	   Indeed,	   renewal	   in	   Islam	  has	   waned	   and	  waxed	   ever	   since	   the	   inception	   of	   Islam	   (Masud	   2000c).	   The	  sacred	  never	  disappeared;	  it	  has	  just	  been	  ideologically	  configured	  in	  particular	  ways	   (Asad	  2003).	   In	   a	   challenging	   dialectic	  with	   the	   particular	  modernity	   of	  the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state,	   Joygrami	   reformists	  make	   their	   own	   configuration	   of	  the	  sacred.	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Conclusion:	  ‘We	  just	  want	  to	  live	  in	  peace’	  	   ‘Resentment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  weak	  about	  being	  treated	  cruelly	  by	  the	  powerful	   is	   generally	   a	   spontaneous	   human	   reaction,	   but	   learning	   to	   see	  certain	  practices	  as	  insupportable	  that	  were	  not	  previously	  viewed	  as	  such,	  and	  organizing	  social	  opposition	  to	  them,	  are	  steps	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  human’	  (Asad	  2003:	  154).	  	  	  ‘The	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   human’	   may	   seem	   like	   a	   revolutionary	   slogan.	  However,	   revolution	   is	   not	   the	   mode	   of	   change	   that	   Joygramis	   want.	   The	  assertion,	  ‘we	  just	  want	  to	  live	  in	  peace’	  (ām’rā	  emani	  śānti	  thāk’te	  cāi),	  is	  one	  I	  would	  hear	  over	  and	  over	  again,	  accompanied	  with	  a	  sigh	  and	  a	  shrug,	  whether	  from	  a	  pious	   imam,	  a	  poor	  widowed	  mother,	  a	  wealthy	  mischievous	  boy,	  or	  a	  party	  worker	  prone	  to	  spending	  his	  last	  pennies	  on	  alcohol.	  So	  how	  to	  achieve	  ‘peace’?	  	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  come	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  why	  there	  is	  ‘resentment’	   and	  why	   the	   ‘social	   opposition’	   against	   ‘insupportable	   practices’	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  Islamic	  reformism.	  I	  wondered:	  why	  Islamic	  reformism?	  Why	  not	  political	  action,	  for	  instance?	  Why	  not	  revolt?	  Why	  a	  quietist,	  apolitical	  (or	  ‘anti-­‐political’)	  form	  of	  social	  renewal?	  Why	  an	  Islamic	  form	  of	  renewal?	  Why	  a	  form	  of	  social	   renewal	   that	   focuses	   firstly	  on	   the	  cultivation	  of	   the	  self,	  and	   is	  only	  performatively	  public?	  	  	  In	  order	   to	  understand	   the	  particular	   form	   that	   ‘the	   reconstruction	  of	   the	  human’	   takes,	   I	  have	  presented	   the	  vernacular	   cosmopolitics	  of	  humanity	  and	  sociality,	  as	  well	  as	  ethics	  and	   justice	  of	  a	  Muslim	  community	   in	  West	  Bengal,	  along	  with	   the	   contemporary	   ethical	   transitions	  within	   it.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  cosmopolitics,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  current	  predicament	  of	  Muslims	   in	   India,	   we	   have	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   religion/secularism	   framework.	  Furthermore,	   I	   have	   used	   this	   ethnographic	   study	   to	   develop	   an	   innovative	  theoretical	   framework	   that	   aims	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	   ethical	  life	  both	  in	  my	  fieldsite	  and	  beyond.	  	  In	   this	   conclusion,	   I	   will	   firstly	   recapitulate	   the	   main	   arguments	   brought	  forward	   in	   this	   thesis.	  On	   the	  basis	  of	  my	  arguments,	   I	  will	  next	  offer	  another	  perspective	  on	  the	  debate	  upon	  secularism	  in	  India.	  Thirdly,	  I	  will	  suggest	  how	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the	  arguments	  of	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  taken	  forward	  in	  the	  anthropology	  of	  ethics.	  Next,	   I	  will	  offer	   suggestions	   for	   future	  research	  on	  secularism.	  Finally,	   I	   shall	  suggest	   how	   this	   thesis	   is	   significant	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   ethics,	   and	   in	  particular	  for	  ethical	  life	  in	  secular	  modernity.	  	  
Thesis	  summary	  In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  ethical	  renewal	  that	  take	  place	  in	  Joygram,	  I	  have	  utilized	  a	  two-­‐sided	  approach.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  we	  need	  to	  understand,	  firstly,	   the	   roots	   of	   ethical	   action	   (the	   local	   cosmopolitics),	   and	   secondly,	   the	  political	  and	  economic	  environment	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  vernacularisation	  that	  take	  place	  in	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment.	  	  Firstly,	  I	  have	  asked,	  what	  is	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  human	  in	  Bengali	  Muslim	   cosmopolitics?	   What	   are	   the	   categories	   that	   inform	   and	   constitute	  ethical	   life	   in	  this	  context?	  In	  chapter	  2	  and	  3	  I	  have	  extensively	  discussed	  the	  local	  cosmopolitics;	  the	  roots	  of	  ethical	  action.	  I	  have	  drawn	  on	  studies	  of	  South	  Asian	   personhood	   and	   kinship	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   in	   the	   regional	   ideology	  being	   human	   and	   becoming	   a	   person	   are	   not	   separate	   categories;	   mānuṣ	  connotes	   both	   the	   physiological,	   mortal	   human	   being	   and	   the	   social,	   moral	  person.	   Joygrami	   cosmopolitics	   are	   a	   combination	   of	   Islamic	   cosmogony	   (the	  ‘contract	  behind	  contracts’)	  with	   the	   local	   ideology	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  holism.	  From	  the	   moment	   of	   birth	   the	   child’s	   cosmogonic	   relationship	   with	   Allah	   and	   the	  relatedness	   thereafter	  with	   kin	   and	   neighbours	   is	   enacted	   through	   exchange;	  subsequently	  becoming	  and	  making	  a	  person	  are	  both	  physiological	  and	  ethical	  projects	   in	   which	   various	   people	   are	   involved	   through	   the	   exchange	   of	   bio-­‐moral	  substances.	  Although	  marriage	  and	  family	  are	  practically	  important	  units,	  
jāti	  is	  ideologically	  the	  more	  important	  unit	  of	  relatedness.	  Due	  to	  the	  fluidity	  of	  substances,	  jāti	  is	  an	  inherently	  unstable	  category	  and	  therefore	  the	  exchanges	  that	   create	   jāti	   relatedness	   are	   closely	   monitored	   ethical	   acts,	   regulated	   by	  
dharma.	  	  On	  this	  basis,	   I	  have	  argued	  for	  a	  non-­‐essentialist	   interpretation	  of	  Muslim	  personhood.	   I	   have	   analytically	   separated	   generative	   Muslimness	   and	   ethical	  Muslimness	  and	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  these	  modes	  of	  being	  develop	  in	  mutually	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reinforcing	   relation	   to	   each	  other.	   The	   latter	   point	   implies	   that	   humanity	   and	  ethics	  are	  categories	  integral	  to	  each	  other.	  	  The	  most	   significant	   argument	   here	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	  moral	   personhood	  outside	  of	  dharma,	  as	  the	  'human	  person'	  (mānuṣ)	  is	  generated	  out	  of	  exchanges	  within	   a	   particular	   jāti,	  which	   in	   itself	   is	   an	   enactment	   of	   dharma;	  without	  
dharma	  one	   is	   considered	   barely	   human,	   because	   one	   is	   not	   within	   human	  sociality.	  I	  have	  further	  elaborated	  on	  the	  sources	  of	  ethics	  of	  Joygrami	  Muslims,	  and	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  faith	  (imān)	  in	  Allah	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  cultivation	  of	  the	  faculties	   that	   allow	   a	   human/person	   to	   develop	   jñān/phronesis	   (practical	  judgement)	  and	  good	  character.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  evaluative	  autonomy	  for	  ethical	  judgement	  originates	  within	  generative	  Muslimness	  and	  is	  enacted	  upon	  in	   ethical	  Muslimness.	   This	  means	   that	   freedom	   is	   achieved	   only	   after	   divine	  submission;	   absolute	   freedom	   is	   a	   human	   impossibility.	   I	   have	   demonstrated	  that	  the	  local	  ethics	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  virtue	  ethics	  (embedded	  in	  the	  ideology	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  holism)	  and	  ethicised	  Salvationism.	  This	  implies	  that	  human	  action	  is	   ideally	   directed	   both	   and	   simultaneously	   at	   this-­‐worldly	   and	   at	  transcendental	   goals:	   these	   goals	   collapse	   into	   one.	   All	   throughout,	   I	   have	  demonstrated	  how	  forms	  of	  exchange	  reflect	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Islamic	  dharma:	  exchanges	  are	  virtuous	  (khuśi)	  if	  they	  are	  balanced	  and	  reproduce	  equality	  and	  solidarity.	  	  The	   finding	   that	   the	  potential	   for	  ethics	   is	  derived	   from	  divine	  submission	  and	   jāti	   relatedness	   is	  highly	  significant	  and	  has	   far-­‐reaching	  consequences.	   It	  means	  that	  any	  form	  of	  reformation,	  self-­‐cultivation	  and	  ethical	  renewal	  of	  my	  interlocutors	   will	   always	   be	   from	   within	   Muslimness.	   Muslimness	   does	   not	  pertain	   to	   the	   delineated	   category	   of	   religion,	   but	   is	   a	   holistic	   form	   of	  moral	  personhood.	  One	  can	  therefore	  not	  cultivate	  oneself	  as	  a	  good	  secular	  person	  as	  juxtaposed	  to	  being	  a	  good	  Muslim,	  but	  only	  as	  embedded	  within	  the	  cultivation	  of	  ethical	  Muslimness.	  	  On	   account	   of	   this	   finding,	   I	   have	   argued	   against	   the	   universalisation	   of	   a	  modern,	   secular	   conception	   of	   ethics	   as	   residing	   in	   sovereign	   conscience.	  Instead,	  I	  proposed	  that	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  social,	  that	  is,	  the	  transcendental	  social,	   is	   axiomatic	   for	   ethics.	   In	   turn,	   ethics	   link	   the	   transactional	   and	   the	  transcendental	  social.	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Secondly,	   I	   have	   contextualised	   the	   cosmopolitics	   in	   the	   plural	   politico-­‐economic	   environment	   in	   chapter	   4	   and	   5,	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   a	   comprehensive	  understanding	   of	   the	   motivations	   for	   ethical	   renewal.	   I	   have	   analysed	   the	  narratives	   of	   corruption	   and	  moral	   decay	   so	   prominent	   in	   Joygram,	   within	   a	  theoretical	   model	   of	   short	   term	   and	   long	   term	   transactions:	   the	   world	   is	  perceived	  as	   ‘rotten’	  because	   transactions	  are	   instrumentalised	  and	  no	   longer	  embedded	   in	  macrocosmic	   visions	   of	   order	   and	   justice,	   and	   foster	   inequality	  and	   exploitation	   rather	   than	   equality	   and	   solidarity.	   My	   interlocutors	   strive	  after	   a	   restoration	   of	   the	   cosmic	   order	   and	   an	   ideological	   negation	   of	   the	  competitive	   individual,	   so	   as	   to	   recover	   the	   autonomous	   dignity	   of	   the	  moral	  person	  and	  a	  harmonious	  society.	  	  I	  have	  argued	  against	  a	  conception	  of	  Indian	  Muslims	  as	  non-­‐modern	  since	  the	   latter’s	   ideal	   restoration	   of	   an	   ethics	   of	   justice	   and	   order	   incorporates	  modern	  ideologies	  and	  categories.	  My	  interlocutors	  attach	  strong	  significance	  to	  the	   ‘idea	  of	   India’,	   and	   to	   the	   liberal	   secular	   ideology,	   yet	   they	  are	   confronted	  with	  a	  failure	  of	  practical	  execution.	  Since	  they	  link	  unethical	  political	  practices	  to	  the	  Realpolitik	  of	  communist	  rule,	  my	  interlocutors	  feel	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  dharma	  forestalls	   restoration,	   and	   they	   strive	   after	   a	   social	   renewal	   that	   revives	   the	  ethical	  dimension	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  life.	  Furthermore,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   harmonious	   plurality	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	  labour	   of	   exchange	   between	   jātis.	   My	   interlocutors	   act	   from	   a	   laminated	  subjectivity	  that	  resonates	  with	  other	  jātis	  from	  within	  a	  shared	  idea	  of	  dharma.	  Against	  the	  threat	  of	  purely	  instrumental,	  exploitative	  and	  violent	  party	  politics,	  Hindus	  and	  Muslims	  stand	  united,	  because	  at	  least	  they	  both	  have	  dharma	  even	  though	   the	   expression	   and	   normativity	   of	   their	  dharma	   is	   different.	   The	   very	  idea	   that	   the	   other	   jāti	  has	   a	   dharma	   makes	   that	   other	   more	   reliable	   to	   act	  ethically,	  and	  much	  more	  so	  than	  an	   ‘other’	  without	  a	  dharma.	  Even	  though	  in	  my	   interlocutors’	   view	   the	   Islamic	   dharma	   as	   the	   only	   path	   to	   salvation,	   any	  
dharma	  could	  potentially	  redeem	  humanity	  in	  this	  world.	  	  	  I	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   Nehruvian	   secularism	   is	   locally	   understood	   to	  mean	  equal	  treatment	  of	  every	  Indian	  no	  matter	  her	  jāti/dharma.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	   idea	   of	   a	   plurality	   of	   jāti/dharma.	   For	   Joygramis,	   I	   have	   argued,	   dharma	  offers	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  ‘toleration	  of	  tension’	  that	  is	  behind	  the	  labour	  of	  the	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precarious	   management	   of	   inter-­‐jāti	   exchange.	   Inter-­‐jāti	   exchanges	   generate	  ‘minor	  differences’	  and	  distinction	  (within	  the	  fluidity	  of	  bio-­‐moral	  substances)	  and	  it	  is	  the	  tense	  toleration	  of	  these	  differences	  that	  fosters	  relative	  harmony.	  
Dharma	  is	  as	  such	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  Nehruvian	  secularism,	  as	  much	  as	  dharma	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  be	  a	  respectable	  secular	  citizen	  who	  is	  able	  to	   live	  harmoniously	   in	  a	  pluralistic	  society.	  I	  have	  also	  demonstrated	  that	   the	  discourse	  of	  secularism	  and	  legal	  and	  bureaucratic	  practices	  have	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  how	  the	  place	  of	  dharma	  is	  understood	  by	  its	  adherents:	  if	  dharma	  is	   limited	   to	   the	   category	   religion,	   distinction	   is	   increasingly	   sought	   in	   the	  theological	   realm,	   where	   it	   is	   reified	   in	   dogmatic	   difference.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	  unclear	  how	  difference	  and	  similarity	  should	  be	  managed	  in	  other	  spheres	  if	  the	  value	  of	  everyday	  exchange	  is	  undermined	  by	  bureaucratic	  procedures.	  	  These	   findings	   are	   highly	   significant	   because	   it	   challenges	   the	   hegemonic	  discourse	   of	   secularism	   as	   abstract	   tolerance	   or	   bureaucratic	   procedures.	  Secularism,	   if	   it	   is	   to	   function	  well,	   is	  an	  ethical	   labour.	   In	  this	  case,	  dharma	  is	  the	   source	   of	   ethics,	   and	   thus	   the	   source	   of	   the	   secular.	   If	   dharma	   would	   be	  categorised	   as	   religion,	   by	   implication	   religion	   would	   be	   the	   source	   of	   the	  secular.	  If	  religion	  is	  not	  to	  be	  the	  source	  of	  the	  secular,	  then	  it	  remains	  highly	  ambiguous	  what	  should	  be	  the	  ethical	  foundation	  of	  secularism.	  	  Lastly,	   I	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   Islamic	   reformism	   in	   Joygram	   entails	  ethical	   transitions	   that	   create	   tensions	   in	   the	   village;	   moments	   of	   ‘extra-­‐ordinary	   ethics’	   in	   which	   the	   values	   integral	   to	   the	   cosmopolitics	   are	  reconsidered.	   Reformists	   in	   Joygram	   aspire	   for	   a	   kind	   of	   personhood	   that	  resonates	  with	  the	  local	  model	  of	  virtue	  ethics,	  but	  includes	  global	  grammars	  of	  conviction	   that	   are	   at	   once	   interiorised	   and	   rational,	   as	   well	   as	   visceral	   and	  mystical.	   On	   this	   basis,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   Islamic	   reformism	   is	   not	   a	   local	  phenomenon.	  Instead,	  it	  resonates	  within	  larger	  global	  processes	  that	  challenge	  a	  hegemonic	  global	  culture	  of	  secular	  modernity.	  	  
Implications	  for	  the	  debate	  on	  secularism	  in	  India	  	  In	  the	  introduction,	  I	  have	  questioned	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  secularism	  in	  India.	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  position	  of	  the	  ‘modernists,	  the	  ‘communitarians’,	  and	   the	  normative	   liberal	  position	  of	  Bhargava,	   and	   I	  have	  made	   reference	   to	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the	  position	  of	  Hindu	   right-­‐wing	   secularism.	   I	   have	  argued	   that	  none	  of	   these	  positions	   take	   a	   sufficiently	   critical	   perspective	   on	   the	   actual	   formation	   of	  secularism	   (as	   a	   doctrine)	   in	   India	   and	   ultimately	   serve	   to	   reproduce	   the	  problematic	   bifurcation	   of	   the	   Indian	   nation-­‐state	   into	   a	   secular	   society	   and	  religious	  communities.	  This	  thesis	  brings	  a	  new	  perspective	  to	  the	  debate.	  The	  crisis	  of	  secularism,	  I	  argue,	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  highly	  ambiguous	  formation	  of	   secularism	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   and	   secondly,	   in	   the	   lack	  of	   ethical	  practice	   in	  governmental	   institutions.	   Despite	   the	   highly	   ambiguous	   configuration	   of	  secularism	  in	  India	  and	  the	  actual	  practices	  of	  injustice,	  my	  interlocutors	  do	  not	  hold	   the	   secular	   ideology	   accountable	   because	   they	   believe	   strongly	   in	   the	  potential	  for	  justice	  this	  ideology	  has	  to	  offer.	  Moreover,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Nerhuvian	  secular	  ideology	  is	  not	  fundamentally	  incompatible	  with	  the	  Islamic	  
dharma,	   despite	   conflicting	   conceptualisations	   of,	   for	   instance,	   personhood.	  Like	  Muslim	  Ansaris	  in	  Varanasi,	  Muslim	  Jogramis	  ‘appealed	  to	  notions	  of	  state	  secularism	  …	  by	  asserting	  a	   language	  of	   the	  good	   Indian	   citizen	   in	   relation	   to	  legal	  or	  formal	  aspects	  of	  the	  state	  whilst	  continuing	  to	  hold	  the	  state	  judiciary	  and	  courts	   in	  high	  regard…’	  (Williams	  2012:	  991).	  This	  significantly	  alters	   the	  pervasive	   idea	   that	   ‘misrecognition’	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   communities	   and	  ‘incompatibility’	   between	   the	   ideologies	   of	   the	   communities	   and	   the	   state	   are	  central	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	  secularism.	  	  Appealing	   to	   state	   secularism	   offers	   space	   for	   navigation,	   and	   limited	  recognition,	  but,	   like	  Williams,	   I	   am	  cautious	   in	  valorising	   ‘Muslim	  autonomy’,	  which	  may	   risk	   ‘letting	   the	   state	   off	   the	   hook,	   rather	   than	   seeking	   to	  make	   it	  more	   accountable’	   (2011b:	   278).	   In	   this	   dissertation	   I	   complicated	   ‘Muslim	  agency’,	  while	  seeking	  to	  hold	  the	  state	  more	  accountable:	  the	  very	  structures	  of	  the	  modern	  political	  and	  economic	  arrangements	  put	  some	  people	  –	  excluded	  minorities	   most	   of	   all	   –	   in	   a	   position	   where	   navigation	   becomes	   impossible.	  Power	   structures	  and	   institutional	   forces	   limit	  Muslim	  agency	  –	  and	  dignity.	   I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  Muslims	  continue	  to	  derive	  ethical	  autonomy	  from	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  and	  from	  within	  relatedness	  in	  the	  Muslim	  jāti	  and	  not	  because	   Muslims	   do	   not	   understand	   the	   secular	   ideology,	   or	   because	   it	   is	  inherently	  incompatible	  with	  Islam.	  I	  suggest	  that	  for	  my	  interlocutors,	  dharma	  continues	   to	   be	   the	   root	   of	   ethical	   action,	   and	   the	   covenant	   with	   Allah	   the	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‘contract	   behind	   contracts’,	   because	   there	   are	   no	   other	   valid	   options;	   my	  interlocutors	  do	  not	  conceive	  of	  another	  foundational	  contract	  that	  is	  attractive	  and	   can	   form	   a	   foundation	   for	   humanity	   to	   flourish.	   I	   do	   not	   deny	   that	  transformations	   over	   time	   may	   change	   what	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   the	  foundational	  contract	  –	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  contract	  with	  the	  creator-­‐god	  but	  with	  the	   state,	   for	   example.	   Jāti	   is	   a	   segmentary	   concept	   and	   the	   jāti	   of	   the	   nation	  could	  potentially	  be	  primary	  to	  the	  Muslim	  jāti.	  However,	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  the	  secular	  contractual	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  is	  embedded	  within	  dharma.	  I	  will	  clarify	  the	  argument	  here.	  	  One	  may	   ask	  why	   the	   contract	  with	   the	   creator-­‐god	   remains	   foundational	  for	   Muslims	   in	   a	   secular	   state,	   if	   the	   state	   ideologies	   are	   considered	   to	   have	  ethical	   potential,	   and	   why	   the	   Muslim	   jāti	   continues	   to	   be	   the	   pivotal	  transcendent	  collective	  if	  they	  have	  imbibed	  the	  ‘idea	  of	  India’.	  Alternatives	  for	  transcendent	   collectives	   are	   the	  nation	  or	   the	   Islamic	  ummah.	   But	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  Muslims	  are	   structurally	   excluded	   from	   the	   Indian	  national	   imagination,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  they	  have	  to	  abide	  by	  Indian	  territorial	  boundaries	  and	  can	  only	   ‘privately’	  be	  part	  of	  the	  Islamic	  ummah.	  The	  latter	  would	  sometimes	  feature	   as	   a	   utopia	   in	   the	   imagination	   of	   my	   interlocutors.	   Muslims	   live	   in	   a	  state	  they	  call	  Hindusthān;	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  nation	  is	  always	  questioned,	  ‘tell	  a	  lie	  a	  thousand	  times	  and	  it	  becomes	  true’	  and	  the	  Muslim	  is	  a	  terrorist,	  and	  the	  livelihood	  (and	  life)	  of	  a	  ‘second-­‐class’	  citizen	  is	  never	  secured.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  exclusion	  and	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  Indian	  nation-­‐state,	  Indian	  Muslims	  respond	  to	  this	   challenge	   upon	   the	   very	   dignity	   of	   being	   human	   by	   creating	   a	   stronger,	  more	  coherent	  ethical	  narrative,	  rooted	  in	  the	   ‘contract	  behind	  contracts’	  with	  the	  creator	  god.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  confrontations	  with	  the	  state,	  time	  and	  again	  people	  feel	  disappointed	   that	   promises	   have	   not	   been	   lived	   up	   to,	   and	   their	   trust	   in	   the	  state	   increasingly	   deteriorates.	   The	   exchanges	   with	   the	   state	   are	   not	  experienced	   as	   virtuous.	   In	   liberal	   political	   theory,	   citizens	   relinquish	   their	  natural	  freedom,	  and	  transfer	  their	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  nation-­‐state	  in	  exchange	  for	   protection	   of	   their	   liberties.	   This	   kind	   of	   contract	   is	   comparable	   to	   the	  contract	  that	  Muslims	  have	  with	  Allah:	  Muslims	  voluntarily	  enter	  into	  a	  contract	  which	   requires	   them	   to	   give	   up	   their	   unlimited	   freedom	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	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promise	  of	  protection	  and	  regeneration	  of	  life.	  However,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  law	  and	  order	  is	  highly	  arbitrary	  and	  Muslims	  feel	  threatened	  rather	  than	  protected	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  lack	  of	  law	  and	  order	  makes	  it	  seem	  that	  the	  contract	  with	  the	  state	  still	  allows	  people	  to	  live	  in	  unconstrained	  freedom	  –	  the	  contract	  with	  the	  state	  does	  not	  generate	  a	  visceral	  social	  relatedness,	  whereas	  social	  constraint	  is	   essential	   to	   the	  generation	  of	   the	  moral	  person	  and	   the	   capacity	   for	   ethical	  judgement.	   Muslims	   do	   enter	   into	   a	   secular	   contract	   with	   the	   state,	   but	   it	  becomes	   embedded	   in	   the	   sacred	   covenant	   with	   Allah	   because,	   in	   their	  experience,	  the	  state	  contract	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  strong	  enough	  to	  generate	  ethics.	  I	  want	  to	  further	  suggest	  that	  perhaps	  humans	  are	  always	  already	  related	  –	  this	  relatedness	  is	  conceptualised	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  in	  the	  Islamic	  dharma	  but	  it	  is	  denied	   by	   the	   liberal	   ideology,	   as	   the	   free	   individual	   (‘man	   in	   nature’,	   Asad	  2003:	  127ff)	  enters	  in	  a	  contract	  with	  the	  state.	  This	  may	  point	  to	  the	  inherent	  flaw	  in	  the	  liberal	  ideology;	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point	  further	  down.	  	  I	  want	   to	   take	   the	   liberty	  here	   to	  make	   the	  normative	  suggestion	   that	   it	   is	  not	   necessarily	   problematic	   for	   a	   secular	   polity	   that	   dharma	   forms	   the	  foundational	  contract.	  It	  is	  problematic	  only	  because	  of	  the	  flaws	  inherent	  to	  the	  ambiguous	  management	  of	  difference	  in	  postcolonial	  India.	  I	  want	  to	  point	  out	  again	   that	   my	   interlocutors	   allow	   for	   a	   plurality	   of	   dharma,	   and	   idealise	   a	  society	   in	  which	  different	   jātis,	   aspiring	   to	   live	  according	   to	  different	  dharma,	  cohabit	  harmoniously.	  This	   is	  how	   they	   interpret	   secularism.	  We	  can	  perhaps	  think	  of	  their	  position	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Akeel	  Bilgrami	  (2011)	  explains	  it:	  one	  can	  only	  sign	  onto	  the	  secular	  polity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   internal,	  not	  external,	  reasons	  and	  the	  internal	  reasons	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  individual’s	  moral	  disposition.	  Even	  though	   the	   theologies	   underlying	   ideas	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   cosmic	   order	   may	  differ,	  there	  may	  be	  agreement	  on	  the	  criteria	  that	  need	  to	  be	  met	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  transactions.	  The	  criteria	  are	   fundamentally	   to	  circumscribe	  exploitation	  and	   structural	   inequality.	   One	   may	   subscribe	   to	   these	   criteria	   for	   various	  reasons:	  one	  may	  call	   it	  a	  Kantian	  universal	   imperative	  established	  by	  reason;	  another	  may	  derive	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  dignity	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  created	  after	  the	  image	  of	  god.	  In	  an	  overlapping	  consensus,	  people	  ‘concur	  on	   the	   principles,	   but	   differ	   on	   the	   different	   reasons	   for	   holding	   to	   this	   ethic.	  The	   state	  must	   uphold	   the	   ethic,	   but	  must	   refrain	   from	   favouring	   any	   of	   the	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deeper	  reasons’	  (Taylor	  2011:	  37).	  So	  members	  of	  different	  jātis	  could	  reach	  an	  ‘overlapping	   consensus’	   to	   justify	   a	   secular	   polity,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   substantive	  values	   founded	   in	   dharma;	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   different	   foundational	   contracts.	   I	  suggest	  therefore	  that	  a	  secular	  polity	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  in	  contradiction	  with	  the	  significance	  attached	  to	  dharma,	  including	  the	  Islamic	  dharma,	  and	  dharma	  could	  be	  the	  source	  of	  the	  secular.	  In	  reality,	  the	  state	  is	  not	  impartial,	  and	  the	  ‘deeper	   reasons’	   of	   Muslims	   are	   not	   considered	   equally	   valid	   to	   the	   ‘deeper	  reasons’	  of	  the	  majority.	  	  It	   is	   expected,	   or	   hoped	   for,	   that	  Muslims	  will	   reform	   their	   criteria	   in	   due	  time,	   so	   that	   they	   will	   come	   to	   accept	   secular	   criteria	   and	   nominations	   and	  consider	  the	  contract	  with	  the	  state	  foundational	  (see	  Bhargava	  2010;	  Bilgrami	  2011).	  However,	   in	  the	  current	  political	  atmosphere	   it	  can	  hardly	  be	  expected	  that	   Muslims	   will	   come	   to	   consider	   the	   contract	   of	   the	   state	   more	   just	   and	  beneficial	  than	  the	  contract	  with	  Allah.	  ‘A	  group’s	  capacity	  to	  change	  via	  internal	  reasoning	   requires	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   psychological	   security	   and	   self-­‐confidence,	  precisely	  what	   is	  undermined	  by	   the	  demoralization	   [of	   the	  Muslim	  minority]	  caused	   by	   such	   harassment	   [by	   Hindu	   right	   wing	   sympathizers]’	   (Bilgrami	  2011:	  31).	  	  My	   interlocutors	   are	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   widespread	   suspicion	   of	   the	  dangerous	   Muslim	   ‘Other’	   and	   the	   ‘war	   on	   terror’,	   which	   creates	   indignation	  and	   frustration.	   Reforming	   the	   self	   and	   the	   community	   according	   to	   the	  reformist	   teachings	   is	   a	   very	   conscious	   act	   of	   taking	   responsibility	   and	  distancing	   oneself	   from	   the	   ‘bad	   Muslims’.	   This	   act	   is,	   however,	  counterproductive	  to	  their	  ambition	  to	  be	  respected	  and	  included	  in	  the	  Indian	  citizenry,	   as	   the	   outward	   performance	   of	   Islamic	   ethics	   makes	   them	   more	  suspicious	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   ‘secular’	   Indians	   who	   may	   be	   unaware	   of	   the	  distinctions	  between	  one	  form	  of	  Islam	  and	  another.	  	  I	  conclude	  this	  section	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  secularism	  as	  a	  project	  can	  only	   have	   ethical	   validity	   if	   it	   allows	   for	   consistency	   in	   the	   subjects’	   ethical	  imagination.	  The	  problem	  remains	  that	  the	  force	  of	  the	  secular	  doctrine	  resides	  indeed	  ‘not	  in	  neutralizing	  the	  space	  of	  politics	  from	  religion	  but	  in	  producing	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	   religious	  subject	  who	   is	  compatible	  with	   the	  rationality	  and	  exercise	  of	   liberal	  political	   rule’	   (Mahmood	  2006:	  344)	  whereas	   Indian	   liberal	  
287	  	  
political	  rule	   itself	   is	  deeply	  ambiguous,	  unreasonable	  and	  unjust.	   It	   is	   for	   this	  reason	  that	  other	  normative	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  have	  more	  validity,	  and	  that	  secularism	  in	  India	  is	  in	  crisis.	  
Suggestions	  for	  research	  on	  ethics	  In	  this	  section,	   I	  outline	  how	  this	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  the	  anthropology	  of	  ethics,	  and	  offer	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research;	  the	  ambition	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  ethical	  life	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  and	   to	   offer	   a	   theoretical	   architecture	   that	   could	   inform	   future	   research	   on	  ethics.	  	  The	   thesis	   offers	   an	   innovative	  model	   of	   ethical	   reality	   that	   suggests	   that	  social	  imagination	  is	  the	  source	  of	  ethics.	  It	  is	  only	  by	  virtue	  of	  imagination	  that	  we	   live	   in	   a	   transcendental	   social:	   we	   imagine	   ourselves	   and	   others	   to	   be	  related	  in	  particular	  ways.	  This	  relatedness	  gives	  speech	  and	  action	  its	  inherent	  ethical	  dimension.	   In	   turn,	   virtue	  ethics	   link	  particular,	   time-­‐and	   space-­‐bound	  acts	  to	  collectively	  imagined	  ideals;	  ideals	  that	  are	  rendered	  explicit	  and	  shared	  through	  ritual.	  This	  model	  attempts	  to	  resolve	  the	  long	  debate	  in	  anthropology	  on	   whether	   ethical	   action	   is	   socially	   or	   materially	   determined,	   or	   an	   innate	  disposition,	  and	  reconsiders	  the	  questions	  regarding	  the	  inherent	  social	  or	  free	  nature	   of	   human	   beings.	   It	   allows	   for	   a	   combination	   of	   an	   ‘epistemology	   of	  estrangement’	   and	   of	   ‘intimacy’	   (Keane	   2003:	   225)	   in	   the	   study	   of	   ethics:	   it	  allows	  for	  a	  deeply	  engaged	  analysis	  of	  the	  particular,	  of	  vernacular	  categories	  of	   understanding,	   and	   of	   vernacular	   understandings	   of	   human	   freedom	   and	  agency,	   while	   it	   also	   allows	   for	   cross-­‐cultural	   comparison	   and	   theorisation	  
without	  reductionist	  essentialisation.	  	  Therefore,	   from	   this	   model	   follow	   two	   suggestions.	   Firstly,	   the	  anthropological	  study	  of	  ethics	  needs	  to	  explore	  ethical	   lifeworlds	  through	  the	  relevant	   vernacular	   categories.	   I	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   ethics	   of	   my	  interlocutors	   (dharma)	   involves	   complex	   negotiations	   operating	  with	   various	  ideological	  reference	  points.	  It	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  capture	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  vernacular	   ethics	   within	   purified	   categories	   relevant	   elsewhere,	   like	   the	  modern	   West.	   After	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   vernacular	   categories	   of	   ethics	   are	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understood,	  useful	  analytical	  comparisons	  can	  be	  made;	  in	  this	  manner,	  I	  have	  compared	  the	  vernacular	  concept	  jñān	  to	  the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  phronesis.	  	  The	  conceptualisation	  of	  modern	  ethics	  follows	  from	  a	  particular	  historical	  trajectory,	   which	   involved	   the	   distinction	   between	   modern	   state	   law	   and	  morality	   (Asad	   2003:	   218ff).	   This	   distinction	   cleared	   the	   space	   not	   only	   for	  secular	  law	  but	  also	  for	  secular	  morality;	  that	  is,	  religious	  morality	  has	  become	  classified	   and	   categorised	   in	   a	   secular	   manner.	   In	   the	   modern,	   secular	  classification,	   ethics	   is	   interior/invisible/private,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  exterior/visible/public	   nature	   of	   law.	   This	   secular	   conception	   of	   religious	  ethics,	   Asad	  maintains,	   is	   ‘at	   once	  modern	   and	   Christian’,	   as	   it	   presupposes	   a	  sovereign	  conscience	  (2003:	  245).	  ‘That	  conscience	  is	  a	  purely	  private	  matter	  at	  once	   enabling	   and	   justifying	   the	   self-­‐government	   of	   human	   beings	   is	   a	  necessary	  (though	  not	  sufficient)	  precondition	  of	  modern	  secular	  ethics’	  (Asad	  2003:	  247).	  Asad	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   traditional	   language	  of	   the	  Shari’a	   such	   a	  distinction	   is	   not	   clear-­‐cut	   at	   all,	   since	   the	   central	   idea	   of	   virtue	   cannot	   be	  defined	   according	   to	   binary	   terminology	   like	   this-­‐worldly/otherworldly	  sanction,	  or	  free	  self-­‐governance/obedience	  to	  external	  authority.	  Furthermore,	  Asad	  argues	  that	  the	  capacity	  for	  virtuous	  judgement	  is	  dependent	  on	  embodied	  relationships	  rather	  than	  on	  a	  private	  conscience.	  	  In	  my	   research	   context,	   the	   application	  of	   a	   secular	   classification	  of	   ethics	  would	  obscure	  crucial	   aspects	  of	   the	  ethical	   reality.	   I	  have	  argued	   that	  ethical	  autonomy	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   Allah	   (rather	   than	   from	   a	  sovereign	   conscience).	   Furthermore,	   the	   ethics	   of	   Muslim	   Joygramis	   is	  fundamentally	   social	   as	   the	   capacity	   for	   judgement	   is	   generated	   from	  within	  relatedness.	   On	   this	   basis,	   I	   have	   rejected	   Laidlaw’s	   (2014a)	   conception	   of	  ethics	  because	  it	  has	  the	  shadows	  of	  the	  modern	  secular	  conception	  of	  ethics	  as	  described	   by	   Asad.	   As	   anthropologists,	   we	   need	   to	   be	   acutely	   aware	   of	   the	  normativity	   and	   historical	   specificity	   of	   such	   distinctions	   lest	   we	   assume	   the	  ethics	  of	  our	  interlocutors	  to	  be	  conceptualised,	  located	  and	  enacted	  in	  a	  certain	  (secular)	  manner.	  	  An	   analysis	   through	   the	   vernacular	   category	   dharma	   and	   the	   theoretical	  concept	  of	  the	  transcendental	  social	  allows	  me	  to	  suspend	  the	  binary	  categories	  religious/secular	  and	  modern/traditional,	  but	   that	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	   there	  are	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no	  real	  differences	  and	  changes	  when	  people	  are	  confronted	  with	  secular	  state	  institutions,	   or	   with	   circulating	   idea[l]s	   of	   modernity.	   As	   Asad	   repeatedly	  reminds	  us,	  secular	  and	  religious	  ideologies	  or	  institutions	  articulate	   ‘different	  kinds	  of	   subjectivity,	   [mobilize]	   different	   kinds	  of	   social	   activity,	   and	   [invoke]	  different	  modalities	  of	  time’	  (Asad	  2003:	  62).	  I	  have	  revealed	  both	  the	  changes	  and	  the	  continuities	  –	  these	  take	  place	  in	  the	  transcendental	  social	  -­‐	  but	  without	  claiming	  that	  the	  one	  or	  the	  other	  is	  ‘actually’	  secular	  or	  religious,	  because	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  at	  all	  helpful	  to	  make	  such	  an	  external	  distinction.	  	  The	  complexities	  are	  clear	  in	  the	  vignette	  recounted	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  thesis.	  To	  reiterate:	  Samsuddin’s	  response	  to	  injustice	  is	  that	  people	  should	  follow	  dharma	  more	  strictly	  in	  order	  to	  follow	  the	  law	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  and	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  modern	  law	  is	   incorporated	  in	  dharma	  as	  an	  ethics	  of	  justice.	  Samsuddin	  may	  be	  called	  deeply	  religious	  for,	  in	  his	  view,	  one	   is	   not	   human	   without	   a	   dharma.	   Yet	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   Samsuddin’s	  invocation	  of	   the	   law	   could	  be	   interpreted	   as	   the	   sign	  of	   a	   secular	   sensibility,	  especially	  where	   it	   concerns	   his	   endorsement	   of	   state	   violence	   to	   cleanse	   the	  public	  sphere	  of	  bad	  elements	  (see	  Asad	  2003:	  59	  –	  60).	  He	  embraces	  the	  idea	  of	   the	   state	   as	   transcending	   and	   mediating	   the	   different	   identities	   that	   are	  united	   in	   an	   imagined,	   national	   community,	   ruled	   by	   constitutional	   law.	   Asad	  argued,	   ‘this	   transcendent	   mediation	   is	   secularism	   (2003:	   5,	   emphasis	   in	  original).	  Yet	  again,	   for	  Samsuddin	  it	   is	  clearly	   impossible	  to	  be	  secular	   in	  this	  manner	  without	  it	  being	  rooted	  in	  dharma.	  That	  is,	  state	  mediation	  has	  in	  turn	  to	  be	  transcended	  by	  another:	  a	  divine	  authority.	  	  There	   are	   undoubtedly	   different	   kinds	   of	   subjectivity,	   social	   activity	   and	  modalities	   of	   time	   at	   play	   here	   than	   we	   may	   have	   found	   in	   the	   pre-­‐modern	  Bengali	   landscape;	   ‘words	  and	  practices	  were	   rearranged,	   and	  new	  discursive	  grammars	   replaced	   previous	   ones’	   (Asad	   2003:	   25).	   I	   think	   it	   is	   important,	  firstly,	   to	  recognize	  that	   these	  are	   fluid	  reconfigurations	  within	   larger	   ideas	  of	  justice	  (a	  larger	  transcendental	  social).	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  why	  some	   practices	   and	   discourses	   do,	   and	   some	   do	   not	   change.	   We	   could	   label	  Samsuddin’s	   position	   as	  modern	   and	   secular	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   orthodox	  Islamic	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Is	  this	  contradictory?	  Maybe	  less	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  
dharma	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  always	  contains	  this-­‐worldly	  concerns.	  For	  this	  reason,	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I	  do	  not	  think	  it	  is	  analytically	  or	  theoretically	  helpful	  here	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  sacred	  and	  the	  secular.	  	  I	  propose	  that	  in	  the	  study	  of	  ethics,	  anthropologists	  should	  go	  beyond	  Asad	  and	   suspend	   the	   categories	   ‘religious’	   and	   ‘secular’	   altogether	   if	  we	  value	  our	  interlocutors’	   categories	   as	   equivalent	   to	   our	   own	   categories	   rather	   than	  subordinated	  and	   in	  need	  of	  analysis	   through	   our	  categories.	   I	  have	  gone	   to	  a	  great	   length	   to	   relate	   the	   local	  meaning	  of	  dharma,	   jāti,	   jñān	   and	   imān.	   These	  fundamental	  ideas	  related	  to	  this	  thesis	  help	  to	  explain	  in	  depth	  the	  ethics	  of	  my	  interlocutors	   rather	   than	   categorising	   them	   according	   to	   religious/secular,	  belief/reason	   binaries.	   Only	   then	   have	   I	   made	   the	   analytical	   comparison	  between	   jñān	   and	   phronesis	   to	   open	   up	   the	   possibility	   for	   cross-­‐cultural	  comparison.	  	  So,	   secondly,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   anthropology	   of	   ethics	   should	   have	   the	  ambition	   for	  a	  higher	   level	  of	   theoretical	   synthesis	   in	  order	   to	  allow	   for	  more	  cross-­‐cultural	   comparison.	   What	   are	   the	   categories	   and	   forms	   of	   relatedness	  relevant	   in	  the	  transcendental	  social?	  What	  are	  the	  ethical	   ideas	  and	  practices	  employed	   to	   realize	   the	   transcendental	   social?	   What	   are	   the	   aspects	   of	   the	  transactional	   social	   that	   inform	  particular	  ethical	  practices?	  How	  does	  change	  in	   the	   transactional	  social	   inform	  shifting	  ethical	  practice	  and	  discourse?	  How	  do	   people	   negotiate	   a	   challenge	   to	   their	   transcendental	   social,	   or	   conflicting	  transcendental	   socials?	   In	   attempting	   to	   answer	   these	   and	   other	   related	  questions	  for	  people	  across	  the	  world,	  the	  anthropology	  of	  ethics	  could	  offer	  a	  transparent	  and	  comprehensive	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  ethical	  life.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  study	  of	  ethics	  anthropologists	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘difficulty	  of	  reality’	  and	  the	  ethical	  tragedy	  this	  involves.	  Das	  (2014)	  used	  the	  idiom	  ‘difficulty	  of	  reality’	  to	  critique	  Laidlaw	  (2014a)	  for	  not	  paying	  sufficient	  attention	  to	  the	  experiential	  dimension	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	   incoherence	  of	  ethical	  systems.	  A	   ‘conflict	  of	  values’	   (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  169)	  seems	   to	   presuppose	   a	   choice	   that	   can	   ‘resolve’	   the	   conflict.	   However,	   choice	  cannot	   always	   solve	   a	   conflict	   of	   values,	   because	   values	   are	   often	  incommensurable	   and	   often	   neither	   option	   may	   be	   considered	   actually	  virtuous.	  I	  have	  paid	  attention	  to	  this	  aspect	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  as	  the	  concept	  of	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phronesis	  allows	  for	  incommensurability:	  a	  virtuous	  judgement	  (understood	  as	  
phronesis)	  is	  aimed	  at	  a	  non-­‐instrumental	  balance	  rather	  than	  a	  black-­‐or-­‐white	  choice.	   I	   consider	   the	   conceptual	   idea	   of	   the	   ‘difficulty	   of	   reality’	   to	   operate	  analytically	  in	  parallel	  with	  phronesis;	  it	  adds	  the	  dimension	  of	  violence,	  and	  the	  melancholy,	  scepticism	  and	  sense	  of	  defeat	  that	  accompany	  the	  ‘impossibility’	  of	  a	  truly	  consistent	  and	  coherent	  moral	  life.	  	  The	   latter	   observation	   points	   to	   an	   element	   that	   I	   foremost	   hope	   to	   have	  made	  clear	  in	  this	  thesis:	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reality	  is	  not	  just	  the	  impossibility	  of	  living	  according	  to	  religious	  ideals	  (Laidlaw	  2014a:	  126).	  Everyday	  reality	  is	  highly	   political,	   I	   would	   think	   anywhere,	   however	   certainly	   for	   Muslims	   in	   a	  Bengali	  village.	  Das	  does	  not	  make	  her	  critique	  of	  Laidlaw	  explicit	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  problematic	   depoliticised	   view	   of	   ethics,	   but	   her	   ethnography	   (2010,	   2012)	  speaks	   for	   itself.	   She	   critiques	   the	   Foucauldian	   poststructuralist	   framework	  because	   ‘the	   perplexities	   raised	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   ordinary	   men	   and	  women…	  challenge	  us	  to	  think	  differently’	  (Das	  2014:	  494;	  cf.	  Mattingly	  2012:	  174-­‐175).	  Thinking	  differently,	  I	  feel,	  is	  thinking	  how	  the	  political	  predicament	  forms	   the	   foil	   of	   ethical	   tragedies	   and	   how	   the	   violences	   of	   everyday	   life	   are	  folded	  into	  everyday	  ethical	  conflict.	  	  	  I	  have	  asked,	  why	   is	   there	  no	  revolt?	  There	   is	  no	  revolt	   for	   radical	   change	  because	  everyone	  is	  always	  implicated	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  violence;	  such	  is	  its	   perpetual	   potency.	   The	   ‘difficulty	   of	   reality’	   is	   that	   ‘the	   social	   violences	   of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   living	  are	   central	   to	   the	  moral	  order’	   (Das	  and	  Kleinman	  2000:	  5).	  The	   violences	   are	   not	   external	   forces	   penetrating	   the	   pristine	   culture	   of	  Joygram;	   there	   is	   a	   circulation	   of	   ideas	   and	   practices	   and	   violences	   and	   I	   do	  hope	   to	   have	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   everyone	   is	   always	   implicated	   –	   the	  inescapability	  (the	  banality	  of	  evil)	  is	  a	  form	  of	  violence	  in	  itself.	  To	  be	  in	  peace,	  is	  to	  live	  the	  ‘art	  of	  life’.	  This	  is	  not	  quite	  possible	  in	  an	  environment	  deemed	  so	  thoroughly	  immoral,	  and	  when	  one’s	  ethical	  autonomy	  is	  curtailed.	  	  The	  impossibility	  to	  revolt	  creates	  an	  ethical	  tragedy,	  because	  one	  becomes	  implicated	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  an	  unethical	  system.	  It	  can	  create	  a	  scepticism	  so	   embedded	   in	   everyday	   life	   ‘that	   guarantees	   of	   belonging	   to	   larger	   entities	  like	   communities	   or	   state	   are	   not	   capable	   of	   erasing	   the	   hurts	   or	   providing	  means	  of	  repairing	  this	  sense	  of	  being	  betrayed	  by	  the	  everyday’	  (Das	  2007:	  9).	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Everyone	  is	  confronted	  with	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reality,	  and	  to	  ‘live	  in	  peace’	  is	  probably	   closest	   to	   ‘living	   sanely’,	   which	   does	   not	   have	   to	   mean	   living	  comfortably,	   but	   ‘being	   able	   to	   overcome	   the	   trance-­‐like	   character	   that	  everyday	   life	   sometimes	   takes’	   (Das	  2014:	  493).	  The	   ‘trance-­‐like’	   character	  of	  life	   is	   expressed	   in	   a	   deep	  melancholy	   and	   paralysing	   scepticism.	   In	   Joygram,	  the	  tone	  of	  an	  ordinary	  conversation	  is	  sarcastic,	  as	   if	  nothing	   is	   like	   it	  should	  be,	  and	  scepticism	  is	  expressed	  outright	  in	  the	  desire	  to	  die.	  The	  melancholy	  of	  someone	   like	   Nasiruddin,	   when	   he	   admits	   he	   does	   the	   opposite	   of	   dharma,	  because	   he	   can’t	   do	   otherwise,	   is	   palpable.	   He	  was	   quite	   literally	   paralysed	   -­‐	  spending	   days	   just	   sitting	   on	   the	   floor	   -­‐	   when	   the	   truck	   he	   manages	   was	  involved	   in	   an	   accident	   because	   the	   driver	  was	   drunk,	   but	   the	   insurance	   that	  had	  cost	  him	  a	  small	  fortune	  did	  not	  cover	  this	  particular	  kind	  of	  accident;	  his	  wife	  just	  gave	  birth	  to	  a	  third	  daughter;	  his	  father	  was	  dying	  of	  diabetes;	  and	  he	  himself	   started	   suffering	   of	   the	   same	   disease.	   However,	   he	   overcame	   the	  scepticism	  that	  had	  taken	  hold	  of	  him	  in	  a	  manner	  not	  uncommon	  to	  the	  men	  in	  Joygram.	  He	  joined	  the	  Tablighi	  Jamaat,	  and	  tried	  to	  simply	  focus	  on	  living	  ‘the	  art	  of	   life’,	  not	   to	   live	   comfortably	  but	   sanely.	  Reformist	   Islam	  offers	  a	  way	   to	  ‘reconstruct	  the	  human’	  and	  ‘redeem	  humanity’	  through	  the	  re-­‐instantiation	  of	  fundamental	   ethical	   principles.	   The	   law	   and	   politics	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   suffice	  because	  of	   the	  violence	  and	   instrumentality	   inherent	   to	   it,	   and	  because	  of	   the	  constant	   disappointment	   that	   whatever	   is	   promised	   is	   not	   happening	   –	   and	  keeping	  a	  promise	  is	  a	  most	  fundamental	  ethical	  principle	  (Lambek	  2010).	  	  I	  suggest,	  then,	  that	  in	  a	  study	  of	  ethics	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  anthropologists	  look	  at	   all	   the	   aspects	   that	   allow	   for	   particular	   kinds	   of	   ethical	   action	   (what	   I,	  following	   Keane	   [2014,	   2015]	   have	   called	   ethical	   affordances),	   and	   all	   the	  aspects	   that	  obstruct	  other	  kinds	  of	  ethical	  action.	  We	  have	  to	  allow	  space	   for	  scepticism	  and	  tragedy	  lest	  we	  romanticise	  the	  ethical	  lifeworlds	  of	  others	  and	  ourselves.	  	  Attention	  to	  the	  ethical	  tragedy	  implies	  that	  we	  have	  to	  allow	  for	  failure,	  for	  double	   binds,	   for	   ‘catch-­‐22’	   situations.	   Ironically,	   Islamic	   reformism	   further	  enhances	   the	  contradictions	   in	  ethical	   life,	  because	   it	   is	  not	  only	  an	  answer	   to	  but	  also	  a	  product	  of	  modernity	  and	  the	  strategies	  of	  secularism.	  The	  particular	  expression	  of	  Islamic	  reformism	  in	  India	  is	  at	  least	  in	  part	  a	  result	  of	  the	  limited	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space	   for	   navigation	   due	   to	   the	   reification	   of	   Muslim	   identity	   in	   a	   racialised	  community	  identity,	  and	  the	  reification	  of	  dharma	   into	  the	  narrow	  category	  of	  religion.	  The	  project	  of	  social	  renewal	  that	  my	  interlocutors	  desire	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  holistic	  cosmopolitics	  of	  kinship	  and	  sociality,	  and	  would	  ideally	  include	  all	   spheres	   of	   life,	   as	  well	   as	   including	  non-­‐Muslims	   (all-­‐encompassing	   justice	  and	   order).	   The	   purified	   Islamic	   reformist	   form	   and	   meaning	   of	   dharma	   is	  counterproductive	   to	   this	   ideal.	   As	   the	   villagers	   that	   have	   joined	   the	   Tablighi	  Jamaat	  (albeit	  erratically)	  advocate	  the	  purification	  of	  Islam	  from	  its	  supposedly	  non-­‐Islamic	  elements,	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  promote	  a	   ‘systematic’	  (Osella	  &	  Osella	  2009:	  S216)	  and	  coherent	  ethical	  life-­‐style,	  they	  further	  inhibit	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  holistic	  social	  renewal.	  	  Implicitly	   and	   unintentionally,	   Islamic	   reformist	   organisations	   like	   the	  Tablighi	   Jamaat	   may	   reproduce	   the	   religion/secular	   politics	   binary.	   It	   is	  therefore	   equally	   counterproductive	   for	   the	   aspiration	   to	   be	   included	   as	   a	  modern	  citizen,	  due	  to	  the	  exclusionary	  mechanism	  of	  the	  Indian	  secular	  state.	  The	   Islamic	   aesthetic	   is	   meant	   to	   be	   a	   public	   performance	   of	   piety,	   of	   ‘good	  personhood’,	   including	   ‘good	   secular	   citizenship’.	   Yet	   it	   deviates	   from	   the	  hegemonic	   ideas	  of	   secular	  aesthetics	  and	  moral	  practice.	  Muslims	  are	  denied	  their	   own,	   inclusive	   conception	   of	   culture.	   The	   ethical	   renewal	   of	   Islamic	  reformism	  may	  therefore	  not	  have	  the	  desired	  consequences.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  allow	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  tragedy	  to	  play	  out	  in	  our	  reflections	  of	  ethical	  lifeworlds.	  	  
Suggestions	  for	  research	  on	  secularism	  	  ‘Secularism’	  and	  its	  derivatives	  are	  ‘essentially	  contested	  concepts’	  (Starrett	  2010)	  so	  utilising	  secularism	  as	  an	  analytical	  category	  is	  problematic.	  However,	  secularism	   can	   be	   studied	   as	   an	   object	   of	   analysis.	   This	   section	   will	   address	  suggestions	  for	  the	  research	  of	  secularism	  that	  explores	  how	  the	  ‘powers	  of	  the	  secular	   modern’	   (Scott	   &	   Hirschkind	   2006),	   and	   in	   particular	   of	   modern	  categorisation,	  affect	  peoples’	  ordinary	  lives	  and	  their	  claims	  to	  citizenship.	  To	  gain	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  how	  secular	  forces	  create	  various	  kinds	  of	   ethical	   affordances	   is	  particularly	  pertinent	   in	  postcolonial	   and	  postsecular	  contexts	  where	  the	  public	  presence	  of	  religious	  groups	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  secular	  state	  is	  often	  ambiguous.	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This	   thesis	   illustrates	   that	   a	   ‘secular	   state	   is	   not	   one	   characterised	   by	  religious	  indifference,	  or	  rational	  ethics	  –	  or	  political	  toleration.	  It	  is	  a	  complex	  arrangement	   of	   legal	   reasoning,	  moral	   practice,	   and	   political	   authority’	   (Asad	  2003:	   255).	   Hegemonic	   legal	   and	   moral	   discourses	   (particularly	   regarding	  rights	  and	  liberties)	  developed	  contingent	  upon	  the	  development	  of	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  human	  self	  (ibid.:	  127	  –	  158).	  Throughout	  this	  history	  we	  can	  see	   the	  duality	   ‘nature’	  and	   ‘culture’	  –	  a	  duality	   that	  accompanies	   the	  story	  of	  nationalism:	  Mankind	  is	  sprung	  from	  nature,	  creates	  a	  cultural	  community	  that	  is	   the	   nation,	   and	   allows	   this	   cultural	   community	   to	   regulate	   his	   natural	  freedom	  (ibid.:	  193).	  Modern	  liberal	  political	  theory	  presupposes	  an	  essence	  to	  the	  human	  being,	   from	  which	  one	  draws	   their	   sovereignty:	   inalienable	   rights.	  Asad	   argues	   that	   the	   legal	   concept	   of	   the	   person	   with	   natural	   rights	   was	  constructed	   not	   only	   as	   a	   limit	   to	   an	   arbitrary	   government	   but	   ‘may	   also	   be	  closely	   linked	   to	   the	   desire	   to	   stabilize	   the	   contingent	   character	   of	   the	   self’	  (ibid.:	   135).	   The	   anxiety	   about	   the	   ‘porous	   self’	   (Taylor	   2007:	   33)	   came	   forth	  from	   the	   increasing	   transferability	   of	   property	   rights	   and	   the	   ensuing	  precariousness	  and	  volatility	  of	  property	  itself.	  Subsequently,	  the	  human	  being	  was	  conceptualised	  as	  a	   ‘buffered	  self’	   (ibid.);	  a	   ‘sovereign,	  self-­‐owning	  agent	  –	  
essentially	  suspicious	  of	  others	  –	  and	  not	  merely	  a	  subject	  conscious	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  identity’	  (Asad	  2003:	  135,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  We	  need	  to	  carefully	  scrutinise	  ideas	  of	  liberty	  instead	  of	  assuming	  secular	  freedom	   to	   be	   ‘more	   free’	   than	   non-­‐secular	   forms	   of	   freedom.	   That	   is,	   the	  freedom	  that	  Muslim	  Joygramis	  ‘have’	  or	  experience	  (the	  freedom	  generated	  by	  submission	   to	   Allah)	   is	   not	   necessarily	  more	   limited	   or	   constrained	   than	   the	  freedom	  of	  modern,	  ‘liberal’	  secularism,	  unbound	  by	  religious	  tradition.	  As	  Asad	  observes,	   ‘“The	  room	  for	  choice”	  is	  not	  a	  homogeneous	  space	  of	  which	  secular	  liberal	   society	  happens	   to	  have	   the	  most’,	   rather,	   ‘what	  one	  gets	   is	   a	  different	  pattern	   of	   constraint	   and	   possibility’	   (2003:	   226).	   Further	   research	   should	  provide	   insight	   into	  how	  particular	   conceptualisations	  of	  personhood,	  kinship	  and	  freedom	  -­‐	  beyond	  the	  normative	  secular/religious	  binary	  -­‐	  inform	  ideas	  of	  liberty	  and	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  and	  other	  citizens.	  What	  matters	  most	  in	   this	   context	   is	   that	   anyone	   (or	   any	   community)	   who	   holds	   a	   different	  cosmopolitical	   vision	   of	   humanity	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   conflicting	   visions	   of	   their	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rights,	   which	   may	   result	   in	   the	   structural	   violence	   of	   being	   denied	   rights	   or	  failing	  to	  acquire	  substantive	  citizenship.	  	  I	   oppose	   the	   idea	   that	   those	   individuals	   or	   communities	   with	   different	  cosmopolitical	   visions	   are	   unable	   to	   grasp	   the	   discourse	   on	   modern	   rights;	  rather,	   I	   stress	   the	   need	   for	   research	   into	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   individuals	   and	  communities	   are	   denied	   human	   dignity	   by	   being	   denied	   the	   validity	   of	   their	  conceptualisations	   just	   because	   another	   conceptualisation	   has	   become	  hegemonic.	  First	  of	  all,	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  there	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  problem	  of	  misrecognition	  or	  incommensurability;	  the	  problem	  is	  one	  of	  being	  denied	  legitimacy.	  The	  idea	  of	  misrecognition	  follows	  from	  epistemological	  (or	  perhaps	  even	  ontological)	  boundaries	  between	  ‘Indian	  society’	  and	  ‘modernity’,	  which	   I	   have	   equally	   argued	   against	   in	   this	   thesis.	   This	   boundary	   often	   falls	  seamlessly	  together	  with	  the	  religious/secular	  boundary.	  	  For	   instance,	   the	   Subaltern	   Studies	   project	   has	   unfortunately	   made	   itself	  guilty	   in	   the	   reproduction	   of	   the	   religious/secular	   bifurcation.	   Their	   laudable	  intention	   to	   not	   interpret	   subalterns’	   actions	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   alien	   (read	  Western)	   conceptual	   tools,	   has	   the	   unfortunate	   corollary	   of	   delineating	  subalterns	  into	  an	  enchanted	  sphere	  exterior	  to	  the	  rationalized,	  secular	  realm	  of	   modernity.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Subaltern	   Studies	   project	   demonstrates	   ‘the	  scholarly	  fetishizing	  of	  religiosity	  and	  its	  treatment	  as	  a	  foundational	  worldview	  that	  anchors	  a	  supposedly	  autonomous	  domain	  of	  subaltern	  life’	  (Subramanian	  2009:	  24-­‐5;	  see	  also	  Hansen	  1996).	  	  We	   should	   also	   not	   assume	   that	  modernity,	   or	   the	   liberal	   ideology	   of	   the	  state,	   takes	   on	   the	   same	   forms	   everywhere	   (see	   e.g.	   Bhargava	   2010;	  Khilnani	  1999).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  ethnography	  of	  colonial	  cases	  in	  British	  India,	  Das	  (2006)	  shows	  that	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  conceptualisations	  of	  personhood	  and	  rights	  is	  wider	   and	   more	   complex	   than	   a	   religious/secular	   bifurcation.	   The	   body	  produced	  before	   the	   law	   ‘is	  already	  constituted	  as	  a	   socio-­‐legal	   subject	   rather	  than	  a	  natural	  body’	   (Das	  2006:	  95),	  with	  particular	   implications	   for	   the	   legal	  approach	  to	  gender	  and	  kinship.	  	  The	  manipulation	  of	  particular	   ideological	  premises	  may	   in	   some	  cases	  be	  closer	   to	   vernacular	   conceptualisations	   of	   personhood	   and	   rights,	   or	   may	   be	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another	   technique	  of	   control	   and	   suppression.	   In	  modern	   law,	   and	   in	  modern	  interpretations	  of	  Muslim	  Personal	  Law,	   the	  monogamous,	  nuclear	   family	   is	   a	  core	  legal	  unit	  (Asad	  2003:	  231ff),	  which	  is,	  as	  Cannell	  (2013)	  shows,	  grounded	  in	  Protestant	  notions	  of	  kinship.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Muslim	  self	  in	  Joygram	  is	  generated	  from	  the	  relatedness	  within	  a	  jāti,	  and	  that	  the	  nuclear	  family	  is	  ideologically	  subordinated	  to	  the	  jāti.	  The	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  and	  of	  units	  and	  processes	  of	  reproduction	  among	  Muslims	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  a	  secular	   liberal	   conception	   nor	   is	   it	   consistent	   with	   the	   socio-­‐legal	   subject	  created	  by	  the	  Indian	  state.	  What	  Das	  (2006)	  shows,	  moreover,	  is	  that	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  liberal	  rights	  discourse	   is	   itself	   highly	   ambiguous:	   the	   court	   cases	   show	   ample	   space	   for	  subjective	   interpretations	   rather	   than	   seamless	   rational	   bureaucratic	  procedure.	   The	   main	   challenge	   that	   Indian	   Muslims	   face,	   then,	   may	   be	   not	  another	  kind	  of	  coherent	  collective	   imagination,	  but	   the	  ambiguity	   inherent	   in	  the	   production	   of	  modernity.	   The	   liberal	   state	  may	   operate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  particular	  mythical	  reality	  (Asad	  2003:	  127ff)	  but	  it	  does	  not	  act	  with	  coherence	  accordingly:	  as	  I	  have	  shown	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  postcolonial	  Indian	  myth	  is	  rife	  with	  ambiguities.	  This	  political	  ambiguity	   feeds	  and	   intensifies	   the	  ethical	  ambiguity	   of	   everyday	   life.	   ‘The	   difficulty	   of	   reality’	   (Das	   2014)	   for	   my	  interlocutors	   is	   not	   the	   conflict	   between	   two	   coherent	   and	   incommensurable	  ideologies	   but	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   coherent	   and	   legitimate	   narrative	   of	   social	  reproduction.	  	  	  	  Due	  to	  the	   limited	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	   I	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  draw	  out	   in	  detail	   the	   contrasting	   understandings	   of	   citizenship	   and	   claim-­‐making	   this	  entails.	   However,	   I	   suggest	   that	   further	   enquiry	   is	   necessary	   into	   how	   these	  alternative	   understandings	   and	   segmentary	   orderings	   of	   kinship	   and	  relatedness	   inform	   notions	   of	   citizenship,	   and	   how,	   in	   turn,	   the	   particular	  cultural	   construction	   of	   kinship	   in	   the	   legal	   system	   excludes	   or	   denaturalises	  the	  claims	  to	  citizenship	  of	  alternative	  forms	  of	  social	  subjects.	  	  McKinnon	   and	   Cannell	   (2013)	   have	   reminded	   us	   that	   kinship	   crosscuts	  domains	   like	   the	   traditional	   (where	   it	   is	   usually	   considered	   ubiquitous	   and	  pivotal)	  and	  modernity	  (where	  it	  has	  supposedly	  been	  ‘privatised’	  and	  become	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irrelevant	  to	  other	  domains).	  Kinship,	  and	  the	  ordering	  of	  social	  relations	  that	  flow	   from	   a	   particular	   ideology	   of	   kinship,	   are	   crucial	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  narratives	   of	  modernity,	   of	   nation-­‐state,	   citizenship	   and	   secularism	   are	  made	  legible	  and	  relevant	  in	  any	  society,	  whether	  modern	  or	  traditional	  (Bear	  2007;	  2013).	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   I	   have	   used	   Carsten’s	   (2000)	   idiom	   ‘relatedness’	   to	  allow	   for	   the	   processual,	   domain-­‐defiant	   character	   of	   locally	   meaningful	  categories	  of	  belonging.	  	  Michelutti	  and	  Forbess	  (2013)	  similarly	  argue	  that	  kinship	  should	  be	  central	  in	   analyses	   of	   processes	   of	   vernacularisation	   (of	   democracy,	   for	   instance,	   see	  Michelutti	   2008).	   They	   propose	   ‘divine	   kinship’	   as	   an	   analytical	   tool	   through	  which	   to	   explore	   the	   interconnections	   between	   democracy,	   kinship	   and	  religion,	   and	   to	   explore	   ‘how	  non-­‐public	  domains	   of	   social	   life	   shape	   political	  life’	  (2013:	  5),	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  my	  study	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  personhood,	   kinship	   and	   sociality	   are	   constructed	   is	   indeed	   central	   to	   the	  possible	   vernacular	   engagements	   with	   the	   supposedly	   modern,	   secular	   state.	  Furthermore,	  I	  suggest	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  considerations	  are	  key	  to	  the	  study	  of	  vernacular	   conceptualisations	   of	   rights,	   liberty	   and	   states’	   management	   of	  demands	   for	   recognition	   and	   claims	   to	   rights	   articulated	   in	   non-­‐hegemonic	  forms.	  One	  example	  of	  research	   in	   this	  direction	   is	  Subramanian’s	  study	  of	  claim-­‐making	  genealogies	  of	   fishers	   in	  Southwest	   India.	   In	  a	   study	  of	   the	  grassroots	  rather	  than	  the	  state’s	  perspective,	  Subramanian	  explicitly	  positions	  herself	  as	  against	   studies	   that	   are	   ‘definitively	   separating	   modern	   and	   nonmodern	  political	  epistemologies’	  and	  instead	  aims	  at	  ‘narrating	  the	  circulation	  of	  ideas,	  practices,	  and	  strategies	  within	  shared	  arenas	  of	  power’	  (2009:	  23).	  She	  argues	  that	  ‘[p]ostcolonial	  citizenship	  would	  be	  not	  a	  derivate	  juridical	  construct	  that	  is	  a	   less	   authentic	   expression	   of	   cultural	   subjectivity	   but	   a	   dynamic,	   locally	  constituted	  process	  through	  which	  people	  envision	  their	  relationship	  to	  nature,	  community,	  nation,	  and	  state’	  (2009:	  31).	  Subramanian’s	  project	  is	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  and	  I	  hope	  that	  more	  studies	  of	  secularism	  look	  into	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   secular	   constructions	   of	   rights	   either	   vernacularise	   in	   relation	   to	   local	  cosmopolitics,	   and/or	   continue	   to	   exclude	   people	   with	   divergent	  conceptualisations	  of	  humanity	  and	  rights.	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The	  need	  for	  such	  studies	  is	  particularly	  pressing	  in	  a	  postcolonial	  context,	  but	   also	   in	  Western	   contexts	   where	   immigrant	   groups	   enter	   into	   contractual	  relationships	   with	   the	   state.	   The	   interaction	   between	   the	   state	   ideology	   and	  immigrant	  groups	  is	  too	  often	  portrayed	  as	  standing	  in	  a	  mutually	  opposing	  yet	  infiltrating	   relationship	   to	   each	   other.	   This	   is	   prominent	   in	   the	   study	   of	   the	  Tablighi	  Jamaat,	  for	  instance	  Pieri’s	  study	  (2015),	  which	  aims	  to	  reconsider	  ‘the	  impact	  liberalism	  has	  on	  how	  illiberal	  groups	  [TJ]	  practice	  their	  beliefs’	  (2015:	  22).	  A	  more	   sensitive	   approach	  would	  go	  beyond	   such	  a	  binary	  opposition	   to	  draw	  out	   the	  processes	   of	   legitimation,	   exclusion	   and	   approximation	   (see	   e.g.	  Bowen	  2013;	  Meer	  &	  Modood	  2015;	  Modood	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  I	   propose	   that	   the	   framework	   that	   I	   have	   employed	   in	   this	   thesis,	   of	   the	  transcendental	  and	  transactional	  social,	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  frame	  the	  exploration	  of	   these	  kinds	  of	   conflict,	   especially	  when	  concerning	  different	   conceptions	  of	  physiological	   and	   social	   reproduction.	   According	   to	   Bloch,	   the	   transcendental	  social	   is	  surprisingly	  static	  and	  unconscious,	  and	  only	  becomes	  reflected	  upon	  when	  challenged.	  It	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  static,	  as,	  in	  Bloch’s	  view,	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  purely	  reproductive	  of	  power	  and	  social	  hierarchies.	  When	  it	   is	  challenged,	  people	   fear	   chaos,	  which	   is	   particularly	   the	   fear	   of	   non-­‐replacement	   (the	   fear	  that	   one’s	   children	   will	   not	   follow	   in	   one’s	   role).127	  I	   want	   to	   add	   that	   it	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  static	  because	   it	  contains	   the	  potential	   for	  ethics,	  and	  thus	   for	  justice	   and	   order.	   When	   the	   transcendental	   social	   is	   challenged,	   there	   is	   a	  moment	  of	  extra-­‐ordinary	  ethics,	  when	  it	  is	  uncertain	  which	  values	  are	  shared	  and	  who	  can	  be	   trusted.	  This	  equally	   incites	  a	   fear	  of	   chaos	  and	   the	  potential	  degeneration	  of	  humanity.	  	  Regarding	  this	  research,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  this	  fear	  of	  chaos	  that	  incites	  the	  emphasis	   on	   dharma.	   That	   is,	   the	   Bengali	   Muslims’	   predicament	   is	   that	   their	  transcendental	   social	   is	   challenged:	   they	   face	   competing	   imaginations	   of	   the	  nature	  of	  humanity,	  and	  of	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  collective.	  The	  macro-­‐cosmic	  holistic	  ideal	  of	  dharma	  is	  alive	  in	  the	  bodies	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  villagers	  and	  has	  incorporated	  modern	  ideologies.	  However,	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  and	   its	   institutions	  are	  perceived	   to	  act	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   instrumentality	   rather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Personal	  communication,	  23.03.2015.	  	  
299	  	  
than	   ethics,	   thus	   its	   promise	   of	   transcendence	   is	   limited.	   Many	   Muslims	  therefore	  turn	  to	  a	  stronger,	  more	  coherent	  narrative:	  Islamic	  reformism.	  This,	  however,	  equally	  inspires	  a	  moment	  of	  extraordinary	  ethics.	  The	  fear	  of	  chaos,	  then,	  is	  all-­‐pervasive.	  	  
Implications	  for	  ethical	  life	  in	  secular	  modernity	  I	   have	   in	   this	   discussion	   so	   far	   painted	   a	   rather	   bleak	   picture	   of	   the	  contemporary	  conditions.	  Yet,	  my	   interlocutors	  continue	   to	  have	  hope,	  and	  so	  should	   I.	   Therefore,	   I	   want	   to	   conclude	   on	   a	  more	   hopeful	   note,	   and	   explore	  possibilities	  for	  shared	  ideas	  of	  the	  good	  and	  sources	  of	  solidarity	  in	  the	  ethical	  life	  of	  a	  secular	  modern	  world.	  	  This	  line	  of	  inquiry	  is	  relevant	  and	  pressing	  in	  a	  world	  deemed	  postsecular,	  postmodern,	   and	   postliberal;	   in	   a	   world	   where	   the	   secularisation	   thesis	   is	  deeply	   contested	   and	   religion	   is	   back	   in	   the	   public	   sphere,	   yet	   religion	   in	   its	  narrow	   categorisation	   does	   not	   offer	   shared	   ideas	   of	   the	   common	   good	   and	  common	   grand	  narratives.	   Almost	   all	  modern	   nation-­‐states	   have	   a	   religiously	  diverse	   population,	   but	   the	   success	   of	   secularism	   as	   a	   political	   doctrine	   to	  ‘manage’	   this	   plurality	   is	   questionable.	   One	   of	   the	  most	   pressing	   questions	   of	  our	  time	  has	  therefore	  become:	  ‘what	  holds	  us	  together’?	  (Bellah	  2008).	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  sudden	  and	  burgeoning	  anthropological	  interest	  in	  ethics,	  and	   particularly	   in	   virtue	   ethics,	   is	   part	   of	   the	   quest	   for	   diverse	   kinds	   of	  narratives	   that	   can	   form	   the	   inspiration	   for	   shared	   ideas	  of	   the	  good	  –	  and	  of	  being	   good	   without	   necessarily	   being	   religious.	   It	   fits	   within	   the	   desire,	  recognised	  by	  Comaroff	  (2008)	  and	  quoted	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  to	  find	  narratives	  and	   guidelines	   for	  modes	   of	   being	   that	   transcend	   the	   ‘bloodless’	   bureaucratic	  practices	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  instrumentalised	  market.	  It	  fits,	  as	  such,	  within	  a	  tendency	   that	   can	   loosely	   be	   called	   ‘postliberal’,	   a	   term	   mostly	   deployed	   in	  political	   theology	  but	  making	   its	  way	   into	  political	   theory,	  policy	  and	  practice.	  Stacey	   (2015)	   attempts	   to	   encapsulate	   the	   disparate	   arguments	   identified	   as	  postliberal	  as	  follows:	  as	  political	  theory	  has	  become	  dominated	  by	  liberalism,	  ideas	  of	  the	  good	  have	  been	  neglected	  and	  replaced	  by	  an	  abstract	  respect	   for	  plurality.	   Public	   political	   responsibility	   and	   social	   duty	   have	   eroded,	   as	   these	  have	  become	  private	  matters.	  	  The	  state	  and	  the	  market	  are	  supposed	  to	  fill	  the	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vacuum	  but	   they	   are	   built	   on	   a	   contractual	   logic,	   and	   perceived	   to	   stand	   in	   a	  zero-­‐sum	   relation	   to	   each	   other.	   So,	   ‘post-­‐liberals	   propose	   to	   return	   to	   the	  theoretical	  moment	  at	  which	  ideas	  of	  the	  good	  were	  undermined,	  and	  to	  slowly	  work	   from	   theory	   through	   to	   politics,	   policy	   and	   practice,	   reawakening	   our	  sense	   of	   solidarity,	   and	   reinvigorating	   collective	   action’	   (Stacey	   2015:	   19).	  Postliberals,	  then,	  both	  make	  the	  empirical	  (and	  normative)	  observation	  of	  our	  post-­‐Durkheimian	  predicament	  and	  make	  value-­‐based	  attempts	  to	  usher	  us	  into	  a	  new	  era	  of	  collective	  solidarity.	  	  The	   big	   question	   is,	   of	   course,	   what	   are	   the	   ‘ideas	   of	   the	   good’	   and	  what	  should	   be	   its	   sources.	   Prominent	   philosophers	   and	   theologians	  who	   could	   be	  considered	  postliberal	   (and	  are	  popular	   among	  anthropologists),	   for	   instance,	  Charles	   Taylor	   (2007),	   John	   Millbank	   (2008)	   and	   Alasdair	   MacIntyre	   (2007	  [1981]),	  all	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  revival	  of	  the	  Christian	  narrative	  is	  the	  solution	  for	  the	  moral	  void	  we	  experience	  in	  secular	  modernity.	  I	   do	   not	   think,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   most	   helpful	   to	   think	   within	   a	   particular	  religious	  denomination	  if	  we	  want	  the	  question	  of	  ‘what	  holds	  us	  together’	  to	  be	  genuinely	  inclusive	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  Public	  responsibility	  and	  social	  duty	  could	  well	  be	  reinvigorated	  through	  a	  Christian	  narrative,	  yet	  still	  we	  need	  to	  think	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  -­‐	  beyond	  cultural	  categories	  –	  to	  find	  categories	  that	  appeal	  to	  all	  of	  humankind.	  	  Anthropologists	   have	   long	   quarrelled	   with	   ideologically	   hegemonic	  teleological	   narratives	   like	   the	   modernisation	   and	   secularisation	   theses.	   ‘We	  have	  never	  been	  modern’,	  Latour	  (2012)	  proclaimed.	  The	  studies	  on	  kinship	   I	  discussed	   above	   form	  one	  way	   of	   dismantling	   the	   idea	   that	  we	   are	   inevitably	  disenchanted	  Cartesians.	  It	  is	  unfortunate	  that	  the	  most	  prominent	  work	  on	  our	  current	  ‘secular	  age’	  (Taylor	  2007)	  does	  not	  allow	  any	  space	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  kinship.	   Kinship,	   and	   the	   sacred	   qualities	   so	   often	   attributed	   to	   kinship,	  therefore	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  ‘buffered	  self’	  (ibid:	  33).	  Taylor	  may	  be	  right	  in	  his	  postulation	  that	   in	  Western	  secular	  society,	  belief	   in	  god	  is	   just	  one	  option	  among	  others	  (ibid.:	  2)	  and	  that	  ideologically,	  the	  modern	  self	  is	  ‘buffered’	  (ibid:	  33),	  but	  this	  is	  based	  on	  a	  particular,	  Christian	  understanding	  of	  belief	  that	  may,	  in	   fact,	  not	  even	  be	  representative	  of	   the	   ‘Christian	  West’.	   In	  everyday	  reality,	  belief	  and	  non-­‐belief	  are	  very	  fluid	  categories,	  as	  are	  the	  secular	  and	  the	  sacred,	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and	   the	   transcendental	   and	   the	   immanent.	   Notwithstanding	   hegemonic	   ideas	  about	   the	   secular	   nature	   of	   kinship,	   the	   attribution	   of	   ‘sacred’	   qualities	   to	  kinship	   is	   unwavering	   –	   for	   instance,	   all	   kinship	   relations	   among	  members	  of	  the	  Latter-­‐day	  Saints	  in	  the	  USA	  have	  a	  sacred	  quality	  (Cannell	  2013:	  232).	  Most	  significantly	  for	  my	  discussion	  here,	  Cannell	  suggest	  that	  religious	  kinship	  ideas	  	  ‘may	   also	   reveal	   something	   truthful	   about	   the	   modern	   world	   that	   is	  otherwise	   difficult	   to	   see,	   precisely	   by	   evoking	   a	   world	   in	   which	   the	  domains	  of	  human	  experience	  are	  not	   fully	  divided	   from	  and	  against	  one	  another.	   In	   this	   sense,	   modern	   disenchantment	   may	   be	   partially	  transcended	   through	   a	   language	   and	   practice	   of	   kinship	   understood	   as	  ineffable,	  a	  third	  term,	  one	  that	  escapes	  from	  the	  polarity	  of	  substance	  and	  legality	   and	   remains	   embedded,	   like	   an	   anti-­‐fetish,	   hidden	   in	   our	  metaphors	  of	  human	  transmission’	  (2013:	  238).	  	  The	   sacred	  manifests	   itself	   not	   only	   in	   kinship,	   but	   also	   in	   other	   kinds	   of	  relationships	  and	  ordinary	  everyday	  activities	  (Lynch	  2012).	  The	  sacred,	  here,	  is	  not	  best	  described	  as	   something	   ‘supernatural’	   since	   this	   idiom	  reproduces	  the	  modern	  distinction	  between	  a	  pre-­‐human	  nature,	  a	  constructed	  culture,	  and	  the	  supernatural	  as	  something	  that	  is	  not	  actually	  real.	  Rather,	  the	  sacred	  points	  to	  that	  irreducible	  dimension	  of	  social	  human	  life:	  ethics.	  	  I	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  find	  new	  sources	  or	  to	  revive	  a	  Christian	  narrative.	   I	   suggest	   that	   instead,	  we	   need	   to	   increase	   our	   awareness	   of	   those	  parts	  of	  social	  life	  that	  already	  transcend	  instrumentality,	  and	  to	  make	  explicit	  those	   tacit	   ideas	   in	  social	   life	   that	  provide	   inspiration	   for	   social	   solidarity	  and	  collective	  action.	  The	  anthropological	  study	  of	  ethics	  shows,	  indeed,	  that	  ethics	  are	  all-­‐pervasive	  in	  ordinary	  speech	  and	  action	  (Lambek	  2010a,	  2010b;	  Keane	  2015)	  and	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  particular	  domain	  of	  life.	  Moreover,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis,	  ethics	  are	  inherently	  social;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  private	  matter	  but	  comes	  forth	  from	  our	  imagination	  of	  the	  transcendental	  social.	  	  I	  think	  that	  in	  our	  quest	  for	   ‘what	  holds	  us	  together’,	   it	   is	  very	  important	  –	  not	  only	  for	  academics	  but	  for	  any	  human	  being	  on	  this	  planet	  seeking	  to	  live	  in	  social	  solidarity	  –	  to	  think	  outside	  of	  purified	  categories,	  and	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  larger	  transcendental	  social.	  It	  allows	  for	  the	  quest	  for	  an	  ethical	  life	  to	  be	  a	  quest	  of	  humanity	  rather	   than	  of	  a	  particular	  religious	  or	  cultural	  community.	  Whether	   the	   transcendental	  goal	   is	   salvation,	   rebirth,	  or	   the	  continuation	  of	  a	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lineage	   is	   analytically	   secondary	   to	   the	   universally	   shared	   fact	   of	   living	   in	   a	  transactional	  and	  transcendental	  social	  –	  that	  is,	  of	  being	  mortals	  yet	  imagining	  a	  space-­‐	  and	  time-­‐transcending	  social	  reality.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  negotiation	  between	   the	   two	   is	   ethics	   –	   so	   we	   are	   inevitably	   all	   involved	   in	   ethical	  negotiation	   even	   though	   it	   may	   seem	   that	   secular	   modernity	   has	   created	   a	  moral	   void.	   A	   post-­‐Durkheiman	   social	   form	   is	   for	   Robert	   Bellah	   (2008)	   a	  sociological	   impossibility;	  not	  unlike	  my	  interlocutors’	  contention	  that	  a	  social	  form	  without	  dharma	   is	  a	   sociological	   impossibility.	  Dharma,	   I	  have	  argued	  at	  length,	   is	   an	   ethics	   of	   order	   and	   justice	   rather	   than	   a	   delineated	   religion	   of	   a	  particular	  denomination	  (even	  though	  it	  can	  include	  that).	  All	  human	  beings,	  if	  they	  are	   to	  distinguish	   themselves	   from	  other	  animals,	  engage	   in	  ethics	   in	   the	  construction	   and	   negotiation	   of	   the	   transcendental	   social,	   whether	   we	   call	   it	  Durkheimian	  collective	  ideals	  or	  dharma.	  	  The	   ideological	   differences	   between	   transcendental	   socials	   may	   seem	  ‘uniquely	  realistic’	  (Geertz	  1973)	  and	  beyond	  negotiation	  for	  the	  adherents	  of	  a	  particular	  worldview,	  but	  if	  we	  open	  up	  our	  myopic	  perspective,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  all	  humans	  are	  engaged	  in	  comparable	  ethical	  practices:	  transcending	  biological	  mortality	   and	   constructing	   collective	   ideals	   that	   will	   allow	   for	   social	  reproduction.	  I	  think	  that	  upon	  concrete	  recognition	  that	  transcendence	  in	  this	  form	   is	   universal,	   the	   normative	   quarrel	   between	   secularism	   and	   religion,	   or	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	   religion	  becomes	  secondary	  and	  we	  can	   talk	  about	  how	  to	  construct	  collective	  forms	  of	  solidarity.	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